Anthony Elghossain: Hezbollah: Liars, guns and money

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Hezbollah: Liars, guns and money
Anthony Elghossain/Now Lebanon/March 18/16

For decades, Hezbollah has carefully crafted—and celebrated—an image of cleanliness and commitment: unlike the Lebanese state, political parties, and other one-time or would-be militias, Hezbollah has delivered goods and services to their constituents without dipping their hands into the cookie jars available to those engaged in politics or large-scale commerce in the Levant.
But the Partisans of God are lying.

Hezbollah deals with plenty of folks—drug smugglers, arms traffickers, counterfeiters, thieves and businesspeople dabbling in licit and illicit trade throughout the far-flung Lebanese diaspora—whose moral deficiencies rival those of its sworn enemies. (Never mind that Iran has given Hezbollah tens of millions—and, sometimes, hundreds of millions—of dollars a year since its inception. And never mind that Hezbollah tacitly supports the corrupt politics of patronage pursued by its friends in the Lebanese state, state-sponsored councils and large-scale commercial enterprises. If Hezbollah had clean hands—and, again, it doesn’t—that would be because it’s too busy reaching for handouts from Tehran while letting its friends pick at the dirt in Lebanon. Anyhow…) Because the profits of cooperating or the penalties of not cooperating with Hezbollah typically exceed those related to complying with or not complying with international, American, European and Lebanese laws, Hezbollah has had its pick of partners for quite some time. And because none of Hezbollah’s partners—those of principle, profit or fear—have an interest shining a light on their collusion with the party, it’s been able to do keep its dirt in the dark.

Increasingly, however, Hezbollah’s business is going public. Officials around the world—including in the United States, Latin America and Europe—have continued to cooperate on investigations that link Hezbollah to Columbian drug cartels and common criminals alike. Researchers and journalists have devoted more attention to the earthly concerns—or, as one seminal book puts it, “the global footprint”—of the Party of God. In the next few months, pursuant to the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, various executive offices, departments and agencies of the US government will report to the US Congress on the nature and extent of many of Hezbollah’s global enterprises.

In broad terms, US officials will report on Hezbollah, states and other actors. They’ll report on financial transactions, media contracts, narcotics trafficking (and related activities), and significant transnational crime (and related activities) involving Hezbollah and its agents, affiliates, accomplices, intermediaries and/or facilitators (referred to generally as “relevant others” in this article, though not under US law). They’ll also report on any state that supports Hezbollah, in which Hezbollah maintains significant parts of a global logistics network or in which Hezbollah raises, manages, transacts with or launders money. They’ll identify any foreign financial institutions—including central banks—that knowingly conduct significant transactions for, on behalf of, or in connection Hezbollah or relevant others. And US officials will also report on those that help Hezbollah—or others—evade sanctions and other applicable laws and restrictive measures: for instance, money launderers that help Hezbollah or relevant others conceal money from drug trafficking or even engage in ordinary financial transactions that would be legal if the Party of God weren’t a US-designated “foreign terrorist organization.”

The US Congress has required officials—including those in the US State Department, the US Treasury Department, the US Drug Enforcement Agency, and the like—to present as much of this information as possible in unclassified form. Hezbollah and those that enable it are already preparing to cope with the pressure of publicity.
But the US Congress has basically prodded American officials to begin stacking evidence to widen the scope of applicable law. In their reports, for instance, US officials may soon provide evidence that could lead to Hezbollah’s designation as a foreign narcotics trafficker or significant transnational criminal organization—not only a foreign terrorist organization. After (allegedly!) reaping the rewards of narcotics trafficking and criminal enterprises to reduce dependency on Iran and counteract the consequences of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization, Hezbollah and others will now realize the risks they’ve invited by broadening their business.

In today’s Lebanon, of course, American efforts like sanctions, reports or any envisioned public pressure won’t affect the Party of God politically or military—and certainly not in an immediate sense. In public, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and a cadre of officials and fellow-travelers will probably take to the airwaves to deny, deny, deny. And at some point, as they did when they assaulted Beirut in 2008 or invaded Syria in 2013, they’ll decide they must defend, defend, defend. They’ll legitimize what is illegal. Reacting to these measures, those that support Hezbollah will continue to support it and those that oppose Hezbollah will continue to oppose it. None of the Lebanese, mind you, will give two shits about long-winded testimony on Capitol Hill, a court case in the US Southern District Court of New York or Hezbollah’s “import-export businesses” in the Tri-Border area or Togo or Benin. They’ve got plenty to fight about in Lebanon and throughout the region.

But bankers and businessmen will care. In the long term, moreover, they’ll come to care more and more as their risks—and awareness of such risks—rise. In addition to penalizing parties like Hezbollah and its partners today, such sanctions will scare off individuals and companies tomorrow. As states, banks, businesses and communities around the world find it increasingly costly to do business with Hezbollah, they will shun it and its agents and affiliates. Like the Partisans of God themselves, most of these men—the very sorts of individuals, caring about their bottom lines, that Hezbollah managed to enlist in the first place—will take money over guns and God.

**Anthony Elghossain is a legal advisor and writer based in Beirut and London. He tweets @aelghossain