The Kurdish Dilemma
Ali Ibrahim/Asharq Al Awsat/October 28/15
The joint operation by US and Kurdish Peshmerga forces to free 20 Iraqis captured by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq has created much controversy, given that it is the first ground operation carried out by the Americans in Iraq since the decision to withdraw all US forces from the country. It was an operation that carried some risk, and that was clear when reports and statements confirmed that the US had lost one soldier during the raid to free the hostages from ISIS, which was intent on executing them. But the operation was also noteworthy because it was the first the US had carried out in coordination with any foreign forces on Iraqi territory since the end of the Nuri Al-Maliki era, during which the US had decided against having any permanent military presence in the country. There has certainly been coordination between the Americans and the Kurds before. But this happened in Kobani, in Syria, where Kurdish forces reached out to the Americans after they were surrounded by ISIS forces. The US then hit the extremist group’s targets in the area with airstrikes, while the Kurdish forces on the ground assaulted ISIS positions with a ferocity that ended up inflicting heavy losses on the extremists and drove them out of the area. By contrast, Iraqi forces fighting ISIS have not held their ground at all. We saw this most recently in the Iraqi city of Ramadi, which the extremist group captured in May using tactics combining suicide bomb attacks and booby-trapped vehicles. In Syria, meanwhile, the picture remains murky, especially after Barack Obama’s recent announcement that Washington would be reevaluating its support for the moderate Syrian opposition after many of them were captured by ISIS and ended up handing over their US weapons to the extremist group. Then came the Russian military intervention in Syria, which reveals a much more pragmatic strategy for working with forces on the ground fighting ISIS. However, we must bear in mind that the Russian plan sees Assad’s army as its main partner against ISIS and the most likely candidate for defeating the group in Syria. This is of course a problem for those opposition fighters that both support the Syrian revolution against the Assad regime and are also fighting ISIS on the ground. They view the Assad regime as the problem and not the solution and want revolutionary forces to establish themselves on the ground in Syria and also drive out ISIS from the country so that its fighters can return to the various countries from which they came. Until now, though, the Kurds have been the only fighting force that has proven its worth against ISIS, whether in Iraq or in Syria. But the Kurds also have political aims—and they have not been coy about them—to gain international backing for the establishment of their own autonomous state in the region. This has indeed been a sticking point for efforts seeking both to find a resolution to the Syrian conflict and drive ISIS out of Iraq. It is a serious political problem, because anyone who would support such aims would put themselves at odds with Turkey, Iran, and other domestic factions. When it finally comes time for all to sit at the negotiating table and find political solutions to these crises, there would need to be a clear vision for solving this Kurdish dilemma. As things stand, there isn’t one, and this makes it extremely difficult to find any solutions to the current problems. We can put it like this: Turkey considers Kurdish calls for autonomy more dangerous to its national security than the threat of ISIS.
The Russians and the Syrian Crisis
Salman Aldosary/Asharq Al Awsat/October 28/15
Russia did not wait long after its entrance into the Syrian conflict to bolster its position. Since its military action began, Moscow has backed it up with a frenzied slew of political moves. The standout maneuvers here are Moscow’s proposed solutions to the crisis in Syria, details of which were covered by Asharq Al-Awsat on Saturday. Moscow has been able to take advantage of Western ambivalence on the Syria issue, which has created a space for President Vladimir Putin to rise to the occasion and allows the Kremlin to assume the role of an implacable international player in the crisis—one that has, at the same time, now also become indispensable to its solution. Bashar Al-Assad’s departure has always been at a crucial part of proposed international solutions on the Syria issue. But recently there have been a series of signs from Washington to London to Paris to Berlin, as well as other Western capitals, that they are changing tack on the issue, accepting Assad’s remaining in power perhaps for a brief period—a change that has come perhaps as a result of the influx of thousands of Syrian refugees into Europe. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—true friends of the Syrian people—have not budged from their positions on the Assad issue, assuming the role of isolated refuseniks who must now reluctantly deal with this international change of heart—one which, of course, benefits Russia. Neither country wants Assad to remain in power, even for a brief period; but neither has also objected to the recent international U-turn on the issue, as both wish to find a viable solution to this crisis whose problems grow ever more complex as time goes on. Whilst we cannot say that the Russian proposal is the best put forward thus far, it is certainly the “best of the worst” solutions that have been offered. The West has failed to adequately stand by the Syrian people, leaving the space open for the Russian Bear to step in and fill the vacuum. As the conflict has gone on, the world has slowly abandoned the Syrian people, until only Riyadh and Ankara are now left to swim against the current of international malaise on Syria, even after the U-turns on the Assad issue, which was, once upon a time, a red-line for the international community. The truth is that it is quite likely Assad will not leave after 18 months as has been proposed. We may well find that after three or four or even 10 years that the crisis remains ongoing, still inflamed, and Assad remains at the head of the ruling regime, even if he only controls a small part of the country’s overall territory. This is likely in light of the political and military support he continues to receive from Moscow. The dilemma now is how Assad can be kept as far away as possible from the political process in Syria during the coming period—and whether Moscow is truly capable of offering real guarantees that the current regime will not rise once again, in new form, like a phoenix from the ashes. Unfortunately, the absence of a positive role from the US, which was previously a leader in the talks and has now become a follower, hacks away at any confidence that the Russian plans will generate a genuine solution free of booby-trapped tactical moves from Moscow. This is especially true in light of the Syrian opposition’s concerns regarding Russia’s seriousness about reaching a genuine political solution. Last week’s meetings in Vienna on the Syrian crisis showed Washington acquiescing to Russia’s vision, as well a lack of any real desire from the White House to to assume a leading position on the issue. There is now nothing left for Washington to do except go through the motions pertaining to this new role it has adopted. Hopefully it will be able to secure some internationally sanctioned balance that will temper this new, terrifying Russian drive. The bitter reality is that Moscow is now pointing the way for everyone else to abandon Syria, while at the same time not being able guarantee there will be a Syria left at all, now that everyone has actually jumped ship.
