Media hysteria over Russia and Syria
Maria Dubovikova/Al Arabiya/September 10/15
The opening of the 70th U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 15 will likely be occupied by two issues that are currently making headlines: the refugee crisis, and reports that Russia is preparing for direct involvement in the Syrian war. Public opinion blames the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for the refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands heading to Europe (although the deaths of thousands leaving from Libya have been overlooked).The current hysteria is odd because Russia had previously been asked to join the international coalition against ISIS. Regarding reports of Russian involvement in Syria, it has been involved practically since the beginning of the conflict. Russia has a naval base in Tartus that was modified years ago to make it capable of receiving large ships. It is also a key supplier of military hardware and training to Damascus.
No reason
Without this aid, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would have captured the capital long ago. Russia sees no reason to cancel its military contracts with Damascus until ISIS is defeated and the Syrian conflict is resolved by political means. The number of Russian landing crafts has practically stayed the same, yet the media is creating a frenzy. Any demands to stop military aid in the current circumstances will be perceived by Moscow as unpronounced support for ISIS and proof that the West only seeks to topple Assad.
The current hysteria is odd because Russia had previously been asked to join the international coalition against ISIS. Since Moscow has made clear that it sees Assad as part of the solution in the fight against ISIS, why is the media trying to portray Russian involvement as against the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) rather than ISIS? Moscow is unlikely to put boots on the ground or considerably expand its military presence in Syria. It still remembers Afghanistan, and has vivid examples of failed U.S. interventions. Furthermore, direct involvement in Syria would be too risky given its problems in the Caucasus. The only way it could be involved directly in operations against ISIS is via airstrikes, and only if Assad is acknowledged as part of the solution, which is the only way to stop the refugee crisis and give hope to those who have lost it. However, Syria is part of the solution to the refugee crisis, not the solution itself. After Syria, we will have to deal with Libya.
Can the GCC test Iran’s government?
Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya/September 10/15
Earlier this week, after a meeting in Tehran with the Austrian president, Iranian President Hassan Rowhani was asked if his country could discuss peace in Syria with Saudi Arabia and the United States. “We will sit down at any table with countries inside and outside the region,” Rowhani responded. Given the determination Tehran has displayed to date in supporting the Syrian regime and specifically President Bashar al-Assad, Rowhani’s comments could easily be interpreted as empty talk. Yet this is not an isolated episode – on the contrary. Following the nuclear deal, a handful of Iranian officials have stated their willingness to reach out to their country’s neighbors to improve relations and seek regional stability. In May, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed publicly his willingness to visit Saudi Arabia. This followed an invitation in 2014 from former Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. That visit never materialized.. Nevertheless, Iranian overtures did not cease and have recently intensified.
Reaching out
In recent weeks, various Iranian officials and former officials have renewed calls for regional dialogue to reduce tensions, and specifically mentioned talks with Saudi Arabia. In August, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, said his government “welcomes dialogue and cooperation with Saudi Arabia with a view to restoring peace, security and welfare to the region.” Discussing a political transition in Syria without Assad raises a lot of hard questions, but it is an inevitable step.
Earlier that month, he had called on the normalization of relations between the two countries to bring much-needed stability to the region, but warned the Saudis about the negative repercussions they could face across the region if there is no change of approach.
This month, Hossei Sadeghi, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, wrote a particularly balanced column calling for the “establishment of regional relations on the basis of confidence building with special focus on existing considerations in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations.” He described how Zarif is in charge of this active agenda of public diplomacy and public consultations with Iran’s neighbors to promote dialogue and cooperation. Recently, Mohammad Reza Fayyaz, Iran’s ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), also signaled Tehran’s willingness to improve ties with Saudi Arabia. Unhelpfully, however, he blamed Riyadh for much of the region’s ills. Last week, Seyed Hossein Mousavian – a former Iranian official now based in Princeton, and whose views tend to be aligned with the moderates in Tehran – wrote a piece on the constructive engagement that can be built between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Mousavian briefly recognized the legitimate security concerns of the GCC states regarding Iran, and the need to address those concerns.
Where to test?
Washington interprets the nuclear deal as proof that Tehran can become a reliable partner to address some of the region’s crises. However, for most of the GCC states and Saudi Arabia in particular, the deal does not remove most of their anxieties regarding Iran. While Tehran’s efforts to export its revolution were a cause of anxiety for all GCC states, they do not presently share the same level of concern about its foreign policy and the disruptive activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) across the region.
Oman under Sultan Qaboos has established close ties with Iran. The UAE and Qatar have strong economic links with the country, but have serious differences with and worries about its regional policies, as do the Saudi and Bahraini governments. Kuwait has recently started to develop closer economic and trade relations with Iran, but shares the concerns of most other GCC members.
The key question then is how the GCC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, should respond to Iranian calls for dialogue. Where and how could the far less bellicose rhetoric of the Rowhani administration, especially when compared to the years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, be tested to confirm whether it corresponds to a real willingness to make concessions, reach tangible compromises and reign in the hardliners? How can it be asserted whether the moderates have the definitive upper hand in foreign policy? The obvious answer would be the tragic conflict in Syria, with its devastating repercussions for the region and beyond. Tehran cannot reasonably call for better relations with its neighbors for the sake of stability and peace, and support a dictator that is directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, as well as millions of refugees and internally displaced people. Discussing a political transition in Syria without Assad raises a lot of hard questions, but it is an inevitable step if Iran wants to establish the reputation of responsible regional power.
