A New World Order is emerging from the Middle East
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya/October 27/15
This year is seeing the most drastic reshaping of the geopolitics of the Middle East possibly since WW2. Certainly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Everything is in flux. Russia and Iran are pushing out the U.S. and NATO in Syria, Iran is already leading the Shiite war effort in Iraq, and the Iraqi government is now considering inviting military assistance from Russia against ISIS as well. This after the hundreds of billions of dollars that the U.S. has spent on the country. Across the entire Fertile Crescent, the U.S. and its allies are being almost entirely marginalized. As are their interests.Further to the South, lay the traditional allies of the U.S. in the region: Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These alliances still hold – for now. Though there is obviously no love lost between the U.S. and these countries. None of the governments of these countries now trust the U.S. The Egyptian government is still caught up in the ambivalence of the West between its desire for democracy in the region and its desire for stability and for secular governance. The détente between the U.S. and Iran on the Iranians’ nuclear program has led to Saudi alarm. And the Israelis are hunkering down in their metaphorical bunker as the world around them descends into chaos, and the flames of war are starting to spread to the occupied territories.
When the Middle East became destabilized in the wake of the Arab Spring, the others pounced
To the east, Afghanistan is once again in total chaos, with the Taliban emerging as the most likely group to prevail in the country. And Pakistan, formerly the U.S.’s most reliable ally in the region, is being absorbed into the Chinese sphere of influence with the help, once again, of the Iranians. In fact, one could argue, the entire East is being reshaped geopolitically according to the needs of Chinese commerce: pipelines from Russia to China, pipelines from Iran to Pakistan paid for by the Chinese, railways and road infrastructure built by the Chinese in South East Asia in Myanmar to connect them to the deep water port in Kyaukpyu, to the south west with the trade corridor through Pakistan to connect them to the deep water port of Gwadar, and across the whole of Central Asia, as China is rebuilding the Silk Road. Muscling in. Russia, Iran and China are muscling in on the Middle East, and so far it seems that the U.S. and Europe have neither the capacity, nor the will, to do anything about it. The American Century, at least in the Middle East, seems well and truly over. How did it come to this? For one, the U.S. has taken the eye off the ball. Invading Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 could have perhaps worked, on its own. The U.S. was able to bring its allies along, and there was a great deal of good will towards the American war aims at the time. But all that was squandered with the insane decision to also invade Iraq.
That war clearly overstretched U.S. forces and allowed Iran, Russia and eventually China to flex their muscles in their regional spheres of influence against U.S. interests. The initial response of the Obama administration to the catastrophic consequences of the Bush-era warmongering was to pursue a more liberal, international law approach to geo-politics. It was the only way that the U.S. could have sustained its status in the international arena. But by then it was already too late. The U.S. had long lost the moral authority to call on other countries to obey international norms, and no longer had the strength to enforce even a semblance of international law. Its rivals had smelled blood and tasted success. And so, when the Middle East became destabilized in the wake of the Arab Spring, the others pounced. And now, China is carving up the East, Russia the Levant, and Iran every country in its neighborhood and around the Jordan River.Just how the situation will look when the dust settles it is impossible to know. But it is almost certain that there will be very little room left for the U.S. or its European allies in the region. And with that, our access to oil and gas will never be safe or secure ever again. Transitioning to alternative sources of energy is no longer just a matter for the Climate Change “hippies”. It should be the highest priority even for the most hawkish neo-conservatives.
Very quietly, Iraq is ceasing to exist
Dr. John C. Hulsman/Al Arabiya/October 27/15
For the tragic country of Iraq, no news presently is bad news. By that I mean that the headline strategic story at present is that nothing major has changed since ISIS’s stunning advances of last summer. Iraq is now de facto split along organic ethno-religious lines into three very distinct sub-states, roughly corresponding to the old Ottoman Empire sanjak provinces. Worse still for the Abadi government in Baghdad, ISIS is increasingly ensconced as merely another nasty political fact of life in the Middle East; it shows no real signs of going away. Instead, political ossification has set in, making the overturning of this gloomy state of affairs increasingly unlikely.
For the Baghdad government remains irredeemingly weak, largely in the pocket of its Iranian benefactors, and unable to do much on its own. Economically, the central government is a basket case. Export figures for the first seven months of 2015 have crashed, leading to predictions of the budget deficit reaching a cavernous 20%. Since the fall of Saddam, widespread corruption has been a cancer on the Iraqi body politic. On August 7, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most respected figure in the country, called on Prime Minister al-Abadi to take ‘drastic measures’ to fight corruption.
The reform-minded premier responded, doing away with 11 of 33 cabinet positions, cutting three Deputy Prime Ministerial posts, and merging four other ministries. As the doling out of cabinet positions has become a major form of clientelism, such a paring back of the bloated central government must be seen as a step in the right direction. However, despite the Grand Ayatollah’s support and regardless of Abadi’s reformist zeal, the odds remain high that the Prime Minister will prove unable to slay the formidable dragon of corruption.
For the motive force behind the Abadi government remains Iranian brute force. The present Iraqi Interior Ministry is a wholly owned subsidiary of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard corps; out in the field Shia militias directed by Tehran have proven themselves for more successful fighters than the laughably corrupt and woeful Iraqi army. As long as the armed forces buttressing Baghdad remain so incredibly weak, it is almost impossible to see how the Abadi government is capable of regaining lost Iraqi territory—be it to the Kurds or ISIS—on its own, and for its own purposes.
In contrast, there are no signs that the relatively capable and highly motivated Kurdish Peshmerga are about to be reined in by Baghdad. With the help of American air strikes, the Kurds have managed to repulse ISIS on the ground, regaining most of the territory they had lost in the summer of 2014. Strong enough to turn their backs on Baghdad, the oil revenue deal between the Abadi and Barzani governments has again broken down.
The Kurds, defying Baghdad, have unilaterally been selling their own oil via Turkey. Sales have amounted to more than 450,000 barrels per day (bpd) since May 2015, amounting to direct revenue for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of $1.5 billion for July-August 2015. If the Kurds can hang onto the contested and oil-rich city of Kirkuk (and there is absolutely no present challenge to them there), their proposed state would prove economically viable. In all but name, Iraqi Kurdistan has for a long while been independent.
ISIS showing real signs of staying power
And the KRG is not the only sub-state in Iraq in rude health. Far more ominously, ISIS is showing real signs of staying power. After more than a year of American-led coalition bombing, amounting (as of October 2015) to more than 10,600 air strikes, ISIS has yet to feel a dent in its economic chest. The sale of oil, ISIS’s main source of income, is generating revenues of up to $500 million a year.
Nor is ISIS being eradicated on the battlefield. Since bombing commenced in September 2014, the American-led coalition has killed as many as 15,000 ISIS fighters, according to US intelligence estimates. However, during this time the group’s military strength has increased, with there now being as many as 70,000 ISIS fighters overall, including 15-20,000 foreigners. Despite some territorial setbacks in central Iraq, such as the fall of Tikrit and the recent liberation of Baiji, ISIS continues to dominate roughly one-third of the country, an area the size of Britain. There are simply no real signs ISIS is going away.
As a strong adherent of ethical realism, I follow the British parliamentarian and thinker Edmund Burke’s admonition that to do good in the world, it must be viewed as it truly is, warts and all, to then be made better. To do so in Iraq must cause anyone an involuntary shudder. For what one sees is a country definitively split in three parts, with ISIS now merely a fact of life in Mesopotamia. Outgoing and highly capable U.S. Army Chief Ray Odierno, on the eve of his retirement, stated forthrightly (and shockingly to American ears) that Iraq might have to be partitioned. I’d say to the general that the horse has already left the stable; in truth it already is. Iraq has ceased to exist.
A Russian roadmap for the political transition in Syria
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/October 27/15
It is very possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin has developed a consensual framework for a political settlement in Syria that would overcome the Assad Knot, after securing important concessions from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The first of these is securing acknowledgment of the leading Russian role in Syria and the restoration of Russian influence in the Middle East.
The second is a willingness for military and intelligence cooperation in the war on ISIS, which would ward off the framing of the Russian intervention as a Christian war against Islamic terrorism, before it spreads to the Russian homeland and near-abroad. The third is defusing preconditions requiring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down at the start of the political transition, in favor of accepting Assad’s gradual exit in parallel with said transition. And the fourth concession is agreeing to shore up regime institutions as part of the solution, compared to previous positions that insisted on fully replacing the regime with the opposition’s framework.
If Vladimir Putin has decided to build on these concessions, then he must have no doubt discussed with Assad – who was summoned to Moscow this week – a roadmap for his departure. This would likely follow a timetable imposed by the transitional process, which in all likelihood will span months, not weeks. This would enable Assad to step down after defeating “terrorism”, as he always states, after bolstering the Syrian state, as these two elements would constitute an “honorable exit” for Assad, compared to defeat and prosecution for his role in precipitating and perpetrating the atrocities in Syria.
Indeed, if Assad’s Moscow visit and meeting with Putin were instead meant to reaffirm solidarity between the two men, the Russian leader would not have immediately contacted the Saudi king and Egyptian president immediately after Assad flew back to Damascus.
Yet all this does not mean that today’s meeting in Vienna between the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, Saudi, and Turkey will conclude with a public agreement on Assad’s departure. Potentially, Russian proposals may not be acceptable to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, should they be deemed lacking in guarantees. Accordingly, the coming days will prove to be crucial in terms of determining the features of the putative political transition – and names being discussed by the major players could be leaked.
The ‘Assad Knot’
In any case, political realism requires us to be prudent and cautious. For one thing, the Trust Knot is as challenging as the Assad Knot. Furthermore, military battles continue, and could even intensify if the Gulf nations and Turkey sensed Russia could temper concessions while scoring military gains for the Assad regime at the expense of the armed opposition, rather than ISIS. And thirdly, the Iranian dimension of the Russian initiative remains ambiguous; some conjecture that Iran’s role has been undermined by Russia, others believe everything is proceeding in full coordination between Moscow and Tehran to crush ISIS and preserve the regime in Damascus.
It is not yet clear whether the motivation for Putin’s initiative was his realization that there is clear determination to pushback against Russia military operations, as these seek to purge the armed Syrian opposition backed by the Gulf states and the United States. To be sure, the introduction of US-made TOW anti-tank missiles to the Syrian battlefield signaled a shift in the US position: Washington is not going to sit idly by while being blatantly humiliated by a Russian-Iranian alliance as it proceeds to eliminate the moderate Syrian opposition to rescue Assad. That message was communicated unequivocally, and the men in Moscow received it loud and clear.
It is possible that the generals in Moscow were the ones who best understood it, as they recalled what Stinger missiles did to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, precipitating its collapse. It is possible that it was they who persuaded Putin the best course of action for Russia and its national interests is to avoid sinking in Syria’s quagmires.
The specter of Afghanistan is not an American invention meant to intimidate Russia. It is a bona fide Russian nightmare that those men, who are holdovers from the Soviet era, have not forgotten. Most likely, those generals rushed to alert their president of the need to avoid the reckless kind of arrogance that could cost Russia dearly, a Christian nation with a sizeable Muslim minority surrounded by five Muslim-majority republics. The top brass must have realized that it would be contrary to Russian interests for Moscow to spearhead the global war on “Sunni terrorism”, and concluded that a deal is better than this quandary.
The Russians have not come out in protests against their government’s support for a president rejected by half of his people, and accused of killing hundreds of thousands. The Russians have gave in to nationalism, considering every stance by their government a response to American and European humiliation during the Libyan war. For this reason, they did not thoroughly analyze the repercussions of Russian policy on the Syrian people. But now that Putin has decided to escalate militarily, the specter of Afghanistan has returned, and Russian protests came out against the adventurism of the Russian presidency and the military has sounded the alarm regarding the cost of intervention in the Syrian quagmire.
However, this does not mean at all that Russia will back down militarily in Syria for fear of “Afghanization”. What it means is that Russia seems to be resolved now to develop a political horizon for its military escalation.
The other parties that have protested against Russian military escalation in Syria are ready to work on a political settlement. However, they too have decided to escalate militarily, as part of their efforts to strengthen their negotiating hand.
The best of the two scenarios is for the coming military escalation to proceed in a gradual manner as the political settlement – agreed to by Russia, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the international community – approaches. The worst scenario is for military escalation to continue without understandings or settlements, turning Syria into a worst example than Afghanistan. What is frightening here is that this is quite possible, despite all indications suggesting a deal is coming.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made demarches towards Russia a while ago, to persuade it that there is no animosity with it but rather that shared interests are many. The only difference is on the fate of Assad in the political settlement and Russian arms exports to Iran. Even in the aftermath of the surprising overt Russian military intervention in Syria, high-level delegations from Saudi and the UAE still visited Russia, to stress what could constitute a basis for political and economic cooperation.
Saudi and Emirati diplomacy continued to pursue a path of persuasion on Syria, and found around President Putin people willing to listen, because the proposals could save Syria from the coming bind. There is also a welcoming attitude towards partnership with Russia when it comes to rebuilding Syria.
Russia’s vision for Syria
Russian-Turkish and Russian-Qatari relations have been affected by two important factors. First: the Islamist organizations, which Moscow deems to be extremist, including the Muslim Brotherhood backed by Ankara and Doha. Russia accused both capitals of also supporting terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Nusra Front in Syria. Second: the gas pipelines through Syria and Turkey to export the gas of Russia’s number one rival Qatar to Europe, Russia’s backyard.
Most likely, the Russian domination in Syria would be a turning point with regard to gas pipeline projects for both Turkey and Qatar. Now, Ankara has offered some concessions regarding Assad’s role in the transitional phase and regarding entering as a party to the war on ISIS. Ankara has also waved the migrants’ card to get concessions from Europe and Germany, which has a lot of sway with Russia.
Russia and Iran have been allies as far back as their collaboration in Syria began, and there is nothing to confirm the hypothesis about their rivalry in Syria. However, there might be a Russian desire to take charge of the military situation in Syria, ahead of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, or the Shiite militias backed by the IRGC. Perhaps Moscow believes the IRGC and its allies pose a fundamental threat to its Syria policy, namely to strengthen the Syrian regime and not undermine it, even if this were at the hands of its allies.
If Iran agrees to Russia’s vision for Syria, then there will be no disputes between them. However, if the IRGC insists on its own vision, Iran will have to ultimately decide whether there is a difference between the moderate presidency and its doves, and the hardliners of the IRGC and its hawks, and by Iran here we mean Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The decision on Syria is extremely important for Tehran, and so is its alliance with Russia, and vice versa. Therefore, there must no doubt be prior coordination between the two countries. Both are vulnerable to becoming implicated in the quagmire in Syria. So if both sides see that the time is right for a deal, even if it requires the gradual departure of Bashar al-Assad, then they could agree to one, in return for many gains that safeguard their joint influence over any future authority in Damascus.
The outstanding issue here is the common enemy of all sides, ISIS. Defeating ISIS might be easy if all military and intelligence efforts converge. ISIS seems like a cocktail of intelligence plots, and could be a destructive and terrifying tool in the Syrian polarization.
The coming days will bring new developments that need to be carefully analyzed, without fanfare or fearmongering. It is a crucial stage in the international negotiations on Syria, and could bode well for Syria.
