The king is dead,The Middle East after Abdullah
Jan 25/2015 /The Economist
IT COULD hardly have come at a more challenging time for Saudi Arabia. On January 23rd Saudi state television announced that the 90-year-old ruler King Abdullah had died, nearly a month after being hospitalised for pneumonia. De facto ruler for two decades, Abdullah had nominated his successor, his half-brother Salman (see picture below), who was quickly elevated to king. King Salman’s rule may not be long: he is 79 and, some say, suffering from dementia.
Ruling the kingdom is no small job. King Salman has inherited a realm that is the world’s top oil exporter at a time when prices have plunged; is home to Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina at a time when jihadist violence is at a peak; and has been dragged into turmoil in the region. At home, things are scarcely better: the country of 30m is the only one in which women cannot drive thanks to the struggle between reformists and conservatives. And the public accounts no longer balance without dipping into the country’s, admittedly huge, reserves.
Few reckon the new monarch will rock the boat. A former governor of Riyadh, he is thought to be similarly minded to Abdullah, albeit a little more conservative, and will be advised by the same people.
But challenges abound. Abroad, Saudi has taken a more activist stance of late, and not always with much success. The attempt to build a rebel army to oust President Bashar al-Assad of Syria failed; and Saudi Arabia is now involved in a war against the jihadists of Islamic State. Officials are particularly alarmed by America’s attempts to strike a deal with Iran, with which it vies for power, over its nuclear programme. Iran, champion of the Shia minority, has been expanding its influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The new king will have instant decisions to make after Yemen’s government fell to Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, overnight. Saudi Arabia had led attempts for a peaceful transition in the country after the toppling of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.
Saudi citizens are worried about blowback at home from Yemen, Islamic State and Iran. The Shia regime in Tehran has been critical of Saudi Arabia for guarding its market share of the oil trade by refusing to cut production to stop the price fall. This is starting to cause a pinch at home. In December Saudi Arabia said its budget deficit would rise to $39 billion in 2015, almost 5% of GDP. Thousands of graduates need work, and most seek jobs in the bloated public sector rather than in the fledgling private one. Decades-old talk of diversifying the economy has risen again.
Indeed domestically the obstacles are greater. By Saudi standards, Abdullah was a moderniser, appointing the first female government minister and in 2013 appointing 30 women to the Shura Council. These moves drew protests from the puritanical Wahhabi clerics and parts of the devout population, as well as reformers who point out that women are still unable to drive or fraternise with men who are not relatives. Free speech is curbed. A number of Saudis are pushing for religion to have less of a grip on the public sphere, the results of which are strict laws on blasphemy and a ban on cinemas.
After the Arab protests, Abdullah sent armoured vehicles to help crush Bahrain’s uprising by the island’s mainly-Shia population against the Sunni ruling family. He kept his own population, especially the Shia in the east, quiescent by spending millions on government wages and housing, and setting up a Facebook page for citizens to air their grievances. How long Saudi Arabia’s ageing rulers can continue such tactics is in question, and not just because of the cost. One of Abdullah’s great legacies has been funding scholarships that have sent thousands of young Saudis to study in Western universities where, some at least, have picked up democratic ideals.
By appointing Salman as his crown prince, Abdullah also avoided the looming difficulty of passing the crown down a generation in a system where power has been handed down between the sons of Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia in 1932. On taking the throne King Salman affirmed that his crown prince will be the youngest brother of the generation, Muqrin, a 69-year-old former pilot, intelligence chief and governor of Medina, who was last year appointed deputy crown prince by Abdullah.
Perhaps to avoid the next generation jostling for power, Salman quickly moved to appoint a nephew (descended of the his own Sudairi line) as deputy crown prince: Muhammad bin Naif, the interior minister, who has shown an iron fist when dealing with terrorism. To deal with the inevitable struggle for the crown, Abdullah in 2006 set up an allegiance committee composed of representatives of each of the sons of the founder. Unlike the current generation, who recall their Bedouin roots, many see many of the next generation as profligate, flashy and irresponsible, having grown up in times of great wealth. During his rule Abdullah cut the allowances to the thousands of princes and princesses, much to their chagrin.
For both Saudis and foreign allies such as America, perhaps the toughest issue facing Saudi Arabia is the puritanical Wahhabi form of Islam that it has fostered; the Al Sauds rule in a pact with the Wahhabi clerics. Abdullah removed the most extreme teachings in school textbooks after the September 11th 2001 attacks on Americam in which 15 of the 19 hijackers turned out to be Saudis. But recently voices near and far have been pointing out the contradiction between Saudi joining the coalition against Islamic State while implementing harsh punishments at home for transgressions of its devout religious strictures. The most striking example is the 1,000 lashes handed down— to Raif Badawi, a liberal blogger who called for more freedom of thought (the flogging has been suspended after the first 50 lashes, on the grounds of health). The question for the outside world is whether the Saudi ruling family is part of the problem, or the best defence against the extremists.
