Russia’s Withdrawal Is Another Facade
Anna Borshchevskaya/The Washington Institute/March 16/16
In addition to Moscow’s purposeful ambiguity about the true scope of its withdrawal from Syria, the announcement’s timing reflects Putin’s intention to force favorable terms in the latest peace talks.
As the Syrian peace talks resumed in Geneva this week, President Vladimir Putin announced a partial withdrawal of the “main part” of Russian armed forces as of March 15, according to the state-owned TASS news agency. Noting that the Defense Ministry had “on the whole” achieved its goals in Syria, Putin explicitly connected the withdrawal with the Geneva talks: “I hope that today’s decision will be a good signal for all conflicting sides. I hope that this significantly raises the confidence of all participants in the [peace] process.” He added that Russia’s Foreign Ministry would “intensify” its involvement in that process.
It is unclear exactly which forces will withdraw from Syria, particularly since Putin specified that Russia’s Tartus naval facility and Hmeimim Air Base will continue to operate as usual. The air base was established after Russia’s military campaign began last September, so it will certainly require Moscow to keep more forces in Syria than it had before the intervention, even if it does make good on its pledge to withdraw some units.As for the notion that Moscow has achieved its goals in Syria, Putin has previously stated that the purpose of the intervention was to defeat the Islamic State (IS). But the group is obviously not defeated, and Moscow’s varying statements about the IS threat do not offer much clarity. On March 14, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russia had destroyed over 2,000 “bandits” in Syria who had originated from Russia, including seventeen field commanders. Last year, however, the Kremlin justified the intervention in part with claims that 5,000-7,000 fighters from Russia had joined IS — and those claims themselves diverged drastically from earlier reports citing much lower figures. Besides the fuzzy numbers, Moscow’s decision to deploy troops to Syria may have increased the IS threat to Russia rather than decreased it; only time will tell, but the group has already targeted Russian civilians in apparent retaliation for the intervention (e.g., last October’s downing of a Russian passenger jet in Egypt was attributed to an IS cell).
More tellingly, the vast majority of Russia’s airstrikes in Syria have been against rebels fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, not against the Islamic State. Rescuing Assad from the rebellion and securing Russia’s interests — as Putin defines them — has been the real goal in Syria, and on that matter he can certainly claim success. The intervention has strengthened the regime’s position in the peace talks in Geneva, with Assad reportedly stating that Russian assistance helped him achieve “victories against terrorism” and stabilize the security situation. Both Assad and Putin define “terrorist” as any armed person who opposes the regime. Assad also noted that Russia will scale back its presence but keep some forces in place.
In broader terms, Putin’s seems to be laying the groundwork for casting himself as a “great world leader” — a peacemaker who successfully carried out a limited campaign with “minimum casualties,” then withdrew in order to lead international peace efforts. In doing so, he will undoubtedly seek to pressure both the United States and the Syrian opposition to stick with the Geneva process and more important, to make concessions that would benefit Putin above all else. The Russian language has a concept that best describes this situation: “pokazukha,” a facade or window dressing, something Putin knows all too well how to construct.
**Anna Borshchevskaya is the Ira Weiner Fellow at The Washington Institute.
Why Putin is ahead in Syria’s game of chess
Joyce Karam/Al Arabiya/March 16/16
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announcement of partial withdrawal from Syria on the eve of the 5th anniversary of the uprising, serves Moscow two advantages. One in dictating the terms of intervention on the Syrian regime and refusing getting stuck in a quagmire by following Assad’s military roadmap; and the second is in emerging as a key interlocutor with regional countries and the opposition in the political process. For Putin, his intervention in the conflict last September was shaped around the political process to bolster the regime’s position in the talks and slow its bleeding in the Northern of the country. Having achieved that at a heavy humanitarian cost for the Syrians, it is not in Moscow’s interest to be permanently entangled in a war that Assad and Iran would like to continue to Turkey’s and Jordan’s borders by pursuing an long outdrawn mission to regain full control of the country. Undertaking Assad’s full task would be a costly quagmire for Russia, who has already established ties with the Syrian rebels, and along with the United States, would rather invest in a political roadmap while protecting the current landscape giving advantage to the Assad regime.
Russia to Assad: We are not Iran
In announcing the “withdrawal of the main part of our military force from the Syrian Arab Republic,” Putin’s message appears to be directed at both, his ally the Assad regime, and his old rival Washington, the Syrian opposition and key regional players. Putin’s message to Assad is while Moscow has invested in strengthening the regime’s position in the North, it does not share its vision of a military solution, especially one that is driven by Iranian proxies and would take years and threaten confrontation with Turkey, Jordan and Israel. Russia is not Iran in Syria, and won’t get bogged down directly or through proxy militias to save the Assad family or routes to Hezbollah. Its strategic military interests, while they are invested in the current security structure, will be better met through engaging in a political process over Syria that gives edge to the regime’s interests.
Russia is not Iran in Syria, and won’t get bogged down directly or through proxy militias to save the Assad family or routes to Hezbollah. Putin’s hint in his remarks that “The effectiveness of our military created the conditions for the start of the peace process” asserts such direction. For Russia, its alliance with pro-Iranian militias on the ground in Syria helped in the short term to stabilize the regime after a brutal summer, block a safe zone on the Turkish border and make gains in Northern Syria. In the long term, however, Russia’s goals are bound to clash with Iran. While Tehran is expanding its role in Syrian territory through Hezbollah and Iraqi militias as well a massive trained pro-regime militia, Russia’s roadmap relies heavily on saving what is left of the security and military infrastructure of the Syrian state.
Syria is Russia’s last bastion on the Mediterranean from the Cold War, and the specter of the country breaking up or Moscow losing its intel and military benefits is a red line for Putin. From the naval base in Tartous (its last outside the Soviet Union) and the new airbase in Latakia, Russia is looking to solidify its presence in Syria rather than surrendering it to militias or having it become another Afghanistan. Moscow’s arms contracts with Syrian regime amount to $700 million a year, and its military, political, and cultural influence is deeply rooted in the Syrian society.
Putin as an interlocutor?
By having shown that his military role can change the balance in Syria, Putin has Assad more dependent on him to maintain the upper hand, while Moscow will employ this advantage in the negotiations. Putin’s partial withdrawal signals to Assad that absent of political concessions, a full withdrawal by Russia could mean the regime losing the air advantage, relying heavily on pro-Iranian militias, and possibly rolling back the gains made in the North against moderate rebels. At a time when Washington has dithered the Syrian rebel insurgency and backed down on its position asking Assad to “step aside” before any transition, Putin’s terms of settlement in Syria are largely in alignment with the Obama administration. The US has abandoned any talk about regime change in Syria and its primary objective is working towards a political solution, fighting ISIS and containing the flow of refugees. Moscow for its part is worried about more than 1,700 fighters from Russia that have joined ISIS. Putin’s diplomatic moves indicate that he’s eying the role of becoming the key interlocutor for any political settlement in Syria. In that, he is relying on his improved ties with Arab countries, having visited Egypt, hosted the Leaders of Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar in the last two months, and prior to that convened a summit with Saudi deputy crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces. For Arab states, Russia is not Iran, and that alone can help in finding common ground on a political transition in Syria that these states would like to see it undercut Iran’s influence while accommodating the moderate opposition and fighting ISIS. A senior Arab official points out that Russia did not block the Yemen resolution that gave international cover for a war that the GCC has largely framed against Iran. Moscow has also taken into account Israel’s interests in Syria, not interjecting Israeli operations, one aimed at Hezbollah leader Samir Kuntar last December. By changing the rules of the game and the political conversation, Putin is once again mastering the chess board in Syria. Russia’s ultimate success is contingent on how much pressure is Moscow willing to apply on a regime whose sole path since 2011 has been to bomb and kill its way into maintaining power.
