Why exclude Nimr al-Nimr from punishment?
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/January 04/16/
A New York Times reporter in Tehran deleted his tweet that all the convicts executed by Saudi Arabia on Saturday were Shiite, and clarified that this was untrue. However, he did not say only four of those executed were Shiite, while the 43 others were Sunni.
The BBC summarized news of the executions by just referring to that of Nimr al-Nimr. It reported the execution of a man convicted in the murder of a BBC cameraman in a separate piece of news. We understand why Iran is leading the media campaign against the executions. It is targeting Saudi Arabia, against which it has been fighting a political and propaganda war since it decided to engage in sectarian wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. But why would others follow Iranian propaganda without at least examining the allegations of both parties? Was Nimr a peaceful opposition figure? Of course not. Was he a leader of Shiites? Absolutely not. He was like other extremist preachers. Did his speeches criticize the Saudi government? Yes, but so do those of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Saudi Arabia cannot execute Sunni religious preachers who are guilty of incitement that lead to murder, and overlook the cases of Shiite convicts. There are 5,000 extremists in Saudi jails, hundreds of whom have been convicted. Most of them are Sunni Saudis, while only dozens of them are Shiite Saudis. It makes no sense to ask Saudis to execute Sunni religious leaders, and let other implicated preachers be. Nimr was an extremist Shiite Saudi preacher. He was exactly like Al-Qaeda theorist Faris al-Shuwail, and Sunni extremist preacher Hamad al-Humaidi. None of the three committed murder, but they were convicted by the judiciary based on the law of criminalizing incitement to violence, as they incited their followers to commit murder, and were involved in other activities that are based on practicing violence. Humaidi’s group kidnapped and killed U.S. citizen Paul Johnson, and kept his head in a fridge in the house where they were arrested. Although it was not Humaidi who slaughtered Johnson, his followers committed the crime based on his instructions. Shuwail, who surrendered after he was injured in security confrontations in the town of ar-Rass, is considered one of the most prominent takfiri preachers in Saudi Arabia. Abdulaziz al-Toaili’e, a Sunni figure and Al-Qaeda’s media broadcaster, was also among those executed. He did not kill anyone himself, but was involved in recruitment and armament operations, and incited against others.
Incitement
Nimr was an extremist preacher, not a political leader. Like leaders of Sunni extremist organizations, he incited others to pursue armed opposition and fight, and helped them by collecting arms and funds. He was arrested while helping a man wanted for murder to escape. Nimr had a group known as the List of the 23, who were accused of armed operations. Four of the 23 men handed themselves in and were later released, some were killed during confrontations, and others are on the run. Nimr was arrested while police pursued a wanted man called Hussein al-Rabee. Nimr and Rabee were in two separate cars, and Nimr’s car bumped into a police car to help Rabee escape. While the police arrested Nimr, gunmen in another car opened fire on security forces, injuring Nimr and others. Rabee escaped, but was arrested two months later. According to the Saudi system, Nimr is legally responsible for the incitement, recruitment and crimes that his followers committed because of him. These crimes are many. His followers deliberately killed six policemen in separate incidents, and dozens were injured. They killed three civilians, and arbitrarily opened fire on foreign workers to obstruct work, killing a Bengali. They opened fire on a car belonging to the German embassy, and the vehicle burnt as a result. The two diplomats in the car survived the attack, and the perpetrators were later arrested. Our problem, or rather the world’s problem today, is extremist clerics who lead destructive acts and threaten peace everywhere. It makes no sense to ask Saudis to execute Sunni religious leaders, and let other implicated clerics be.
Saudi-Turkish cooperation: Opportunities and challenges
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/January 04/16
The strategic cooperation council established by Saudi Arabia and Turkey is one step above a bilateral alliance, and its goal goes beyond restoring balance to Sunni forces in Iraq and Syria, and thus requires an in-depth examination of Saudi-Egyptian, Turkish-Russian, and Turkish-Egyptian relations. Meanwhile, Iran and Qatar are both relevant to the developments in Saudi-Turkish relations, as are the U.S., ISIS, and the Syrian opposition.There are both convergences and divergences in Saudi-Turkish relations, which were upgraded this week to the level of strategic cooperation. The linchpin of this strategic cooperation council will be the mechanisms of activating the alliance should developments in Syria require intervention to counter Russian protection of Bashar al-Assad. Other challenges include reconciling Turkish hostility to the Kurdish organizations and the aspirations of the Kurds, with Saudi Arabian neutrality in this matter.
Furthermore, there are several grey areas when it comes to the fight against radical Sunni groups Washington and Moscow designate as terrorist groups, despite the fact that Ankara and Riyadh have agreed to fight ISIS and similar groups that pose an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, perhaps more so than to Turkey. The first country of concern in this context is Egypt. Egypt, an ally of Saudi Arabia, has tense relations with Turkey. The government of Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi sees the Turkish government under Recept Tayyip Erdogan to be an incubator of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus sees any Saudi-Turkey rapprochement as rapprochement over the Muslim Brotherhood, which were designated in the past as a terrorist group by Riyadh. Cairo wants the Muslim Brotherhood to continue to have that designation, and fears that the rapprochement might entail a reversal of that designation. Already, there are liberal as well as Muslim brotherhood voices that believe the kingdom’s designation of the Muslim Brotherhood is harmful and unnecessary.
The Saudi-Turkish cooperation council is an important event, but it is no alternative to the Gulf Cooperation Council, nor is it an alternative to the regional security system that Iran is seeking to build. Despite some tension over Cairo’s attitudes vis-à-vis Syria, Yemen, and anti-terrorism Saudi is determined to maintain the alliance with Egypt and preserve the regime there. For its part, Egypt is appreciative of the indispensable Saudi, Emirati, and Kuwaiti support despite its resentment over Gulf expectations and the fact that it has had to take a back seat in Arab leadership in the present time. Ultimately, both Cairo and Riyadh realize that Egypt is vital, pivotal, and irreplaceable in the regional balance of power.
Arab heavyweights
However, with the establishment of a Saudi-Turkish strategic alliance, Egypt must be asking what place it will have in it, and how its position in the Arab strategic weight will be reconciled in the regional balance of power. Saudi’s response is that there is no contradiction between the two, as evidenced by the commitment to the continuation of the alliance. Clearly, there is a need for a profound dialogue between the two Arab heavyweights. Russia is on good terms with Egypt and has interesting relations with Saudi Arabia. One of the aspects of strategic Russian-Egyptian cooperation stems from their combined hostility to Islamist groups led by the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, this has led to Russian-Egyptian convergence on Syria, at a time when Saudi and Russian attitudes on Syria are diverging while Russian-Turkish attitudes there are clashing outright. The pragmatism Saudi diplomacy currently adopts led Riyadh to seek a working relation with Moscow, despite profound differences over Syria, which has helped set the Vienna peace process in motion and bring in Iran to the table of discussions surrounding Syria’s fate. It is the same kind of pragmatism that has prompted Riyadh to establish a strategic cooperation council with Ankara, at the height of Russian-Turkish tension, while at the same time voiding any animus with Moscow. For its part, Moscow pledged not to intervene in Yemen against the Arab coalition. This week, Moscow rejected a request from ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to take action against the Saudi-led coalition. Yemen is a top Saudi priority, both militarily and diplomatically, including at the UN, where Moscow’s role is extremely important. So no matter how deep Saudi disputes are with Russia over Syria or Iran, Riyadh is keen on maintaining its newfound pragmatic ties with Moscow for both tactical and long-term strategic calculations.
Moscow, for its part, wants to maintain strong relations with Saudi Arabia, as long as Riyadh does not condition this on disengagement with Iran and Syria. This pragmatism is to thank in part for the Vienna process, which has brought together around twenty nations, led by the U.S., Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, who all followed the plans drafted by Russian diplomacy culminating with the third round in New York that produced an unprecedented U.N. Security resolution on Syria. Resolution No. 2259 deferred contentious issues, led by the fate of Bashar al-Assad during the transitional process, the question of which opposition figures are acceptable, and the question of which groups in Syria are terror organizations. The Vienna process resolution, midwifed by Russia, bypassed the Geneva Communique, which called for a transitional period during which Assad hands over power to an executive governing body. The new resolution effectively repealed the Geneva Communique and bypassed the “Assad Knot.” The list of proposals given to Jordan, which has been assigned by the Vienna nations to prepare a list of groups to be listed as terrorist organizations, was also deferred, containing 167 putative groups. The reason is the anger expressed by Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the latest meeting of the Vienna process in New York, when he learned the Qods Force and Hezbollah were included in the list. The meeting was then suspended, the list was buried, and work has restarted from scratch on a new list. Turkey, in turn, has listed the groups it considers to be terror organizations, including the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). For its part, Russia has focused its gaze on the list of Syrian opposition group prepared by Riyadh in the wake of a previous meeting of the Syrian opposition. However, Moscow insisted on merely referring to that effort in the preamble to resolution 2259, and removed it from the operative clauses that were originally meant to endorse the list. The political battle over the implementation of resolution 2259, which for the first time endorsed a political process in Syria since the conflict there began five years ago, is inevitable. Saudi Arabia and Turkey want to include figures and groups in the terror lists that Russia do not want included. However, Riyadh wants to benefit from Ankara to pressure on Iran not just with regard to the list, but also to curb Iranian meddling in the region, and agree on mechanisms that guarantee the effectiveness of the alliance against terrorism and counter Russian protection of Assad. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir had declared the creation of the joint strategic cooperation council in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart following the summit between King Salman and President Erdogan in Riyadh last week.
Tenser by the day
He said the purpose of the council includes deeper coordination with Turkey in light of the challenges both countries face in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, from terrorism to extremism to Iran’s negative intervention in regional issues. Countering challenges will not be easy however. Turkey is not an effective participant in the war with ISIS and similar groups in Syria, and its main concern is the Kurds as the regime is weakened. Turkey is opposed to secular groups, including Kurdish groups, which reveals its keenness on empowering Islamist groups. In Iraq, Turkey is at odds with Saudi Arabia in a way; Saudi has normalized relations with Baghdad after 25 years of estrangement, while Turkish-Iraqi relations grow tenser by the day. True, both countries have reservations with regard to the government of Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad, but they have different reasons. While Turkey’s reasons have Kurdish dimensions, Saudi’s have Iranian dimensions. Yet both are pursuing the restoration of the Sunni element in the balance of power after ISIS fled from Ramadi. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are both crucial for the quest to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Saudi-Turkish cooperation council is an important event, but it is no alternative to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. Nor is it an alternative to the regional security system that Iran is seeking to build, to include it, Iraq and the countries of the GCC after the latter is dismantled. It is an important event that requires profound analysis and follow-up.
