Eyad Abu Shakra: The Syrian Settlement – Principles of Geneva 1 or the Concessions of Geneva 2/ Abdulrahman al-Rashed: Saudi boots on the ground in Syria

The Syrian Settlement – Principles of Geneva 1 or the Concessions of Geneva 2?
Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al Awsat/February 06/16

 Opinion: The Syrian Settlement – Principles of Geneva 1 or the Concessions of Geneva 2?
I reckon that there is no political observer who expects much from the Geneva 3 talks on Syria. In fact, a senior western diplomat was frank when he candidly expressed his doubts about chances of success as the High Negotiations Committee (HNC) took its difficult decision to send its delegation for talks with the UN’s Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura, along with calls to implement international pledges regarding human issues. The HNC, which was formed by the Riyadh conference and brought together the broadest representation of Syrian opposition groups, was under immense pressure to attend Geneva 3. This pressure was international as de Mistura threatened the HNC with a fait accopmli conference, Washington threatened the opposition that it would cut off aid if its HNC did not attend and, of course Russian, as the Russian air force is now at war with the Syrian people. The astonishing thing at this point is that while Russia acts as a full political and military ‘partner’ of the Assad regime, it still insists on being an authority eligible to pick and choose delegates of Assad’s “opposition”. Actually, if we review the overall efforts made to stop the war in Syria since the summer of 2011 when Bashar Al-Assad decided to crush the popular uprising by force, we find two movements moving simultaneously in opposite directions:
1- There was a gradual decline in the cohesion of the group of countries that stood by the Syrian uprising as the US and Iran were finalising the JCPOA (i.e. the Iran nuclear deal). 2- As it became clear to Al-Assad’s regime that it would not survive if left to its own devices, all the hidden links kept in reserve for a rainy day, its implicit alliances and subsequently its strategic role in the Middle East were all uncovered. The countries that initially sided with the Syrian uprising joined together under what was called the “Friends of Syria” and met in February 2012 in the absence of Russia, China and Iran. The aid provided by the Western powers claiming the ‘friendship’ of the Syrian people, however, fell short of what the Syrian opposition was asking for, namely, safe havens, no-fly zones, and advanced and effective defensive weapons capable of neutralizing and deterring Al-Assad’s air force.
Then in June 2012 a meeting was held in Geneva, this time attended by Russia and China, and set in motion a “transitional” process leading to “A Syria without Al-Assad. However, Russia supported by China adopted the regime’s demands that the priority should be ‘fighting terrorism’, meaning the opposition. At this point there was a clear difference of interpretation of the Geneva (now known as Geneva 1) principles.
The Western “Friends of Syria” continued later on to refuse providing any qualitative military aid to the opposition, especially, ‘The Free Syrian Army’ as ISIS was gaining ground in many parts of Syria, virtually, unopposed and unhindered by the regime’s army. Indeed, the regime intentionally exploited the advances of ISIS against the ‘FSA’, making common cause with it as spelt out candidly by a Syrian intelligence Lebanese functionary. By 2013 the US – Iran rapprochement was rapidly becoming a reality, more so after the Muscat secret negotiations were divulged, and Hassan Rouhani won Iran’s presidential elections in June 2013. Almost immediately Washington described his win as a victory for “moderation” and “rationalism” that deserved a positive response. Indeed, within, few months, as soon as Al-Assad realised that White House’s threatening ‘red lines’ were non-existent it used chemical weapons in Greater Damascus while doing nothing about ISIS taking over the city of Raqqah which became Syria’s first provincial capital to fall to the extremist terrorist organization. Washington, in turn, did nothing about the chemical attack, and expressed its satisfaction that the Al-Assad had handed in his chemical ‘arsenal’.
In January 2014 Geneva 2 was held without any positive results. Moscow stood firm while Washington, not only retreated from its initial stance, but moved even closer to the Russian interpretation of what was going on in Syria. Then, in early March 2014 President Barack Obama sent a clear message ‘to whom it may concern’ through an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in which he insinuated that he regarded Iran as a trustworthy ally in the Middle East along with Israel. Subsequently, Washington rhetoric against Al-Assad was getting fainter, concentrating its argument on the fact that “he has lost his legitimacy” as Raqqah became the declared ‘capital’ of ISIS in the heart of Syria.
Both inside and outside Syria, letting down the Syrian uprising by 2015 led to the proliferation of extremist groups against a marked erosion of frustrated and desperate moderates, some of whom began bit by bit to leave the political and military scene. Yet, despite this, and the active backing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and its Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghani militias, the regime failed to gain the upper hand in the field. Given the above stalemate, against the background of massacres, human suffering, threats to a number of the regime’s heartlands, and the West’s move to consider fighting ISIS as the priority in Syria, Russia joined the war in October 2015 under the pretext of attacking ISIS.
Then, one month after the Russian intervention, which actually concentrated its bombardment on the positions of the ‘FSA’ and the ‘moderate’ Opposition groups, representatives of 17 countries connected with the Syrian crisis met in the Austrian capital Vienna, including Iran, in the absence of the regime and opposition. The meeting ended with agreeing on a ceasefire and a ‘framework for political transition’, but not the future of Al-Assad. Consequently, last December, the UN Security Council unanimously agreed a ‘road map’ that begins with negotiations between the Syrian regime and opposition aimed at reaching a ceasefire, forming a ‘transitional government’ within six months and conducting elections within 18 months, again saying nothing about Al-Assad’s role. But in the light of developing agreements between Washington and Moscow, and the changes on the ground brought about by the Russian military campaign, some reports have recently suggested that Washington and Tehran have agreed that Al-Assad remains in office until 2022! What should we expect now? It is obvious that the Syrian opposition has no option but to continue its steadfastness, regardless of how huge the disappointment is. Steadfastness without illusions! The Syrian opposition is aware today that its ‘adversary’ is also the ‘referee’, and thus must not give it new excuses to continue betraying it.

Saudi boots on the ground in Syria?
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/February 06/16
Saudi Brigadier General Ahmed al-Assiri, official spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, has made an interesting statement about Riyadh’s readiness to send ground troops to Syria. This raises a lot of questions. Does this mark a change in the Saudi foreign policy? Should we fight inside a foreign land? Why should we fight with the U.S.-led coalition? If there is a will to intervene, why don’t we fight the far more brutal al-Assad regime? Sending ground troops to Syria seems to be a new approach. This is the first time when there is willingness from the Saudi side to participate in a ground offensive to fight ISIS in Syria. In the past, there were talks of the country’s willingness to intervene, without specifying the nature of the tasks. However, Saudi Arabia has already been part of the war in Syria since last year as a member of the U.S.-led coalition conducting air strikes against terror outfits.
Saudi Arabia has already been part of the war in Syria since last year as a member of the international coalition conducting airstrikes against terror outfits. There is another reason behind Saudi Arabia fighting as part of the U.S.-led coalition. Like Russia, it either has the approval of the Assad regime – which is impossible for Riyadh and highly unlikely to get a nod from Damascus anyway – or it should have the authorization of the United Nations as is currently the case with Yemen, where Saudi troops are fighting with the approval of the Security Council. Thus, the coalition receives legal cover and represents an integrated system of countries. It is also clear why Saudi Arabia is interested in fighting against ISIS in Syria. Like many other countries, it is aware that the organization will try and target the country at some stage. It is believed that hundreds of brainwashed Saudis are fighting there and some have even tried to return and carry out terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia. The rationale on which ISIS would like to target Saudi Arabia are explicit and similar to those of al-Qaeda.
Choosing the fight
The most significant question is why do we fight ISIS and leave the Assad regime that has committed the most heinous crimes in the history of the region? First of all, Saudi Arabia is not a neighboring country to Syria, as Iraq and Jordan separate both the countries. Moreover, Saudi Arabia cannot fight there without an international authorization or it will be considered as conducting an act of aggression that would engender serious consequences. Turkey has been fighting ISIS inside Iraq and Syria but not the Syrian regime, despite being enraged by it since the crisis began five years ago. Turkey has the longest border with Syria and, with 700,000 professional soldiers, it has one of the largest armies in the world. Its army would reach a million people if one adds reserves. Despite all that, Turkey is committed to international laws and has not intervened militarily. Fighting ISIS is not just a military process; it is a political one too. By eradicating ISIS, the Russians and Iranians won’t have an excuse to destroy the national Syrian opposition that has nothing to do with extremist groups and foreign fighters. Weakening ISIS by eliminating most of its fighters, will improve the situation of the Syrian resistance, which has long been targeted by extremists and Assad forces and his allies. This is what we are witnessing in Deraa in the south, where the Syrian regime’s allies are actively targeting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) under the pretext that they are an extremist organization. By putting the statement of Brigadier General al-Assiri in context, it will be clear that Saudi Arabia is ready to conduct land operations in Syria based on two conditions – the international will and the presence of a large military system.