Aaron Magid: State of the Union highlights Jordan’s rift with Obama/Mustafa al-Haj: What are the real goals behind local truces in Syria/Joyce Karam: Middle East reality: An inconvenient truth for Obama

State of the Union highlights Jordan’s rift with Obama
Aaron Magid/Al-Monitor/January 15/16
Despite the harsh divide among Republican presidential candidates on foreign policy, the importance of Jordan has been a unifying theme. Donald Trump praised King Abdullah on Twitter and Ohio Gov. John Kasich wished in a presidential debate that Jordan’s king “would reign for a thousand years.” In stark contrast to the Republicans, President Barack Obama downplayed or did not mention Amman’s most critical national priorities — the Islamic State [IS], Palestine and the war in Syria — during his Jan. 12 State of the Union address. Addressing members of Congress that evening, Obama emphasized, “As we focus on destroying [IS], over-the-top claims that this is World War III just play into their hands.” The American leader’s assertion that such dire warnings about IS are misguided directly contradict one of Abdullah’s main talking points when traveling overseas. Over and over — whether at the United Nations General Assembly podium, during an interview with PBS’ Charlie Rose or even in Kosovo — the Jordanian monarch has declared that the battle against IS is “a third world war, and I believe we must respond with equal intensity.”
After IS kidnapped Jordanian pilot Lt. Muath Al-Kaseasbeh and burned him alive in a cage in February of last year, the Jordanian air force launched a series of strikes against IS targets in Syria and Iraq. Jordan claimed to have killed 7,000 fighters in the days following Kaseasbeh’s execution.
Obama’s minimizing of the IS campaign speaks to a fundamental divergence with Abdullah and has led many leading thinkers in Amman to question America’s determination and willingness to, in the president’s own words, “degrade and ultimately destroy [IS].” If the world’s strongest and most advanced military cannot defeat a far inferior and less organized group, what are Obama’s true intentions?
In addition to IS, the State of the Union illustrated a major policy rift with Amman regarding the Palestinian peace process. Obama did not once bother to mention Palestine or Israel in the speech setting up his administration’s goals for the upcoming year. Here again, Jordanian leaders take an opposite approach to this sensitive issue. House Speaker Atif Tarawneh said in October, “Jordan, under the leadership of King Abdullah II, has placed the Palestinian issue on top of its priorities.” Amman raises the urgent need to create a Palestinian state in almost every meeting abroad. The Hashemite Kingdom’s difference with the Obama administration is not solely focused on this speech, but rather encompasses a larger policy divide. Since Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace efforts stalled in 2014, the United States has not led an ongoing effort to end the Palestinian conflict. White House Middle East coordinator Rob Malley told reporters in November that reaching a negotiated solution between the parties during Obama’s remaining term “is not in the cards.” In contrast to Amman’s wishes, the Obama administration no longer prioritizes tackling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a region filled with violence. Even before the speech, it was difficult to ignore the missing element in Abdullah’s Washington itinerary Jan. 12. After traveling thousands of miles, the king initially could not secure a meeting with Obama because of “scheduling conflicts.” However, the two did meet briefly Jan. 13 at Andrews Air Force Base before both departed on separate trips. A longtime and dependable US ally despite the Middle East’s turmoil arrives in the US capital, but Obama could not carve out more than about five minutes for the king.
In addition to the battle against IS, nearly five years of fighting in Syria have dramatically impacted next-door Jordan. Jordan has absorbed over 630,000 Syrian refugees, according to the United Nations (one diplomat estimates that Syrians represent about 20% of Jordan’s population), and Abdullah has repeatedly called for decisive action to end the conflict. Yet, in Obama’s brief mentioning of the bloody crisis that has killed some 250,000 people, the US president appeared satisfied with US policy. Obama cites Syria as an example of the “smarter approach, a patient and disciplined strategy that uses every element of our national power” by partnering with local forces — despite the fact that the conflict’s violence has only been spreading. It is no wonder that in recent months, Abdullah has met multiple times with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a US rival, during trips to Moscow to discuss developments in the Middle East. The United States provides Jordan with significant financial aid, but mere monetary assistance is no longer sufficient in tackling the region’s spiraling crises. With Putin demonstrating decisive action in his military intervention alongside Damascus while daylight grows between Abdullah and Obama over IS, Palestine and Syria, the king may question whether the United States is truly a reliable Jordanian ally during such uncertain times.

What are the real goals behind local truces in Syria?
Mustafa al-Haj/Al-Monitor/January 15/16
DAMASCUS, Syria — Several successful cease-fire truces have been reached in different parts of Syria between the Ministry of National Reconciliation on the one hand and UN delegations and native dignitaries on the other. The regime calls these truces “national reconciliations,” but many observers wonder if perhaps the agreements just stem from the regime’s desire to herd opposition brigades into Idlib in northwestern Syria. Under one of the latest truces, in Homs, the opposition battalions’ militants took their light weapons on Dec. 8 and left al-Waer neighborhood for the countryside of Idlib in the north after a five-month siege on the city. Also, a deal led opposition fighters in long-besieged Zabadani to leave with their families on Dec. 28 toward Lebanon, Turkey and the Idlib countryside. The truce aimed to implement the September agreement reached in Turkey between an Iranian delegation and one from the opposition umbrella group Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest). On Dec. 1, a delegation of notables representing Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Waer neighborhood met with regime representatives — including the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, Mohammed Dib Zaitoun, and the governor of Homs, Talal al-Barazi — under UN auspices through UN Ambassador in Syria Yacoub El Hillo.
The main directive of the resulting truce, which was implemented Dec. 9, provided for a complete cease-fire between the two parties and the exit of 270 fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra — which opposed the truce — to the countryside of Idlib in the north. The truce called for medium weapons to be handed over to the Syrian regime, humanitarian corridors to be opened into the neighborhood, the conditions of the remaining wanted people to be settled and a list of detainees held by the regime to be prepared for them to be released. The regime says these truces serves the political solution process, but some activists and media outlets think the regime is seeking to empty these areas to prove its military strength and ability to manage the crisis. They say that the regime wants to kick-start the process of demographic change in the region and that it will not allow the displaced to return to their homes once the situation calms down.
In this context, France 24 website reported Dec. 18 that al-Waer residents refused to leave the neighborhood, as the truce had suggested, despite the miserable conditions there. The residents might fear that the Old Homs scenario will be repeated once they are out, and that the regime will never allow them to return. In April, the regime did not allow Old Homs residents to return following the deal between Jabhat al-Nusra and the regime there, even though the deal stated that the civilian citizens would be able to return.
Al-Monitor asked Anas Judeh, head of the opposition’s Nation Building Movement, about the extent to which these truces might manage to end the armed conflict and solve the Syrian conflict.
“From the Russian standpoint, the agreements currently reached with armed groups in regime-controlled areas are the result of the Vienna II agreement signed in October 2015 calling for clearing the ‘useful’ Syrian areas of undisciplined armed groups that are incompatible with international agreements,” Judeh said. “This paves the way for a stable environment, which can set the stage for a political process that Russia can apply and invoke with the United States, thus extending the international conflict” over how to handle Syria. According to Judeh, Moscow believes that to solve the Syrian crisis, terrorism must be countered first and Syria must be rescued from extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (IS) through Russia’s military presence. Only then can a transitional phase that includes Bashar al-Assad be discussed. “We should be careful not to end up with a serious social fracture or animosities among the Syrian people,” Judeh added. “Putting an end to the military conflict and transferring thousands of armed men along with their families to ‘remote’ regions is not enough. After all, these, along with their children, will only be ticking time bombs. Social, cultural and political work is essential to reintegrate them within the Syrian community. War on the extremist and terrorist ideology is not limited to military means alone, as it also includes cultural, social and political aspects.”
Instead of ending the conflict, Judeh said, sending fighters to other areas only serves to entrench the problem and might ultimately divide Syria into separate areas controlled by the regime, IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Kurds. Some critics say the regime’s efforts are an attempt to prove it can reach compromises that could end the Syrian war. The regime, they say, is trying to prove it should be a key player in the next phase, which would enhance its power centers in regime-controlled areas. This would subsequently lead to the deterioration of truces given that they were not reached under appropriate conditions, and especially given the absence of neutral observers. Al-Monitor met with Reem Turkmani, head of the Madani Organization and a member of the board of the Syrian Civil Coalition. Turkmani said, “To begin with, what the regime is doing cannot be described as reconciliations. These are agreements whose main parties are military bodies seeking to achieve their interests through negotiations, not fighting.”He added, “We may witness more local agreements, but there is no guarantee of continuity given the absence of observers, human rights organizations to follow up on the prisoners’ situation or independent mediators. And there is no political will to reach a solution.”Turkmani told Al-Monitor that the best solution is for Syrians — be they civilians or militants — to stay in their areas. But some of them are forced to leave for two reasons. First, there is no third party, such as international observers, capable of protecting those who are most vulnerable to the risk of arrest. Therefore, some people prefer to leave out of fear of being arrested or forced into conscription, which could lead to their death.
Second, not all truces go as smoothly as those in Zabadani and al-Waer. For example, on Dec. 25, there were signs of an unprecedented deal that would have allowed IS militants to exit the southern Damascus districts of al-Qadam and al-Hajar toward Raqqa, the organization’s stronghold. Under the deal, buses would have transported the militants through areas under the control of Jaish al-Islam and then head to Raqqa. However, the deal failed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, after Jaish al-Islam Cmdr. Zahran Alloush was killed Dec. 24. But a civilian activist from al-Qadam said Jaish al-Islam wasn’t involved at all with the failed truce. “IS is the reason behind the deal’s failure. They did not want to get out at once without knowing who would be governing the areas that they were leaving,” the activist, who oversees the Facebook page of the Local Council of al-Qadam in Damascus, told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “Jaish al-Islam has nothing to do with this. The buses arrived the morning of Dec. 25 and waited in vain as IS members refused to leave.”

Middle East reality: An inconvenient truth for Obama
Joyce Karam/Al Arabiya/January 14/16
Characterizing events from Yemen to Syria to Libya as a “transformation that will play out for a generation, rooted in conflicts that date back millennia” is not only a reality distortion by U.S. President Barack Obama, but also a dangerous fantasy that resigns American diplomacy to dismissiveness in the Middle East. Shrugging off the Middle East’s largest upheaval in decades as a theological rift, and shying away from major diplomatic initiatives, is a slap in the face for U.S. role and stature, restricted today to responding and containing conflicts.
Absolving Responsibility
Blaming the chaos of the Middle East on centuries’ old battles is a perfect cop-out strategy for Obama, avoiding his legacy from being tarnished by the fragmentation of four states, two of which were bombed by the United States (Iraq and Libya). Except, religious scriptures from a different era are not driving the current regional rivalry, or spurring ISIS. It’s oppression, civil wars, ISIS territorial gains, and unchecked regional bickering that is fueling the hellfire. Obama’s narrative, however, is largely aimed at absolving his administration of any wrong doing in the Middle East, and attributing current infernos to a “transformation” across a whole generation that Washington apparently has little influence over. This claim self destructs in every conflict zone in the Middle East, three of them started on Obama’s watch four years ago. This is not to say U.S. leadership is not needed in the Middle East. On the contrary, it is only through U.S. leadership that the region can see an end to the current horror. In Iraq, it was U.S. catastrophic invasion in 2003 and not a Quran scripture that unleashed hell in that country. Five years later, it was Obama’s mismanagement of Iraq, propping up the corrupt leadership of Nouri Maliki even as he lost elections in 2010, that gave ISIS a golden opportunity to takeover Mosul. The fall of Mosul has little to do with a generational “transformation” and plenty with misguided policies from the White House.
In Libya, the Sunni-Shia millennia rift does not even apply in a country with majority of Sunnis and intricate tribal structure and large oil wealth. It’s not a sectarian conflict that is breaking Libya between East and West, and it’s not under theological circumstances that ISIS was able to recruit 3500 members across the country. The failed state in Tripoli is a direct product and outcome of an unfinished intervention by NATO (US included) in 2011. Leaving militias in place, and allowing proxy regional wars to takeover the country was a fatal blow to Tripoli’s transition after the elections, and a recipe for the civil war to come.
In Syria, a sectarian conflict is only a self fulfilling prophecy after years of promising democracy and “orderly transition” to a population while going silent when war crimes, chemical weapons were used against it. Obama’s cold approach to Syria, comparing it to Congo in 2014, and shying away until 2015 from robust diplomacy, has opened the door for almost every regional power, mercenary and terrorist organization out there to step into the void.
Resignation not an answer
Obama’s tone comes at a very low point for U.S. diplomacy in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process is dead, and regional tension between two major powers in the Middle East, Saudi and Iran, is at an all time high threatening backlash from Sanaa to Beirut. While Obama bragged at the Congress that “when it comes to every important international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead — they call us”, that is no longer exclusively the case in the Middle East. Washington was not consulted before the Yemen war, and its efforts were rejected in the latest Gaza ceasefire. Russia’s relations with Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia have seen improvement over the last three years. Also, the Iraqi government that the U.S. spent trillions to bring to power, has not been able to stop Russia’s flights through its airspace into Syria. This is not to say that U.S. leadership is not needed in the Middle East. On the contrary, it is only through U.S. leadership that the region can see an end to the current horror. The biggest breakthroughs in the region, whether it’s in the Arab-Israeli conflict or rolling back aggressors have happened because of U.S. leadership. However, an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is not a substitute for regional diplomacy, nor should it come at expense of ending conflicts. Obama’s last State of the Union was almost a surrender to the new Middle East realities against his own vision when he assumed the Presidency. It is a complete departure from the Cairo speech, and Obama’s address to the Arab youth in 2011 promising that “after decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be.” Not anymore