The joy of sects
Michael Young/Now Lebanon/January 07/16
In recent days there has been considerable debate over how rational was the Saudi decision to execute the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, since the potentially destructive consequences were always evident. The wisdom of the move was doubtless questionable, but in no way was it irrational, in light of the regional challenges the Al-Saud family is facing today. Indeed, both the Saudis and Iran, in constantly playing on sectarian polarization, are in a no-lose situation. What the Saudis were accused of doing the Iranians have done just as much. Both have regarded sectarianism as a useful weapon to mobilize entire communities in the fight against one another; and the regimes in the two countries can only gain, at least in the short term. The execution of Sheikh Nimr was designed to send a number of messages, including warning the Saudi Shiite community against engaging in internal dissent. It was also a way of covering for the vast majority of executions that day, this time of Sunni militants, with 43 of those put to death being members of Al-Qaeda.
Less likely is the argument that the executions were somehow designed to detract from the spending cuts the Saudi government is implementing because of its financial crisis. After all, economic discontent takes time to build, is usually deep, and cannot be offset through the killing of one or a few men.
In fact the Saudi regime has profited. The rift with Iran, which the Saudis accelerated after attacks against Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, forced everyone to take sides. Several Gulf states and Sudan have severed ties with the Islamic Republic. In such an atmosphere the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, as a leader of the world’s Sunnis, was only enhanced.
This can only make resolutions of the region’s crises more complicated, certainly. But to the Saudis the issue goes beyond this war or that. The regime feels existentially threatened by Iranian moves—whether it is justified or not—and only by exacerbating the situation as it has can it hope to reshuffle the deck, oblige its allies to take a firmer position in its favor, thereby allowing it to bargain from a position of strength. The Saudis are well aware of how regional conditions are developing to their disadvantage. The war in Yemen has not been going well. Strangely, the regime seems to have forgotten how it managed to turn Yemen into a quagmire for the Egyptian army in 1962-1967. The more they destroy Yemen, the more the Saudis are creating a treacherous failed state on their own border, which can only threaten the kingdom itself.
In Syria events are equally unsettling. It is becoming clear to the Saudis that the Obama administration’s focus on defeating ISIS is gradually pushing it to take a position more in line with Russia than with regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Already, the Americans have taken an ambiguous position over Bashar al-Assad, saying that his departure was no longer a precondition for the start of a Syrian peace process.
More worrisome, the tide of public opinion in the West has turned solidly against both the Saudis and the Turks, amid a growing perception that they are assisting the most extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. With Russia trying to cut off rebel supply lines between Turkey and Syria, and Moscow and Washington reportedly collaborating in backing a coalition of Kurdish and Arab forces opposed to ISIS, the Saudis can see that they are becoming increasingly isolated in Syria. To the Saudi regime the only available outlet is to rally Sunni public opinion and regain the initiative. The confrontation with Iran does precisely that. To the argument that this approach will only exacerbate sectarian animosities, the Saudis would respond that the region has long moved beyond that stage. Nor was it ever really in doubt that the Saudis, faced with a much more populous Iran allied with a plethora of local armed groups in the region, would fail to exploit the sectarian card against Tehran.
Where the Saudis will have to be careful, however, is not to be swallowed by the very forces they have helped unleash. The Saudi royal family has long remained in power through an effective bargain agreed with the clerical leadership, particularly the Al ash-Sheikh, the kingdom’s leading religious family. Yet a good part of that contract has entailed acceding to a Wahhabi doctrine that has influenced some of the most radical Islamist groups. In an environment of increasing sectarian hostilities the extremist are bound to gain. And if or when they do they may seek to sweep aside the Saudi royal family and lead the campaign themselves. That the Saudi regime felt a need to execute Sheikh Nimr to alleviate the impact of the larger number of executions of Sunni extremists was hardly a reassuring sign. It means that at a time of regional sectarian antagonism, it cannot afford to act too strongly against extremists who may have support at home.
Nor is it worthwhile to blame only Saudi Arabia. Iran, too, has played on sectarian solidarity–in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. Doing so reinforces the Islamic Republic’s bona fides as leader of the Shiite world. Moreover, with Iranian parliamentary elections scheduled for next month, further sectarian polarization may well benefit the country’s hard-liners, who fear a victory by the candidates gathered around President Hassan Rouhani. In the overall picture, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are taking risks. Sooner or later they will have to arrive at a modus vivendi. But in the interim their actions are everything but irrational.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of The Daily Star newspaper. He tweets @BeirutCalling.
