Ukraine or Afghanistan: Reasons and Consequence of Putin’s Bold Move in Syria
Samir Altaqi &Esam Aziz/Middle East Briefing/September 12/15
Russia’s increased military involvement in Syria will result in prolonging Syria’s civil war, additional difficulties in the already faltering war against ISIL, bringing the non-ISIL opposition closer to ISIL, and a substantial increase in regional tension.
The context of President Vladimir Putin’s decision to build a new military base in Latakia while increasing aid to Assad, including the probable participation of Russian military advisors in the battle of Zabadani, was set by the serious possibility of a sudden collapse of the Assad regime from within, or under attack from the opposition’s Southern Front.
Russia, a harsh critique of US interventionist policy in the Middle East, is now implementing its own interventionist policy. Prefabricated housing facilities, enough to host 1000 military personnel, have been air lifted to the site of the new base. Greek and Turkish authorities were asked to grant permission to fly a dispatch of military cargo planes in several occasions in the last few months.
It is not likely that the Russian increased involvement was coordinated with the US administration. We could not, however, confirm that from any official source in Washington, and we doubt we would be able to confirm or deny US prior knowledge in the near future. But there are several indications that Russia is deploying its forces along the lines believed to be separating areas of strategic interest to Iran and the Assad regime (the Western coastal region) from the rest of Syria. These are the lines where suggested UN forces could deploy in the future.
This summer, four factors played a major role in moving Moscow’s position from a limited support to Assad to going all the way in support of the Syrian President. Last June, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had met with Putin, he told journalists that he sensed a change in the Russian leader’s previously unfettered backing of Al Assad. “He is no longer of the opinion that Russia will support Al Assad to the end. I believe he can give up Al Assad,” Erdogan said.
Putin’s policy seems to have changed directions as a result of the following four developments:
* Lessons learned from the summer diplomatic effort:
During the summer, the Russians understood that the timid alternative represented in the “civilian opposition” in Syria will not be the convenient “at the end”, defined in Russian, which Erdogan mentioned. They found out that the actual momentum is in the hands of the armed groups. The armed opposition was determined to end the rule of Assad, and it was the armed opposition that holds the cards of the future of Syria. Regional supporters of this opposition were also determined to kick Assad and Iran out of every inch of Syria. Saudi Arabia refused to negotiate anything unless there is a consensus that Assad should go. They rejected a proposed role for Tehran without a prior approval of the departure of Assad. This was a reflection of the Saudi understanding that no one in Syria will accept to keep Assad after all this killing. Assad continuation means a certain continuation of instability. The middle road that the Russians were looking for in the civilian opposition was too narrow to allow a passage for a political solution.’
It is interesting that Russia’s open military assistance to Assad shows that the kind of political solution Moscow was talking about was unworthy of convincing Moscow itself to postpone its open aid to Assad. The Russians understood that the only solution possible will not guarantee their interests and that the solution they are marketing will change nothing. Furthermore, the situation on the war fronts was pushing the crisis beyond the point where the civilian opposition could make any real difference.
* Signing the Iran nuclear deal:
The Russian move gained momentum directly after the successful conclusion of the Iran nuclear negotiations. Moscow played an important role in helping the negotiations to succeed. President Obama said he was happily surprised at the assistance given by Moscow to overcome the obstacles that threatened the negotiations. It is now becoming clear that Moscow had its own plans in the Middle East and that breaking Iran’s international isolation was a mere part of it.
Apparently, Moscow’s agenda had two items- its own interests in Syria and those of Iran. The objective has always been to have a friendly regime in Damascus that guarantees Russia’s access to Syria’s coast and that respects Iran’s interests in South Lebanon and Syria. Iran, free of sanctions, was out of the hook. It has a lot to offer to Moscow. The interests of the two sides converged in Syria perfectly. ÷ it is time for Moscow to harvest what the West has planted-Long sanctions that ended with lifting them to make Iran a very valuable fruit for the Russians.
* The situation on the ground in Syria:During the summer and as it became obvious that Assad could not hold on his own for long time, a different calculus must have been made. The endgame was nearing in a spontaneous way where no one, US included, can guarantee the results. Watching the situation plays out the way it did, while President Obama is lost in the middle, Putin decided to walk the walk. Waiting for the result of negotiations between the civilian opposition and the regime was futile in view of the situation on the ground and the little or no difference this opposition can make.
Moscow understands, probably correctly, that its interests in Syria cannot be a standalone issue-that is to say in isolation from the nature of the future regime and the active forces in the new Syria. Whatever promises they could have been given to preserve these interests in a post-Assad Syria shaped by the armed opposition were not going to satisfy Moscow. For President Putin, dropping Assad is a matter of strategic calculation. If he could have credibly seen a chance that Russian and Iranian interests would be preserved in Syria under an alternative to Assad, he would have considered this alternative.
During this summer as well, it was clear that ISIL is expanding and that US does not know what to do. The fig leaf of the air raids against ISIL was politically helpful to the US administration, but it was not sufficient at all to halt the terrorists’ advance, let alone “crush” or defeat them. Putin found out that he had to do what he had to do.
*The US paralysis in Syria:
By summer, it became abundantly evident that the US administration either does not what to do in Syria or does not have the will to afford what should be done. The fiasco of the US “train and equip program” cleared some fog for the Russian leader. It became obvious that the US was stuck somewhere in the maze of the Syrian crisis. It could not tailor an approach that combines all the scattered factors in a favorable framework to guide its moves. The objectives looked to the US administration too contradictory to put together in one multifaceted approach. It wanted to bring the Iran talks to a fruitful conclusion, defeat ISIL, guarantee a soft landing for the regime in Damascus, prepare a friendly cohesive force to act on the ground in Syria, assist the opposition, pressure suspicious regional players to come to an accommodation on the future of Damascus, shape the armed conflict on the ground or do any other meaningful thing in the way of constructing a concept to deal with the challenge.
It is not only that the US administration’s “strategists” were unable to come up with a valid conceptual framework to get things where they want things to go, this was also combined with a lack of will to implement any meaningful strategy even if one was at hand. The do-nothing-approach was convenient to the US administration as it helped to avoid angering the Arabs or Iran and suited President Obama’s domestic political discourse.
This disinterested, disengaged state of mind led to scattered unconnected steps, and hence reaching an end station of total paralysis in the Middle East. The administration thought it sufficient to find cover in the success of the Iran talks in order to hide failures in everything else related to the Middle East.
Now, where will the Russian increased intervention in Syria take the Syrian crisis?
Four destinations are clear so far:
* The death of the political solution:
The first consequence of Putin’s decision is the death of any political solution. The one solution that is possible does not satisfy Moscow as it requires the departure of Assad, hence it jeopardizes Russian and Iranian interests. And the one solution that the Russians toyed with during the summer will change nothing in the actual configuration of the crisis.
It should be noted that even if there is a solution that addresses Russia’s interests but does not satisfy Tehran, it will be rejected by Moscow.
* The almost inevitable partition of Syria:
Putin’s move raised the confrontation in Syria to a higher level where a major international power is involved directly. It is clear that the Russian President estimates that the continuation of the crisis opens the doors to other powers’ intervention. There is already some speculations about a British and Australian military involvement under discussion. Putin decided that he must move quickly to demark “his”- and his allies in Tehran’s-territory-that is to say preserve Russia’s and Iran’s interests in Syria. This territory does not include all of Syria. It is only the Western coast strip populated mainly by Alawis in addition to areas adjacent to south Lebanon, where Hezbollah is stationed. The Russian intervention is said to be introduced to major capitals as a preparatory step for the deployment of Blue Hamlets to guard the lines between the future Khamenei-Putin-Assad Syria and the rest of that country.
* The expansion of ISIL:
Russia’s bold step in Syria will complicate the effort to reach a political deal as it will harden Assad’s approach and bring him back to the non-starter conditions he previously announced. It will, furthermore, make the armed opposition, determined to get rid of the Syrian President, more reluctant to deal with the idea of a political deal. That will reduce the relative distance between this opposition and ISIL if measured in tactical approaches to the crisis.
In other words, if the prospects of a political solution is pulled out of the picture, the result will be putting ISIL and non-ISIL opposition forces on one common ground. Circumstances will be more conductive to solving subjective differences between them so far as objectively separating the two side is minimized by the absence of any political horizon and as they both meet in the same side of the fence.
A “reconciliation” between the opposition groups and ISIL would most probably be reached. The reason this reconciliation is likely is the fact that the Russian recent step, by its very nature, means a more militarization of the conflict. The opposition will realize that it is squeezed between either accepting bits of the remains of Syria or fighting until “the end”- their end. The Russian “end” has nothing to do with the Syrian opposition.
* The continuation of the war for the foreseeable future:
The problem that the Russian leader will encounter is the same that existed all along-Syria’s armed opposition. As just have been mentioned, Russia’s military base in Latakia betrays the fact that the endgame acceptable to Moscow and Iran is the partition of Syria with full control of both powers over the western coast of Syria.
But that reveals as well that there is an assumption, very questionable indeed, that the opposition will cease fire once it sees the “border line” of Assad-Khamenei-Putin’s western land. If this can happen in the future, it could have happened in the past. The war will certainly drag on and the imaginary borders between the West and the Rest will never be static. The assumption that ISIL and the non-ISIL will fight each other in the Rest may prove self-deceptive. Lessons of Kabul and the Rest during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan seem to have been forgetten.
Even when two sides of that kind fight each other, the result we usually see is not the ashes of both as empirical minds imagine. It is a third entity that does may not, seen from this early corner, be very attractive.
By entering Syria in this heavily militarized fashion, the Russian used the green light that may have been given by the US administration to achieve a different objective-establishing a permanent and unchallenged presence on the whole coast of Syria. It might have been Putin’s response to Suzan Rice Libya trick in the UNSC in 2011. Vitaly Churkin nodded then in approval of a limited humanitarian mission for NATO in Libya to find out later that it was the full-fledged operation that brought the current chaos. The question is whether Secretary Kerry nodded now in approval of an operation that will bring more of the same. But it appears that the last laugh will not be Putin’s. It is ironic that somehow the arrow manages in certain cases to make a U-Turn in midair.
Yet, the main question is if it will be another Ukraine, or is it Afghanistan all over again. All looks like we are on for another Afghanistan.
