Prospects for mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/January 11/16
It was only natural for the international community to condemn the assault on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, which was reminiscent of previous attacks on the U.S. embassy in Tehran after which Americans were hold hostages for 444 days, during the Islamic Revolution. The U.N. Security Council’s condemnation was firm and was not linked to any preambles, given that the principle of not harming diplomatic missions is an absolute one. In truth, the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had made a mistake when he focused his denunciation in his first statement on Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 people, including 43 Sunnis and 3 Shiites convicted of inciting terrorism, before mentioning in passing the attack on Saudi diplomatic missions, appearing as though justifying – even if unintentionally – the attack.
Interference
The majority of the international community rejects in principle the logic of the death penalty, but with notable exceptions such as the United States. Yet it is the right of Saudi Arabia to consider the U.N.’s positions to be interference in its internal affairs, while it is the right of the secretary general to stress opposition to the death penalty in general. The Islamic Republic of Iran, since its emergence in 1979, adopted a strategy of exporting the revolution, and remains determined to implement it. This is the battle it has clearly chosen. Riyadh is right when it notes the duplicity in international attitudes, which do not protest more than 1,000 executions carried out by Iran in the same vehemence as their condemnation of Saudi executions. Nevertheless, no capital can ignore the execution of 47 people in one go no matter what the causes of the execution are and regardless of the timing, which is very important. Now, after Riyadh’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with Tehran to protest what seemed to be an official Iranian blessing of the attack on Saudi embassies, coupled with statements by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei regarding “divine revenge” against Saudi for executing Shiite preacher Nimr al-Nimr (who has a history of inciting violence and terrorism) the question is this: What next? What is the magnitude of the Saudi message?
The Saudi-Iranian confrontation has shaken world capitals, sparking fears of further bloody proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, in addition to aborting all U.N.-led diplomatic efforts seeking solutions to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. However, concerns this time went beyond proxy wars, to the possible serious implications and dimensions of Iranian meddling in Saudi internal affairs, particularly in the Shiite-dominated Eastern Province of the kingdom close to Bahrain. In Bahrain too, Iranian meddling has taken the form of subversion, incitement, and creation of terror cells though Lebanese Hezbollah and other groups. There have been several offers for mediation including from Russia, Turkey, Iraq, and Oman. But the United States did not offer to mediate, despite the open lines between Washington and Tehran, so much so that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry contacted Tehran before contacting Riyadh in an odd diplomatic move, given the long-standing alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Tehran’s motives
Seizing the opportunity to mediate is very important. There is nothing fruitful about an open-ended estrangement without practical goals and specific objectives. Saudi delivered a clear message to Tehran as part of its quest to stop the international scramble to portray Iran as a peace advocate when it is a direct party to the war in Syria alongside the regime – recruiting militias and sending advisors in clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, yet with international consent. Iran’s reckless non-spontaneous attack on diplomatic missions exposed Tehran’s motives. However, the international community has a weak memory in the time of the U.S. love affair with the Islamic Republic and Obama’s appeasement of Tehran in the name of the nuclear deal. Therefore, pragmatism is necessary even if national pride is at its height right now, and even if the prevailing trend is saying no voice must be louder than the voice of battle. Thinking calmly is what is needed, no matter how justified being incensed is at the moment. For this reason, the message sent by Saudi diplomacy by receiving U.N. envoy on Syria Staffan de Mistura was wise. Saudi envoy to the U.N. Abdullah al-Mouallemi said Riyadh will not boycott the U.N. because of the secretary general’s positions, and that it would continue to take part in the Vienna talks on Syria despite the estrangement with Tehran, which reflects the cool-headedness and prudence of Saudi diplomacy.
Pragmatism says: Choose your battles so you don’t have to fight too many that would drain you militarily and economically. Pragmatism requires a clear and realistic specification of priorities as well as the determination of the cost of victory and the cost of defeat. Pragmatism, unfortunately, is not always ethical and principled. It’s the art of necessity.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, since its emergence in 1979, adopted a strategy of exporting the revolution, and remains determined to implement it. This is the battle it has clearly chosen. Today, Iran and Russia are in a firm, solid alliance that has proven its robustness in Syria, taking advantage of America’s weakness. The Russian-Iranian-Hezbollah axis, blessed by China, has worked to guarantee the survival of Bashar al-Assad in power and guarantee Russian and Iranian influence in Assad’s Syria and the Middle East for a long time to come. On the other hand, Iran is confident of U.S. courting, and wears it like a ring on its finger. Former U.S. President George W. Bush gave Iraq to Iran on a platter of silver, and current U.S. President Barack Obama has gifted Iran his Syria failure. Both U.S. presidents effectively made Iran a regional leader, deliberately turning a blind eye to its violations and terrorist attacks that Washington is aware of in details, and its meddling in the Arab countries with a view to export the Iranian revolution.
Pragmatism requires deep reflection on the meaning and dimensions of the decline of the alliance relationship between the United States and the Gulf Arab states, and even Washington’s willingness to replace the Arab ally with an Iranian ally. Realistically speaking, it should be recognized that Washington would bless a victory by Iran, Russia and Hezbollah in Syria. Realistically, it must be taken into account that Israel has returned to supporting Bashar al-Assad remaining in power, and that its relation with Iran have become increasingly one of appeasement if not cooperation in the fight in Syria under the title of combatting Sunni terrorism led by ISIS and similar groups. Realistically speaking, one should remember the terror attacks of 9/11 has a cost Arabs must bear, while also recalling that Arab oil is no longer an American need.
Faced with this reality, it is necessary to do a cost-benefit analysis for any measures going forward, in light of the crises and conflicts in the Arab region.
Internal security
Clearly, the absolute priority is for the internal security of all Gulf states. But clarifying the red lines requires both an advancement strategy and an exit strategy, and awareness of the strengths of the other side. Saudi national security is the subject of unanimous agreement in the GCC, representing Gulf national security. If Russia or Oman, for example, want to act as mediators between Saudi and Iran, they must be asked to seek serious Iranian pledges with U.S. guarantees to cease incitement and interference in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. This is an absolute priority that the GCC must clarify, and this is the battle that it must choose. The second battle is in Yemen, which is also part of Saudi national security. Iran has chosen to fight a proxy Yemen with Saudi Arabia to turn it into a quagmire for the Saudis, who would then be drained in their own “Vietnam” there. Iran itself has managed to dodge drowning in its own Vietnam in Syria, thanks to Russia’s U.S.-sanctioned intervention there.
There is no international partner undertaking in Yemen what Russia is undertaking in Syria, so there is no alternative to seeking an exit strategy for Yemen. As it seems, this is now only possible through the diplomatic efforts led by U.N. Envoy Ould Cheikh Ahmed. Syria, unfortunately, is not a battle that can be won. The international community has decided not to fight a regime that has massacred its people, but to fight ISIS even if this requires an alliance with the “devil”. Syria will remain a dark stain on the world’s conscience, and a wound that will prevent celebrating any victory no matter how much some might delude themselves into believing otherwise. Pragmatism requires counting the losses and choosing the battles. Pragmatism teaches that nothing lasts forever and that today’s loss could be an investment in tomorrow, if prudence rather than emotion is pursued.
The ongoing Islamic Revolution in Iran has borne fruit for the mullahs in Tehran, but it has cost Iran dearly over four decades of isolation and missed prosperity and progress. This is not a victory. By contrast, the Gulf in the past four decades developed and built astonishing cities, and integrated itself with the world despite some restrictions on freedoms. In the end, history does not stop with a U.S. administration. Loyalty is not something U.S. policies are known for, but rather, abandonment and betrayal of allies is the reputation Washington has earned for itself. Yet, emotional and reactive haphazardness must be avoided in Saudi-Iranian relations.
The Saudi state vs the Iranian revolution
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Now Lebanon/January 11/16
After two failing wars to spread democracy and a messy Arab Spring, America has finally eased its pressure on its allies to democratize. Today, a brutally pragmatic Washington realizes that the record of human rights and press freedom — whether in Turkey, Egypt, Saudi and maybe soon Iran — does not make or break alliances. This is why America’s campaign against the Saudi execution of 47 of its citizens stood out. If Washington were protesting capital punishment in principle, such objection did not square with the 27 executions that America saw in 2015. If Washington were objecting that Riyadh had killed dissidents, the US often does the same by raining death from above — without due process — on terrorists around the world. So America has no problem with capital punishment per se, which makes protesting the Saudi execution political, and strategically problematic. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not one between Sunnis and Shiites as such, but rather a confrontation between a state and a revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran was the brainchild of its founder Ayatollah Khomeini. It also borrowed Marxist ideas that were circulating amongst dissidents as evident in the literature of revolutionaries like Ali Shariati. Iranian revolutionaries transformed Marx’s slogan “workers of the world unite” to “downtrodden of the world unite.” Hussain, the third Shiite Imam who was slain in Karbala in 680 CE and whose memory is observed annually, became the symbol of these downtrodden.
Iran’s Islamism is similar to communism, in that Iran believes in the expansion of its brand of Islam through non-state actors or “popular militias,” modeled after its own Basij and Pasdaran. Just like how Iran’s Supreme Leader and Revolutionary Guards overshadow the president and the regular army, Iran has seen to it that Lebanon’s Hezbollah becomes stronger than the Lebanese state and army. In Iraq too, Iran has been copying its “militia state” model by creating, arming and funding groups that can outmuscle the state and the army. And since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Iran has poured money, arms and training on newfound militias that will certainly replace, or at least undermine, President Bashar al-Assad and his regime should the Iran-Assad alliance prevail in the ongoing Syrian war. Saudi Arabia, for its part, hangs on to the model of the nation state and strives to empower neighboring governments.
After the murder of pro-Saudi Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Riyadh invested in the creation of a UN tribunal that indicted five Hezbollah operatives, who stay defiantly at large and under their party’s protection.
After the 2006 war, while Iran reimbursed Lebanese Shiites with cash, Saudi Arabia parked $300 million at the Central Bank to shore up Lebanon’s Foreign Currency reserves and protect the national currency against collapse. After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Islamist terrorist bombers found their way to Beirut’s Shiite neighborhoods. Iran’s response was to double down on Hezbollah fighting in Syria. Saudi Arabia, for its part, donated $3 billion to the Lebanese Army to buy French arms. In Iraq, as Iran strengthened its Shiite militias that fight both ISIS and the Sunnis, Saudi Arabia reopened, last week, its embassy in Baghdad for the first time in 25 years. After Washington vouched for him, Riyadh now bets on Prime Minister Abadi and the Iraqi state and hope that the two can subdue Iran’s militias and restore Iraqi sovereignty.
In Yemen, where the pro-Iranian Houthi militia had invaded Sanaa and ejected the government of Abdrabbu Mansour, Saudi Arabia sent in its army to reign in Yemen’s insurgents and reinstall the government. Only in Syria, Saudi Arabia’s policy has stood out in supporting armed opposition factors. Yet this Saudi policy came only after Riyadh had jumped through hoops in an attempt to solve the crisis through diplomacy. Saudi Arabia first went to the Arab League, then to the UN General Assembly since Russia had shut down the Security Council. Despite all its efforts, Saudi Arabia was left with one choice: To arm Syrians that are defending themselves against Assad’s atrocities, including his chemical attacks.
And yet, under pressure from Washington, which clearly prefers Assad to prevail, Saudi Arabia’s arming of opposition factions had been subdued and minimal. When Washington said that Riyadh should not have executed that Saudi Shiite cleric, America was effectively helping Iran export its Islamic revolution. If Riyadh has to take into consideration Tehran’s position on how to deal with its Shiite citizens, then Saudi sovereignty will be undermined in favor of pan-Shiism. Had Riyadh held back on executing Nimr — regardless of how repugnant capital punishment is — then it would have set a precedent that whenever it wants to deal with its Shiite citizens, it has to go first through Tehran. Such a dynamic would ensure Iran’s status as the cross-border leader of all Shiites, just like the Soviet Union saw itself as the sponsor of communists anywhere around the globe. Before America’s government and mainstream media get all riled up against the deplorable execution of Saudi citizens and take Iran’s side, they better understand what they are getting themselves into.
**Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the Washington Bureau Chief of Kuwaiti newspaper Alrai. He tweets @hahussain
