Iraq and Syria—One Country, One War Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al Awsat
Sunday, 14 Jun, 2015
About a year ago, US President Barack Obama attempted to justify Washington’s different approach on the crises in Iraq and Syria. While drones, military consultants, and arms have been sent to Iraq, only humanitarian aid—blankets, medicines, supplies—have been sent to Syria. Back then, Obama said his administration was committed to Iraq’s security because the country has strategic value for the US. Regarding the US position on Syria he said meanwhile that it would remain firmly focused on the political and humanitarian fronts since there were no plans for any other kind of American involvement in the crisis.
Naturally, most governments speak about Iraq and Syria separately. But this divide between the two neighbors is based on old maps and is in reality no longer tangible on the ground. There are no borders, border guards, passports, or armies separating Iraq and Syria anymore. Many checkpoints have become mere stopovers for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants and other fighters crossing into and out of Iraq’s western Anbar province. War and terrorism have united both countries. And, so, ISIS now seems justified in having named itself the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.”
Back when Iraq and Syria’s borders first began to “disappear,” I wrote about how viewing the situation according to the old, traditional rules—border markers, flags, countries, religion—would result in a failure to understand the depth of the crisis. But the picture is now clearer. Current events in Iraq are an indispensable part of developments in Syria, and both countries’ borders are now worn-out old lines jotted on paper at the offices of various foreign affairs ministries around the world. We are currently witnessing a crisis that unites the two countries, all the way from Syria’s Bab Al-Hawa border crossing north of Turkey, to Jordan’s Trebil on the border with Iraq, to Saudi Arabia’s Arar crossing, just south of Iraq. ISIS militants now loom dangerously on the suburbs of both the Syrian capital Damascus and the Iraqi capital Baghdad.
If concerned countries wish to confront this crisis and stop ISIS’s expansion, they must deal with Iraq and Syria as one country, because success and failure in one is now connected to the other. It is no longer relevant that the world, and particularly the United States, categorizes Iraq as an oil-rich country with strategic importance while at the same time categorizing Syria as a mere radish farm! We are before a Siamese twin facing one war against the same enemy.
All this means of course that depending on the Baghdad government will not achieve much. It also means that supporting Shi’ite militias in Iraq via the Shi’ite-dominated Popular Mobilization volunteer forces will deepen wounds and increase collective Sunni resentment toward Baghdad as well increase hostility against the US. Such policies will in the end make ISIS’s pretensions to statehood and being the representative of the majority of Sunnis in both Syria and Iraq, an actual reality.
The remaining reasonable option, after the failure of the above alternatives, is to support opposition Sunni forces in Syria and Sunni tribal forces in Iraq to help them fight ISIS—which claims to be a Sunni group—and to stop using the Popular Mobilization forces and Shi’ite militias in Iraq—which are under the control of the Iranians and actually end up serving the aims of ISIS. It also goes without saying that concrete steps must be taken to resolve the tragedy which the Syrian people are currently experiencing. Syrian Sunnis, who make up around 80 percent of the country’s population, cannot remain silent towards Assad’s regime after his forces have now killed more than a quarter of a million Syrians. Iran and its ally Assad will not begin to accept a political solution that leads to healing the Sunni majority unless an aerial plan is developed to confront and prevent the Syrian regime’s daily massacres. Assad’s air force is currently allowed to fly and drop barrel bombs on civilians as it resumes its ethnic cleansing operation. Meanwhile the Syrian opposition is prohibited from obtaining access to advanced weapons that could help them defend themselves against Assad’s air power. To rub salt in the wound, the international community refuses to impose a no-fly zone, which would put an end to this tragic situation.In the absence of an adequate understanding and resolution of these crises, ISIS will no doubt expand and find itself more supporters and fighters—even more than the current 100,000 militants fighting alongside it in Iraq and Syria.
Breaking Yemen’s military stalemate is key for Geneva talks
Sunday, 14 June 2015
Mohamed Chebarro/Al Arabiya
Anything short of a clear and verifiable victory for either side in Yemen will not pave the way for a political settlement in the upcoming Geneva talks. The Houthi militias and deposed President Saleh will not be persuaded to return to the previously agreed power-sharing agreement unless they are squeezed militarily and feel their fortune is about to turn.Hence the Geneva meeting risks becoming a platform that undermines the Arab coalition and raises the Houthi and Saleh’s profile as victims on the international stage. The Houthis and Saleh are unlikely to discuss the implementation of the U.N. Resolution 2216, as many believe that more than 70 days of Saudi-led air strikes has not led to great losses that would have allowed for the Resolution’s implementation; if the Houthis and Saleh still feel strong, why would they disarm or even discuss sharing power?
Air campaign
After more than 70 days of continued air strike to degrade pro-Saleh and Houthi militias, the Yemeni army did not usher the way yet for all parties to return to the negotiating table. Both sides in the conflict are heading to Geneva with an irreconcilable agenda. Some believe that Houthis and Saleh are emboldened by the bombing of the past three months and the air campaign has militarily failed so far to dislodge them from their bases. They also believe the campaign has failed to see the Houthi grip on power eroded in their northern strongholds or even the capital Sanaa.
Civil war
Also, the 70-plus days of raging street battles in most southern Yemeni towns did not deliver a clear and verifiable victory either. Local resistance fighters allied to the government of exiled President Hadi did not manage to tip the balance of power in Hadi’s legitimately elected government, despite close air support by the Arab force coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Nor did the air drops of weapons and ammunition to pro-Hadi resistance fighters deliver the city of Aden back to the legitimate government.
Resolution 2216
Resolution 2216 will remain an umbrella for the continued air war until further notice. If the Geneva meeting turns out to be a platform for Houthis and Saleh to demonstrate their power and ability to remain in control of land, and through this have the keys to any future settlement for the Yemeni crisis, Geneva could become a burden for the coalition rather than an advantage. Houthis, Saleh and their patron Iran does not yet seem in the mood to announce defeat and or readiness to even bargain. In their strategic calculations Tehran officials see that the frontlines are static in military terms, and no political breakthrough is noticed in the form of massive Yemeni parties and tribes abandoning Saleh and the Houthis’ ship, yet. Therefore resolution 2216 for Houthis and Saleh is a merely on paper and could be emptied of any impact on the ground. For them, the international community’s efforts are so far lacking enough teeth to peel off Houthis and Saleh gains. The resolution cannot turn back the clock to the Sanaa take over last September or the departure of President Hadi from Aden in March. In their mind, the role of the U.N. as the facilitator of lengthy power sharing negotiations in Sanaa helped them fortify their power base and allowed them plenty of time to negotiate with one hand and to continue a physical power grab with the other.
The best outcome that one could hope for in the Geneva talks is another humanitarian truce.This is bound to reiterate that the coalition is not waging war a against the Yemeni population, even though it would allow Houthi and Saleh militias to have a breather and prepare for another round of fighting.
International community
For the international community, the Geneva meeting will be another forum for the major players to show they have not lost all their relevance as demonstrated clearly in the Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan crises. The Geneva meeting is for the U.N. a demonstration of its ability and relevance in today’s Middle East to convene meetings for talks with the lowest of expectations for both the international community and the warring parties. Both sides in the conflict are heading to Geneva with an irreconcilable agenda. One side believes itself to be the legitimately elected government and the inheritor and defender of a peace process underpinned by the GCC peace initiative created since Saleh’s removal from power after 33 years in office. The other side believes itself to have fought six wars against the central government in the hope to gain a greater role in Yemeni power-brokering mechanisms.
