English LCCC Newsbulletin For
Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For January 01/2025
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
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Bible Quotations For today
The feast of the circumcision of the Lord Jesus
Luke 02/21/When eight days were fulfilled for the circumcision of the
child, his name was called Jesus, which was given by the angel before he was
conceived in the womb.
Titles For The Latest English LCCC
Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on January 01/2025
Elias Bejjani/Text and Video: Our Faithful Wishes for the New Year: Love,
Peace, Faith, Fear of God, and the Last Day of Judgment/January 01, 2025
Elias Bejjani/Text & Video: Sheikh Abbas Al-Jawhari Abandoned His National
Stances Mostly Out of Greed for Shiite Leadership After the Defeat of
Hezbollah/December 31, 2024
Statement Issued by the World Council for the Cedar Revolution: Lebanese
Citizens Must Exercise Caution in Declaring Allegiance and Extending
Congratulations to Syria’s New Regime Until Its Good Intentions Are Proven
Lebanese military enters Chamaa following Israeli withdrawal
Bassil says prefers Geagea over army chief or Franjieh
Hezbollah official warns Israel against staying in south after 60-day period
French ministers in Lebanon for talks month into Israel-Hezbollah truce
Turkey ready to export electricity to Lebanon and Syria as delegation visits
Damascus
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on January 01/2025
A New Year Dawns on a Middle East Torn by Conflict and Change
A new year dawns on a Middle East torn by conflict and change
Syria’s de facto leader meets minority Christians
Gulf Countries Call for ‘Reconsidering’ Sanctions on Syria
France says it struck Daesh positions in Syria
US strikes Houthi targets in Yemen capital, coast: CENTCOM
Israel Acknowledges It Assassinated Hamas Leader in Beirut
Days after Surgery, Netanyahu Rushes to Knesset for Budget Vote
Israel intercepts Houthi missile fired from Yemen
Iran security chief says 'new resistance' against Israel to emerge in Syria
UK special forces face possible Syria war crimes charges
UN: Gaza healthcare nearing ‘total collapse’ due to Israeli strikes
Ocalan: PKK chief held in solitary on Turkish prison island
Titles For
The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources
on January 01/2025
The relationships that led to Assad’s downfall/Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq
Al Awsat/December 31, 2024
How to bring the region closer to peace in 2025/Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg/Arab
News/December 31, 2024
As the Year of the Camel ends, Kingdom celebrates 'timeless companion' to
Arabs/Osama Al-Sharif/Arab News/December 31, 2024
How questions of sovereignty and security are fueling instability in the
Sahel/Jonathan Lessware/Arab News/December 31, 2024
Alawites Under Threat in Syria?/Fabrice Balanche/The Washington Institute/Dec
31, 2024
A Fateful Debate in Tehran/Ehud Yaari/ Jerusalem Strategic Tribune
website/December 2024
The Latest English LCCC
Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on January 01/2025
Elias Bejjani/Text and Video: Our Faithful Wishes for the New Year: Love, Peace,
Faith, Fear of God, and the Last Day of Judgment
Elias Bejjani/January 01, 2025
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2024/12/81879/
How transformative and healing it would be if each and every one of us were
fully ready to welcome the year 2025 with a clear conscience, a reconciled
spirit, and a renewed commitment to love and understanding. Imagine entering the
new year with a heart unburdened by the weight of past grievances, a mind freed
from the chains of hostility, hatred, and jealousy, and a soul glowing with
forgiveness and compassion.
Life, as fleeting as it is precious, unfolds in the blink of an eye. The gift of
life that Almighty God has granted us is a treasure that He may choose to
reclaim at any moment. These undeniable truths compel us to reflect deeply on
how we live our days and how we engage with those around us. Let us, therefore,
make a conscious decision to leave behind the pains, hardships, and
disappointments of 2024, embracing the opportunity for a fresh start.
As we turn the page to 2025, let us commit to filling the blank slate of this
new year with acts of kindness, gestures of goodwill, and moments of genuine
connection. Let us strive to build bridges where walls once stood, to sow seeds
of hope where despair had taken root, and to light the path of love where
shadows of division lingered.
For our beloved Lebanon, a nation enduring the heavy yoke of occupation and
oppression, let this new year ignite a collective yearning for peace and
freedom. May it inspire all its people—the impoverished, the marginalized, and
the oppressed—to find strength in unity, courage in faith, and resolve in their
pursuit of justice and sovereignty. Let us pray that 2025 brings a renewed
spirit of hope and the dawn of a brighter, liberated future for our homeland.
To every faithful and wise individual, the call is clear: Begin this new year
with open hands, a forgiving heart, and unwavering faith. Extend love to those
who may have wronged you, embrace the gift of reconciliation, and walk forward
with self-confidence and hope.
Let us usher in 2025 with prayers for a year marked by peace, love, and the fear
of God. May it be a time of renewal and blessings for all. From the depths of
our hearts, we wish everyone a Happy New Year filled with forgiveness, faith,
hope, and enduring love.
May Lebanon’s suffering come to an end, and may its people rise with strength
and dignity to reclaim their freedom and future.
Elias Bejjani/Video: Our
Faithful Wishes for the New Year: Love, Peace, Faith, Fear of God, and the Last
Day of Judgment
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKkvH5SrJac
Elias Bejjani/January 01, 2025
Elias Bejjani/Text & Video: Sheikh Abbas Al-Jawhari Abandoned His National
Stances Mostly Out of Greed for Shiite Leadership After the Defeat of Hezbollah
Elias Bejjani/December 31, 2024
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2024/12/138546/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsiKVr4vrXc&t=274s
I was deeply surprised today by Sheikh Abbas Al-Jawhari’s speech, aired during
his interview with "Al-Jadeed TV Station." For years, I viewed him as a national
model to be followed, but his recent rhetoric—marked by a drastic shift in tone,
vocabulary, and substance—was both shocking and profoundly disappointing. His
speech reflected a complete departure from his previous national, sovereign, and
coexistence-oriented stances, leaving me and many others puzzled by his sudden
repudiation of his past alliances. This 180-degree turn—delivered with anger and
laced with militarized, provocative, and blatantly sectarian undertones—is
troubling to say the least.
Understanding this "self-coup" and its underlying motives leads one to conclude
that it is a calculated political move, aimed at positioning himself as a leader
within the Shiite community in the aftermath of Hezbollah’s defeat and the
evident weakening of the Amal Movement. His shocking return to a sectarian
discourse aligned with the Mullahs' agenda—and his newfound defense of
Hezbollah's choices, including his support for Gaza war—raises serious
questions. These are positions he had previously criticized and marketed
against. For many sovereign Lebanese across societal, sectarian, and political
lines, his dramatic volte-face is both bewildering and disheartening.
From a political perspective, Sheikh Al-Jawhari’s demands—such as trading
Hezbollah’s weapons for Shiite representation within the state power
structure—betray a personal, authoritarian agenda. His focus on Maronite seats
and his emphasis on sectarian calculations rather than national unity highlight
his intent to exploit the power vacuum left by Hezbollah’s collapse. This shift
unmistakably reveals his ambition to replace Hezbollah as the leader of the
Shiite community. Unfortunately, such aspirations come at the expense of his
national and sovereign commitments.
Even more concerning was the tone of his rhetoric, which was doctrinal,
provocative, and deeply divisive. In this regard, he outdid even figures like
Mufti Qabalan, known for his arrogance, sectarian fervor, and rejection of
Christian—particularly Maronite—partners in Lebanon. Sheikh Al-Jawhari’s new
stance is short-sighted and selfish, prioritizing personal gain over the
collective good. His provocative mobilization of Shiite community members around
sectarianism is both unacceptable and counterproductive, as it entrenches them
further into Iranian-Hezbollah’s destructive choices.
In summay, Sheikh Al-Jawhari’s rhetoric today is unrecognizable compared to his
past positions. His shift appears driven by a desire for sectarian leadership
within the Shiite community, yet this ambition is unlikely to materialize given
the many competitors vying for this role. Personally, I have long admired Sheikh
Al-Jawhari’s courage, patriotism, and dedication to Lebanese identity and
sovereignty. His recent pivot, however, has left me disillusioned.
At a time when the Shiite community is in desperate need of leaders who reject
Hezbollah, Amal, and subservience to the Iranian regime’s Wilayat al-Faqih,
Sheikh Al-Jawhari’s departure from his former principles is a missed
opportunity. I sincerely hope he will reconsider his trajectory and return to
the values that once earned him admiration and respect. Lebanon and its
sovereign path depend on leaders who rise above sectarianism and stand firm
against external domination.
Statement Issued by the World Council for the Cedar
Revolution: Lebanese Citizens Must Exercise Caution in Declaring Allegiance and
Extending Congratulations to Syria’s New Regime Until Its Good Intentions Are
Proven
Free translation by: Elias Bejjani
December 31, 2024
The World Council for the Cedar Revolution issued the following statement:
After fifty years of oppressive rule by the Assad family in Syria, marked by the
immense suffering of both the Lebanese and Syrian people, the Baathist regime
has fallen swiftly and unexpectedly. This collapse coincided with the end of its
Iranian ally’s influence in Lebanon and the concurrent decline of Hezbollah’s
role. Today, power is shifting in Damascus, with Sunni Islamists attempting to
assume governance, replacing the Alawite Baathists who had long employed
systemic human rights violations. Under their rule, cities were destroyed,
populations displaced, and millions of Syrians subjected to atrocities. The
Lebanese, too, endured the bitterness of their dominance under the guise of
Arabism, neighborhood ties, and brotherhood—often cloaked in a humiliating
subordination that dictated enmity and feigned friendship.
The Syrian people have every right to celebrate and aspire to a future free from
violence—a future where equality and citizens’ rights prevail, balance and
justice are upheld among Syria’s diverse communities, and relations with
neighboring countries are built on mutual respect without interference. However,
the new regime must prove its commitment to these principles by initiating
internal reconciliations and establishing laws that safeguard the interests and
rights of all Syrians. Lebanese citizens, while they may share in the relief at
the fall of the former regime, should wait until the transitional period
concludes and the new government’s intentions and policies become clear before
reassessing bilateral relations.
The World Council for the Cedar Revolution, dedicated to Lebanon’s independence
and the protection of its people, remains vigilant against the potential rise of
a new hegemony. Future actions, not words, will determine the sincerity of the
new regime’s intentions. Therefore, the Council urges the Lebanese people, who
are acutely aware of the dangers of external interference—especially following
the devastation of the last war imposed by Hezbollah—to exercise caution. It is
imperative to refrain from prematurely declaring allegiance or offering
congratulations until the new regime’s goodwill is substantiated and its
governance is accepted by all components of Syrian society, which has grown
weary of violence and tyranny.
Walid Jumblatt’s hasty visit to Damascus, consistent with his habitual shifts in
allegiance, should not be seen as a model to follow. His actions are not
necessarily indicative of prudent leadership. Moreover, his premature initiative
may fail to advance a Druze dialogue with Syria’s new rulers. This does not
justify a rush by other Lebanese to submit, declare allegiance, or even offer
congratulations to the new regime.
The Council calls on Lebanon’s leadership to preserve their integrity and
recognize that public awareness and evolving dynamics will not spare those who
bow at every doorstep in pursuit of personal gains. The nation’s leaders must
prioritize the interests of Lebanon and its people over opportunistic
self-preservation.
Lebanese military enters Chamaa following Israeli
withdrawal
NAJIA HOUSSARI/Arab News/December 31, 2024
BEIRUT: For the first time since the ceasefire agreement went into effect a
month and four days ago, a joint patrol of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL
entered the town of Chamaa in the western sector, following the withdrawal of
Israeli forces. The army repositioned itself at various posts at the start of
the ground war launched by the Israeli military, which advanced into several
towns and villages across the border region. Israeli soldiers remain in some
areas despite the ceasefire, continuing to demolish homes and bulldoze roads it
claims are Hezbollah facilities.
Israel is carrying out a slow withdrawal from the region despite 35 days having
passed since the ceasefire was agreed. The Israeli forces still have 25 days
remaining before the final deadline for their complete withdrawal, during which
the Lebanese military is set to deploy and work on clearing the area of illegal
weapons in implementation of Resolution 1701. Lebanese engineering teams headed
to Chamaa to remove unexploded ordnance and inspect the area before stationing
themselves there following the Israeli withdrawal. Two weeks ago, the Lebanese
military entered Khiam, working to open roads and seize weapons and ammunition
depots found in the town and surrounding areas. It said that “there will be no
weapons other than those of the Lebanese Army.” Meanwhile, Israeli military
spokesperson Avichay Adraee reiterated in a social media post a warning to “the
residents of southern Lebanon not to return to their homes or move south of a
line extending from Mansouri in the west to the town of Shebaa in the east, at a
depth ranging between three and nine kilometers, until further notice.”Adraee
claimed that Israel “does not intend to target civilians at this stage, but
anyone who decides to return to villages and areas south of this line puts
themselves at great risk.”The restricted area, where residents are barred from
returning to, now encompasses 63 towns along the Lebanese-Israeli border. In a
serious incident, Israeli forces shot and wounded Charbel Choufani, a Rmeish
resident, as he attempted to reach his farm near the town. Choufani was struck
in the shoulder and hospitalized. Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israeli
forces have continued artillery bombardment of border areas, including strikes
targeting Shebaa. Meanwhile France’s Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu and
Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot conducted their second day of diplomatic
visits in southern Lebanon. The ministers received comprehensive security
briefings from Lebanese Army Brig. Gen. Gaby Lawandos, commander of the South
Litani Sector, and French UNIFIL contingent representatives in Deir Kifa. During
their visit, the ministers observed joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Army armored patrols
and reviewed military capabilities, including reconnaissance, transport, and
Cobra battery units. The ministers, who chose to spend their year-end holiday
with French peacekeepers, shared meals with the troops. Earlier, the French
delegation met with Lebanese Army Commander Gen. Joseph Aoun and France’s
representative to the Five-Party Committee monitoring the ceasefire, Brig. Gen.
Guillaume Ponchin. The ministers will attend a memorial service on Wednesday at
the Pine Residence in Beirut, honoring a French peacekeeper who died in a
traffic accident near Shamaa on Nov. 15 while on UNIFIL patrol duty.
Bassil says prefers Geagea over army chief or Franjieh
Naharnet/December 31/2024
Free Patriotic Movement leader Jebran Bassil has called for an inter-Christian
understanding on a president, ahead of an election session scheduled for January
9.
Bassil said there might be surprises in the session and called for consensus, in
remarks published Tuesday in al-Joumhouria newspaper. Although Bassil called for
an agreement with the Lebanese Forces and other Christian parties on a list of
candidates, he said the only solution is a consensual president that has the
support of all parties, including Hezbollah and its allies. Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Geagea had said earlier this month that he might run for the
presidency if he could secure enough political support. Bassil said that Geagea
enjoys popularity (among Christians) which can make him a legitimate president
and that he doesn't mind supporting him if he can unite the Lebanese. He said he
preferred him over Army chief Joseph Aoun and Hezbollah candidate Marada leader
Suleiman Franjieh.
Hezbollah official warns Israel against staying in south
after 60-day period
Naharnet/December 31/2024
Deputy head of Hezbollah's political council Mahmoud Qmati has warned that
Hezbollah will deal differently with Israeli soldiers if they remain in Lebanon
for more than 60 days - an initial stage of a ceasefire reached in late
November.
"We've committed to patience for 60 days and after that the present forces will
become occupation forces and we'll deal with them accordingly," Qmati told
Hezbollah's al-Manar on Monday. Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters are to
gradually withdraw from southern Lebanon during the 60-day period laid out in
the ceasefire agreement brokered by France and the United States. Since the
fragile ceasefire went into effect, Israel has been occasionally bombing
Lebanon, and troops have been advancing instead of retreating, bulldozing and
detonating border villages. "There are red lines including the resistance's
weapons and funds for reconstruction," Qmati said, accusing "homeland's
partners" of acting in the interest of Israel. "We do not want aid on conditions
that would harm the resistance. France and the U.S. must understand that we will
not accept that our red lines be violated, and that we are ready for
everything," Qmati said. "We will not accept the occupation of our land," he
later added. "We are patient today, for the sake of our people and because of
the commitment we gave to the mediators. We are committed to being patient for
60 days. On the day 61, we will deal with Israeli forces (inside Lebanon) as
occupation forces and we will act accordingly," he warned, adding that the
resistance capacities have not be weakened and that Hezbollah is not obliged to
be committed to the ceasefire if Israel is not committed to the ceasefire too.
"Either there is commitment from both sides, or there is no commitment from both
as well."
Qmati said that supporters and citizens who returned to their villages in south
Lebanon are now demanding Hezbollah to respond to the Israeli violations. "We
were patient for them," he said. "Today they are asking us to retaliate."
French ministers in Lebanon for talks month into Israel-Hezbollah truce
Agence France Presse/December 31/2024
France's top diplomat and defense chief arrived on Monday in Lebanon, where a
fragile truce since late November ended intense fighting between Israel and
Hezbollah. Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot and Defense Minister Sebastien
Lecornu met with Lebanon's army chief Joseph Aoun, and on Tuesday are due to
visit U.N. peacekeepers near the Israeli border. A Lebanese army statement on
social media said that Aoun and the visiting ministers discussed "ways to
strengthen cooperation relations between the armies of the two countries and to
continue support for the army in light of current circumstances". Aoun, who is
being touted as a possible candidate for Lebanon's president, has been tasked
with deploying troops in the south of the country since the ceasefire came into
effect on November 27.Lecornu said on X that he is also due to meet with a
French general representing Paris "within the ceasefire monitoring mechanism".
"Our armies are, and will remain, committed to the stability of Lebanon and the
region," he said. The monitoring body brings together Lebanon, Israel, the
United States, France and the United Nations' UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. It is
meant to support the implementation of the ceasefire and assess violations. On
Thursday, UNIFIL said it was "concerned" by "the continued destruction" carried
out by the Israeli army in southern Lebanon, despite the truce. Lecornu and
Barrot are scheduled to meet on Tuesday with French soldiers deployed with
UNIFIL in south Lebanon.
Turkey ready to export
electricity to Lebanon and Syria as delegation visits Damascus
Associated Press/December 31, 2024
Turkey is prepared to export electricity to Lebanon and Syria to assist them in
addressing power shortages, Turkey’s energy minister said, adding that a Turkish
delegation was already in Damascus to evaluate Syria’s energy infrastructure.
Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar also said Monday that
the Turkish delegation included experts who would be assessing how Syria’s oil
and natural gas could be used to improve the economy. “We can see the picture a
little more clearly after seeing the situation of the transmission network,” the
state-run Anadolu Agency quoted Bayraktar as saying. He said Syria's electricity
capacity had dropped significantly due to the civil war. “The vast majority of
the people meet their electricity needs through generators,” he said. “There is
a serious need for electricity.”Turkey has backed insurgents who ousted
President Bashar Assad and has expressed readiness to support the new
administration.
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on January 01/2025
A
New Year Dawns on a Middle East Torn by Conflict and Change
Asharq Al Awsat/December 31/2024
In Damascus, the streets were buzzing with excitement Tuesday as Syrians
welcomed in a new year that seemed to many to bring a promise of a brighter
future after the unexpected fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government weeks earlier.
While Syrians in the capital looked forward to a new beginning after the ousting
of Assad, the mood was more somber along Beirut’s Mediterranean promenade, where
residents shared cautious hopes for the new year, reflecting on a country still
reeling from war and ongoing crises. War-weary Palestinians in Gaza who lost
their homes and loved ones in 2024 saw little hope that 2025 would bring an end
to their suffering. The last year was a dramatic one in the Middle East,
bringing calamity to some and hope to others. Across the region, it felt foolish
to many to attempt to predict what the next year might bring. In Damascus, Abir
Homsi said she is optimistic about a future for her country that would include
peace, security and freedom of expression and would bring Syrian communities
previously divided by battle lines back together. “We will return to how we once
were, when people loved each other, celebrated together whether it is Ramadan or
Christmas or any other holiday — no restricted areas for anyone,” she said. But
for many, the new year and new reality carried with it reminders of the painful
years that came before. Abdulrahman al-Habib, from the eastern Syrian city of
Deir Ezzor, had come to Damascus in hopes of finding relatives who disappeared
after being arrested under Assad’s rule. He was at the capital’s Marjeh Square,
where relatives of the missing have taken to posting photos of their loved ones
in search of any clue to their whereabouts. “We hope that in the new year, our
status will be better ... and peace will prevail in the whole Arab world,” he
said. In Lebanon, a tenuous ceasefire brought a halt to fighting between Israel
and the Hezbollah group a little over a month ago. The country battered by years
of economic collapse, political instability and a series of calamities since
2019, continues to grapple with uncertainty, but the truce has brought at least
a temporary return to normal life.Some families flocked to the Mzaar Ski Resort
in the mountains northeast of Beirut on Tuesday to enjoy the day in the snow
even though the resort had not officially opened.
“What happened and what’s still happening in the region, especially in Lebanon
recently, has been very painful,” said Youssef Haddad, who came to ski with his
family. “We have great hope that everything will get better.”
On Beirut's seaside corniche, Mohammad Mohammad from the village of Marwahin in
southern Lebanon was strolling with his three children.
“I hope peace and love prevail next year, but it feels like more (challenges)
await us,” he said. Mohammad was among the tens of thousands displaced during
more than a year of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Now living in Jadra,
a town that was also bombarded during the conflict, he awaits the end of a
60-day period, after which the Israeli army is required to withdraw under the
conditions of a French and US-brokered ceasefire. “Our village was completely
destroyed,” Mohammad said. His family would spend a quiet evening at home, he
said. This year “was very hard on us. I hope 2025 is better than all the years
that passed.” In Gaza, where the war between Hamas and Israel has killed more
than 45,500 Palestinians, brought massive destruction and displaced most of the
enclave's population, few saw cause for optimism in the new year. “The year 2024
was one of the worst years for all Palestinian people. It was a year of hunger,
displacement, suffering and poverty,” said Nour Abu Obaid, a displaced woman
from northern Gaza. Obaid, whose 10-year-old child was killed in a strike in the
so-called “humanitarian zone” in Muwasi, said she didn’t expect anything good in
2025. “The world is dead,” she said. “We do not expect anything, we expect the
worst.”The war was sparked by the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas-led attack on southern
Israel in which fighters killed around 1,200 people and abducted some 250
others. Ismail Salih, who lost his home and livelihood, expressed hopes for an
end to the war in 2025 so that Gaza's people can start rebuilding their lives.
The year that passed “was all war and all destruction,” he said. “Our homes are
gone, our trees are gone, our livelihood is lost.” In the coming year, Salih
said he hopes that Palestinians can “live like the rest of the people of the
world, in security, reassurance and peace.”
A new year dawns on a Middle East torn by conflict
and change
AP/December 31, 2024
DAMASCUS: In Damascus, the streets were buzzing with excitement Tuesday as
Syrians welcomed in a new year that seemed to many to bring a promise of a
brighter future after the unexpected fall of Bashar Assad’s government weeks
earlier. While Syrians in the capital looked forward to a new beginning after
the ousting of Assad, the mood was more somber along Beirut’s Mediterranean
promenade, where residents shared cautious hopes for the new year, reflecting on
a country still reeling from war and ongoing crises. War-weary Palestinians in
Gaza who lost their homes and loved ones in 2024 saw little hope that 2025 would
bring an end to their suffering. The last year was a dramatic one in the Middle
East, bringing calamity to some and hope to others. Across the region, it felt
foolish to many to attempt to predict what the next year might bring. In
Damascus, Abir Homsi said she is optimistic about a future for her country that
would include peace, security and freedom of expression and would bring Syrian
communities previously divided by battle lines back together. “We will return to
how we once were, when people loved each other, celebrated together whether it
is Ramadan or Christmas or any other holiday — no restricted areas for anyone,”
she said. But for many, the new year and new reality carried with it reminders
of the painful years that came before. Abdulrahman Al-Habib, from the eastern
Syrian city of Deir Ezzor, had come to Damascus in hopes of finding relatives
who disappeared after being arrested under Assad’s rule. He was at the capital’s
Marjeh Square, where relatives of the missing have taken to posting photos of
their loved ones in search of any clue to their whereabouts. “We hope that in
the new year, our status will be better ... and peace will prevail in the whole
Arab world,” he said.
In Lebanon, a tenuous ceasefire brought a halt to fighting between Israel and
the Hezbollah militant group a little over a month ago. The country battered by
years of economic collapse, political instability and a series of calamities
since 2019, continues to grapple with uncertainty, but the truce has brought at
least a temporary return to normal life. Some families flocked to the Mzaar Ski
Resort in the mountains northeast of Beirut on Tuesday to enjoy the day in the
snow even though the resort had not officially opened. “What happened and what’s
still happening in the region, especially in Lebanon recently, has been very
painful,” said Youssef Haddad, who came to ski with his family. “We have great
hope that everything will get better.”On Beirut’s seaside corniche, Mohammad
Mohammad from the village of Marwahin in southern Lebanon was strolling with his
three children.
“I hope peace and love prevail next year, but it feels like more (challenges)
await us,” he said. Mohammad was among the tens of thousands displaced during
more than a year of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Now living in Jadra,
a town that was also bombarded during the conflict, he awaits the end of a
60-day period, after which the Israeli army is required to withdraw under the
conditions of a French and US-brokered ceasefire. “Our village was completely
destroyed,” Mohammad said. His family would spend a quiet evening at home, he
said. This year “was very hard on us. I hope 2025 is better than all the years
that passed.”In Gaza, where the war between Hamas and Israel has killed more
than 45,500 Palestinians, brought massive destruction and displaced most of the
enclave’s population, few saw cause for optimism in the new year.
“The year 2024 was one of the worst years for all Palestinian people. It was a
year of hunger, displacement, suffering and poverty,” said Nour Abu Obaid, a
displaced woman from northern Gaza. Obaid, whose 10-year-old child was killed in
a strike in the so-called “humanitarian zone” in Muwasi, said she didn’t expect
anything good in 2025. “The world is dead,” she said. “We do not expect
anything, we expect the worst.” The war was sparked by the Oct. 7, 2023
Hamas-led attack on southern Israel in which militants killed around 1,200
people and abducted some 250 others. Ismail Salih, who lost his home and
livelihood, expressed hopes for an end to the war in 2025 so that Gaza’s people
can start rebuilding their lives. The year that passed “was all war and all
destruction,” he said. “Our homes are gone, our trees are gone, our livelihood
is lost.”
In the coming year, Salih said he hopes that Palestinians can “live like the
rest of the people of the world, in security, reassurance and peace.”
Syria’s de facto leader meets minority Christians
AFP/December 31, 2024
DAMASCUS: Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa met with senior Christian
clerics on Tuesday, amid calls on the Islamist chief to guarantee minority
rights after seizing power earlier this month. “The leader of the new Syrian
administration, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, meets a delegation from the Christian community
in Damascus,” Syria’s General Command said in a statement on Telegram. The
statement included pictures of the meeting with Catholic, Orthodox and Anglican
clerics. Earlier Tuesday, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot called for an
inclusive political transition in Syria that guarantees the rights of the
country’s diverse communities. He expressed hope that “Syrians could take back
control of their own destiny.”But for this to happen, the country needs “a
political transition in Syria that includes all communities in their diversity,
that upholds the most basic rights and fundamental freedoms,” Barrot told AFPTV
during a visit to Lebanon with Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu. Barrot and
Lecornu also met Lebanon’s army chief Joseph Aoun and visited UN peacekeepers
patrolling the southern border, where a fragile truce ended intense fighting
between Israel and Hezbollah in late November.
Since seizing power, Syria’s new leadership has repeatedly tried to reassure
minorities that they will not be harmed, although some incidents have sparked
protests. On December 25, thousands protested in several areas of Syria after a
video circulated showing an attack on an Alawite shrine in the country’s north.
A day earlier, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets in Christian areas
of Damascus to protest the burning of a Christmas tree near Hama in central
Syria. Before the civil war erupted in 2011, Syria was home to about one million
Christians, according to analyst Fabrice Balanche, who says their number has
dwindled to about 300,000. Earlier, a Syrian official told AFP that Sharaa held
“positive” talks with delegates of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
on Monday. The talks were Sharaa’s first with Kurdish commanders since his
Islamist-led rebels overthrew longtime strongman Bashar Assad in early December
and come as the SDF is locked in fighting with Turkish-backed factions in
northern Syria. The US-backed SDF spearheaded the military campaign that ousted
Daesh group jihadists from their last territory in Syria in 2019. But Turkiye,
which has long had ties with Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham group, accuses the
main component of the SDF of links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which
has waged a four-decade insurgency against the Turkish state. On Sunday, Sharaa
told Al Arabiya television that Kurdish-led forces should be integrated into the
new national army. “Weapons must be in the hands of the state alone. Whoever is
armed and qualified to join the defense ministry, we will welcome them,” he
said.
Gulf Countries Call for ‘Reconsidering’ Sanctions on
Syria
Kuwait: Asharq Al Awsat/December 31, 2024
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali Al-Yahya called from Damascus on Monday
for lifting international sanctions off Syria following the downfall of Bashar
al-Assad. He and Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General Jasem Mohamed
Albudaiwi met with head of the new Syrian administration Ahmed al-Sharaa and
Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani. The GCC countries stand in solidarity
with Syria and are committed to its security and territorial integrity, he
added, calling on the international community to "reconsider" sanctions in it.
He also said Kuwait's leadership also appealed for aid to be sent to Syria
urgently. "The visit expresses our keenness on opening a new page of regional
cooperation...we also value the responsiveness of the new administration in
Syria to these efforts," he said. Shibani urged Kuwait to reopen its embassy in
Damascus and resume relations with Syria. "We call with all love and joy on
brothers in Kuwait to open their embassy in Damascus and resume diplomatic
relations very soon," he said during a joint press conference. For his part,
Albudaiwi condemned the Israeli violations against Syria and its settlement
expansion in the occupied Golan Heights. "The GGC countries are serious about
supporting Syria and its people," he added. "The Israeli attacks are a flagrant
violation of international laws, and we call on Israel to withdraw from the
occupied Syrian territories," he urged. Moreover, he said the GCC supports
"everything that bolsters Lebanon and Syria’s security and stability."
France says it struck Daesh positions in Syria
AFP/December 31, 2024
PARIS: French aircraft have bombed Daesh positions in Syria, Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu said Tuesday, in its first such strike on the country’s soil
since the fall of Bashar Assad. “Our armed forces remain engaged in battling
terrorism in the Levant,” Lecornu wrote on X while on a New Year visit to French
UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. “On Sunday, French air assets carried out targeted
strikes against Daesh on Syrian soil,” he added. The defense ministry told AFP
that France’s Rafale fighter jets and US-made Reaper drones “dropped a total of
seven bombs on two military targets belonging to Daesh in central Syria.”France
has belonged to the Inherent Resolve international coalition against Daesh since
2014 for Iraq and 2015 for Syria. French troops involved in the operations are
based in the region, including in the UAE. As Assad’s fall to a shock offensive
by Syrian rebels led by a radical Sunni group rapidly reshapes the country,
observers fear space could be left for Daesh to regather its strength. The group
has survived in both Iraq and Syria despite the destruction of its so-called
caliphate that lasted from 2014-19. Washington said in mid-December that it had
doubled American troop numbers fighting jihadists in Syria, to around 2,000. Its
Central Command (Centcom) — responsible for the Middle East — said it wanted to
ensure that IS “does not seek to take advantage of the current situation to
reconstitute in central Syria.”Around 2,500 US troops are also deployed in Iraq,
according to Washington.
US strikes Houthi targets in
Yemen capital, coast: CENTCOM
AFP/December 31/2024
WASHINGTON: The US military said Tuesday its forces had hit Houthi targets in
Yemen’s capital that the Iran-backed militia used to attack American warships
and commercial vessels. The attacks began Monday and were carried out by US Navy
ships and aircraft that also struck Houthi-controlled coastal regions of Yemen,
the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said. It also said US Navy and Air Force
aircraft had destroyed “seven cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs over the
Red Sea,” using an acronym for unmanned aerial drones. “There were no injuries
or damage to US personnel or equipment in either incident,” it said. One witness
in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa reported several strikes in different
locations. Another reported raids on Sanaa on the Defense Ministry and having
heard a powerful explosion. Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam called the
strikes “an American aggression” and “a blatant violation of the sovereignty of
an independent state and a blatant support for Israel.”The Houthis said earlier
Tuesday that they had fired two missiles at Israel, hours after the Israeli
military said it had intercepted a projectile launched from the country. The
Houthis have been firing missiles and drones at Israel, and at ships in the Red
Sea and Gulf of Aden, in what they say is solidarity with Palestinians during
the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip.
Israel Acknowledges It
Assassinated Hamas Leader in Beirut
Asharq Al Awsat/December 31/2024
Israel acknowledged for the first time it was behind the assassination of Hamas
leader Saleh Arouri in Beirut in January 2024. Arouri, the deputy political head
of Hamas and a founder of the group’s military wing, was one of at least five
top Hamas leaders assassinated in Lebanon over the past year, according to the
year-end review released by Israel’s Shin Bet security service on Tuesday.
Days after Surgery,
Netanyahu Rushes to Knesset for Budget Vote
Asharq Al Awsat/December 31, 2024
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to Israel’s parliament Tuesday for an
emergency vote on a portion of the budget less than two days after his prostate
surgery, after parts of his coalition refused to support the measure.Israeli
media reported that Netanyahu took his seat in the Knesset despite doctors’
objections in an effort to pass the budget measure. The coalition was able to
achieve a majority in a last-ditch attempt. The vote was critical because
Tuesday is the last day of the 2024 tax year, and if the vote had not passed,
the government would have had to find another funding source to plug an
approximately 10 billion Israeli shekel ($2.7 billion) deficit. Also, if the
budget does not pass in full by March, it will force snap elections. Far-right
Public Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has instructed his party not to support
the critical budget measure, which attempts to address a massive budget deficit.
At least three others also said they would vote against the measure over their
displeasure over forced enlistment of ultra-Orthodox men in the military. On
Monday, the hospital said Netanyahu’s recovery was proceeding well after
undergoing prostate surgery Sunday night.
Israel intercepts Houthi missile fired from Yemen
Associated Press/December 31/2024
Israel’s military said it intercepted a missile fired toward the country by
Yemen’s Houthi rebels, setting off sirens late Monday in central Israel
including Tel Aviv. There were no reports of injuries from Magen David Adom,
Israel’s rescue service.
The Houthis have been firing drones and missiles at Israel as well as attacking
shipping in the Red Sea corridor — attacks they say won’t stop until Israel
agrees to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel has carried two waves of intense
strikes in recent weeks in Yemen in response to the missile attacks. The latest
launch raises the likelihood of further Israeli retaliation. At a U.N. Security
Council meeting on Monday, Israeli U.N. Ambassador Danny Danon vowed his country
will respond decisively to Houthi attacks.
Iran security chief says 'new resistance' against Israel to
emerge in Syria
Agence France Presse/December 31/2024
Iran's security chief Ali Akbar Ahmadian said a new group would emerge in Syria
to fight Israel following the fall of president Bashar al-Assad, state media
reported.
"With the occupation of Syrian territories by the Zionist regime, a new
resistance has been born that will manifest itself in the years to come," said
Ahmadian, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, IRNA news
agency reported late Monday. In a meeting with Oman's foreign minister, Ahmadian
insisted that Iran's anti-Israel axis of resistance was "not weakened" after the
December 8 fall of Assad, a longtime Tehran ally. Assad fled Syria after rebel
forces led by the Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the
capital Damascus after a lightning offensive. Since his fall, Israel has carried
out hundreds of air strikes on Syrian military facilities since Assad's fall,
saying it aimed to prevent them from falling into hostile hands. Israeli troops
also occupied strategic positions in a U.N.-patrolled buffer zone between Syria
and the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights which it seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war. The move was described by U.N. chief Antonio Guterres as a breach of the
1974 armistice between the two countries.
Iran has since condemned Israel's seizure of land in Syria. Tehran's allies in
the region, including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, have suffered
severe blows in conflicts with Israel since the outbreak of the Gaza war in
2023.
During Monday's meeting, Ahmadian maintained that Iran has "not changed" its
nuclear doctrine against pursuing atomic weapons, IRNA reported. Last month
Iran's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview with The Guardian
newspaper that frustration in Tehran over unmet commitments, such as lifting
sanctions, was fueling debate over whether the country should alter its nuclear
policy. Iran insists on its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and
has consistently denied any ambition of developing weapons capability.
UK special forces face possible Syria war crimes charges
Tom Bennett - BBC News/December 31, 2024
Nine members of UK special forces could face prosecution over alleged war crimes
linked to at least two separate incidents in Syria, according to Ministry of
Defence (MoD) data seen by the BBC. The data, which was originally obtained via
a Freedom of Information request by The Times newspaper, shows that two cases
are being reviewed by the Service Prosecuting Authority (Spa), the military
equivalent of the Crown Prosecution Service. One case involves one individual,
while another involves eight individuals. The MoD did not disclose details of
the cases, or whether they involved singular or multiple incidents.
UK Special Forces have been deployed on operations against Islamic State (IS) in
Syria during the past decade - but the MoD does not comment on operations or the
whereabouts of special forces troops. Minister says Afghan commandos described
'horrific' SAS war crimes
SAS killings: How a scandal was uncovered
Afghanistan inquiry hears senior officers hid SAS killings
An MoD spokesperson said: "Our UK personnel are respected worldwide for the
highest standards and action will be taken against anyone that fails to meet
these standards, including dismissal from service, where appropriate.
"It would be inappropriate to comment further on ongoing investigations."In
March 2024, it emerged that five serving SAS soldiers were under investigation
over an incident involving allegations of potential war crimes in Syria more
than two years ago. According to the Daily Mail, the incident related to an
operation involving the killing of a suspected jihadist, whose body was found
near to a primed bomb vest - but he was not wearing the vest when killed. The
SAS soldiers involved are alleged by superiors to have used excessive force and
should have arrested the man instead of killing him, the Mail reported. The
soldiers are said to have claimed he posed a threat and intended to carry out a
suicide attack. It is unclear if this earlier-reported case is the same as the
one involving eight individuals. In addition to the cases in Syria, the MoD data
reveals that the Spa is also considering a case in relation to a special forces
individual in Afghanistan. Again, details were not provided of this case. A
public inquiry is being held into the activities of the SAS during their time in
Afghanistan. The Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan - launched in the
wake of reporting by the BBC and other media outlets - is investigating whether
UK Special Forces killed civilians and unarmed people on night raids in
Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013.
UN: Gaza healthcare nearing ‘total collapse’ due to Israeli
strikes
AFP/December 31, 2024
GENEVA: A United Nations report published Tuesday found that Israeli strikes on
and near hospitals in the Gaza Strip had left health care in the Palestinian
territory on the verge of collapse. The report by the UN human rights office
said such strikes raised grave concerns about Israel’s compliance with
international law. “Israel’s pattern of deadly attacks on and near hospitals in
Gaza, and associated combat, pushed the health care system to the brink of total
collapse, with catastrophic effect on Palestinians’ access to health and medical
care,” the UN human rights office said in a statement.
Its 23-page report, entitled “Attacks on hospitals during the escalation of
hostilities in Gaza,” looked at the period from October 7, 2023 to June 30,
2024. It said that during this time, there were at least 136 strikes on 27
hospitals and 12 other medical facilities, claiming significant casualties among
doctors, nurses, medics and other civilians and causing significant damage to,
if not the complete destruction of, civilian infrastructure. The report noted
that medical personnel and hospitals are specifically protected under
international humanitarian law, provided they do not commit, or are not used to
commit, acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian function.It found
that Israel’s repeated claims that Gaza hospitals were being improperly used for
military purposes by Palestinian groups “vague.”“Insufficient information has so
far been made publicly available to substantiate these allegations, which have
remained vague and broad, and in some cases appear contradicted by publicly
available information,” the report said. UN human rights chief Volker Turk said
Gaza hospitals had become a “death trap.”“As if the relentless bombing and the
dire humanitarian situation in Gaza were not enough, the one sanctuary where
Palestinians should have felt safe in fact became a death trap,” he said. “The
protection of hospitals during warfare is paramount and must be respected by all
sides, at all times.”The Gaza war was triggered by the unprecedented Hamas-led
October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. That resulted in 1,208 deaths, mostly
civilians, according to an AFP tally of Israeli official figures. Israel’s
retaliatory military campaign has killed more than 45,500 people in Gaza, a
majority of them civilians, according to figures from the Hamas-run territory’s
health ministry that the UN considers reliable. The report concluded with a call
for credible investigations into the incidents detailed, and said they had to be
independent given the “limitations” of Israel’s justice system in respect of the
conduct of its armed forces. “It is essential that there be independent,
thorough and transparent investigations of all of these incidents, and full
accountability for all violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law which have taken place,” said Turk. “All medical workers arbitrarily
detained must be immediately released.“It must also be a priority for Israel, as
the occupying power, to ensure and facilitate access to adequate health care for
the Palestinian population, and for future recovery and reconstruction efforts
to prioritize the restoration of the medical capacity which has been destroyed
over the last 14 months of intense conflict.”
Ocalan: PKK chief held in
solitary on Turkish prison island
AFP/January 01, 2025
ISTANBUL: Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed founder of Kurdish militant group the PKK,
is hailed by many Kurds as an icon, but within wider Turkish society many see
him as a terrorist who deserves to die. On Saturday, Ocalan, who has been held
in solitary confinement in Turkiye since 1999, received his first political
visit in nearly a decade amid signs of a tentative thaw in relations with the
Turkish government. The move came two months after the leader of the far-right
MHP, a close ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, offered Ocalan an
unprecedented olive branch if he would publicly renounce terror.
In a message sent back with his visitors, two lawmakers from the pro-Kurd
opposition DEM party, Ocalan — the man who embodies the decades-long Kurdish
rebellion against the Turkish government — said he was “ready” to embrace
efforts to end the conflict. “I am ready to take the necessary positive steps
and make the call,” said the 75-year-old former guerrilla, who also received his
first family visit in four years on October 23. During that visit, Ocalan said
he had the necessary clout to shift the Kurdish question “from an arena of
conflict and violence to one of law and politics.”Ankara’s tentative bid to
reopen dialogue nearly a decade after peace efforts collapsed comes amid a major
regional adjustment following the ouster of Syria’s Bashar Assad. Ocalan founded
the PKK — the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — in 1978. It spearheaded a brutal
insurgency that has killed tens of thousands in its fight for independence and,
more recently, broader autonomy in Turkiye’s mostly Kurdish southeast. A
Marxist-inspired group, the PKK is considered a terror organization by Turkiye,
the United States, the European Union and most of Turkiye’s Western allies.
After years on the run, Ocalan was arrested on February 15, 1999 in Kenya
following a Hollywood-style operation by Turkish security forces. He was
sentenced to death, but escaped the gallows when Turkiye abolished capital
punishment in 2004. He has since been held in an isolation cell on Imrali island
in the Sea of Marmara. For many Kurds, he is hero they call “Apo” (uncle). But
Turks often call him “bebek katili” (baby killer) for his ruthless tactics,
including the bombing of civilian targets. Tentative moves to resolve Turkiye’s
“Kurdish problem” began in 2008. Several years later, Ocalan got involved in the
first unofficial peace talks, approved when Erdogan was premier.
Seen as the world’s largest stateless people, Kurds were left without a country
when the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I. Although most live in
Turkiye, where they make up around a fifth of the population, the Kurds are also
spread across Syria, Iraq and Iran.
For hard-line nationalists who support the post-Ottoman idea of “Turkishness,”
the Kurds simply do not exist. And not all Kurds back the ideas, let alone the
methods, of the PKK. Led by Hakan Fidan, Erdogan’s spy chief turned foreign
minister, the talks raised hopes of ending the insurgency in favor of an
equitable solution for Kurdish rights within Turkiye’s borders. But they
collapsed in July 2015, reigniting one of the deadliest chapters in the
conflict. After a suicide attack on pro-Kurdish demonstrators attributed to
Islamic State (IS) group jihadists in October 2015, the PKK accused Ankara of
collaborating with IS and resumed its violence with a vengeance. Turkiye’s
widescale use of combat drones has pushed most Kurdish fighters into Iraq and
Syria, where Ankara has continued raids. The government has defended its de
facto silencing of Ocalan by saying he failed to convince the PKK of the need
for peace, raising doubts about how much sway he has over the group. Ocalan was
born on April 4, 1948, one of six siblings in a mixed Turkish-Kurdish peasant
family in Omerli village, in Turkiye’s southeast. His mother tongue is Turkish.
He became a left-wing activist while studying politics at university in Ankara,
and did his first stint in prison in 1972.He set up the PKK six years later,
then spent years on the run, launching the movement’s armed struggle in 1984.
Taking refuge in Syria, he led the fight from there, causing friction between
Damascus and Ankara.
Forced out in 1998 and with the net closing in, Ocalan raced from Russia to
Italy to Greece in search of a haven, ending up at the Greek consulate in Kenya,
where US agents got wind of his presence and tipped off ally Ankara.
Lured into a vehicle and told he would be flown to the Netherlands, Ocalan was
instead handed over to Turkish military commandos and flown home on a private
plane to face trial.
The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources
on January 01/2025
The relationships that led to
Assad’s downfall
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al Awsat/December 31,
2024
I have previously questioned the depth of Tehran’s relationship with
Bashar Assad, as he considered it his pillar of support. It saved him in 2014
but failed 10 years later. In the final weeks of his life in March 2000, Hafez
Assad decided to negotiate with Israel. He was in a hurry, wanting to resolve
the outstanding issues before handing power to Bashar. Despite his illness, he
flew to Geneva and negotiated with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak through a
mediator, US President Bill Clinton. The draft agreement was about regaining the
occupied Golan Heights without addressing the issue of a Palestinian state. The
Israelis, aware of Bashar’s grooming for the leadership, were not confident he
would take power, given the hidden conflicts. Hafez died 10 weeks after the
Geneva meeting.
Bashar did not return to negotiations until protests erupted against him in
2011. But Benjamin Netanyahu remained skeptical of Bashar’s ability to sever
ties with Tehran and Hezbollah, so he refused. One of the key reasons for the
longevity of Hafez’s regime was his ability to manage relations with his foreign
adversaries. He refrained from confronting Israel after the 1973 defeat, whereas
Bashar integrated Syria into the Iranian “Revolutionary Guard Empire,”
inevitably making it a target for destruction later. Why did Hafez not sign a
peace agreement with Israel, despite having secretly coordinated with it? His
closest ally, the late Abdul Halim Khaddam, mentioned that Hafez feared it would
be said that the Alawite minority made peace with the enemy. And what about his
confrontations with Israel through Lebanon? In reality, Syria did not launch
attacks on Israel during its 30 years in Lebanon. Instead, it acted as a
military force to curb the activities of Palestinian factions, and later
Hezbollah to a lesser extent, until Bashar expanded the risks. Hafez’s strategy
was to take control of Lebanon as long as Israel occupied the Golan Heights. He
used it as a bargaining chip with Arab states and played the role of mediator in
the abduction of Western hostages. Using the same policy of getting close to the
fire without being burned, he gave Turkish Kurds refuge, but when Ankara
threatened him, he stopped and indirectly handed over their leader. One of the
key reasons for Hafez’s longevity was his ability to manage relations with his
foreign adversaries. Hafez’s relationship with Iran must be understood as
complex. He used it for geopolitical balance against his enemy, Saddam Hussein,
to prevent the Damascus regime’s fall. He leveraged Tehran to enhance his
significance in Riyadh and repeatedly played roles in easing tensions with
Tehran.
After the 1996 Alkhobar bombing, he handed over some Saudi fugitives when it was
revealed the cell had hidden in Damascus. On the other hand, he facilitated the
escape of its leader to Tehran.
In trying to understand the relationship, Khaddam spoke about Hafez’s policy
toward Iran. When Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited in 1985, seeking Assad’s
support in Iran’s war against Iraq, like a skilled Iranian merchant, he tried to
convince him that the reward for their alliance upon defeating Saddam would be a
stronger Syrian position against Turkiye, Israel and Iraq. Khaddam said Hafez
was cautious about overextending the alliance amid the region’s shifting sands.
There is no doubt that one of the reasons for the fall of Bashar’s regime was
his failure to manage foreign policy, especially his alliance with Iran. While
Hafez built a strong relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime,
understanding its importance, he refused to participate in its war. Yet, like
Israel and Libya, he secretly sold Scud missiles to Iran. As for Bashar, at the
start of his presidency, he gave the impression to everyone that he had shifted
his orientation westward, away from Moscow and Tehran. It was not long before
everyone who had initially supported him — Saudi Arabia, Spain, France and the
US — realized the truth. Early in his alliance with Iran, Bashar planned to
seize control of Lebanon’s decision-making process by assassinating Rafik Hariri
and numerous other leaders, before turning Hezbollah into the sole ruler in
Lebanon after the expulsion of his forces. Bashar then dared to open his
southern borders to armed groups to attack the new regime in Baghdad, which was
under Washington’s protection. This justified neighboring countries like Jordan
and Turkiye opening their borders to Syrian rebels in 2012, ultimately leading
to his regime’s downfall.
Alliances can be understood in the context of regional conflict, considering
Hafez’s strong relationship with Tehran as a significant player, and similarly
Bashar’s. However, the latter became deeply involved in its wars in Lebanon and
Iraq.
Khaddam said Bashar made a fateful decision to fully merge with Tehran in 2011.
My opinion, as I mentioned earlier, is that his involvement in Tehran’s wars
started years earlier. Was Bashar’s rise to power, supported extraordinarily by
Tehran, what pushed him to always act as an agent like Hezbollah? Very few know
what happened between 2000 and 2024.
**Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former
general manager of Al-Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq
Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @aalrashed
How to bring the region closer to peace in 2025
Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg/Arab News/December 31, 2024
Even by the turbulent standards of the Middle East, 2024 was earth-shattering in
Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and the West Bank. In Gaza, tens of thousands were killed
and millions made homeless. Impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity
emboldened perpetrators to commit ever more gruesome atrocities. In Syria,
Bashar Assad was forced to flee after a disastrous 24-year rule capped by a
bloody 13-year civil war. In Lebanon, Israel decimated Hezbollah’s leadership
and weakened its grip on power. Consistent with Israel’s indiscriminate battle
doctrine, there was a huge civilian toll.
The most catastrophic event in 2024 was the killing fields of Gaza and this
looks set to continue into 2025. More than 45,000 Palestinians have been killed
there since October 2023, mostly women and children. About 100,000 more have
been injured, some maimed. Many others are missing or buried under the rubble of
their destroyed homes.
In October, the World Health Organization estimated that more than 6 percent of
Gaza’s population of 2.3 million had been either killed or injured. The UN
estimates that nearly 70 percent of Gaza’s water and sanitation plants have been
destroyed or damaged. That includes all five of the territory’s wastewater
treatment facilities, plus desalination plants, sewage pumping stations, wells
and reservoirs. Nearly all of Gaza’s inhabitants have been forcibly displaced,
some multiple times. Having taken control of all entry points into the Gaza
Strip, Israel has severely impeded the flow of aid. For example, out of the 91
attempts the UN made to deliver aid to the besieged north of Gaza between Oct. 6
and Nov. 25, 82 were denied and nine impeded. The conditions for survival are
diminishing for the 65,000 to 75,000 people estimated to remain in the north.
Starvation has already taken a toll in many parts of Gaza and famine is looming.
The most catastrophic event in 2024 was the killing fields of Gaza and this
looks set to continue into 2025. In addition to deliberately starving the
Palestinians of Gaza and forcibly displacing them en masse, which are war crimes
under the Geneva Conventions, Israel has engaged in other grave breaches of
international humanitarian law, including indiscriminate bombing and the
targeting of unarmed civilians, hospitals, schools, refugee camps and shelters.
It is for these and other war crimes and crimes against humanity that the
International Criminal Court in November issued warrants to arrest Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
The Israeli government, led by Netanyahu and populated by some of the basest
ministers Israel and the region have ever had, engaged in this genocidal
campaign because it was assured by the full support of the US. Although the
Biden administration frequently voiced disagreement with some of Netanyahu’s
extreme tactics, it continued to support him materially and shield him from UN
censure. President Joe Biden, the consummate politician who has spent more than
50 years in politics, failed to use his tremendous leverage to temper Israel’s
unhinged behavior in Gaza, let alone bring a halt to the war. His administration
also failed to persuade Israel to allow aid to flow to starving Palestinians. It
was argued that it would be difficult for Biden to discipline Israel during the
US election campaign. But once the elections were over, the administration
continued its lackadaisical approach of letting Israel off the hook every time
the UN tried to improve the situation inside Gaza. Many have argued that Biden
still has enough time and power to do the right thing before he leaves office on
Jan. 20. Jonah Blank, now with the RAND Corporation, served for 10 years as a
Biden adviser. He wrote that there are three steps Biden could take during his
final weeks in office that would “mitigate Palestinian suffering and preserve
the possibility of a two-state solution — which would also be the best way to
solidify Israel’s security in the long run.”
First, he should recognize Palestinian statehood. Second, he should sponsor a
resolution on a two-state solution at the UN Security Council. Third, he should
enforce existing US legislation on arms transfers. These three actions are
within Biden’s executive authority and could change the course of the crisis in
the Middle East, “which is hurtling toward catastrophe,” as Blank made clear.
Such actions could salvage Biden’s legacy, which is now marred not only by the
failure of his Middle East policy but also his contribution to the Democratic
Party losing the presidential and congressional elections. This was one of the
most pivotal moments of 2024.
According to US election experts, Biden’s initial insistence on running for
reelection, against the better judgment of Democratic Party elders, led to that
loss. After his disastrous performance in the presidential debate with Donald
Trump, Biden was urged to relinquish his bid for a second term. He reluctantly
agreed, but it was too late to salvage the Democratic Party’s election campaign.
The Democrats blamed him for their resounding defeat as the Republicans, led by
Trump, trounced them everywhere to get what might be called — in the language of
racing — a trifecta or even a superfecta. Republicans convincingly flipped the
White House and the Senate and retained their majority in the House of
Representatives. They already had a solid majority in the Supreme Court, thus
rounding out the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.
From Jan. 20, they will be in a position to change the face of the federal
government for a long time. For at least the next four years, America’s allies,
partners and adversaries need to deal with this changed landscape in Washington.
But for the next few weeks, Biden is in control and he can make history if he
chooses to do so. A permanent ceasefire is needed in Gaza to start the process
of rebuilding and reunifying the Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian
Authority, instead of breakaway factions. In addition to the Gaza war, there are
other crises that the White House needs to address during the weeks leading up
to Trump’s inauguration to make sure that there are no gaps in US regional
policy on the changing of the guard at the White House and Congress. They
include the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Fortunately, in each of these
four crises, there is consensus on what needs to be done and UNSC resolutions to
go by.
First and most urgent is the crisis in the West Bank, where the Israeli
government and settlers have increased their attacks on Palestinians with the
clear aim of driving them off their land. Hundreds of Palestinians have been
killed and their homes and farms destroyed or burned down.
Clearly, the only way to defuse the West Bank crisis is through ending the
occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. Already, about 150 countries
have recognized Palestine as a state and there is a clear consensus on the
parameters of this solution in UN resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative.
In September, Saudi Arabia, together with Norway, the Arab League and the EU,
launched the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution.
The first meeting of the alliance was held in Riyadh on Oct. 30 and attended by
90 states and organizations, while the second meeting was held in Brussels on
Nov. 28 and the third is planned for January in Oslo. The US took part in these
meetings and expressed support for the alliance. It needs to do more to persuade
Israel to join. Second, in Lebanon, the agreement of a 60-day temporary
ceasefire was a good start, but it needs to be solidified by the implementation
of UNSC Resolution 1701 of 2006, which called for the withdrawal of all forces,
save for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and the Lebanese security forces, from
Lebanese territory south of the Litani River.
Third, the surprise attack in late November by Turkiye-backed Syrian groups on
Aleppo and the surrounding areas ended in Assad’s ouster and the installation of
a new Islamist government in Damascus. In large part, the attack was motivated
by the impasse in the UN and Arab League-mediated political process. In December
2015, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which set forth a roadmap to
resolve the crisis in Syria. Talks over its implementation stalled because the
Assad regime stopped cooperating with UN Special Envoy Gere Pederson. Instead,
the civil war raged, claiming the lives of hundreds of thousands and leaving
half of Syria’s population homeless.
In May 2023, the Arab League reached an agreement in Amman with the Assad regime
to resume the political process, but it later ignored the Arab League’s pleas to
live up to that agreement. The weakening of Assad’s close allies, Iran and
Hezbollah, and preoccupation of Russia, Assad’s third ally, contributed to the
decision by the militants to launch their successful blitz. In October, Assad’s
forces again bombed the rebel-held Idlib province, probably hastening their
decision to mount their counterattack. Things in Syria are now in flux, but the
new rulers appear to be eager to reassure Syrians and the outside world that
they intend to have an inclusive government focused on rebuilding Syria’s
devastated economy. Fourth, in Yemen, the UN-led peace process has also stalled,
as the Houthis have chosen to improve their political standing by disrupting
international maritime trade and attacking ships. Here too, there is a clear
UNSC resolution (No. 2216 of 2015, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter) that sets out the main parameters for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict. To its credit, the Biden administration has been working on all these
issues. But time is of the essence. It needs to take advantage of its remaining
days in office to finish at least some of them, so as to hand over to the new
administration a coherent response.
* Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the Gulf Cooperation Council assistant
secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation. The views expressed
here are personal and do not necessarily represent the GCC.
X: @abuhamad1
As the Year of the Camel ends, Kingdom celebrates 'timeless companion' to Arabs
Osama Al-Sharif/Arab News/December 31, 2024
The Palestinian people have this week lost one of the most outspoken champions
of their cause. Jimmy Carter, the 39th president of the US, died on Sunday at
the age of 100. Carter will be remembered as a man of integrity and courage. His
readiness to move away from the more orthodox foreign policy line adopted by
both Democrats and Republicans back in the 1970s over the Arab-Israeli conflict
triggered fundamental shifts in how the world later approached that conflict,
with the plight of the Palestinians as its core.
Carter’s life embodied the American dream, while transcending it through his
dedication to global service. His one term as president (1977-1981), even though
he was often criticized during his tenure, yielded lasting diplomatic triumphs,
most notably the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt — an achievement
that earned him respect as a peacemaker long after he left office.
Carter, who had no foreign policy experience prior to his 1976 presidential
victory, oversaw one of the most important and complex US diplomatic
interventions ever to resolve a significant aspect of the conflict: ending the
state of war between Egypt and Israel. Those agreements paved the way for future
US-sponsored peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, culminating in the
signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which would be followed by a peace deal
between Jordan and Israel.
Carter’s commitment to peace and justice knew no bounds. Though controversial,
his advocacy for Palestinian rights and criticism of Israeli policies reflected
his unwavering commitment to human rights and justice, regardless of political
cost.
His 2002 Nobel Peace Prize recognized his diplomatic achievements and his
lifelong dedication to advancing human dignity and peace. Throughout his life,
Carter maintained a reputation for integrity that stood as a beacon in American
public life. His plainspoken manner and modest lifestyle reflected his belief
that true greatness lies in serving others. Even as he faced criticism for his
political positions, few questioned his sincerity or commitment to his
principles.
Carter’s commitment to the Palestinian issue extended beyond his presidency and
covered most of his post-presidential career. During his time in office and over
the following decades, Carter brought unprecedented diplomatic attention to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leaving an indelible mark on Middle East peace
efforts. His crowning achievement was the 1978 Camp David Accords, as he
skillfully mediated negotiations between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. While the accords primarily focused on
normalizing Egyptian-Israeli relations and returning the Sinai Peninsula to
Egypt, they also established a framework for addressing Palestinian rights and
autonomy. However, the provisions regarding Palestinian self-determination
remained notably vague and fell short of Palestinian aspirations for statehood.
Throughout his life, Carter maintained a reputation for integrity that stood as
a beacon in American public life. Carter was committed to acknowledging
Palestinian rights throughout his administration, stressing the importance of
including Palestinian self-determination in any enduring peace solution. His
administration kept open communication channels with the Palestine Liberation
Organization, representing a significant change in America’s diplomatic
approach. Carter also supported UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called
for a fair settlement of the Palestinian issue, although the implementation of
such resolutions continued to be contentious. After leaving the White House,
Carter’s advocacy for Palestinian rights intensified. He became an increasingly
vocal critic of Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories and a steadfast
proponent of a two-state solution. Through books, speeches and direct
involvement in peace initiatives, Carter consistently highlighted the challenges
faced by Palestinians and advocated for their rights and recognition. During the
1990s and 2000s, he participated in numerous peace initiatives and observer
missions in the region, working to foster dialogue and understanding between
Israelis and Palestinians.
Carter’s 2006 book “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid” marked perhaps his most
controversial contribution to the discourse. In it, he provided a critical
examination of the Israeli occupation and its impact on Palestinian lives. While
the book drew sharp criticism and allegations of antisemitism from some
quarters, especially in Israel, Carter remained resolute in his stance,
continuing to address issues such as settlement expansion and the humanitarian
crisis in Gaza.
Throughout his post-presidency, Carter openly criticized US policies that he
believed undermine Palestinian interests. This included certain aspects of
military aid to Israel and what he perceived as inadequate pressure on Israeli
actions in the West Bank and Gaza. His approach reflected a rare willingness
among American political figures to challenge established views on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Carter’s legacy regarding the Palestinian issue reflects the achievements and
limitations of American engagement with this conflict. His presidential
accomplishments, particularly the Camp David Accords, established important
frameworks for negotiation, even if they failed to fully address Palestinian
aspirations. His post-presidential advocacy helped maintain focus on Palestinian
rights and the necessity of a just resolution to the conflict. Through both
periods, Carter’s efforts underscored the intricate challenges of achieving
lasting peace in the region and the importance of considering the rights and
aspirations of all parties involved in the peace process.
Carter’s contribution to advancing peace in the region has influenced US foreign
policy on the conflict and created momentum that transcended his one-term
presidency. His successors, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton,
George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, all attempted to
mediate between Israel and the Palestinians with mixed results. None was able to
deliver what was promised to the Palestinians under the Oslo Accords: an
independent state and an end to Israeli occupation.
In hindsight, one can say that US mediation became a liability for an equitable
peace deal. The US was never able or willing to put real pressure on Israel to
embrace the two-state solution and end its occupation of Palestinian
territories.
Today, as Trump gets ready to begin his second term as president and complete
what he started in his first term — attempting to conclude a peace deal between
the Arabs and Israel — Palestinians cannot help but feel abandoned by the
international community. The Biden administration’s complicity in the Gaza
massacre is a case in point. Carter’s advocacy of the Palestinian cause was not
just about sound foreign policy, but a deep and genuine belief in the historical
injustice they had endured and continue to endure. No US president since has had
the courage or integrity to even come close to matching Carter’s legacy of
genuine empathy with the Palestinians.
• Osama Al-Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman. X:
@plato010
How questions of sovereignty and security are fueling instability in the Sahel
Jonathan Lessware/Arab News/December 31, 2024
LONDON: As a piece of geopolitical theater, the timing was hard to beat. Chad’s
foreign minister announced the end of military cooperation with France just
hours after his French counterpart left the country. That it took place on Nov.
28, as Chad celebrated its Republic Day—a key date in its move away from French
colonial rule—only added to the symbolism. On the same day, Senegal also
suggested French troops should leave. It was a seminal moment in post-colonial
relations between France and the Sahel—the belt of nations south of the Sahara
that stretches across Africa. The departure of French troops from Chad and
Senegal means France will no longer have a military presence in a region where
it has long held sway. While Chad’s decision to evict French troops was not
driven by a military coup, it came amid increasing hostility toward the French
across the region. (AFP/File) The political dynamics of the Sahel have been
rapidly shifting in recent years, and 2024 was no exception. Chad’s decision to
end its defense pact with France was one of the most significant events in a
year that saw a continuation of the shift away from Western influence.
In the past three years, France has withdrawn troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and
Niger, as a wave of coups brought military regimes hostile to French influence
into power. These governments have looked elsewhere—to Russia, China, and
Turkiye—for defense cooperation, dealing a major blow to Western hopes of
maintaining a security presence in a region that has become a melting pot for
extremist groups. The year began with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announcing
they would leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a
regional bloc established to help maintain financial and political security.
There is widespread concern that the shrinking of this influential bloc of
nations will lead to further instability. Indeed, the backdrop for the past year
of turmoil has been an ever-deteriorating security situation across the Sahel,
with a growing number of civilians maimed and killed amid extremist
insurgencies. Chad’s decision to end its defense cooperation with France came in
stark contrast to the ambitious Sahel security policy it enacted more than 10
years earlier. In 2012, northern Mali was overrun by militants allied to
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. As they expanded south toward the capital, Mali
appealed to its former colonizer for help. In early 2013, France deployed 1,700
troops as part of Operation Serval. The initial mission appeared to work as the
militants fled northern towns. But the insurgency soon spread to neighboring
countries. In response, France expanded the operation in 2014 to include five
states—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It deployed more than
5,000 soldiers and rebranded it Operation Barkhane. Meanwhile, the insurgency
grew, with militant factions aligning into two main groups: the Al-Qaeda
offshoot Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Sahel branch of Daesh.The
failure to suppress the militants in Mali in the long term was one of the
reasons for the 2020 coup that led to a deterioration in relations with France.
In 2022, President Emmanuel Macron withdrew French troops from Mali as Russian
mercenaries increased their presence. A similar pattern followed in Burkina Faso
and Niger, where populations turned against the French presence, military coups
ensued, and France had to withdraw its troops.
FASTFACTS
• Chad ended military cooperation with France in November 2024, marking a major
shift in the Sahel’s geopolitical landscape.
• Post-colonial resentment and France’s neo-colonial policies fueled public
opposition, forcing troop withdrawals from Sahel nations.
• With Western powers withdrawing, Russia expanded its role in the Sahel,
providing military advisers and forming alliances.
While Chad’s decision to evict French troops was not driven by a military coup,
it came amid increasing hostility toward the French across the region.
“After 66 years since the independence of the Republic of Chad, it is time for
Chad to assert its full sovereignty and redefine its strategic partnerships
according to national priorities,” Abderaman Koulamallah, Chad’s foreign
minister, said.
“This decision, taken after in-depth analysis, marks a historic turning
point.”Many analysts feel this was a turning point of France’s own making,
stemming from its neo-colonial policies that limited the sovereignty of Sahel
nations.
“Since independence, France has intervened in Chad and other former colonies,
providing regime survival packages and interfering in domestic politics,” Ulf
Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, told Arab
News. There has been increasing hostility toward the region’s monetary system,
which many view as a relic from the colonial era that allows France to maintain
excessive control over their economies. The African Financial Community (CFA)
franc monetary zone applies across 14 countries in West and Central Africa and
is pegged to the euro. Critics say it strips those countries of an independent
national monetary policy. This has fed growing resentment of the French presence
in the region. “The continued French interference in domestic affairs has
created substantial anti-French sentiment in its former colonies,” said Laessing.
“No ruler in Africa can be seen close to France as they would face a public
backlash. This was one of the reasons why Chad decided to end the military
partnership with France.”The deteriorating security situation has added to that
resentment. An attack by the extremist group Boko Haram near the border with
Nigeria in October killed at least 40 Chadian soldiers. Opposition parties said
the French presence had failed to prevent the attack. Reports preceding the
French foreign minister’s visit in November suggested France was already
planning a major troop reduction in African countries, including cutting numbers
in Chad from 1,000 to 300.
However, the full withdrawal from Chad means that the last operational French
base in Africa will be in Djibouti on the Red Sea coast, which Macron visited on
Dec. 20. For Chad, losing French military support is a significant concern for
the multinational force battling Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin—an area that
includes parts of Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. “The withdrawal is good
news for Boko Haram,” said Laessing. “I don’t think that the US and Britain will
be able to contribute to the Lake Chad force without French logistical
support.”In 2019, French jets stopped a rebel column approaching the capital to
topple then-President Idriss Deby. He was killed in 2021 in further clashes with
militants and replaced by his son, Mahamat Deby Itno. “Chad’s decision to expel
French troops is a dangerous move for President Mahamat Deby because the main
function of the French jets based in the Chadian capital is to protect the
government against rebel attacks, which are frequent in this fragile country,”
said Laessing. The two Mirage 2000-D fighter jets left Chad for France on Dec.
10. It was not just France that saw its position in the Sahel eroded in 2024. In
March, Niger announced it would end military cooperation with the US. By
mid-September, the withdrawal of 1,100 American troops was complete, ending an
extensive counter-terrorism operation run out of two air bases. As the Americans
left, the Russians moved in, with military advisers arriving from Moscow in May.
In 2024, the growing alliance of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger represented a
seismic shift in the region’s balance of power. As violence surged, a record
7,620 people were killed in the Sahel in the first six months of 2024—a 9
percent increase from 2023 and a staggering 190 percent rise from 2021. Many
fear the geopolitical changes in the region will make Sahel nations even more
unstable. With little hope of political or military solutions, the conflicts are
likely to persist, leaving vulnerable populations in greater peril in the year
ahead.
Alawites Under Threat in Syria?
Fabrice Balanche/The Washington Institute/Dec 31, 2024
At a time when Westerners are questioning the Islamist takeover in Damascus,
Sunni Arab treatment of the Assad family’s broader Alawite base will offer
insights into the nascent government’s true stance on religious tolerance,
transitional justice, and state-building. For more than half a century, the fate
of Syria’s Alawites was linked to their coreligionists and patrons in the Assad
family. In 2011, their solidarity with Bashar al-Assad’s regime enabled him to
hold off the rebellion and preserve his tottering rule until Russia intervened
in 2015. By November 2024, however, the Alawite community had been bled dry
after thirteen years of conflict, with a third of its men between ages twenty
and fifty having fallen in combat.
The results were inevitable: when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led other rebel
factions in their sweeping offensive a few weeks ago, the army’s Alawite pillar
simply did not fight. Homs, a city that is half Alawite, resisted for only a few
days. HTS then seized the coastal region, the stronghold of the Alawite
community, which offered no resistance despite being expected to form a
defensive enclave to shield fleeing Alawites from potential acts of revenge by
Syria’s new Islamist authorities.
From Oppressed to Oppressors—and Back Again?
Alawism is often classified as a heterodox version of Shia Islam, with a core
belief in metempsychosis (the transfer of souls) that is rejected by orthodox
Muslim authorities in the Twelver Shia and Sunni communities. Much of Alawite
doctrine is a pastiche drawn from the great monotheistic religions (including
Islam) and Zoroastrianism, and many of its rites have been secret and
initiatory, rendering it an object of strong suspicion over the centuries. The
famous Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyyah even called for the sect’s eradication.
Alawites were not formally recognized as Muslims until 1932, when the Grand
Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, issued a fatwa seeking to undermine
the foundations of French colonialism in Syria. France had established an
Alawite statelet on the coast in 1920, based on the Lebanese model and intended
to serve as a refuge from perceived Sunni persecution. Husseini’s fatwa offered
the Alawites equal treatment in an independent Syria dominated by Sunnis. Yet
this circumstantial ruling failed to convince many in the Sunni majority that
Alawites were not “heretics.” Social conditions for Alawites only improved with
the rise of the Baath Party in 1963—and then especially after Hafiz al-Assad
took power in 1970 and systematically appointed them to key positions in the
army, intelligence services, and state ministries. By eliminating tribal leaders
who rebelled against his power, he effectively made the Alawite community a
monolith. Alawites were used to carry out regime campaigns of oppression,
including the 1982 Hama massacre in which Assad targeted an uprising led by the
Muslim Brotherhood, leaving 30,000 dead. Hafiz’s son Bashar continued this
strategy for years, then made the Alawites the pillar of his counterinsurgency
policy after 2011. In response to this long history of abuses, many elements of
the new Sunni leadership in Damascus and their followers presumably carry a
legacy of religious and social enmity toward Alawites in general. The sect could
face a risk of collective punishment, even including those Alawites who opposed
rather than helped Assad.
The new leadership will presumably begin by purging the military and the
civilian bureaucracy. Indeed, signs of this could be seen after the rebels
starting taking ground while advancing toward the capital. Under Assad, more
than 80 percent of Alawites worked for the state, comprising most of the army
and intelligence officer corps, most of the government’s senior administrators,
and most of the management in public industries. During the civil war, the wives
and children of slain Alawite troops received public jobs to compensate for
their losses, swelling the ranks of those who owed their livelihoods to the
state and the Assad family.
HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (aka Ahmed al-Sharaa) has used a similar
strategy since his time overseeing the group’s stronghold in Idlib province—but
for the benefit of sympathetic Sunnis rather than Alawites. Under the pretext of
carrying out “de-Baathification” inside the army and government, he will almost
certainly usher in a “de-Alawitization” process. This means that the Alawite
coastal region will have to rediscover its vocation as a refuge. Many Alawites
living in Damascus, Homs, and surrounding inland areas will likely feel
compelled to move back to their homes there—properties that they established not
just as holiday getaways, but as insurance for the future. If they stay in other
parts of Syria, their lives could quickly become difficult and even dangerous
amid the return of displaced, potentially vengeful Sunnis.
After all, the mixed regions between Homs and Hama saw many of the regime’s
worst community massacres during the war, with Alawite-led forces causing
significant Sunni displacement toward Idlib, Lebanon, and Turkey. Alawite
paramilitary fighters looted houses along the way; in Tartus, a market even
emerged for the proceeds of this theft called “the Sunni souk.” Entire Sunni
areas were depopulated and destroyed, such as Bab al-Amr in Homs, al-Qusayr, and
Qalaat al-Hosn on the slopes of the famous Crusader fortress. Of course, Alawite
localities suffered a similar fate at the hands of Sunni Islamists in places
like Arima (Latakia) in August 2013 and al-Zarah (Homs) in May 2016. In the both
cases, the HTS predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra was involved in the massacre of
Alawite civilians.
Policy Implications
In assessing what might happen next, foreign officials will need to consider
that Alawism diverges sharply from the Salafist doctrine embraced by Syria’s new
authorities. In many practical ways, the Alawite way of life differs from the
one Jolani, HTS, and other Sunni political Islamist elements might now
introduce—a contrast seen not just in Idlib, but throughout the conservative
Sunni regions that made up much of the country before the war. Previously, state
power made life possible for minorities in these areas. Will the next government
be willing to guarantee the safe existence of Alawites in Syria? And will it be
powerful enough to back up this guarantee? Alternatively, new government
policies may themselves pose a threat to the Alawite way of life. For example,
will veils now become obligatory in communities like Tartus and Latakia? Will
the consumption and production of alcohol be prohibited? What will happen to the
Alawite mausoleums that dot the countryside and serve as places of popular
devotion? Indeed, the destruction of an Alawite shrine in Aleppo on December 25
drove thousands of Alawites into the streets of Homs, Latakia, Jableh and Tartus.
And, finally, will a revamped Ministry of Religion launch a plan to build
mosques in Alawite communities and “set them on the right path”? Notably, the
Ottomans tried such a course in the nineteenth century after American Protestant
missions expeditiously converted Alawites to Christianity, facilitated by the
poverty of the former and the wealth of the latter. Ottoman authorities in turn
closed the evangelical schools and churches and expelled the missionaries, while
compelling most Alawites to return to their old faith. Attempts to direct them
to Sunnism failed, however.
So far, HTS has consistently stated that Alawites will be part of the new Syria,
that there will be no reprisals against them, and that those involved in
Assad-regime crimes will be held accountable via the justice system, not
vigilantism. HTS officials have also been holding meetings with local Alawite
representatives. And Jolani himself has repeatedly stated that HTS will not
impose sharia restrictions on minorities. Meanwhile, the new authorities have
set up reconciliation centers where members of the former regime’s armed forces
can register and surrender their weapons—an essential step in any amnesty
process. Hopefully, this will not be a prelude to their eventual mass arrest or
discreet elimination once disarmed.
These reconciliation efforts are also tied to the broader question of
transitional justice for Alawites and other servants of Assad who committed
human rights violations against Sunnis as part of what the regime called a
“counterinsurgency.” Described in 1940 by the French geographer Jacques
Weulersse as “forgotten by history,” the Alawites now find themselves at the
center of one of the bloodiest chapters in Syria’s history. As noted above, they
may be subjected to collective punishment as a result, which could rise to the
level of ethnic cleansing.
Even the notion of Alawites retreating from other parts of Syria entirely and
establishing a solid enclave on the coast may not be feasible. The idea has been
considered at various points in the past but never realized due to various
internal and external factors. More important, the new masters of Damascus would
never give up the country’s lone maritime access point just for this purpose.
At a time when Westerners are questioning the HTS-led takeover in Damascus, the
group’s treatment of Alawites will provide concrete information regarding its
true stance on religious tolerance, transitional justice, and state-building.
Humanitarian aid and diplomatic relations with the next government must be
conditioned on equal rights for minorities. Otherwise, Syria may once again
become a hotspot for endless sectarian bloodshed.
*Fabrice Balanche is an adjunct fellow with The Washington Institute and an
associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/alawites-under-threat-syria
A Fateful Debate in Tehran
Ehud Yaari/ Jerusalem Strategic Tribune website/December 2024
https://jstribune.com/yaari-a-fateful-debate-in-tehran/
There are growing indications – not yet certainties – that the top echelons of
the Iranian regime are locked in a fierce debate over a comprehensive
reassessment of their regional policies. The Farsi media and public statements
by politicians allow only a glimpse of the intensity of the controversy. Still,
the ongoing heated discussions have already led the generals of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), usually quite fond of bombastic rhetoric, to
take a step back and reduce public appearances.
The issue at stake is whether Iran should invest billions more dollars to
reconstruct the armed proxies established in recent decades by Qassem Suleimani,
the late commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force. These funds are desperately needed
at home where the local currency has sunk to a record low. The main dilemma, of
course, relates to the future of Hizbullah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad as
well as the wide array of Iranian-sponsored militias in Syria with their Afghani
and Pakistani recruits.
Many political elites of Tehran have concluded that throwing good funds after
bad (funds lost during the current war) is no longer viable. The sums involved
would be huge and the resupply of proxies made difficult by the loss of land
corridors in Syria, with the emergence of an anti-Iranian authority there.
Problems with the Proxies
One should pay attention to – and not dismiss as sheer pretense – Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei’s statement that the Islamic Revolution “doesn’t employ proxies”
and that the different factions of the Axis of Resistance stand on their own
feet and chart their course of action independently. In my opinion, this was a
loaded signal to Iran’s clients in the Middle East that they should not expect
Tehran to rush to their rescue. Iran was content to let Arabs fight and die for
its cause but is not willing to sacrifice its own soldiers and interests in
order to bolster severely weakened junior allies. The performance of Hizbullah,
Hamas and the other factions in Gaza, as well as the Syrian Army and its
auxiliary units, have all bitterly disappointed their Iranian mentors.
Indeed, Iran has avoided coming to the rescue of its single most important
proxy, Lebanon’s Hizbullah. This once formidable military organization saw its
leadership almost entirely decapitated and most of its vast arsenal of rockets
destroyed. The successors of Hasan Nasrallah had to accept a ceasefire with
Israel, abandoning their commitment to a “Unity of the Fronts” between Lebanon
and Gaza.
Since then, Iran has been slow and hesitant in providing Hizbullah with
financial assistance. Iran has promised to compensate the Lebanese Shi’ite
community for the tens of thousands of displaced persons, thousands of damaged
houses, thousands of families of new “martyrs” and thousands of injured. This is
causing widespread resentment amongst the popular base of the “Party of God.”
Furthermore, the Iranians are turning a deaf ear to Hizbullah’s pleas to help
find out what happened to no less than one thousand Lebanese fighters still
missing. When the Lebanese regular army moved recently to close military bases
of Palestinian of armed groups in the country, especially the Popular Front,
there was not one word of reprimand from Tehran.
Reconstituting Hizbullah’s military strength, if possible, will require many
years. Therefore, Iran concentrates on arresting the decline of its political
influence within Lebanon and defections of former partners. The Druze as well as
some Christian and Sunni factions have started distancing themselves from the
“Camp of Resistance. ” It’s quite clear now that Hizbullah’s candidate, Suliman
Franjieh, cannot be elected as the next president of Lebanon.
The Iranians also came quickly, if grudgingly, to terms with the loss of their
most important Arab ally, the Assad regime, hurriedly evacuating all Iranians
from the country. Despite widespread rumors to the contrary, there appears to be
no attempt to organize armed opposition to the takeover of Damascus, as proposed
by some senior officers of the Assad regime who fled to Iraq. Instead, Iran is
publicly begging Ahmed al-Shara’a to allow reopening its embassy in the capital.
Criticism of the vehemently anti-Iranian Sunni Islamist leader has been muted.
Closer to home in Iraq, the IRGC instructed the multitude of Shi’ite armed
militias not to cross the border into Syria and to stop launching rockets and
drones against Israel. The Iranians refrain from openly confronting important
Iraqi Shi’ite leaders – Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani, Prime Minister Mohammad
Sudani and popular leader Muqtada al-Sadr – who have raised their voices against
the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization militias. Each of them in his own way
says now that weapons should be in the hands of the Iraqi state, which alone is
authorized to start hostilities.
The Iranians have only limited control over their Houthi partners in Yemen. They
have supplied them for years with advanced weapon systems and provided training
and support in establishing local production facilities. But Tehran is aware
that it cannot instruct the Sana’a regime how to conduct military operations or
when to lift the blockade on the Red Sea.
In the Palestinian arena, Iran is losing ground to Turkey. Hamas leaders prefer
Istanbul over Tehran as their headquarters. The Palestinian Authority views
Turkey as its potential partner and the Turks are trying to push their way into
Gaza once the current war ends.
Competition with Turkey
A major part of the reassessment in Iran is linked to the deterioration in
relations with Turkey. The two non-Arab former empires of the Middle East have
maintained a mixture of competition and cooperation over the past 200 years.
Yet, the transformed geopolitical landscape, brought about by Israel’s military
campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza, presents new opportunities for Turkey which
President Erdoğan is losing no time in exploiting. Turkey seeks to replace Iran
as the dominant power in Syria and the rest of the Fertile Crescent. Top Iranian
politicians and pundits are attacking Turkish policies and aspirations daily,
accusing Erdoğan of neo-Ottoman ambitions. The inauguration of a Farsi station
by Turkey’s national broadcaster was described in Tehran as a “declaration of
war.” Iran’s designs clash with Turkish dynamism not only by turning Syria into
a Turkish zone of influence and striving to crush Kurdish autonomy, but also in
Lebanon where Turkey keeps busy reviving Sunni political activism, and in Iraq
where Turkey is challenging Iran’s supremacy. The rivalry has spread to other
regions from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa.
Clearly, Turkey has many advantages in this competition. Though the two
countries have similar size populations, Turkey’s economy is three times larger.
Turkey’s modern army is much bigger and far better equipped than Iran’s. Turkey
is member of NATO whereas Iran is subject to heavy international sanctions. Arab
states feel more comfortable doing business with Turkey than with the Islamic
Republic. Furthermore, although hostile to Israel, Turkey can easily switch to
rapprochement, as it had done in the past.
Conclusion
Iran appears to be retreating from – or at least revisiting – the doctrine of
forward defense: establishing a chain of well-equipped militias far from its own
borders as a protective barrier for its own territory. Israel’s military
successes, following its colossal failure on October 7th, 2023, have
demonstrated to Tehran that the vision of positioning a “Ring of Fire” around
Israel has not paid the expected dividends.
The debate in Tehran is far from over. Reformers led by President Pezeshqian
advocate reconciliation with the US and EU through a new nuclear deal, while
many hardliners demand that Iran make a dash for a nuclear weapon, especially
after its air defense systems were knocked out by the Israeli air force.
Reformers prioritize overcoming severe economic hardships, while hardliners
emphasis regime survival. Reformers criticize the failed adventurous exploits in
the Levant, while hardliners mourn that Iran did not prove proactive enough and
instead pursued “strategic patience.” For the time being, the regime appears to
adopt a slogan of “nuclear deterrence” – get close to an arsenal but refrain
from assembling. On the question of the proxies, they seem to prefer a
wait-and-see approach.
We have reached a point when the US together with key European and Arab states
may be able to influence the direction of the contest within Iran. A sober
combination of carrots and sticks can go a long way.
*Ehud Yaari is the chief Middle East commentator of Israel television Channel 12
and the Lafer International Fellow of The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.