Middle East Peace Process: Oh No, Not Again!
Shoshana Bryen//Gatestone Institute/October 19/15
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6673/middle-east-peace-process
The Palestinians seek three things: a) Creation of an independent state without recognizing a legitimate and permanent State of Israel in any territory. b) Sovereign control of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. c) The right of entry for all remaining 1948/9 Arab refugees from Britain’s Mandatory Palestine, and for their descendants, to any place within pre-1967 Israel in which they, or their antecedents had lived.
Israel seeks three different things: a) Recognition of the legitimacy and permanence of Israel within finalized “secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” This is the security promise of UN Resolution 242 to which Israel is entitled. b) The capital of Israel in Jerusalem and Israeli protection for Jewish patrimony in Eastern Jerusalem. c) “End of conflict; end of claims.” After an agreement, the Palestinians will not be able to press additional claims against Israel for territory or other “rights.”
For the Obama administration now to pursue a Palestinian state…would likely be seen by both sides as nothing more than a shiny new distraction for the benefit of the U.S. negotiators’ vanity, nothing more.
Although most of what Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas recently said at the United Nations has been heard already, many times, the context has changed.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas addresses the UN General Assembly, on September 26, 2014. (Image source: UN)
West Bank Palestinians are — and are known to be — the most privileged refugees in the world. They are not running; they do not have to. Unlike Syrians, no one is dropping barrel bombs on them, starving them, or refusing them entry — as Jordan does with Palestinians among the refugees from Syria. The West Bank Palestinians have homes, food, jobs (often with Israeli companies that pay three times the prevailing Palestinian West Bank wages), education, political parties, seats in parliament, and relative security. Gazans are different, but Israel ensures that they have the basics.
Palestinians are irrelevant in the world, except that they suck up a vastly disproportionate share of the world’s aid money, which has allowed the PA to create a bureaucracy that even Palestinians complain is corrupt and unresponsive.
Hence Mahmoud Abbas’s jeremiad, accusing Israel of “crimes,” but without actually citing any.
Possibly to attempt relevance, Abbas used the U.N. pulpit to incite his followers — with false claims — to violence against the Jews. Now in the 11th year of his four-year term, he threatened to quit. He threatened to torch the Oslo Accords. But, in the end, the Palestinians have been heard already, and the discussion has moved to the hundreds of thousands of migrants sailing and marching to Europe, demanding food, housing and money.
It is in this context, dismayingly, that members of the U.S. Administration are lining up to restart the “peace process.” After reports that Secretary of State John Kerry had scuttled a meeting between Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu, a senior American official told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, “The secretary is interested in reengaging on the issue. He is talking to a full range of experts and stakeholders to better understand the options as part of our ongoing policy review.”
“Policy reviews” have also been heard already. The parameters never change. The absence of progress is owed to the absence of a shared goal toward which both parties can be induced to work. The Palestinians seek three things:
Creation of an independent state without recognizing a legitimate and permanent State of Israel in any territory.
Sovereign control of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
The right of entry for all remaining 1948/9 Arab refugees from Britain’s Mandatory Palestine, and for their descendants, to any place within pre-1967 Israel in which they, or their antecedents had lived.
Israel seeks three different things:
Recognition of the legitimacy and permanence of Israel within finalized “secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” This is the security promise of UN Resolution 242 to which Israel is entitled.
The capital of Israel in Jerusalem and Israeli protection for Jewish patrimony in Eastern Jerusalem.
“End of conflict; end of claims.” After an agreement, the Palestinians will not be able to press additional claims against Israel for territory or other “rights.”
Flying the Palestinian flag at the UN makes some people very happy and others less so, but it is clear that it was only symbolic. The impossibility of finding a shared goal is clear from the first priority on each side — before the questions of boundaries; Jews living in Palestine; security control of the Jordan River Valley; demilitarization; Jewish refugees from Arab countries and their descendants; or settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, which is separate from the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
The Obama administration is watching the disintegration of Sunni Arab culture in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The millennia-old Christian minorities are gone or fleeing. The foundations of Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Mali, and Nigeria are shaking. Turkey is pursuing its old vendetta against the Kurds. Russia, in addition to its new Iran-Shiite-Russian axis, evidently blessed by Obama, may be pursuing its old vendetta against Sunni Turkey — successor to the Ottoman Empire that committed genocide against Christian Armenians, cousins of Slavic Christians. Russia is also pursuing Chechens who gravitate to ISIS for arms and training to take back to Chechnya to restart the Muslim wars in southern Russia. Saudi Arabia is bombing Yemen; Egypt is bombing Libya on occasion, as well as the Iranian-supported Sunni jihadists in Sinai. Sunni Hamas and Shiite Hezbollah both take funding, training, and direction from Shiite Iran.
This sweeping convulsion also has been with us before. After a century, Sykes-Picot is being overtaken by events, with should-have-been-anticipated results. Strong governments are needed to resist guerrilla warfare or colonial wars of occupation; but overthrown strongmen in the Middle East have been replaced by chaos, which serves only the forces of war, and a vacuum that seems to be filled enthusiastically by Russia and Iran.
Mahmoud Abbas and Palestinian nationalism appear have outlived their moment. For the Obama administration now to pursue a Palestinian state, at the expense of Israel, already under daily explicit and lethal threats from Iran — re-empowered by the prospect of $150 billion followed by legitimate nuclear weapons soon — would likely be seen by both sides as nothing more than a shiny new distraction for the benefit of the U.S. negotiators’ vanity, nothing more.
Who is leading the intifada?
Adnan Abu Amer/Al-Monitor/Octobe 19/15
Two weeks into the latest outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian clashes in the West Bank and Jerusalem, none of the Palestinian factions have claimed responsibility for the events, as the field seems to have gone for a random, leaderless walk. In fact, there is disagreement over whether a leader is even needed.Yahya Moussa, a Hamas leader, chairman of the Oversight Committee in the Legislative Council and one of the leaders of the first intifada in 1987, told Al-Monitor, “The intifada requires that a unified national leadership be swiftly formed in order to coordinate and preserve the [intifada], and the Palestinian Authority leadership should return from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip because if it stays in the West Bank, then the intifada will inevitably fail.”
It’s remarkable that it took Palestinian leaders so long to address the confrontations. Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, didn’t address the clashes until Oct. 9. He called for support of what he described as the Jerusalem intifada and for protecting it from any efforts to undermine it.
For his part, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas tackled the confrontations Oct. 14, demanding that the international community immediately intervene to stop Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people. He said the ongoing crimes threaten peace and stability and could trigger a religious conflict in the region and the world.
In a striking paradox, several names are being considered for the leadership that does not exist: Jerusalem Intifada, Mass Intifada, Revolutionary Wave and Third Intifada.
Hussam Khader is a former member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, a Fatah figure in the West Bank and one of the leaders of the second intifada in 2000. In an interview with Al-Monitor, he called on Palestinians “not to get involved in a new intifada, as the latter is a national act that Palestinians resort to when they lose hope or reach a specific level of desperation.”
He added, “However, the Palestinian reality cannot afford to bear the consequences of a new intifada.”
The fact that this much time has passed without a political field leadership being formed raises questions as to who should lead the mass movement and whether this popular wave has a clear political vision and specific objectives, or stems from a mere emotional reaction to Israeli incursions into Al-Aqsa Mosque.
It should be noted that the average age of demonstrators and people responsible for stabbing and running over people is less than 20 years old. They were born after the Oslo Accord between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel in 1993 and 1995. They are just coming of age, and it’s hard for them to see any future but a bleak one.
A senior Palestinian official in Ramallah told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “President Abbas is facing calls within the Fatah leadership to support the Palestinian popular movement and allow the movement’s leaders to participate in the funeral of martyrs. [This call] came following instructions issued by high-ranking Palestinian quarters not to participate in such funerals, contrary to what happened in Gaza, when Hamas rushed to recognize the seven martyrs who were killed on the Gaza border in clashes with the Israeli army on Oct. 9.”
Reports about a leaderless intifada have gone viral on social networks in the past few days. Some Palestinian activists are calling for a decentralized field leadership capable of planning and guiding the movement while confronting Israeli escalations.
Others demand that the intifada remain spontaneous and leaderless. Still others believe that the success of the popular spontaneous movement is conclusive evidence of the failure of Palestinian organizations and leaders in their political performance in past years.
Also, there are those who say that swiftly forming a political leadership would harm the intifada because Palestinian faction leaders are helpless and have no role to play in expanding the intifada.
Abdul Alim Dana, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, told Al-Monitor, “Forming a unified political leadership is of the utmost importance in the event that an agreement between the Palestinian factions participating in the current events in the Palestinian territories — albeit minimal — has been reached about a common national program aimed at confronting [Israel]. Some factions have perceptions as to the formation of this leadership, but most of the intifada participants do not belong to political movements, and agreeing on a common national program requires long, in-depth discussions.”
Palestinian demonstrators will probably fail to continue confronting the Israeli army in the absence of an official Palestinian to lead the support, which is made up of various factions and organizations. The Palestinian Authority (PA) supports a mass uprising, but doesn’t want it to reach the stage of armed operations. Hamas seems to support continuation of the uprising in the West Bank, but does not want it to reach the Gaza Strip because Hamas does not want a new war with Israel, as Palestinian analysts said Oct. 12.
A preliminary review of the confrontations in the Palestinian territories indicates the absence of a political leadership to guide the developments, call for strikes, issue statements to mourn victims and support the families of victims by organizing condolence-paying services.
Al-Monitor looked into statements issued by Palestinian organizations in the past few days and found that they lack any documentation as to the number of victims or the areas of confrontation. Al-Monitor found only a Facebook page called Moqawama Press. The page documents events day by day and provides a round-the-clock account of the number of killed and wounded Palestinians and Israelis.
Hamas spokesman Husam Badran told Al-Monitor, “Hamas is all for having the intifada led through national consensus and everyone’s participation. Therefore, we are working to create a national command comprising all Palestinian forces, the first and easiest step being the formation of zonal leaders to guide field activities.”
There seems to be a clear conviction in the Palestinian street that the revolution in the West Bank and Jerusalem did not ask for the PA’s or any other faction’s permission. Also holding back formation of a unified political leadership could be differences between Fatah and Hamas regarding their description of the confrontations and their perceptions of consequences.
That idea was expressed in an article published Oct. 8 by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar, headed by Azmi Bishara. The article stated that the developments in the West Bank and Jerusalem broke out amid a deteriorating partisan and factional situation plaguing the Palestinian lands. Also, these developments are taking place outside the control of the PA.
The absence of leadership has seemingly not been spontaneous. There are those who believe that this mass uprising may stop any day now, eliminating the need for leadership.
There are also those who believe that the effort to agree on a leader could polarize Palestinians, knowing that there are more issues that could divide the factions than those that could unite them.
Add to this a third group — probably represented by Hamas — that dreads exposing its field leaders, who could be arrested by Palestinian and Israeli security services as soon as the uprising ends.
**Adnan Abu Amer is dean of the Faculty of Arts and head of the Press and Information Section at Al Ummah University Open Education, as well as a lecturer there in the history of the Palestinian issue, national security, political science and Islamic civilization. He holds a doctorate in political history from Damascus University and has published a number of books on issues related to the contemporary history of the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. On Twitter: @adnanabuamer1
The Taliban are coming back for Afghanistan
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Aabiya/October 18/15
It has not escaped anyone that the U.S. intervention in Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster. Twelve years on and the country is effectively split in three, between the Shi’a South, the Sunni North-West and the Kurdish North-East, with no sight on the horizon as to how it might ever be whole and peaceful again. We are reminded of this on a daily basis, as ISIS continues its rampage through the region. What we hear less of in the news is how Afghanistan is still in the grip of an ongoing civil war between the Western-backed government in Kabul and the Taliban. And the Taliban are on the ascent. Just this week, they have taken Kunduz, a major urban centre in the north of the country, and strategically important both for its transport links and its food production. Unlike in Iraq, the U.S. cannot be accused of being half-hearted in its efforts in the country. It continues to spend about 4 billion a year on the Afghan army, for example, and has so far spent over 65 billion, just on that. That is on top of all the other infrastructure and economic investment. The problem is that no amount of money is going to fix Afghanistan. Indeed, the American approach was doomed to failure from the start, a fact foretold by almost all experts. As in Iraq, the U.S. has proven perfectly apt at destroying a military and a state apparatus. And it can even rule a country under direct military occupation. What it cannot seem to do in a country where the majority of the population is hostile, is rebuild a civilian state from the ashes – not when the government military it tries to train up often has no desire to fight the Taliban, and sometimes trained soldiers simply desert to the Taliban. The problem facing Afghanistan is not one that the U.S., or any other external force can solve. And it has recently emerged that the Pakistanis had warned their U.S. allies that this was going to be the outcome all along. Vali Nasr’s recent book contains an iconic passage, describing how General Kayani, Chief of Pakistani Army, reacted to the American proposal to build up and equip an Afghan army for the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. Nasr narrates:
In one small meeting around a narrow table, Kayani listened carefully and took notes as we went through our list of issues. I cannot forget Kayani’s reaction when we enthusiastically explained our plan to build up Afghan forces to 400,000 by 2014. His answer was swift and unequivocal: Don’t do it. “You will fail,” he said. “Then you will leave and that half-trained army will break into militias that will be a problem for Pakistan.” We tried to stand our ground, but he would have none of it. He continued, “I don’t believe that the Congress is going to pay $9 billion a year for this 400,000-man force.” He was sure it would eventually collapse and the army’s broken pieces would resort to crime and terrorism to earn their keep. And so it was going to be. Something resembling an Afghan army still exists, and still fights, however half-heartedly, for the Kabul government. But for how much longer? The problem facing Afghanistan is not one that the U.S., or any other external force can solve. It is that it is not a country in the way we think of a country in the West – it is nothing even vaguely resembling a nation state. It is, instead, a diverse mix of ethnic and tribal alliances, as well as a number of urban polities, who have little in common and little interest in a common good. And they have been constantly fighting with each other since the 1970s, even before the Soviet invasion. The Taliban in the 90s had been the only group with both the firepower and the internal discipline to emerge on top of this conflict and impose some semblance of order. But as things stand now, even they might find it difficult to reimpose their authority. Nevertheless, one thing remains the case: whatever happens next, the prospects for a secular, democratic, pluralistic but unified Afghanistan run from Kabul are very dim indeed.
