Which U.S. presidential candidate is Iran’s favorite?
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya/December 25/15
Although Tehran would prefer a totally different political establishment in the United States, it prefers one American presidential candidate to the others: Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders. It bases its preference on candidates’ view of the nuclear deal, and their policies toward the Middle East, particularly Syria, Israel, Iraq and the Gulf.
Tehran would rather see a Democrat than a Republican as the next U.S. president. At one time there were minimal differences between the parties’ views on Iran, but in the last few years the gap has widened.
Democrats are more likely to honor the nuclear deal, which Iran needs to push the U.N. Security Council to lift crippling economic sanctions. This will enhance its legitimacy globally, which will facilitate its trade and military activities in other nations.
Since the odds appear to favor a Democratic victory in the 2016 election, bilateral ties are more likely to improve or at least not worsen.
Republicans view Iran’s increasing influence in the Middle East as a national security threat. They tend to criticize Tehran more harshly than Democrats for its increasing military activities in Iraq and Syria. Democratic candidates prefer to reduce American boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, and turn a blind eye to what will fill the resulting vacuum.
Democrats believe in further rapprochement with Tehran. With a Democratic president, Tehran will feel empowered to leverage its legitimacy and ratchet up its global position. Democrats view positively Iran’s fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This is a short-term vision, ignoring the long-term consequences of Tehran’s military involvements and support for Shiite proxies across the region.
The candidates’ views on Iran’s rival Israel is critical. While both parties publicly support Israel, Democrats have recently had strained ties with it due to their leanings toward the nuclear deal and further rapprochement with Tehran.
Engagement
Democrats tend to prefer isolationism to more engagement in the region. From Tehran’s perspective, a U.S. withdrawal creates a vacuum that can be filled by it or its Shiite proxies. Also, due to ISIS and the latest regional developments, Democrats lean more toward the idea of Iranian leadership in the region than Arab leadership. For Tehran, a Democratic president will tip the regional balance of power in its favor.
Sanders subscribes to these views, and is much more left-leaning than the other Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Martin O’Malley. Sanders is isolationist and in favor of negotiating with Tehran. In the last Democratic debate, he emphasized the role of Iran. He is the only candidate who has frequently and strongly stressed the idea of cooperating with Tehran to deal with regional issues.
Clinton prefers more U.S. regional engagement. For example, she favors a no-fly zone in Syria, which would threaten Tehran’s interests there. Sanders focuses on domestic issues, and seeks to emulate European countries’ domestic and foreign policies. It follows then that if he becomes president, there would be improved U.S.-Iranian ties since European nations enjoy better ties with Tehran than Washington.
Since the odds appear to favor a Democratic victory in the 2016 election, bilateral ties are more likely to improve or at least not worsen.
Libyan deal on course, but who is on board?
Abdallah Schleifer/Al Arabiya/December 25/15
Last week, representatives of the internationally-recognized Libyan government in Tobruk, and the General National Congress (GNC) – the Islamist-dominated rival authority in Tripoli – signed a U.N.-brokered agreement to form a unity government, which was quickly endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. It is the fruit of nearly a year of sporadic negotiations – a process whose flaws are reflected in the document.
The mediation focused on rival parties and movements, and ignored the tribes that remain central to whatever is still stable in day-to-day life, and are as much a factor as the political movements in the ongoing strife that has characterized Libya since the fall of Moammar Gaddafi.
Thus the Muslim Brotherhood and even more radical Islamist groups that dominate the GNC could only have seized Tripoli and established a rival government after losing elections because they had the support of Misrata tribal militias traditionally opposed to those in Zintan, which supported the legitimate government and subsequently undertook much of the fighting on its behalf, in particular in Tripoli.
Most political figures are grudgingly going along with the deal because of the obvious widespread yearning among Libyans for peace.
Mutual opposition
The speakers of the rival parliaments announced their opposition to the deal as soon as it was announced. Both men are considered hardliners within their respective camps. GNC President Nouri Abu Sahmain has links to the most extremist elements among the Islamist alliances concentrated in Tripoli.
Agila Saleh, head of the legitimate parliament – the House of Representatives (HOR) – has close ties with Libyan army commander in chief General Khalifa Haftar, who is ferociously opposed to all forms of Islamist politics. The two men, at opposite extremes of Libyan politics, actually met together to express their opposition to the deal.
Their refusal was dressed in a nationalist or even patriotic appeal against a unity government in all its details and choice of leadership imposed by an outside force. Instead, they offered the 1951 constitution, but with a ceremonial president instead of a constitutional monarchy. This counter-proposal is not going anywhere in Libya, but it did take the wind out of a growing demand to restore the 1951 constitution in its original form.
Life support
Why then has the unity deal not crashed? Because rival Misrata and Zintan militias had already agreed to a ceasefire, and because the strong Muslim Brotherhood faction within the GNC leadership secured from the U.N. mediator a State Council drawn entirely from the GNC to serve as an advisory body to the HOR.
The unity deal recognized the HOR as the sole legislative authority, but there is a clause buried in it suggesting that in certain types of legislation, the State Council shall express a binding opinion to the unity government, which is otherwise dominated by the HOR.
The deal has not crashed also because of the growing strength in Libya of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The HOR has been asking for the past year that the U.N. Security Council lift the U.N. arms embargo so it can secure heavy weaponry to seriously move against ISIS.
The United States and UK refused, saying they will only do so when there is a unity government. As such, ISIS has been relatively unchallenged as it expands in Libya. So in recent months, London and Washington have been increasing pressure on both sides to sign a unity deal, threatening political isolation for whoever obstructs it, and promising financial and military aid to any unity government that emerges from the U.N.-brokered talks.
Perhaps most important of all, most political figures – particularly those identified with the HOR – are grudgingly going along with the deal because of the obvious widespread yearning among Libyans for peace
