Raed Omari /What’s the difference between ISIS and Asaib Ahl al-Haq?

448

What’s the difference between ISIS and Asaib Ahl al-Haq?
By: Raed Omari /Al Arabiya

Sunday, 31 August 2014

Except maybe for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the reactivation of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism was good news to people around the world, particularly in Iraq and Syria. We were all concerned after seeing what appeared to be the world returning to the Dark Ages. Mass killings, looting, forced migration, torture, crucifixion and beheadings have been just some examples of the inhumanities resurrected by ISIS. The word “beheading” has no place in the human dictionary anyway. It is indubitable that ISIS’ predominance in the region, culminated in the proclamation of its caliphate, has been the direct result of the world’s inaction on both Syria and Iraq. It is also beyond doubt that the world’s failure to institutionalize the anti-terror war has emboldened ISIS and other similar groups to act as if they were independent and sovereign states, while killing, robbing and crushing minorities without fear of punishment or prosecution.

There is no need to delve into the reasons why the U.S. and the EU had remained silent on ISIS until recently, suffice to say that their fear of militant extremism reaching their own doorsteps was what led them to make their long-awaited decisiveness on dealing with terror. What triggered the U.S. airstrikes on ISIS posts in Iraq was the stomach-turning beheading of U.S. journalist James Foley by the Jihadist militia. “In order for the resurrected global war on terror to succeed, it has to be kept aside from the influence of politics” It is better late than never, anyway. We all feared such horrific acts would go unpunished and that ISIS would turn into a reality and untouchable entity one day. Now there is regional and international cooperation to stand firm against the jihadist militia and there is a reactivation of the global war on terror through the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Center and other international channels. The embodiment of all terror However, it seems ISIS is the embodiment of all terror. If mass killings, executions, bombings, shelling of civilians and crushing minorities are terror attributes, I wonder why it is that the Iraqi Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) has not been labeled a terrorist organization.

Until proving otherwise, the Shiite militia has been accused of being behind the two attacks on Baghdad’s northern province of Diyala, one of them on a mosque, which killed dozens of Arab Sunnis. For political and sectarian reasons and with regard to similar violent acts carried by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Iran-backed militia could have committed the shooting attack on the Sunni mosque, now referred to as the Musab Bin Omair Mosque massacre. It is not Asaib Ahl al-Haq alone that matters most in this context. There are other similar Shiite militias in Iraq, including Mahdi Army, Badr Organization and Hezbollah Brigade of similar terrorist and sectarian attitudes that are typified in ISIS and the Nusra Front. But, again, why have such violent Shiite militias not been elevated to the status of terrorist organizations like ISIS? It may be due to ISIS’ “show off” attitude, its large-scale operations or horrific televised acts as opposed to the small-scale, secret terrorist acts by private Iraqi Shiite militias against Sunni communities.

While the U.S. is in declared war against ISIS, it should be noted that the reason why some Arab Sunnis had subscribed or supported ISIS in both Iraq and Syria was the marginalization and crackdown they long suffered under the Shiite governments. ISIS owes much of its predominance to the Arab Sunnis in both war-hit countries who saw in the Jihadist group a “savior” or even a tool to help them get rid of sectarian regimes. With the departure of Nouri al-Maliki and the beginning of the U.S. bombardments of ISIS targets, the pragmatic ISIS-Arab Sunnis relationship began to collapse but it might be reinforced again if the “selective” anti-terrorism approach remains the norm. Terrorism is terrorism: it is not confined to a single sect and should not be applied with double standards. ISIS, the Nusra Front, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Syrian regime are all terrorist groups, responsible for mass killings, torture and crimes against humanity. In order for the resurrected global war on terror to succeed, it has to be kept aside from the influence of politics, waged purely in the service of humanity with no other considerations.

Egypt has regained its regional leadership and the Palestinian cause Sunday, 31 August 2014 Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya The Egyptian-Saudi-Emirati roles overlap on many fast-developing issues, including Palestine, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This tripartite partnership constitutes an important strategic choice with many regional and international dimensions. First of all, there seems to be a determination to restore an Arab position in the regional balance of power, and it is clear that the two Gulf partners see Egypt as naturally qualified for this role that they both support. The second dimension is that the integration between the two Gulf states and Egypt has a direct impact on decision-making concerned with the Arab future itself, and not only as concerns the Arab weight in the regional balance of power. This dimension has two parts: One that has to do with the confrontation with multilateral and multilayered projects, such as the politically ambitious Muslim Brotherhood project, and the project led by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which is coming down with devastating force on the Arab region with nihilistic goals that spare no one. The other part has to do with the hot issues and conflicts that both Iran and Turkey play a role in, in varying degrees and for varying purposes, and also the Palestinian issue, where Israel is proving that it is not interested in the two-state solution but is instead resolved to find alternatives such as the demographic solution to establish a purely Jewish state. In Palestine, it is clear that Egypt played a key role in brokering a truce, and that Hamas and its regional partners had to accept the Egyptian initiative in the end, after initially rejecting it stubbornly. Egypt, then, has restored its leading role in Palestine, and was keen for the Palestinian Authority to restore its main role in Palestinian decision-making, the goal: to prevent such powers from being left in the hands of others at a high cost paid by the Palestinians, rather than by the polarizers or the exploiters of the Palestinian cause.

At best, it is possible to say that Hamas’ strategy implicated Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and lured him into making mistakes, precipitated by his arrogance, which grew stronger thanks to Israeli popular support for the recent decisive military action against Hamas. It is also possible to say that Hamas’ rockets, which hit an Israeli airport and forced airlines to cancel their trips to Israel, were a new qualitative achievement in the Palestinian-Israeli arena. This is in addition to the military cost for Israel, including the killing of a large number of Israeli soldiers who carried out the incursion into Gaza, and this is considered a military victory especially since the war took place between a militarily superior state and a non-state actor. “In Palestine, it is clear that Egypt played a key role in brokering a truce” The Palestinian Authority has benefited from the fait accompli, and is on the cusp of making new decisions in the aftermath of the third Gaza war. Hamas had no intention of giving the Palestinian Authority regional and international momentum, and what Hamas did in the Gaza war was not part of a ploy with Fatah or the Palestinian Authority to play different but coordinated roles. Losers claiming to be victors Hamas did not achieve what it had in mind when it entered the war, and Israel did not win what it had mobilized itself to achieve. Both sides are losers who are claiming to be the victors.

This is what happened in all of Israel’s wars with the organizations that challenged it, using excessive barbaric power against civilians and infrastructure, and leaving behind thousands of victims and tremendous devastation. Israel has lost traditional Western sympathy, especially after the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) exposed it for committing crimes against humanity. Hamas for its part lost what it sought politically, and also lost leaders while its tunnels were destroyed. But the biggest lost is the loss of the lives of more than 2,000 Palestinians and the destruction of thousands of homes. Yet both sides claim to have won, and there is some ground for their claims. However, victory is far from the real equation. Today’s truce will be followed by extensive negotiations that require serious concessions. When the time comes for that, seasoned Egyptian diplomacy will play a role that boosts its efforts to restore its leading Arab role in the Palestinian issue, supported by its Saudi and Emirati partners. Egypt has taken the reins of this leadership with a Palestinian decision that Hamas was forced to consent to, and that the Palestinian Authority welcomed, though now it has to prove its political merit. Manipulating the Palestinian cause Regionally, the Palestinian cause has been pulled away from Syria’s hands. For years, Damascus manipulated the Palestinian cause as it pleased and when it pleased. Today, Egypt has regained control of it with its regional leadership.

This development has implications for more than one country, including Lebanon, where the Syrian management of the Palestinian cause led to using Lebanon as a military platform for many goals that had nothing to do with the Palestinians. The Egyptian-Syrian equation is remarkable on several levels. The comparison between the two countries since the outbreak of the wave of change in the Arab region is also remarkable. Egypt today is on the rise, after having deposed two presidents. By contrast, Syria is in decline, it is paying the price of its recalcitrance with the terrible destruction of the country; is facing fragmentation and disintegration; and has lost its regional leadership. Now, Syria is the focus of “counter-terrorism,” with terrorism being perpetrated by both the regime and the imported opposition equally. Damascus is calling for internationalization as an opportunity for its rehabilitation. It wants to lure President Barack Obama to Syria as part of the war on terror, while ISIS is seeking to lure the American president to the Syrian and Iraqi arenas at the same time. Covert and overt operations Barack Obama is in a predicament. He cannot cooperate openly with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who he once said had lost legitimacy and called for his resignation. But intelligence cooperation is a different issue, and this kind of cooperation has existed between Damascus and Western intelligence services for some time. There is a big difference between covert and overt cooperation. The former is something that the West wants, while the second is something that Syria wants, as a prelude to internationalization and rehabilitation. No matter what happens, the American president’s actions against ISIS in Syria will most likely be different from those against ISIS in Iraq.

To be sure, there are no indications that the U.S. policy has deviated from the goal of turning Syria into a graveyard for everyone in it – i.e. all those who are participating in, supporting, and adopting the fight. There is also no sign of a radical U.S. intervention in Syria, beyond deploying drones and reconnaissance planes. Certainly, this limited intervention remains of extreme importance, but it will not amount to the formal public partnership that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem has called for. Most probably, Barack Obama will avoid anything that could drag him deeper and further, by establishing a relationship of appeasement with Damascus, because this is something that he would be held accountable for internally. As he has said, the battle with ISIS and its ilk is complex and protracted, as long as there are policies that fuel such groups and create nurturing environments for them.

Two cardinal errors President Barack Obama has committed two cardinal errors in his policies towards the Middle East: Distancing himself from the Syrian event, which has helped terrorism grow and Syria to be fragmented; and his overwhelming eagerness to endorse the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and to assume that the people of Egypt would accept imposing religion on the state and the Muslim Brotherhood project, and that other influential countries would cave in to his erroneous and failed strategic choice. Saudi diplomacy has relayed to Barack Obama very clearly that Egypt was a red line. Saudi Arabia and the UAE thus moved immediately to support Egypt in the wake of the popular trial of President Mohamed Mursi, whose party had assumed that the elections that brought it to power gave it the right to seize all levers of power in Egypt.

The Saudi move to dispatch a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal to the Gulf states, starting with Qatar, is important especially in light of rapid escalation in many issues, especially in Libya and Yemen, along with Iraq and Syria. Libya needs rescuing before it turns into an inferno whose fires could spread to neighboring countries. But this appears to be impossible without Egyptian and Algerian intervention of one kind or another. Indeed, both of these countries are directly concerned because of the border they share with Libya, and they are the most important Arab-African nations. Though they always competed in the past, what brings them together now is the threat of radical Islamist groups in Libya, which are their common enemy. Libya today has become an Arab and African problem. Libya will not recover without Egyptian-Saudi-Emirati partnership, or away from Egyptian-Algerian cooperation, and in the absence of this, Libya is likely to suffer further fragmentation, disintegration, and collapse. Yemen is another issue where Obama’s war on terror through drones overlaps with the Iranian support for the Houthis, amid insistence by the Muslim Brotherhood on imposing themselves; amid tribal conflicts; and amid rampant corruption. The signs of Saudi-Iranian understandings had come through the Iraqi gateway, with the removal of the obstacle represented by Nouri al-Maliki, who was removed from power, followed by the visit of a senior Iranian delegation to Riyadh.

The signs of confrontations came from the Yemeni gateway, when the Houthis began a major escalation that threatens the country. What is a constant here is that there is a Saudi-Egyptian-Emirati strategic relationship has important regional dimensions, and this deserves appreciation, at least for what it represents in the regional balance of power and as a bulwark against the projects led by radical Islamist groups. This article was first published in al-Hayat on August 28, 2014 and was translated by Karim Traboulsi.