Thirteen English Reports, Editorial & Analysis addressing the Dire Lebanese disaster caused by the Hezbollah Occupation & The Trojan corrupted Officials/ثلاثة عشرة تقرير ومقالة وتحليل باللغة الإنكليزية تتناول الكارثة التي حلت بلبنان جراء احتلال حزب الله الإرهابي والحكام الطرواديين والفاسدين
Thirteen English Reports, Editorial & Analysis addressing the Dire Lebanese disaster caused by the Hezbollah Occupation & The Trojan corrupted Officials/ثلاثة عشرة تقرير ومقالة وتحليل تتناول الكارثة التي حلت بلبنان جراء احتلال حزب الله الإرهابي والحكام الطرواديين والفاسدين
*Lithuania recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization/Sarah Chemla/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020
*US team to Qatar to probe its alleged finance of Hezbollah – report/Bejamin Weinthal, Jonathan Spyer/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020
*US team to Qatar to probe its alleged finance of Hezbollah – report/Bejamin Weinthal, Jonathan Spyer/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020
*US Sources Expect Washington to Impose Sanctions against Lebanon’s Bassil for ‘Enabling Hezbollah’/Washington – Elie Youssef/Asharq Al-Awsat/Thursday, 13 August, 2020
*Why the army should be the focus of Lebanon’s protests/Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/August 13, 2020
*The Lebanese Revolt Reignited by the Big Explosion/Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020
*The Beirut Disaster: What A Fair Historian Might Say/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020
*The Beirut Disaster Amid Two Legitimacies Hussam Itani/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020
*A Grim Milestone on Covid-19 Could Be a Turning Point/Justin Fox/Bloomberg/August 13/2020
*Abandoned by State after Explosion, Lebanese Help Each Other/Associated Press/Naharnet/August 13/2020
*The Mullahs and Hezbollah, Lords of Drug Smuggling/Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/August 12/2020
*Turkey vies with Saudi Arabia as ‘protector of Lebanon’s Sunnis’/The Arab Weekly/August 13/2020
******* Lithuania recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization/Sarah Chemla/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020 People affiliated with Hezbollah have been banned from entering Lithuania for 10 years. The Lithuanian government announced on Thursday its recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. “Having taken into consideration the information acquired by our institutions and partners, we may conclude that ‘Hezbollah’ uses terrorist means that pose a threat to the security of a significant number of countries, including Lithuania. We stand together with the United States of America, Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, as well as other countries that had reached the same conclusion,” said Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius in a statement. “We appreciate the successful cooperation between the Lithuanian and Israeli national security agencies. We are thankful to these institutions for their significant work in helping ensure the safety of our citizens,” he continued. “It is important to note that we support peaceful people of Lebanon and their wish for their country to implement necessary reforms.”Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi spoke a few moments later with his Lithuanian counterpart, congratulating him on the Lithuanian government’s decision. I spoke with Lithuanian FM @LinkeviciusL and thanked him for the important decision to designate #Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. I call on all European countries to make similar decisions. Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon hold the entire Lebanese population hostage. “Hezbollah is a terrorist organization that has controlled terror in large parts of Lebanon and turned them into Iranian-protected areas while taking Lebanese citizens, its economy and its political system hostage,” Ashkenazi said. “This is a courageous and important decision to maintain regional stability,” he continued. “I call on all European countries to join the decision and understand that this is a dangerous and unstoppable terrorist organization that continues its attempts to carry out terrorist attacks around the world on Iran’s mission and funding.” He finished by thanking “the Foreign Ministry and the defense establishment who led the inter-agency activity to complete the move.”Hezbollah-affiliated people have been banned from entering Lithuania for 10 years. The decision made by the Migration Department of the Republic of Lithuania was based on the information on the listed peoples’ activities within Hezbollah that posed a threat to Lithuanian national security interests. Lithuania recently provided 50,000 euros of humanitarian assistance to Lebanon, following the massive explosion in Beirut on August 4.
US team to Qatar to probe its alleged finance of Hezbollah – report/Bejamin Weinthal, Jonathan Spyer/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020 “We will continue to closely work together to stop the financing of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah,” says US. A team of US government officials traveled on Wednesday to Qatar amid intense international coverage of the monarchy’s alleged role in financing the Lebanese terrorist movement, Hezbollah. The Saudi Arabia government-owned news outlet Al Arabiya reported on Wednesday that “the United States has sent a team to Qatar to investigate” an allegation that “Doha is funding Lebanese Hezbollah militia according to Al Arabiya sources.”information very seriously and top government officials headed to Qatar and spoke with the Qatari government about this case and it is possible that the US will take action in the next hours or several days,” an Al Arabiya correspondent reported citing unnamed sources.“This is a major issue for Americans, especially since Hezbollah is on the US terrorist list,” the correspondent added. The US State Department announced on Wednesday that the “Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales is traveling to Doha, Qatar on August 12 to thank that nation for its commitment to combating global terrorism and its dedication to a robust partnership with the United States on counterterrorism and security.”According to the US State Department Statement, “Ambassador Sales will meet with Attorney General Ali Bin Fetais al-Marri and other senior government officials to discuss Qatar’s role as a strong partner in combating the financing of terrorism, including implementation of its new Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation. Ambassador Sales will also discuss Qatar’s active participation in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.” The Jerusalem Post has reported extensively on a dossier alleging that Qatar provided military hardware and cash to Hezbollah. Jason G., a private security contractor, who penetrated Qatar’s military and intelligence system as a part of an apparent sting operation, furnished the dossier to the Post. German intelligence officials have verified the dossier as relevant and useful, according to German media reports.When asked if the Al Arabiya report is accurate, a State Department spokesperson told the Post: “The State Department noted recent press allegations of a Qatari role in funding the Lebanese Hezbollah. We see the allegations as inconsistent with Qatar’s strong commitment to combating global terrorism and dedication to a robust partnership with the United States on counterterrorism and security.” The spokesperson added that “our close ties with Qatar are indispensable for maintaining security in the gulf region, and we will continue to closely work together to stop the financing of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah.” Multiple Post queries to the Qatar’s government in Doha and its embassies in Belgium, Germany and the US were not immediately returned. The State Department statement said that “Qatar is one of the United States’ closest military allies in the region. Al-Udeid Air Base is home to the Combined Air Operation Center, which hosts 18 nations and is responsible for all coalition air operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. More than 8,000 American military personnel are housed at Al-Udeid Air Base, and another 200,000 transit the base annually.” US allies in the Gulf region, however, classify Qatar as a major sponsor of terrorism. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and other countries imposed an economic blockade on the tiny oil-and-gas rich Gulf state over its alleged support of jihadi terrorism and its close ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
France to Submit Draft-Resolution to SC for More Effective UNIFIL Mission/New York- Ali Barda/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 13 August, 2020 France is expected to circulate a draft resolution to extend operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) before its mandate expires on Aug. 31. Western diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that France distributed to the rest of the four permanent members (the United States, Britain, Russia, and China) a draft resolution aimed at extending UNIFIL’s mission, after including amendments to its mandate, allowing the forces to implement “more effectively” the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701, especially with regards to preventing the presence of weapons and militants in its area of operations between the Blue Line and the Litani River. Speaking on condition of anonymity, the sources said that the proposed amendments fell under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, as stipulated in Resolution 1701, which was issued by the Security Council in the summer of 2006 to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah. These amendments “were discussed with both the Lebanese and Israeli sides, through the permanent missions in New York, as well as with the capitals of the concerned countries,” the sources noted, specifying that the consultations had taken place with the now-resigned government headed by Hassan Diab. The members of the Security Council held a closed meeting on Tuesday to discuss the implementation of Resolution 1701 and the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate. Participants heard two briefings, one by the UN Special Coordinator in Lebanon Jan Kubis on the latest developments, and the second by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix on the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations. The renewal of the force’s mandate is expected on August 27. Prior to the meeting, the permanent French representative to the international organization, Anne Gueguen, said: “Everyone is aware of the seriousness of the situation (in Lebanon) and the absolute necessity to meet the aspirations and needs of the Lebanese people.” She stressed the urgent need for the formation of a new government “as soon as possible”, provided that it “is able to prove to the Lebanese people its ability to face the current major challenges, in the wake of the explosions.”Gueguen added that the UNIFIL “is an essential element to achieve stability because Lebanon is facing such an acute crisis.”The presence of the international force constitutes “a strategic asset for the security of both Lebanon and Israel,” she remarked.
US Sources Expect Washington to Impose Sanctions against Lebanon’s Bassil for ‘Enabling Hezbollah’/Washington – Elie Youssef/Asharq Al-Awsat/Thursday, 13 August, 2020 The US administration is preparing to impose anticorruption sanctions against prominent Lebanese politicians and businessmen in an effort to weaken Hezbollah’s influence in the aftermath of last week’s explosion in Beirut’s port, US officials said, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported. The blast, which killed more than 170 people and injured more than 6,000, has accelerated efforts in Washington to blacklist Lebanese leaders aligned with Hezbollah, the country’s dominant political and military force. The US officials see an opportunity to drive a wedge between Hezbollah and its allies as part of a broader effort to contain its force backed by Tehran, according to the report. Hezbollah has been part of Lebanese coalition governments for more than a decade and is the region’s most potent threat to Israel, which has bombed the group’s forces in Syria and Lebanon to prevent it from amassing advanced missiles. The officials stressed that by sanctioning carefully selected people, they aim to shape the new government with two prime goals: compelling Lebanon’s political class to target endemic corruption that has eaten away at the country and ensuring that Hezbollah doesn’t retain its hold on government decisions. According to the report, one key Hezbollah ally some US officials want to sanction is Gebran Bassil, a former foreign minister and a son-in-law of Lebanon’s president, Michel Aoun. “Gebran Bassil should have been sanctioned years ago,” said Jeffrey Feltman, former US ambassador to Lebanon under President George W. Bush, in an email. “No one has done more to enable Hezbollah’s political (over)reach in Lebanon that he has, in giving an Iranian-funded Shia militia Christian cover,” he noted. The WSJ also cited people briefed on the discussions as saying that the US has been considering politicians and businessmen close to Bassil and others suspected of corruption, including some people close to Saad Hariri, who resigned as prime minister last October after weeks of largely peaceful antigovernment protests. A number of US officials said they want to move quickly so that the penalties can send a message that Lebanon has to change course as it seeks billions of dollars in international aid to rebuild Beirut.
Why the army should be the focus of Lebanon’s protests/Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/August 13, 2020 The last century has seen the rags to riches Lebanese story repeated time and again for many of its emigrants. From all religions, they emigrated under the pressure of poverty, oppression or just because they were looking for bigger opportunities. They moved to a new country and became wealthy, with many turning out to be successful and influential personalities in their adopted communities. Their stories are sometimes even movie-worthy: Stories of sacrifice, resilience and courage. This not only applied to the Safras and Hayeks of the business world, but to every single Lebanese who has emigrated and works hard to keep supporting his or her family back in Lebanon. Ads by Teads These men and women have built the Lebanon brand globally. They have been great ambassadors in helping each other and projecting a positive image of their community. They are successfully integrated in every continent and in all activities. A successful Western businessman of Lebanese descent was once asked in an interview if he was planning on investing in and having activity in his country of origin. His answer was quite surprising but also revealing: He said that he was not smart enough to conduct business in Lebanon, stating that it demanded caution on too many angles and that it was too competitive. Most importantly he described the Lebanese — speaking in terms of business — as cannibals once they get back to their home country. It was a correct assessment and still is. To survive famines, wars, colonization, civil wars, bombs, threats, and killings, the Lebanese have the DNA of a survivor. This DNA is what helps them become successful abroad. However, the Lebanese will to rebuild is becoming more a kind of insanity, as we repeat the same actions while expecting different results. The Lebanese keep rebuilding the real estate, but not the country itself, which is what really needs to be started again. They have left untouched a more than century-old extractive system whose beneficiaries were formerly the Syrian regime and now Hezbollah. This continuity has made the will to survive a ruthless task. Success in Lebanon equates to 100 successes abroad. What the Syrian regime and its heir Hezbollah, along with the warlord structure, have kept going is a horrible system, one that is focused on extraction — it does not share, it only takes. It is a system where bribes and connections can get you out of a jail cell, while the opposite can land you in one. No one has ever thought of breaking it down, but rather focused on how to get into the higher echelons of it. The political leadership and community heads are users, predators and cronies. They do not produce, they just take. If you want to understand Lebanon, just look at its trade and business. Who owns what? Who owns the banks that lent to the state and profited? Who sits on their boards? Who owns the businesses that benefit from the state? I am sure that you will quickly find out that businessmen affiliated with Hezbollah have joint ventures with other clan leaders in some key activities. I am confident that, if you look into their grown-up children’s activities, you will find them all in business together. A quick look at the beneficiaries of the Banque du Liban’s Circular 331 initiative to promote the tech sector would also prove interesting. The broken system even instigated a massive corruption scheme with the high interest rates banks were paying out. No one questioned how the Lebanese banks would remain viable while offering such high rates. Most of their lending was to the government, reaching more than 70 percent of their total lending more than a decade ago. This meant that bankers and officials knew of the coming collapse. It was not only a Ponzi scheme to keep the government and its beneficiaries going, but it was also a good way to stop anyone from asking too many questions — the miracle of the Lebanese banking system. The system was largely fueled by the deposits of hard-working Lebanese, who needed their money to support their families or create an extra income. As expected, it all came crumbling down, as did the entire country. But the extractors were able to exit before the collapse came. Since the beginning of the crisis and the protests of October 2019, we have read many reports that perfectly describe the current situation, from Hezbollah’s role to French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiatives. We have been drowning in analysis. As I said, the Lebanese are gifted, so they have been able to describe the situation and condemn the ruling elite and the destructive Iranian proxy, but no one is coming forward with a concrete plan to build something new. The demands of the protesters are weak and superficial — they are like putting a new coat of paint on a crumbling building. The demands of the protesters are weak and superficial — they are like putting a new coat of paint on a crumbling building. If we look at how things have changed, it only happened once the army shifted sides. I have many reservations on the inner structure of the army and the control Hezbollah might exert on it. However, I am confident that there are many serving men and women who cannot accept the continuous humiliation and extraction of the country’s wealth. These are the ones the protesters need to appeal to. I have written repeatedly that a new prime minister, president or election will not change anything, but that is what is happening. Protesters should, therefore, no longer waste their time protesting dead institutions such as the current president, but instead should protest in front of the Lebanese Armed Forces, asking for their support. Stop throwing rocks and stones at dead institutions. Go ask for the action of the only institution that might be able to make a change. Ask for the creation of a new governing and legislative entity that will start to rebuild the entire structure of the country. Prosperity can only come through meritocracy and inclusiveness that will unleash the incredible talent of the Lebanese people in their own country, not in faraway lands. The army’s answer will at the very least clarify once and for all where it stands. If it does not move with the people and create a direct counterbalance to Hezbollah and the ruling clans, then the next steps should be clear for all. *Khaled Abou Zahr is the CEO of Eurabia, a media and tech company. He is also the editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.
Who killed Rafik Hariri?/Neville Teller/Jerusalem Post/August 13/2020 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the STL) was voted into existence by the UN Security Council in 2007 and formally established in 2009. The wheels of justice, like the mills of God, are known to grind slowly, but the judicial process to determine who was guilty of the assassination of Lebanon’s one-time prime minister Rafik Hariri – and to bring the culprits to justice – has seemed interminable. Just before noon on St. Valentine’s Day 2005 – February 14 – a motorcade swept along the Beirut seafront. In one of cars sat Hariri, returning home from a parliamentary session in central Beirut. As the line of vehicles reached the Hotel Saint Georges, a security camera captured a white Mitsubishi truck alongside the convoy. Seconds later, a massive explosion shook the city. In the midst of the carnage Rafik Hariri, along with 22 other people, lay dead. Some 200 were injured. The blast left a crater on the street at least 10 meters wide and two meters deep. Israeli Startup develops face mask that neutralizes COVID-19, and can be reused for over a year Ten days later, then UN secretary general Kofi Annan sent a fact-finding mission to Beirut to discover who was responsible for the attack. In doing so he was certainly unaware that he was giving birth to what might be termed a new judicial industry – the Lebanon Inquiry process. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the STL) was voted into existence by the UN Security Council in 2007 and formally established in 2009. Now, if its elaborate website is anything to go by, it is comparable to some large commercial enterprise. After 11 years, 415 court sittings and the testimony of no less than 297 witnesses, the STL announced that it would deliver its verdict on Friday, August 7. Three days before, on August 4, came the unprecedented and devastating explosion in Beirut. As a result, and out of respect to the victims, the STL announced that it would postpone delivering its verdict until August 18. Operating on a budget of over $150 million, half of which is provided by the Lebanese government, the STL court, which consists of 11 judges – seven international and four Lebanese – sits in The Hague. Hearings are broadcast through the STL website. The tribunal runs its own public affairs office, which arranges briefings and interviews for journalists, providing them with press releases, court papers, photographs, audio-visual material, fact sheets and basic legal documents. In addition, located within the STL building is a media center whose facilities include Wi-Fi internet access, TV screens to follow the hearings and recording facilities in Arabic, English and French. How – and more important perhaps, why – did this complex judicial operation emerge from Kofi Annan’s decision, immediately following the assassination, to send a small investigative team to Beirut? That team spent a month attempting to get at the truth, but in the end, recognizing the logistical and political difficulties, submitted a report recommending an independent international inquiry. Kofi Annan followed the group’s advice. He assembled another, more highly-powered team of investigators. Six months later, its report concluded that the white truck seen on the security camera outside the Hotel Saint Georges had carried some 1,000 kg. of explosives. Since Hariri’s convoy contained jamming devices intended to block remote control signals, they concluded that the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber. The report cited a witness who said the bomber was an Iraqi, who had been led to believe that his target was then Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi. THE REPORT concluded that top Syrian and Lebanese officials had been planning the assassination from as far back as mid-2004. Its findings were based on key witnesses and a variety of evidence, including patterns of telephone calls between specific prepaid phone cards that connected prominent Lebanese and Syrian officials to events surrounding the crime. So already in 2005 the finger was pointing at Syria and its Hezbollah supporters inside Lebanon. In fact, Lebanese public opinion preempted this conclusion. Lebanon’s powerful neighbor Syria had been enforcing Big Brother control over Lebanese affairs for decades. Rafik Hariri had been actively seeking to loosen Syria’s oppressive grip and had become something of a thorn in the side of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Following Hariri’s assassination a massive protest was organized in Martyrs’ Square in the heart of downtown Beirut, denouncing the atrocity and demanding that Syrian troops be expelled from the country. This so-called Cedar Revolution caught the world’s attention. A diplomatic coalition was formed, with the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia at its helm. On April 26, 2005, after some three months of civil agitation, the last Syrian troops left Lebanon. It took another four years of fact-finding by the UN International Investigation Commission (UNIIC) before sufficient additional and convincing evidence had been collected to enable the STL to be set up. Even so, largely because of blocking tactics employed by Hezbollah officials inside Lebanon, the five identified defendants were never apprehended and the trial has been held in their absence. They are: Salim Ayyash, Mustafa Badreddine, Hussein Oneissi, Sassad Sabra, and Hassan Merhi. The trial of Ayyash, et al. began on January 16, 2014. In preparing the case the prosecution had carefully steered clear of accusations against Syria, trying to avoid a diplomatic confrontation with President Bashar al-Assad and Syria’s supporters. Subsequently, the STL permitted the prosecution to seek to expose Assad’s role in the assassination, and it soon became clear that the prosecution believed Assad wanted Rafik Hariri killed, and that he used Hezbollah and his own security apparatus to achieve his objective. Based on recent court proceedings, it seems likely that on August 18 al-Assad and Hezbollah will be facing a verdict of having planned and executed the murder of Rafik Hariri. As a postscript, it should be noted that the announcement of the verdict is most unlikely to signal an end to the STL judicial enterprise. Under its terms of reference, either the prosecution or the defense can appeal the verdict, the sentence, or both. These particular wheels of justice are likely to be grinding on for a good few years yet. The writer is Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His new book, Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020 will be published on August 28. He blogs at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com
The Lebanese Revolt Reignited by the Big Explosion/Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020 As mass protests reappear in a deeply-wounded Beirut, “occupied Lebanon” moves ever closer to the danger zone. The fact of the matter, however, is that there is nothing new about the background of the massive security “earthquake” that shook Lebanon on Tuesday, August 4. Neither the government has ever surprised the Lebanese people with its subservience, spitefulness, and inefficiency, nor Hezbollah – which is Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) arm in the Arab Mashreq – has ever failed to remind the Lebanese of its sway, aggressiveness, arrogance and deep involvement in a project of regional sectarian hegemony. Hezbollah’s Secretary-General appeared a few days ago, and totally denied any “knowledge of what goes on in Beirut Port”, and any connection of his party with the huge explosion(s), which has so far killed more than 200 and injured around 5,000 people. But even if the Secretary-General was saying the truth, past experiences with Hezbollah do not encourage anyone to be convinced. Below are some examples: Hezbollah, which had always emphasized its “Lebanese” identity; decided one day to come clean. Its Secretary-General personally and candidly told the Lebanese public that “Hezbollah’s budget, salaries, expenses, food and drink supplies, weapons and missiles come from the Islamic Republic of Iran… our money, reserved for us, arrives not through banks but through the same way that we receive the missiles with which we threaten Israel”. This statement clearly means that the Lebanese government, its audit agencies, as well as political, military and security institutions, have no authority or control over the party’s affairs and dealings. In the past, the party used to claim that it would never be dragged into the “alleys” of Lebanese internal politics. Yet, when the right opportunity came, it entered these “alleys’” and infiltrated various sects through its mercenary “puppets” with the clear intention of weakening, blackmailing, and subjugating its competitors and opponents. Furthermore, contrary to its solemnly-declared commitments, the party has led and financed “exclusionist” fronts, brought down cabinets, fomented cabinet crises which paralyzed Lebanon on more than one occasion. For many years, Hezbollah insisted before the Lebanese that its weapons are exclusively kept to be used in “resisting” Israel, from the “occupied” south Lebanon to liberating Jerusalem. The Lebanese, again, “convinced” themselves that this was true, despite the “Thank You Syria” mass show of support organized by Hezbollah for Al-Assad regime, only a few weeks after the assassination of Rafic Hariri and his colleagues. This actually, took place when that regime was widely seen by most of the Lebanese as the culprit. Then, as Western rumors began to link the party itself with the crime, it opposed the establishment of an international tribunal; and later on, refused to cooperate with it when the latter officially accused a number of the party’s fighters of murder. In 2006, however, Hezbollah passed a major landmark in its disregard for the Lebanese government, when it launched an armed operation across “the Blue Line” marking the border with Israel. This operation ended with a disaster for Lebanon and led to Hezbollah’s de facto withdrawal from the area south of the Litani River. Such a withdrawal, realistically and morally, ended its “liberation” mission, for which Hezbollah alone was allowed to keep its weapons while all other Lebanese militias were disarmed. What could be said here, is that in 2006 Hezbollah’s supporters were thankful to the Lebanese government for its brave backing, while the Israeli war machine was pounding the party’s strongholds in south Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, as well as vast areas of the country. But, a short time later, everything changed, and the party accused the government of “treason” and decided to lead a coup against it. Even worse, after relieving itself of the mission of “liberation”, Hezbollah turned its weapon against its opponents inside Lebanon. Under the pretext of protecting itself against accusations that it controls the Rafic Hariri International Airport’s security, the party invaded west Beirut and attacked southern Mount Lebanon in its major internal war against the Sunni and Druze leaderships. This invasion took place after Hezbollah spectacularly managed to penetrate the Maronite Christians, through striking an “understanding” with its previous arch-enemy General Michel Aoun. The policy of the “Carrot and Stick”, adopted by Hezbollah with the Christians (namely the Maronites), the Sunnis and the Druze, achieved two aims: 1- Securing the party’s persistent and deep infiltration of the Lebanese state’s security and political institutions. 2- Laying the foundation of its coup against the “Taif Accords”, when the party and its allies “occupied” central Beirut and besieged the Government Headquarters (the Grand Serail) for 18 months between late October 2006 and late May 2008. The “occupation” of central Beirut ended with an agreement reached by the Lebanese leaders in the Qatari capital Doha, and resulted in the election of the Army Chief General Michel Sleiman. Practically, the strategic political aim of the “Doha Agreement” – based on a balance of power tilted in favor of Hezbollah – was to undermine the constitutional legitimacy of the “Taif Accords”. But soon enough Hezbollah and Aoun conspired against the “agreement’ when they brought down Saad Hariri’s coalition cabinet by withdrawing their ministers. Through president Sleiman’s term, and thanks to its excessive power and its infiltration of non-Shiite communities, the pro-Iran party succeeded in extending its influence throughout the state security apparatus and key government positions; one thing, however it failed to achieve was to sideline the president This is why the relations steadily deteriorated after Sleiman insisted on upholding the “Baabda Declaration” based on the outcome of the National Dialogue sessions called by and presided on by president Sleiman. Finally, there was a rift that led to Hezbollah openly sponsoring Aoun as its presidential candidate; which again disrupted the country’s political life as Hezbollah and its allies regularly boycotted the presidential election meetings so the necessary two-thirds quorum is never reached. After a lengthy impasse, Dr. Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces Party, and Aoun main rival, withdrew his candidacy and declared his support for Aoun. This development left Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt in no position to challenge Christian unanimity, so they followed Geagea’s lead, securing the presidency for Hezbollah’s candidate. Aoun’s presidency secured under clear political imbalance in the Lebanese scene, and during Hezbollah’s “unauthorized” involvement in the Syrian war, proved once and for all that the “Hezbollah statelet” was now stronger than the Lebanese state. Indeed, ever since Aoun took over, the party took full control of the political and security decision-making processes, leaving to Aoun a free hand in securing government appointments for his and Hezbollah’s Sunni and Druze supporters and henchmen, while marginalizing their political opponents. Just after the explosion that devastated Beirut, several contradictory security pronouncements and “sourced claims” were made; mostly either incredulous or intentionally misleading to protect an employee here or a customs officer there. Throughout, the big picture was absent. It was intentionally absent because there was no benefit to claim responsibility; especially for Israel, which is already carrying out a silent “war of attrition” against Iran, whether in Iran itself or on Syrian soil. On the other hand the Lebanese know too well, from Hezbollah itself, that it possesses a formidable arsenal of heavy weapons; and are almost sure its depots are not in Mozambique!
The Beirut Disaster: What A Fair Historian Might Say/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020 If one of us were to role play and become a historian, what might this historian say about the Beirut disaster? At first, after shedding light on the disaster’s humanitarian and economic dimensions, he would situate it in the particular Lebanese context during which it took place. He will find that it crowned a bankrupt approach for managing politics and the economy, and it took place a few months after a colored revolution that had tried and failed to push corrupt political class aside. He will also emphasize that the aforementioned class was represented, at the time of the crisis, by its worst faction and most inane and unappealing, namely, the Aounists, who promised a “strong reign” and then ended up overseeing the weakest period of governance the country had known in its hundred years of existence. As a footnote at the bottom of the page, the historian would add: It is true that Michel Aoun represented the majority of the frustrated Christians of the country when he became president, unlike the weak presidents who preceded him, but he seems to have ended up among them, because the residents of the capital’s most devastated areas (the port, Gemmayzeh, Mar Mikhael, Ashrafieh …), Christian neighborhoods, hold him responsible for what happened to them. The historian will surely comment about the symbolism in much of the people’s reactions. He will refer to the fact that the curse words that had been almost exclusively directed at Gebran Basil, the president’s son in law, were now being directed at the president himself. As for the biggest taboo that had been broken, it was the mock-hanging of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nassrallah in the public square: until that moment, daring to mention Nasrallah had been a life-threatening debasement of sanctity. This was broken. “Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah” became just “one of them,” though he is the most dangerous among them. The historian will focus on this major transformation and its significance: Even those who exonerate Hezbollah of direct responsibility for the disaster realized, or most of them did, that the state’s collapse is founded on its abandonment of its monopoly on maintaining security, its most critical function, in favor of Hezbollah. It is with this division in particular where the path towards disintegration, the tragic climax of which we saw at the Port of Beirut, began. He will add, to remind his reader of the period which shortly preceded the blast, that Hezbollah had been the most prominent and effective protector, during the October Revolution, of the regime responsible for the disaster. However, our historian will leave us with two unresolved questions: On one hand, will the Lebanese manage to produce a cross-sectarian political force that can in turn create an alternative form of governance, thereby preventing Lebanon from ending itself as a nation and a state? On the other hand, do the Lebanese understand that, until further notice, the most powerful thing they possess is what remains of their friendships with the rest of the world, friendships that they ought, from here on out, to avoid wasting away with “resistances” and getting involved in conflicts that they do not have the capacity for? In another footnote, on another page, the historian will add that the disaster showed the truth in what had been said, decades ago, by a Lebanese politician who saw that “Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness.” It may have been noticed that the historian does not mention the prime minister, Hassan Diab, or his ministers, nor does he refer to the government’s fate or the early resignations of some of its ministers. Furthermore, the Lebanese disaster has a regional context as well, a context that the historian calls “a succession of regional tragedies”: It came after two disastrous regional developments that induce nothing but deep sense of pessimism: In Syria, since 2011, its ruler, Bashar al-Assad, has been capably killing his people and displacing them on a massive scale. That experience demonstrated how little value human life held especially since it did not hamper the persistence of Assad’s presidency, and no accountability is forthcoming. In Iraq and Syria, starting from 2013-2014, ISIS has been present. It seized vast territory in both countries and established an unprecedentedly barbaric regime. The movement has been dealt with major and fundamental military defeats, but the causes that brought it to life have not yet been addressed. It continues to be dealt with, in its ups and downs, as a mere military event. This, in general, is bad news. Its negative implications may be limited if aid is obtained to restore some of what had collapsed in Beirut and relieve some of the victims’ families pain. However, it raises issues for Lebanon, and thus for the region as well, which remain to be contemplated and addressed. As for the conclusion that our historian presents in the form of a question, it is the following: “How long will the lives of the people in this region remain cheap, how long will they continue to be killed by oppressive regimes and petty leaders who rely on kinship and sectarian ties and keep their citizens preoccupied with major ideological conflicts meant to further undermine the value of their lives?”
The Beirut Disaster Amid Two Legitimacies Hussam Itani/Asharq Al Awsat/August 13/2020 Lebanon’s tyrants have not grasped the gravity of what happened in Beirut. They did not feel the blast that blew through bedrooms and livelihoods of thousands of Lebanese, nor the avalanche of broken glass, debris and pieces of wood that rained down on the Lebanese and their children, who had been oblivious to the crime of mythical proportions that had been prepared for them. They did not care about the hundreds who had been killed, not that the victims are not numbers, but fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, and loved ones to people who are not of lesser importance than the corrupt officials. A child no older than three years of age was amongst the victims. They did not care about the thousands who were injured in the blast, and who will carry these injuries with them for the rest of their lives or their suffering at the gates of the overcrowded hospitals that had been damaged by the blast, with hundreds bleeding heavily for hours before they could receive the care they needed. They dealt with the victims with criminal carelessness, leaving dozens of those who had still been alive under the rubble, without rushing to deploy cranes and heavy machinery to save them, as any authorities with a minimal degree of moral fortitude, sense of responsibility or merit. Because of politicians’ neglect and the withering away of the institutions that are meant to deal with such situations, dozens of those who had been missing died before the rescue teams arrived. Many firefighters and civil defense personnel, who had not been informed of the dangers of the mission they had tasked with, were added to the list of casualties as they tried to contain the fire that caused the massive explosion. Alternatively, perhaps this oligarchy grasped and felt but nonetheless approached the calamity exclusively from the standpoint of its direct interests: How can I benefit from reconstruction? How do we share the aid that might arrive? Who will rebuild the wheat silo? Who will renovate the apartments? What profits will each of us reap after the bodies of the victims are collected and the widows and orphans stop wailing? It is no secret that Lebanese politicians, without exception, control the contracting and construction sectors, and they can steal everything that may come from international or Arab donors unless the aid goes directly to the victims, without going through the cave of the corrupt state. A similar approach is being taken on the political front; the group that controls the Lebanese, hurried, as soon as Hassan Diab’s government resigned on the evening of Monday, August 10, to search for an alternative cabinet. The names and stances that were announced and leaked indicate an exact replication of the old methods that this group has been following to stamp its authority for decades: representation of the main sectarian factions and blocs in Parliament, taking the regional and international balance into account, in the hope of “convincing” the world that the disasters that these people brought down on the majority of the Lebanese population are being dealt with. In fact, the plan of the “political class”, which has taken a step up, going from corruption to outright criminality, is merely to reproduce its hegemony over the state. For they believe that Western countries will agree to this approach, based on what French President Emmanuel Macron said as he visited Beirut and during the international conference of assistance and support for Beirut on August 9. The fact is, French and European positions lean toward keeping the political scene as it is, without serious change that may lead – if they failed – to the collapse of the last remaining pillars of state authority. This poses a major problem: do Lebanese politicians still represent the majority of citizens? Do they, then, still have the representative legitimacy that allows them to speak for the people, and form the next government, in the same shape and form that the Lebanese have already tried and suffered from? The Lebanese political system, it seems, lacks any mechanisms that would allow for accountability. It is but an amalgamation of small dictatorships, each of which monopolizes it group’s representation, speaking for it and supposedly advancing its interests. They persist in doing so, without any sensitivity to the changes that have been taking place on the streets since October 17. This is especially true for the illegitimately-armed faction that supports this regime and has repeatedly reiterated, leaving no room for doubt or hesitation, that it will prevent peaceful democratic change by force, even if further loss of life and destruction are required. Accordingly, Lebanon is home to two forms of legitimacy that have no links between them: popular legitimacy, which the October 17 uprising speaks for and which was reiterated in the most recent demonstrations mourning for the victims of the explosion on Saturday, August 8. It also demonstrated that its deep crisis persists amid its failure to formulate a program and produce real leadership that challenges the corrupt junta and the representative legitimacy it claims. The representatives sit comfortably in their seats, deeply reassured by the absence of an alternative that could hold them accountable, drag them to the courts and prisons, and rightfully hang them on the gallows. Two forms of legitimacy in crisis coexist, with the second not recognizing the legitimacy of the first and unable to become a serious and weighty political force capable of negotiating and imposing its conditions, on territory that is shrinking and between corpses that are multiplying and houses that are collapsing. There is nothing in this scene but the taste of bitterness, a rotten smell and the sound of owls.
A Grim Milestone on Covid-19 Could Be a Turning Point/Justin Fox/Bloomberg/August 13/2020 The US has reached a landmark of sorts in its so far not very successful battle with the virus that causes Covid-19. Most Americans now know someone who has been infected. This is according to tracking surveys conducted by Navigator Research, a polling project with ties to various left-leaning groups. Given what we know about the spread of the disease from other sources, it sounds about right. Although it is sad news, it may also mark something of a positive turning point. More than anything else, the key to keeping Covid-19 under control seems to be taking it seriously, and knowing someone with the disease can do a lot to focus a person on the risks it poses. That it had to come to this is of course tragic. A key enabler of the spread of the coronavirus, especially in affluent countries with the resources to stop it, has been an inability to imagine that what happened somewhere else might happen closer to home. Italians saw what transpired in China, and failed to act on the early signs that they might be next. New Yorkers saw what was going on Italy and the mayor and governor concluded that, well, this isn’t Italy. Political leaders in the U.K. saw what was going on in Continental Europe and New York and seemed to think their compatriots could just tough it out, before belatedly changing course. Within countries, though, an outbreak in one region usually did translate into rapid changes in behavior everywhere else. This was true at first even in the sprawling, polarized US, where the actions of some on-the-ball state and local officials, President Donald Trump’s sudden (and, it turns out, temporary) conversion from coronavirus doubter to grudging supporter of tough measures to stop it and a sort of generalized public freak-out together kept the epidemic from going national in the spring. This success didn’t last. One reason was of course the impatience of the president, who after his own coronavirus task force issued a reasonable set of recommendations for safely reopening the country, promptly goaded states to ignore them. Given that much of the US had barely been touched by the disease, though, it was always going to be a struggle to persuade people outside of hard-hit areas to take it seriously and stick with practices like social distancing or mask-wearing for long. This is proving to be the case elsewhere as well — the northeastern Spanish region of Aragon, which saw only modest spread of Covid-19 in March and April, is now the epicenter of a summer resurgence. But it’s especially true in the US, which has been beset for a while now by an epidemic of distrust and disinformation that seemingly makes it really hard for people in, say, suburban Tulsa to imagine themselves in the shoes of New Yorkers (and vice versa!). In April, I got into extended email discussions with a couple of readers from outside New York who said they didn’t know anyone with Covid-19 and were clearly dubious of my assertions that I did. Allegations that the disease was a sinister hoax or nearly harmless coursed through social media. Even in the mainstream media and academic research, the deadliness of New York’s epidemic was often ascribed to conditions unique to the big city (such as density and heavy reliance on public transportation) or to the nursing-home policies of Governor Andrew Cuomo. Some things about New York’s Covid experience clearly were unique, and the outbreaks cropping up all over the Sun Belt this summer have generally been slower moving and (so far) less deadly. But they’ve also been much more widespread — to the point that most Americans now know someone who has or has had Covid-19. Almost all Americans, meanwhile, now live in communities where substantial numbers of people have been infected with the coronavirus, meaning they’re increasingly likely to hear about the disease from local news sources that they trust more than national outlets. State and local politicians are of course affected by these changing realities, too, making previously reluctant ones more likely to endorse measures to slow the disease’s spread. But the changes in individual attitudes seem to be at least as important as the government mandates. Here’s a chart of restaurant traffic in Arizona since the state began allowing indoor dining again on May 11. The number of new confirmed coronavirus cases started to rise sharply in Arizona in late May. By late June, the state’s outbreak appeared to be spiraling out of control, with more than 3,000 new cases a day and the percentage of tests coming back positive blowing past 20%. On June 29, Governor Doug Ducey closed bars, gyms and theaters and strongly urged (but did not mandate) the wearing of face masks, and on July 9, he restricted indoor dining at restaurants to 50% of capacity. But as the chart makes clear, behavior had begun changing well before then, as Arizonans saw reports of rising case loads on the local news and learned of friends who had contracted the disease. In the process, they began to slow the epidemic: The number of new cases reported peaked on July 1, meaning that new infections likely peaked a week or more before that. There are still too many infections and too high a positive-test percentage to say things are under control, but they are headed in the right direction, for now at least. The big Covid-19 outbreaks in Florida and Texas appear to have peaked, too, but those states have not yet seen as big a decline in cases as Arizona. That may be in part because their populations are dispersed over many metropolitan areas and media markets, meaning that the local cycle of learning to take Covid seriously has to happen over and over again. Two-thirds of Arizona’s population resides in and around Phoenix, making the process a lot simpler. I realize this isn’t the only possible explanation for current trends in coronavirus data. Hundreds of thousands of Arizonans (possibly more than a million) have now recovered from and are for the time being most likely immune to Covid-19, and this is surely helping to slow the disease’s spread. But the fact that local outbreaks around the world have subsided at very different infection rates (as measured by subsequent antibody surveys) points to behavior changes and public policy being in most cases the more important drivers. Covid-19 is usually not fatal, and may be getting less so over time. It’s not unstoppable either. But when people think that it doesn’t exist, or isn’t coming anywhere near them, or is practically harmless, or is going away soon, it has a nasty way of becoming a big, big problem. We’ve now reached a point where most Americans have a personal link to the disease, which makes such denial a lot harder. That may turn out to be some good bad news.
Abandoned by State after Explosion, Lebanese Help Each Other/Associated Press/Naharnet/August 13/2020 In the southern Lebanese town of Haris, a newlywed couple is living in one of Safy Faqeeh’s apartments for free. He’s never met them before, and they aren’t on a honeymoon. Their apartment in Beirut was wrecked when last week’s massive explosion wreaked destruction across the capital. Faqeeh is one of hundreds of Lebanese who have opened their homes to survivors of the Aug. 4 blast. The explosion, which was centered on Beirut’s port and ripped across the capital, left around a quarter of a million people with homes unfit to live in. But they have not had to crowd into collective shelters or sleep in public parks. That’s because in the absence of the state, Lebanese have stepped up to help each other. Some have let relatives, friends and neighbors stay with them. Others like Faqeeh extended a helping hand even farther, taking to social media to spread the word that they have a room to host people free of charge. The couple saw Faqeeh’s offer on Facebook for a free apartment he owns in Haris, some 50 miles (80 kilometers) south of Beirut. They can stay as long as they need to, the 29-year-old Faqeeh said, and he has a second apartment available for anyone else in need. “This is not help, it is a duty,” he said. When he was a teenager, Faqeeh’s family home was damaged in the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, and they had to stay in a house in Tripoli, clear on the other end of Lebanon. Now he’s paying it forward. “We have experienced several wars and they (people) hosted us,” Faqeeh said. The help that Lebanese are giving goes beyond a place to stay. Armed with helmets and brooms, hundreds of volunteers have circulated through Beirut’s heavily damaged neighborhoods, cleaning up people’s homes and doing free basic repairs, often enough to enable the residents to stay there. The explosion left entire blocks in shambles, with streets blanketed in broken glass, twisted metal, broken brickwork. Yet within days, some streets were clean, the debris neatly sorted in piles. That was thanks to volunteers, often using social media to organize where to target. In some places, they were sweeping streets and hauling away wreckage while security forces or soldiers stood nearby, watching. That has only reinforced for Lebanese their government’s failure to provide basic services, much less respond to the disaster. Many already blame the government and the broader ruling elite’s incompetence, mismanagement and corruption for the explosion. Authorities allowed 2,750 tons of explosive ammonium nitrate to sit in a warehouse at the port unmonitored for seven years, despite multiple warnings of the danger, until it exploded when touched off by a fire. The blast killed more than 170 people, injured thousands and wreaked chaos across the city. The government almost completely left the public on its own to deal with the aftermath. Outside the demolished port, there have been no government clean-up crews in the streets and little outreach from officials to help beyond promises of compensation to those whose homes or businesses were damaged. The list of services people are offering keeps expanding. It now includes free glass for cars damaged in the blast, free maintenance of electrical appliances and free cosmetic surgery for people with face injuries. On Facebook, a group called Rebuild Beirut quickly sprung up. Its volunteers are working at full speed, helping clean up homes and link survivors with donors who will cover the expenses of repairs. The individual acts of solidarity have been even more striking because Lebanon was already in the middle of a worsening economic crisis that has thrown hundreds of thousands into poverty and left households and businesses with little or no excess cash. “I am so proud of the Lebanese people,” said Kim Sacy, a 19-year-old university student. “There is no state, there is nobody, there is nothing … we are the ones doing everything in the field.”Sacy is studying at a French university and was supposed to be on a program in Sweden this year but the coronavirus pandemic grounded her in Lebanon. She was outside Beirut driving home when the blast took place. She didn’t feel the explosion but when she reached her neighborhood of Achrafieh, she found it shattered. “This is where I lived my whole life,” she said. Sacy’s family home was damaged, but she still wanted to help others. “It is not important. I consider myself lucky,” she said. “It is the people who make the home.” She said some of her family members were injured in the blast but are doing fine now. Sacy began collecting food and other items to give to those in need. Around 25 families have reached out to her to donate, some she knows, but half are strangers. For the past week, she has been circulating around Beirut in her car to pick up donated furniture, first aid kits, bed sheets and kitchen utensils that she gives to a local non-governmental organization to distribute. When not doing that, she has been cleaning in the streets, including cleaning a fire station. The self-help spirit has roots in the long civil war, when central authority collapsed and Lebanese had to depend on themselves to get by. In more recent years, waves of anti-government protests have emphasized volunteerism and civic duty — boosted by social media that made connections bypassing the state easier. The shock of the explosion and the trauma of seeing loved ones injured or a home wrecked has exacted an emotional burden on Beirutis — especially with financial woes already weighing on people. The Beit Insan well-being center is offering free services to help people overcome the trauma that the blast may have caused. It is also encouraging people with money to “pay it forward” and cover costs for people to get psychological help. “We know since all the events that have been happening, that less and less people have money for mental health,” said Dr. Samar Zebian, co-founder and co-director of the center. “We are a social business.”
Turkey vies with Saudi Arabia as ‘protector of Lebanon’s Sunnis’/The Arab Weekly/August 13/2020 Ankara sees economic opportunity with Beirut seaport being out of commission. Turkey’s Vice President Fuat Oktay, right, and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut BEIRUT – Observers in Lebanon pointed out the total absence of any Saudi political role in Lebanon after the Beirut explosion at a time when Turkey was quick to present itself as a political and economic actor in the country. Ankara sought to take advantage of declining Saudi interest in Lebanon and of Iran’s wariness about being conspicuously present in a setting drawing a lot of Western attention.Observers pointed out that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted quickly to the Beirut disaster and dispatched to the Lebanese capital Turkish Vice-President Fuad Oktay as his personal emissary, accompanied by Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and a number of Turkish officials, confirming Ankara’s keenness on being perceived as a major player in the Lebanese scene. Riyadh did not hide its dissatisfaction with political developments in Lebanon, even before the explosion. It had stopped providing economic aid to the country and downgraded its diplomatic mission in Beirut. According to senior Saudi officials, Riyadh believes that the Lebanese state has completely fallen under Hezbollah’s sway, which prevents Saudi Arabia’s presence in Lebanon, whether politically or in investment matters. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan did not hide his country’s concern over Hezbollah’s hegemony in Lebanon. “The party has precedents in the use of explosive materials in a number of Arab and European countries,” Prince Faisal said during his participation at the donors’ online summit initiated by France last Sunday. Saudi writer Khaled al-Sulaiman encapsulated his country’s stance towards Lebanon by saying that “thorny bushes should not be watered.” “This time Saudi Arabia has had a different position, an open and transparent position for Lebanon and for the international community: Saudi Arabia will not continue to pay Hezbollah’s bills, and the Lebanese have to assume their responsibilities towards their country, and the international community must assume its responsibilities towards Hezbollah’s mischief internally and regionally,” he wrote in an article in the Saudi daily Okaz. However, Riyadh’s choice to withdraw from Lebanon because of its opposition to Hezbollah opens the door to Turkey’s expanding role in the country, as Ankara seeks to position itself as the “protector of the Sunnis.” A Lebanese observer close to Riyadh said that “Saudi humanitarian aid came generously, but politics was absent.” Political sources monitoring Turkish moves in Lebanon think that Ankara is seeking at the present time to fill the Arab void in the country in light of the deep crisis afflicting Hezbollah as an arm of Iran. These sources confirmed that Turkey has a certain presence in Lebanon, but fails to realise that this presence does not mean that the Sunnis are loyal to it. A prominent Lebanese politician described Turkish presence in Lebanon as rather sizable and important in light of the presence of a number of charities supported by Ankara, especially in Tripoli, the capital of northern Lebanon. Prior to the deadly blast at Beirut port, there had been a political debate between two Sunni political figures over who is loyal to Saudi Arabia and who is loyal to Turkey in Lebanon. Asas Media, a website administered by former interior minister close to Saudi Arabia, Nihad al-Machnouk, has accused former Lebanese security director and Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi of working with Turkish intelligence to take control of northern Lebanon. Rifi responded violently to Machnouk, describing him as someone who kept moving “from an intrigue to the other, and only the employer changes.” Machnouk and Rifi at some point competed for Saudi attention when the Saudi fortunes of the former Lebanese prime minister and head of the Future Bloc Saad Hariri declined. Sunni politicians believe that Turkey is seeking to achieve wide encroachment into Lebanon and to “represent the Sunni community” by sponsoring several Islamic societies and investing in the restoration of old buildings, with a special focus on those reminiscent of the Ottoman era. A Lebanese politician, queried by The Arab Weekly on Ankara’s growing role in Lebanon, stressed the need to “distinguish between the appreciation that the Lebanese Sunnis, especially in Tripoli, hold for Turkey and being loyal to it,” noting that Lebanon’s Sunnis generally sympathise with anyone opposing the Assad regime in Syria. He explained that the Sunnis in general are allergic to anyone who deals with Syrian President Bashar Assad in light of their bitter experience with the Syrian regime, due to its sectarian (Alawite) nature. This sectarian nature appeared specifically in Tripoli, where the Alawites, during the period of the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon up to 2005, turned into something like masters of the city, despite the fact that they formed only a small minority in it. Political sources indicated that the Turkish vice president’s visit to Beirut immediately after the departure of French President Emmanuel Macron was a clear attempt to find a balance with France and present Turkey as a protector of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, just like France’s role as protector of the Lebanese Christians. Furthermore, Turkey did not waste the economic opportunity represented by the port of Beirut being out of commission. Oktay was quick to suggest the port of Mersin in southern Turkey as an alternative to the port of Beirut. Oktay stressed that “Turkey will go with Lebanon to the end.” He pointed out that his visit to Lebanon should be taken as “blank check” for “various types of assistance to the brotherly Lebanese people.” A political observer told The Arab Weekly that Oktay’s words “caused discontent in many circles, including the Sunni community, which has a vested interest in saving Beirut’s port and fixing it as quickly as possible. (Oktay’s statements) revealed Turkish opportunism.” Still, the fact remains that the new map of large ports in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals the size of the opportunity Ankara sees to control trade with Lebanon. With the Beirut seaport out of service and the limited capacity of the port of Tripoli for receiving large container ships makes Mersin port one of the main candidates as a handling port, especially with the international ban on Syrian ports, and the impossibility of access to alternative Israeli ports.
