Russia Faces Israel Deconfliction Dilemma
Middle East Briefing/October 10/15
The Netanyahu government in Israel is deeply disturbed by the unfolding situation in Syria and the lack of a solid understanding with Russia over how to deal with the ongoing threat from Hezbollah and Hamas. On Tuesday, Oct. 6, a Russian military delegation, led by Deputy Chief of Staff Nikolai Bogdanovsky, arrived in Israel to continue talks that began last month in Moscow, when Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot visited the Russian capital to confer with President Vladimir Putin and Valery Gerasimov.
While the Russians and Israelis announced they would establish a working group at the general staff level, significant disagreements remained after the Moscow talks, and there is skepticism that the issues have been resolved during the Russian delegation’s visit to Israel.
In the Moscow talks, Netanyahu sought Russian approval for Israel to continue military operations inside Syrian territory, whenever Israel got intelligence on weapons convoys moving towards the Lebanese border. The Syrian route is one of the primary channels for the smuggling of Iranian weapons into Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Putin outright rejected Israel’s blanket authorization to continue air operations against Hezbollah inside Syrian territory. He pledged, instead, that Russia would not permit Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel from inside Syria and would not permit Russian weapons to be turned over to Hezbollah. This left an enormous gap between the Israeli demands and the Russian promises. Most of the weapons obtained by Hezbollah and Hamas come from Iran, not Russia. Syria is known to be the storage depot for components of advanced rockets, which are smuggled into Lebanon and Gaza and are then assembled.
In the second round of negotiations in Israel, Netanyahu and the IDF leadership made clear that they consider it a high national security priority to have a free hand to block weapons smuggling into Lebanon and Gaza from Syria. Israel will not accept any deal that falls short of ironclad promises that the smuggling routes will be verifiably shut down.
Israel has already conducted reconnaissance sorties into airspace along the Syrian-Lebanese border, profiling for weak spots that can be penetrated. In one instance, Russian MIGs chased Israeli F-16s out.
Pentagon planners in Washington know that the deconfliction deal between Russia and Israel is a vital element of the overall conflict-avoidance architecture now being put in place, and they are deeply worried that the Israel-Russia dispute can blow apart the entire situation, regardless of the level of cooperation achieved between the US and Russian militaries. There is no doubt among Washington national security planners that Israel will take whatever actions it deems necessary to prevent the expansion of Hezbollah and Hamas capabilities to attack Israel with devastating rocket and missile assaults.
Among the proposals on the table when the Russian delegation sat down with IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan and top officials from Israeli military intelligence and the IDF Air Force: Israel would provide Russia with actionable intelligence against rebel forces in Syria, in return for permission for the IDF to carry out bombing runs against Hezbollah arms caravans crossing Syrian territory into Lebanon. Israel would provide advance warning to Russian military officials before launching any such actions.
From Israel’s standpoint, such a deal would be a win-win proposition. It would give Israel a leg up on Iran, as a source of intelligence for Russia’s military operations inside Syria, and it would put pressure on Russia to block Hezbollah from conducting any actions against Israel for the duration of the Russian military operations inside Syria. Israel would be a de facto stakeholder in the future of Syria, whatever the outcome of the new phase of combat and diplomacy.
From the Russian standpoint, such a deal would mean that Israel is neutralized as a border factor. In order to combat what all Israeli factions view as the greatest threat—Iran and Hezbollah—Israel had been providing limited support to some Syrian rebel factions, including some units affiliated with the Nusra Front, to keep Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps forces out of the border region. Israel could move to take control over larger portions of the Golan Heights as part of an enhanced security buffer zone.
Russian-Israeli relations have always been close (historically, the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the State of Israel). But in their Moscow talks, Putin made clear to Netanyahu that the one million-plus Israeli citizens of Russian descent are a voting bloc that he can influence. Avigdor Lieberman, who was once a close Netanyahu ally, serving as his chief of staff and later as his foreign minister, has broken from the Likud leader and could, at some point, help bring Netanyahu down.
Washington and Moscow Begin Complex Syria Talks
Middle East Briefing/October 10/15 http://mebriefing.com/?p=1966&utm_source=MEB+VOL+-+III_+Issue+98+September+2015&utm_campaign=VOL+III+-+Issue+98&utm_medium=email
The United States and Russia have begun complex negotiations on the future of Syria, with no clear indication at this time where they will lead. The talks are being conducted on three tracks.
have initiated talks with Russian counterparts on “deconfliction.” The objectives are to work out rules of engagement to avoid a direct clash between Russian and American forces operating inside Syrian territory. The talks, on the surface, are technical: establishing hot line communications, providing advanced information on planned combat operations to avoid any incidents, and, at a future point, potentially working out plans for joint combat operations against the Islamic State. The latter possibility is for the future.
Secretary of State John Kerry is pursuing a second, diplomatic track with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The two men have established a strong working relationship over years of negotiating the P5+1 deal with Iran and the effort to de-escalate the Ukraine crisis. The depth of their personal relationship is a potentially useful platform for working on a political solution to the four-and-a-half year Syrian conflict. This is, however, as complex as the deconfliction efforts underway between the Pentagon and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The United States and Russia share some objectives, including the idea of maintaining Syria as a unified state, with strong institutions and a secular orientation. But those goals may already be impossible, given the degree to which Syria has broken apart into sectarian enclaves of Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis, Shia and some few remaining Christians.
Furthermore, the US allies in the region have a different agenda than Washington and Moscow, and hold many powerful cards in the ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, Kerry and Lavrov are actively pursuing a Moscow-3 negotiating track, which in fact offers the only option for a settlement.
Russian leaders were taken aback by the sharp reaction by Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the deployment of Russian forces and advanced weaponry into Syria. Given the long Turkish-Syrian border, the US-Russian deconfliction negotiations are but one track. Russia must also negotiate rules of conduct with an angry Turkey and an angry Israel. While the US and Russia have so far avoided any incidents in the skies over Syria, there have been already incidents between Russian and Turkish fighter planes near the border, and at least one incident has been reported involving Israeli Air Force fighter planes that engaged with Russian Su-34s and were chased out of Syrian-Lebanese air space. Pentagon analysts have concluded that the greatest danger of an incident between Russian and Coalition forces is on the Turkish border, where Turkish pilots are known for their aggressive actions, and where Russian fighter jets may begin providing air cover for Kurdish militias fighting the Islamic State.
The third track of negotiations are the most sensitive of all. Various Obama Administration officials are trying to get a full picture of Russian intentions in Syria. If Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary objective is to prop up the Bashar Assad regime, Russian forces will likely target Western-backed rebel groups, including the Free Syrian Army, largely made up of defectors from the Syrian Army who are Syrian nationals and do not subscribe to the Salafist ideology.
The Pentagon and the CIA are assessing reports that as many as 2-3,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah ground troops are coming into Syria to boost the exhausted Syrian Army and to take advantage of the new Russian air support. If these reports prove accurate, it could confirm that Russia is out to bolster Assad’s grip on power by taking back territory now in the hands of rebel forces.
The Pentagon is also demanding clarification from both Moscow and Baghdad about the newly formed information center in the Iraqi capital, which involves Syria, Russia, Iran and Iraq. Will Russia begin combat operations in Iraq? So far, Lavrov has insisted to Kerry that Russia will not set foot in Iraq. Furthermore, the information center could further enhance Iran’s grip on Iraq, and this is exactly what the Obama Administration intends to prevent. Washington is keenly aware that Iran is insisting that ex-Prime Minister Maliki remains in a key position of power in the Abadi government.
The other concern for the Pentagon about the newly established information center is that most of the intelligence provided to the Iraqi Army comes from US intelligence. While it is possible that Russia will conduct intelligence operations in Iraq and even share that intelligence with the United States, for now, the US DOD sees the intelligence center as one more problem, adding to the complexity of the operations.
Adding to the complexities of the situation since the arrival of the Russian forces, the Obama Administration is facing demands from a bipartisan grouping in Washington to create a no-fly zone in northern Syria, explicitly to block Russian air operations in the area. Among the active proponents of such a no-fly zone are Gen. David Petraeus, who put forward the demand in recent Congressional hearings; Sen. John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Rep. Kevin McCarthy, who is possibly the next Speaker of the House of Representatives; presidential candidates John Kasich, Carly Fiorina and Hillary Clinton.
While the Republicans are pushing a heavily armed no-fly zone that could serve as a staging ground for Western-backed rebels, Clinton is promoting a “safe zone,” where refugees could be housed inside Syrian territory, slowing down the refugee flows into Europe.
Under stern warning from the JCS, President Obama has made clear that he will not support a no-fly zone or even a safe zone; however, if the level of combat increases, and another million Syrians flee the country, Europe will weigh in for any option, no matter how foolish, to curb the refugee stampede. European leaders are aware that the Erdogan government in Turkey facilitated the refugee flow into Europe to press European leaders to get more involved in the drive to overthrow Assad. The net effect, however, was to create a new rift between Ankara and the main European capitals.
