Can Mr. Putin Dictate the Conditions of the Transitional Process in Syria?
Middle East Briefying/January 09/16
It is assumed in many European capitals that Moscow is more focused on the outcome of the proposed transitional process in Syria than it is on the future of Assad. This sounds logical. Mr. Putin said several times that what is important is to prevent the collapse of the State and preserve stability in Syria. Yet, examining this assumption thoroughly would reveal some important questions. The main question here is related to the fluid nature of any definition of “the outcome of the Syrian transitional process” and the extent to which it may really contribute to future stability in Syria. First, the fluid nature of the process appeared early on when a dispute emerged about “defining” terrorist groups in the Syrian opposition. While this dispute appears “technical” in the view of some observers, it is in fact more significant in terms of what it really reveals. Shaping the parameters of the transitional process means shaping the outcome of this process. Therefore, it is actually the end that explains the nature of the road that reaches it. Talks about the nature of the transitional process must be designed to produce an outcome that focuses mainly on a sustainable stability. This, in its turn, means cleaning Syria of terrorist groups, building an inclusive state structure, ending the previous state of affairs that led to the wide popular revolt of 2011 and respecting basic human and political rights. Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov used the term “secular” to define the sought after future Syria. We believe that term is deceptive and too general to mean anything in the current Syrian context. Furthermore, it gives the parties involved in the process, particularly Russia, a larger than usual space to create all kinds of obstacles and employ blunt pressure tactics.
Due to historical reasons that are too complex to discuss now, the civil war in Syria has fallen, as is always the case in the Middle East, to default levels defined by religions and sects. We cannot think of any political force, not only in Syria but in the whole Middle East, which is truly secular. Now, how are you going to build a future secular Syria without secularists?
Second, this question becomes more relevant in the context of the current debate about “who is a terrorist? And “who is a secular?” In the case of the talks which will start January 25, there are two Syrian sides: The regime and the opposition (defined by Mr. Putin as good opposition and bad opposition. The good opposition is what Moscow labels “secular” and what others call Assad-friendly, and the bad opposition is defined by Moscow as terrorist and described by others as “Islamist”). All these labels and descriptions seem extremely fluid. Let us start with Assad himself. If terrorism means to kill civilians indiscriminately, then how Assad’s barrel bombs could be called? Did these barrel bombs chose somehow only “terrorists” and not the children? And how is Assad secular if he, and his father before him, built their regime on sectarian loyalty? The general issue then is relatively simple: Where to lay the line that separates terrorists from non-terrorists. This line could be put arbitrarily if necessary in order to abort the whole process or extract more concessions. Take the example of the leader of Jaish Al Islam Zahran Aloush. The guy was a fierce fighter against ISIL. He prevented the terrorist organization from controlling the south of Damascus. He accepted the transitional process. Then he was killed by Mr. Putin who says he is fighting ISIL and who commits to the very transitional process Aloush accepted.
Third, the issue now moved from the point of “what future Syria”, to the issue of “what transitional process”. Mr. Putin is trying to shape the transitional process in order to shape the future Syria.
But why is this a wrong strategy? Is it not possible that all what Mr. Putin wants is to rid Syria from all those bearded fanatics and create an enlightened democratic Syria, like the “very enlightened and democratic” Russia? The answer is clear: One can strive for a future anything based on totally subjective wishes and plans. But in this case, and unfortunately for Mr. Putin, we are talking about another country, other political forces, other armed groups, other ideas and ideologies, other people and another region. But let us go the extra mile with Mr. Putin’s “good intentions”. Let us assume that the Russian President sincerely wants Syria without those bearded fanatics and that there is a way to make that happen through drawing fresh lines separating terrorists (which is all Islamist groups in this case) from non-terrorists (which is the Assad-friendly groups). Then we should exclude all Islamists from the general body of the Syrian opposition. Right? Fine. But what will be left exactly? Almost nobody but some weightless groups. Let us go even further and accept this as a “great success” to the transitional process and its sponsors. Then, we will move to the new transitioned Syria. A new Assad on the same old tyrannical methods with some decorative additions.
But who will fight ISIL then? And what would merit to be called “different” than all we see now or what was there before 2011 that led to the public revolt? Maybe “the person” of Assad will be in a villa in a classy quarter in the outskirts of Moscow. But there would be another Assad in Damascus.
Let us even go the few extra yards left in Mr. Putin’s rope and repeat after him that all Islamist opposition should be excluded from the transitional process. Well, then what we will see it is Assad and Putin negotiating with Assad and Putin. Does the Russian President really believe that the Syria opposition is a bunch of idiots and that they will be indeed deceived by the departure of the person of Assad and join happily in the celebrations of a new Syria with a new Assad? Here comes the theory that promotes the idea that the US fabricated the Syria revolution. Now, all what we have to do is to convince the bad guys in Washington to refrain from playing with their magic buttons that cause revolutions anywhere they wish in the world. If those bad guys are out of the way, Syria can stabilize without the “bad” opposition. It is magic.
This theory reflects not only a sick mind assuming that subjective will can cause earth quakes, but it also reflects an amazing misunderstanding of the depth of malaise in the Middle East. The US may “use” these deep contradictions in the region, it does not create them. And this is always limited by objective circumstances in the region and subjective limits in the US powers.
It is clear that Mr. Putin lives in a self-created bubble of concepts and ideologies. We will leave him there as it is beyond our ability to convince him to look at the situation differently. All what we can do is to compare what is going on in reality with all this diplomatic fuss about the “transitional process”.
If we accept thinning the participants along the lines of Mr. Putin’s “secular” future Syria, all we will get is a replay of the Assad regime and the Syrian revolution. This replay may even be the best possible scenario of the proposed transitional process. The worst case scenario would be a continuation of the currently existing situation but with a different “political décor” in Damascus. In this bad scenario, the situation risks to deteriorate even further than what it is now as is always the case in history.
In this case, the “Russian surge” currently taking place in Syria will end precisely the same way the “American surge” ended in Iraq: The rebirth of even more vicious terrorist wave.
What to do then? Should all this mean that we must allow the terrorists to rule Syria in order to avoid their re-emergence?
If we do allow the terrorists to rule Syria we would have defeated our own higher principle. The one unnegotiable principle would be for any group participating in the new Syria transition to say and act consistently in a manner that totally rejects terrorism and violence. The groups allowed to participate in the “outcome” of the process must commit to respecting the rights of minorities, basic human rights, the rule of law, and the rights of dissent. So long as the youth activists are allowed to communicate what really happens without persecution, we have full confidence on those activists whom we followed closely along the last few turbulent years. Mr. Putin cannot force Islamist opposition to divorce their religious beliefs and join whatever secularism he is talking about. Only history and the natural progress of human spirit in these lands can sort out this issue. The immediate goal should be the unnegotiable condition of rejecting terrorism in word and in action for any group to participate. But after all, it will not be Mr. Putin who allows or denies any group of Syrians to participate in ruling their own country. It is not his country. And whatever force he uses, he will always be unable to force Syrians into submission. He will run out of Syria before he is able to kill every single Syrian opposition member. That is certain. The way the current process advances carry many signs of uncertainty. As we previously said, this process is more likely to fail than to succeed. Only the step of enacting a cease fire is almost a mission impossible. Everyone should be ready for a cease fire that may not actually exist. This should not, however, stop the process. It will be a fatal mistake to hang the prospects of the whole process on the impossible success of the cease fire, though the cease fire should remain central and important as an organizing principle.
If Mr. Putin accepts the Syrian opposition as it really is and excludes only real terrorists who defend an ideology that transcends the national borders of Syria, a move towards ending the crisis would be possible. If he does not, then the assumption common in European capitals that he is focused on the process more than Assad’s future will prove elusive. For Mr. Putin will show that he is not interested neither in the process nor in Assad’s future but only in Russia’s strategic interests. Under the conditions dictated by Mr. Putin, the question becomes: Does the Russian President really wants to end the crisis through a genuine political process?
Few Words for our Critics
Middle East Briefying/January 09/16
Just few words for some of our critics. It has become almost fashionable to sympathize with Tehran’s policies in the Middle East and deny its intervention in the regions’ countries. To criticize Iran’s policies has become equivalent to being a “neo-conservative” and a “warmonger”.
It has also become fashionable to support Assad as the “true fighter” against terrorism. All his opponents have been labeled supporters of terrorism, radicalism and Jihadists. On the other hand, supporting Assad is presented as an effort to foil a US led conspiracy to destabilize the Middle East and change its regimes. Furthermore, it has become fashionable to accuse any Sunni who practice his religion and fight oppression under his religious beliefs, and not under a secular political ideology, of being a terrorist regardless of his position on terrorism as we all know it.
This wave of predicates is pushed to become a “given” in the public discourse. And we see otherwise decent people parroting things like “There are no moderates among Assad opponents”, “Iran is unfairly targeted by the war camp in the West”, “President Putin is the real fighter against terrorism”, or “Sunnis, defined as such, are terrorists”.
This is not only wrong, it is also meant to mold public perceptions in a certain form that is not truthful, not fair and would ultimately undermine all what our critics claim to defend.
The fact that Iran raised a sectarian flag was abundantly clear immediately after the US invasion of Iraq. Though sectarianism existed always behind the surface in the region, it came out to be an explicit organizing principle since the invasion of Iraq.
Any US veteran of the Iraq war knows that first hand. The Iranian regime saw the moment as an opportunity to control Iraq, kill the Americans and subjugate Iraqi Sunnis. Tehran saw controlling Iraq as a national security priority. The only available ideological tool to achieve this end was Iran’s common bond with the Shia majority in Iraq-Shi’ism. In order to use this bond effectively, it was necessary to awaken the sectarian identity among Iraqi Shias on the expense of the national identity of all Iraqis.
Iran has progressed noticeably in its efforts in Iraq since then. Iraq’s Sunnis were faced with a sectarian vengeance as a punishment for an alleged oppression they had nothing to do with. Saddam oppressed all Iraqis, Sunnis, Shias and Kurds.
A short read of what happened after toppling Saddam will show how the dynamics of the shift to sectarianism played out slowly as a curse from the past used to shape the future and to achieve geostrategic plans.
Yes, we consider Iran a sectarian force by excellence and an exporter of a fundamentalist ideology by excellence. Are those critics of ours too blind to see the religiously sectarian slogans in Tehran and in Hezbollah’s political ideology? The moment one identifies himself on sectarian bases is the moment when “his other” will think of his. The Sunni identity was raised in response to an emerging sectarian polarization which was destined, by virtue of being an “idea”, to cross geographical borders.
And yes, we were skeptical of the Iran nuclear deal. Our skepticism was not on the merits of the deal itself. It stemmed from understanding the context on which the deal was signed. An aggressive Iran is destined to be more aggressive once free of tight global sanctions. We hoped for a strategy that position any potential nuclear deal in the context of a comprehensive restraining mechanism to avoid the negative consequences of Tehran’s foreign policies in general and its regional subversive activities in particular.
We even heard voices denying any Iranian subversion in the Middle East. Those who are defending Iran see its religious fundamentalism, sectarian intervention in Iraq and destructive role in Syria without even asking: Why these places and not any other place? Why did not we hear of any Iranian role in other countries like, say, Libya or Algeria? The reason is that there are no Shias there. Tehran cannot revive a sectarian identity there as a convenient bridge for a role to play. But maybe Iran defenders do not understand what they see in their “defend Iran” mood of action. Iran is as oppressive as many other regimes in the Middle East, if not even more. Iran is as fundamentalist as many other regimes in the Middle East if not even more. And Iran is certainly more sectarian than all the others combined. Try to listen to a Kurd in Sanandaj or a Sunni in Ahwaz.
What do we really want from Iran? We want a constructive Iran in a region where limits are delineated and mutual respect, trade, investment, cultural ties and mutual recognition are the coins of the ties between the components of the Middle East. Arabs do not want to interfere in Iran’s affairs neither do they want Iran to interfere in theirs. We have not heard Arabs talk about controlling Tehran but we heard Iranians talk of controlling Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana. Who wants to interfere in the others affairs then? Iraqi Sunnis do not want to be treated as “the others” in their own land. Syrian Sunnis, and in fact all Syrians, do not want to be oppressed under the flags of Assad, Iran, Hezbollah or ISIL.
Are some Sunnis terrorists? Absolutely. Are some Shia terrorists? No doubt. Are many in both camps sectarian? Yes. How to transcend this very destructive state of affairs?
Let us get back to the old Greek philosophy in search for an answer. It was said then that if you are building your house and a neighbor you always hated offered one clear morning to help you, you should welcome him and fix him a drink. It is when people build together that they come to appreciate each other. But certainly it is not by being blind to what the Iranians actually do because of any fashion or in order to raise a word or two against an alleged “neo-conservative” hiding here or there.
We do not have to apologize for rejecting Iranian intervention, subversion, terrorism and sectarianism. We do not have to keep repeating that we reject any sectarianism, Sunni or Shia or Christian or Muslim. Neither do we feel obliged to repeat what we have said tens of times that we will resist, condemn and refuse any sort of discrimination against Shia, Kurds, Christians, Sunnis, Alawis or any other human being because of his belief or color or language. This is indeed the trash of all human thought in the course of our history.
We simply side with the necessity of examining the “content” of any proposed idea to be able to define how it may effect a specific situation. The organizing principle here is man’s dignity, freedom and responsibilities towards the community. It is not the “label” of Sunni or Shia, secular or religious, Christian or Muslim. It is whether this man participates in building the house or work to destroy it.
The Syrian opposition is in some important part religious. It is Sunni. It is not secular. So what? If it vows to respect all the “others”, guarantee their freedom of belief and expression, treat all with dignity and builds houses, schools and hospitals, why should it apologize for its religious belief?
People do not behave according to one individual, or a group of individuals, set of values and standards. They behave according to their own mind set in their time and place. What should be required is only that they respect some universal values that are above all human, hence universal. Islam contributed largely to the march of civilizations in certain parts of our human history. The essence of the Enlighted base of Islam must be revived to bring it back to its great role as a major contribution to human civilization not as its main enemy.
Yes, some Syrian opposition groups raise an Islamic flag. But what is wrong with that exactly? Should they be secular to fit our critics’ views? Those who oppose an Islamic opposition group based on merely being Islamic are as blind as those who attack anything Islamic.
Then comes Mr. Putin. We are discovering now that he has become the hero of fighting terrorism, side by side with Mr. Assad of course. What Mr. Putin does is that he kills ten innocent civilians to get rid of one terrorist. Yet, he is hailed and saluted by some of our critics. In their view, he is foiling a vicious US plan to topple a “legitimate” government. This is such a thin argument that we are not sure it deserves to be even discussed.
The Syrian revolution started by normal simple people. They protested in the streets demanding their dignity and freedom. Assad forces shot and killed them. It still does. What does the US has to do with it? And what does it mean “legitimate” in that context exactly? Where is this magic button that someone in Washington presses to blow a country thousands of miles far?
And at the end, Mr. Putin will not be able to bomb the Syrian people into submission. At the end, what he would have done is give ISIL a wider opportunity to reemerge as it did in Iraq. Oppression definitely creates terrorism as much as sectarianism begets sectarianism. The only way to break this vicious circle is for all to get involved in building something that benefits all.
ISIL infiltrated Syria from Iraq as it sniffed the opportunity. Syrian civilians, under fire, and losing their children and loved ones on daily bases reached a point of being ready to side with anyone who may provide them with the means to live and defend themselves. One can sit in his warm office sipping his coffee and criticizing the Syrians for going radical. Please!
