Aleppo, Homs and Damascus: Who Will Control Syria When Assad Withdraws?
Middle East Briefing/ 03.06.15
http://mebriefing.com/?p=1720
The features of ISIL Islamic State are rapidly being engraved on the rocks and sands of Iraq and Syria while the whole world is watching almost helplessly. After consolidating its recent territorial gains, ISIL’s menu consists now of the battle of Aleppo followed by the battle for Damascus. There is a high probability that ISIL is also eyeing Homs, even before these two big cities.
In a pattern that has now become familiar, signs of mobilization and infiltration around the two cities have shown a rapid increase recently. We will lay out here the expected dynamics of the battles for the two major Syrian cities and the available ways to avoid their falling under the control of ISIL.
But first, a couple of words about the general context of the confrontations on the ground in Syria.
Syrian army forces are preparing to pull out of Dair Al Zour in their implementation of the dictated Iranian Plan B. This plan, which we described in detail in “Middle East Briefing” of May 11th, is simple: Iran and Hezbollah will not continue footing the bills for Bashar Al Assad’s insistence that he is the President of all Syria. They will restrict their support to the Syrian forces defending defensible areas in the West that is strategically important to them, in order to avoid the current war of attrition.
However, Al Assad prefers to leave the regime’s areas that fall out of the new Iranian lines of demarcation to ISIL, not to the non-ISIL opposition forces. This is a continuation of Assad’s method of focusing on the elimination of the non-ISIL opposition in order to present himself as the only antidote to the terrorist group. Assad hopes that the world will ultimately knock on his doors to ally with him in fighting ISIL.
The retreat of the regime forces creates a new paradigm in the Syrian crisis. The central issue is the vacuum created by the withdrawal of these forces and the nature of the forces that will fill it. There are two contenders here: ISIL and the non-ISIL opposition. But a third force should be helped to play a role–the civil society in these areas.
Both sides, ISIL and non-ISIL opposition, know that the moment has come when they can expand in new territories, left by Assad’s forces, relatively quickly. After gaining control of Palmyra, which was kind of given up by the regime once it was evident it would fall to ISIL, the terrorist organization, which is now in control of the vast stretch of land named Syrian Badeya or Desert, defined two axes for its next moves.
The first axis is 28 miles South West of Palmyra. The second, not related to Palmyra per se, is Aleppo. It is not clear yet if Palmyra will be used as the springboard to move to the South West or if ISIL will rather go to Homs in the North West on its way to Aleppo. Both targets seem to be very important.
In terms of Homs, capturing the city will cut the connection between Damascus and the entire Northern region of the country through Route M5. This will weaken the regime’s defenses in both Aleppo and Damascus alike.
As for going to the mountainous region of the South West, this could lead to the final and decisive blow to the Syrian army. The location, heavily fortified with underground bunkers, is the center of the nervous system of Syria’s military strategic forces. All missiles, chemical weapons and strategic weapons are stored there under the protection of the 18th Division of the Syrian Army.
While ISIL may tend towards improving its positions around Homs and Damascus rather than attacking Division 18, the battle for Aleppo may gain priority for ISIL due to some external factors.
The regime’s positions around Aleppo have been substantially weakened under the relentless attacks by the non-ISIL forces. Officials in Damascus, under the pressure of the Iranian Plan B, are mulling over a withdrawal from the city. A plan to give the Industrial Zone on the outskirts of Aleppo to ISIL forces is being considered as a first step in abandoning the city. ISIL recently mobilized around 300 armored vehicles along an axis stretching from Al Bab, from which they run their Northern regional operations, to Jebrin, and in the vicinity of Aleppo Airport, northeast of the city.
The non-ISIL opposition, however, is better located around and in parts of the city. Yet, they do not have the massive military capabilities of ISIL.
In going through all these details, it becomes obvious that the dynamics of the situation could be described as follows:
-The regime is indeed preparing to pull out from large areas designated by its backers as non-strategic and not worthy of wasting the lives of their men and the available resources.
– The consequences of the Assad forces’ withdrawal pushes one question to the surface: Who will fill the vacuum?
– What will happen after Assad, Hezbollah and Iranian forces concentrate their capabilities in “their” regions?
In the strategically important Aleppo, there must be a decision by the US and regional powers to enable the non-ISIL forces to control the city, which is still possible for them, in return for few demands. The first is an iron clad commitment not to subject the minorities, particularly the considerable number of Armen Christians and Allawis, to any acts of revenge for their perceived support of Assad. The second is building a civilian administration in the city that should be provided with all possible assistance to start getting life back to normal while the non-ISIL forces are defending the city against ISIL. The third is to enable residents to create their own inter-sectarian networks and local forces to defend themselves. The fourth is to direct all guns, after controlling Aleppo, to fight ISIL and push its forces further east.
The civilian administration of Aleppo should be considered a strategic objective. Empowering civilians in the city will prove to be the seeds of anti-radical ideologies at a later stage. Furthermore, it will set an example of the future Syria that will emerge from the current ruins.
These conditions may seem to an exterior foreign observer as impossible to accept on the part of the non-ISIL opposition forces. Yet, there are reasons to believe that they are willingly accept them as they know they cannot run civilian administrative functions. They just need to know, through deeds, that there is a strong commitment from the Obama Administration to engage.
By engaging we do not mean putting forces on the ground. Engagement means an aerial protection that could be conducted by the Turks and supported by the US. This would provide Aleppo and its region with the protection the non-ISIL forces cannot provide. The regime is expected to use barrel bombs to punish the city once it leaves as it did, for no strategic reason whatsoever, in the case of Idlib. Accepting these conditions could be facilitated by Saudi Arabia which now backs the non-ISIL forces in the North. Aerial protection should be conditioned on implementing the mentioned conditions. Any massacres against minority civilians must be punished as they would mean the end of this safe haven area. Aleppo civilian administration and total protection of all civilians should be the price for a safe haven.
The positive elements that helps an optimistic view of the current developments are emerging. The moment the Assad forces pull out is the moment when ISIL and non-ISIL forces will fight harder to control Aleppo and the rest of the abandoned regions. This is certain, based on the their previous pattern of fights. Some kind of military force has to be empowered to control the ground. As the US administration refused to assist the non-Islamists early on in the civil war, we are faced with limited choices.
Therefore, the US administration has to take the strategic decision to do things differently after the withdrawal of Assad forces or face a terrorist organization that is larger, richer, stronger and more difficult to contain. Once ISIL controls all of Syria except the coastal enclave, it will be very difficult to defeat. Furthermore, talking then about a political solution will be nonsense.
Briefly, the name of the game now is who will fill the vacuum after Assad’s withdrawal. Non-ISIL forces are the reluctantly preferable answer. The element that should be introduced to the picture is the insistence of the US on civil administration and protection of civilians, minority and majority. It is by all means possible to reach a deal with the non-ISIL opposition on these bases.
Yet, an additional complication could be introduced to this picture, which is, if ISIL decides to attack Damascus. There are many signs which reinforce the impression that Damascus is indeed in the cross-hairs of the organization. According to leaked information from the Syrian capital, generals in Iran’s IRGC, Hezbollah and the Syrian army discussed withdrawing even from Damascus and focusing only on a limited stretch of land that guarantees the strategic interests of Iran, Hezbollah and the Alawi community on the coast.
The conclusion of these discussions is not clear known. But ISIL should be prevented from capturing Damascus at any price due to the psychological impact of such a development and the human suffering expected, particularly for minorities.
Gazing into the fog of the future, one can expect three choices related to Damascus. The first is to try a preventive step through a deal between Zahran Aloush, the non-ISIL Islamist who leads the opposition forces in the South on one hand, and the merchants of Damascus on the other, to protect the city in case the Assad coalition decides to leave it. The second is to wait for the inter-opposition fight that will certainly follow the fall of the city and hope for an agreement between the war lords related to their Modus Vivendi. The third is total chaos.
The organizing principle in looking at the case of Damascus should be the State machine, in addition to the civil society that we explained in the case of Aleppo. The State machine has to be preserved and it is indeed possible to do that. It is possible, if the Administration wants to engage, to push for a kind of coordination between Aloush, who is fully backed by Saudi Arabia, and the notables of the capital city. Such a deal should focus on preserving order, keeping the civilian state structure intact; building a parallel civilian administration to take care of the population’s needs; and collectively confronting ISIL.
It is believed that the withdrawal of Assad to the coastal strip will encourage the regional backers of the non-ISIL opposition to fight ISIL in order to consolidate their control over the rest of Syria. Taking Assad out of the way will immediately push the contradictions between ISIL and non-ISIL to the front. Even if the non-ISIL groups do not fight ISIL, it will fight them. Therefore, Assad’s withdrawal will allow some time to contain the terrorist organization in Syria and force it onto the defensive. It will reduce the weight of removing Assad in the regional powers’ set of priorities and give all parties the space to breath and examine the potentials of a political deal. Assad will turn into a head of a militia. One among others. Unable to block a deal, that is if he survives the radical change in the map of his power.
Therefore, and strange as it is, the withdrawal of Assad forces from large parts of Syria may provide an opportunity to galvanize all the anti-ISIL forces and mobilize them in a planned campaign to fight the terrorist organization. It just needs planning, a leading power, a serious commitment to fight terrorism, and a lot of patience and persistence. These are seemingly rare commodities in Washington today. But they are needed to shape the result of this crucial phase in the evolution of the Syrian civil war.
The question now is: who will control Syria once Assad implements the Iranian plan B? He can no longer refuse it any way. And he is indeed pulling out his forces. This huge stretch of contingent territory should not be left to ISIL. While other alternatives are prepared, ISIL should be stalled.
It is a window of opportunity that may extend to 8-9 months. If the no engagement policy is sustained, ISIL will be difficult to contain. By virtue of its ideology, it will move to target those whom it considers its real enemies, in the region and in the world.
