Can Michel Aoun Be Defeated in Lebanon?
He is highly respected but is no longer a viable contender for Lebanon’s presidency. Even for Hezbollah
By Joseph A. Kechichian, Senior writer/Gulf News/ Published: August 19, 2015
The contrast between two recent demonstrations in Lebanon was striking. A few hundred Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) supporters gathered last week at Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut heeding a call from General Michel Aoun and to mobilise against the government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam. Then on Friday, Hezbollah organised a grand rally at Wadi Hujayr in South Lebanon, a valley made famous during the 2006 war when its militiamen destroyed numerous Israeli Merkava tanks at the very spot. Although the festive occasion marked the ninth anniversary of what Hezbollah calls “Divine Victory” against Israel, the group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah barely touched on the “enemy”. Instead he focused on Aoun and how nothing or no one could defeat his erstwhile ally. Is that the case?
In his bombastic pronouncement, the Hezbollah chief renewed his call on the Future Movement to enter into a dialogue with Aoun allegedly to find solutions to the divisive issues threatening to cripple the government’s work, ranging the gamut from security appointments to the Cabinet’s decision-making system that apparently is no longer acceptable. “Today … I want to reaffirm that … we do not accept that any of our allies are excluded or broken, especially those who stood beside us in the July [2006] war and tied their necks, their fates and their blood to ours,” Nasrallah said in a clear reference to the FPM. He added that his backing of Aoun was not a mere political ploy, but involved a “moral and humanitarian” dimension, as he demanded respect for the FPM. “You can’t break Aoun and you can’t isolate him,” Nasrallah warned Salam and his government, even if no such plans existed.
Then came the icing on the cake. “We are committed to this position,” hammered Nasrallah, as he emphasised that Aoun was a compulsory passage, arguing that state institutions could not possibly function if the FPM was excluded. That clarification revealed that Nasrallah perceived Aoun as a compulsory passage, which led one to wonder whether a mere channel translated into solid backing for the presidency.
Equally shocking was Nasrallah’s call to preserve the very idea of coexistence in a single, and presumably united, state. “When we are all present in state institutions, we can be reassured that no one is seeking to eliminate anyone,” he added, describing the Lebanese state as “the guarantee and the solution” for all citizens. This amazing request rejected partition and federalism, two ideas that were on everyone’s minds and lips, especially FPM backers. Of course, the Hezbollah cleric clarified what kind of state he had in mind — one that encouraged real partnership instead of the entity that hindered equality — although he failed to grasp the notion that the civil war produced an amended constitution that awaited full implementation.
Be that as it may, what was interesting was whether this part of the speech was hastily added after Nasrallah spoke with the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif — who, incidentally praised Salam and the Lebanese government and, most importantly, did not visit Imad Mughniyeh’s grave as such a stop has become more or less routine for every Iranian visitor to Beirut during the past few years. Equally important and highly symbolic was the meeting between Zarif and Defence Minister Samir Muqbel that was yet another sign of support from Tehran for Beirut. No wonder the Lebanese army is now perceived as a source of salvation, especially after repeated catastrophes in Syria.
Wisely, Zarif distanced Iran from internal Lebanese affairs and stated that local actors ought to assume responsibilities to elect a head-of-state, and while Nasrallah insisted that “those who think that Iran might pressure its allies in the presidential issue are delusional,” his call on Christian leaders to reevaluate their stances was pure denial, since it is Hezbollah and the FPM that are blocking the election of a president. To be sure, Nasrallah held on to his alliance with the FPM and hinted that the party might join future street protests if Aoun’s demands for partnership in the government were not met, though it royally chose to pass the opportunity to do just that last week.
Consequently, it was likely that Nasrallah perceived his new challenges on two separate levels.
First, to engage in a gradual political isolation of the FPM leader since the Hezbollah chief barely promised an opportunistic solidarity with his Christian ally, despite his elegant “General Aoun is a must for the presidency” claim. Recent declarations by Amal leader Nabih Berri clarified where a critical component of the opposition stood, when the Speaker rejected Aoun, which spoke volumes. This was followed by an extremely difficult meeting between the Minister of Finance, Ali Hassan Khalil, a Berri counsellor, and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, one of Aoun’s sons-in-law, which failed to mend ties between Berri and Aoun. The gathering apparently degenerated into a shouting match and added fresh disputes to the rapidly growing list, this time over the payment of salaries for civil servants that could not be honoured in September unless the executive branch paralysis was lifted.
The second preference aimed not to isolate the FPM but use it to provoke a confrontation with the Future Movement, that is to say between Christians and Sunnis, something that former prime minister Sa’ad Hariri warned about repeatedly. Hariri affirmed that there was no plan to eliminate Aoun as a political force but the fact was rather clear: he simply was not electable. Virulently anti-Future Movement posters, carried by former ministers no less, at the most recent FPM demonstration, betrayed what Hezbollah planned for the future. Was it not illogical to call for dialogue between the FPM and Future Movement when the latter were portrayed as extremists bent on destroying the state?
As Iranian agents in Lebanon, Hezbollah advanced Tehran’s dual objectives in the Levant: preserve stability if possible and keep-up the pressure for relevance on the regional map. Yet, by pushing for a Sunni-Christian confrontation, Hezbollah may well believe that it is preventing a Sunni-Shiite clash, which it could not possibly win given rapidly changing developments on the ground throughout the area. Under the circumstances, Tehran may have persuaded itself that Hezbollah could become a mediating force, though that was an impossibility too, since party spokespersons excelled in unprecedented sectarian discourses that divided rather than united. At this point, it is clear that Aoun is actually defeated and, ironically, at the hands of his own allies who simply request that their candidate is no longer “disrespected”. That’s easy. Aoun is highly respected but is no longer a viable contender. Even for Hezbollah.
**Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Iffat Al Thunayan: An Arabian Queen, London: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.
