Reflections on the 105th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Greater Lebanon
Elias Bejjani/September 02/2025
105 years ago, the declaration of the State of Greater Lebanon took place. The only historical era in which Lebanon truly enjoyed peace, prosperity, and stability lasted until the early 1970s. After that came disintegration, along with divisions, wars, and chaos triggered by the armed Palestinian invasion, the rise of local nationalist, Arabist, leftist, and jihadist movements, the Nasserist tide, and militant leftist activities.
The process of disintegration and collapse deepened with the Taif Agreement, which was imposed due to an imbalance of local and regional power. Today, Lebanon has reached the peak of its decline and loss of sovereignty under the Iranian occupation, enforced through its jihadist and terrorist military proxy that blasphemously and heretically carries the name “Hezbollah” (“God’s Party”).
From the Mutasarrifate to the State: Contexts of Greater Lebanon’s Birth
The proclamation of Greater Lebanon was a pivotal event in the modern history of the Levant, occurring against the backdrop of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse and the rise of competing national and regional projects. While some local and regional forces sought to realize the “Greater Syria” project under Emir Faisal I, supported by the Arab Revolt, an alternative vision backed by France emerged: the establishment of a distinct political entity in the coastal and mountainous regions of Bilad al-Sham. This paper offers a deep analytical reading of the 105th anniversary of Greater Lebanon’s proclamation, moving beyond traditional historical narratives to deconstruct the root causes, outcomes, and enduring implications of this event on Lebanon’s state structure and identity up to the present day.
The Proclamation of Greater Lebanon: Between Local Aspirations and Colonial Reality
The proclamation of Greater Lebanon was not a unilateral decision imposed by the French Mandate authority; it was the culmination of intersecting local, regional, and international interests. The entity was formally declared through an administrative decree issued by General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Cilicia, on August 31, 1920, which took effect the following day, September 1, 1920.
The Local Role: Patriarch Elias al-Huwayek
Maronite Patriarch Elias Boutros al-Huwayek played a decisive role in the birth of Greater Lebanon, and is considered one of the four most important figures in this context. His vision went beyond creating a mere sectarian refuge for the Maronites; he was firmly convinced of the need for a viable economic entity.
After the famine that devastated Mount Lebanon during World War I, Patriarch al-Huwayek realized that the Mutasarrifate, with its narrow borders, was unable to feed its inhabitants and was plagued by poverty and mass emigration. In response, he led a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where he presented a detailed memorandum on October 24, 1919, demanding expanded borders for Lebanon.
His demands were based on historical and geographical arguments, claiming they coincided with the ancient borders of Phoenicia, as well as those of the Ma‘nid and Shihabid principalities, and with maps from an old French military mission. These claims extended Lebanon’s boundaries from Lake Homs in the north to Lake Huleh in the south, incorporating vital agricultural plains absent from the Mutasarrifate. Thus, Patriarch al-Huwayek was not advocating for a closed sectarian enclave, but for a pluralistic homeland capable of sustaining its people economically.
The French Role: Strategic Support
France had long viewed Lebanon as its foothold in the Middle East, casting itself as the “protector” of Eastern Christians since the 17th century. Supporting al-Huwayek’s demands was therefore not mere benevolence, but part of a strategic plan to cement French influence in the Levant against rising Arab nationalism. The proclamation of Greater Lebanon crowned this French role, with France presenting itself as the protector of minorities in constant tension with their Muslim surroundings. In his speech, General Gouraud praised Patriarch al-Huwayek as “the great Patriarch of Lebanon who descended from his mountain to attend this glorious day.” Thus, the proclamation resulted from the convergence of two wills: a local will for a viable entity and a colonial will for dominance. The economic crisis and famine of Mount Lebanon pressured the Maronite Patriarchate to demand territorial expansion, while France saw in those demands the perfect justification for its military and political presence under the guise of “protecting minorities.” The outcome was the creation of a new entity that satisfied part of the Lebanese population but clashed with the vision of another part.
A New Map and a Divided Identity: Voices of Opposition and Faisal’s Project
Despite local support, the proclamation was met with fierce rejection from most inhabitants of the newly annexed regions. This opposition reflected deep divisions in national visions — divisions that remain alive today.
Annexed Areas and Local Positions
Decree No. 318 defined the new entity’s borders to include the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon plus the districts of Baalbek, the Beqaa, Rachaya, and Hasbaya, as well as the sanjaks of Beirut and Sidon. These regions, which had previously belonged to Ottoman provinces like Damascus and Beirut, suddenly found themselves part of a political entity with different orientations. The general stance of Muslims (both Sunni and Shia) was rejection, though expressed differently across regions:
Tripoli and Beirut: resistance took the form of strikes, civil disobedience, and political opposition led by Sunni notables.
Jabal ‘Amil (South Lebanon) and the Beqaa: resistance was armed, with guerrilla warfare waged against French forces. At the Wadi al-Hujayr Conference, Shia leaders openly pledged allegiance to King Faisal in Damascus.
The roots of this opposition lay in their shift from being part of a ruling majority under the Ottomans to becoming a minority within a Christian-led entity. Many preferred integration into a larger Arab state — “Greater Syria” (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan) — under Emir Faisal’s leadership.
The Faisal Era and the Collapse of the Arab National Project
Prince Faisal ibn al-Husayn was the preferred monarch for opponents of Greater Lebanon. On March 8, 1920, the Syrian General Congress declared Syria’s independence within its “natural borders” and crowned Faisal as king. This Arab nationalist project was the favored alternative for Muslims who rejected the French Mandate and Lebanon’s separation. Yet, the dream was short-lived. In July 1920, France issued Faisal an ultimatum to accept the Mandate; though he reluctantly agreed, French forces advanced on Damascus and defeated the Syrians at the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 1920. Faisal’s withdrawal from Damascus removed the Arab nationalist alternative that opponents had hoped for. This collapse was not incidental but an essential precondition for the success of the Greater Lebanon project. With Faisal gone, opponents were left with no choice but reluctant acceptance of the new reality.
Ottoman Provinces and Their Reactions to Greater Lebanon
Region (annexed) Previous Ottoman Affiliation Reaction
Baalbek, Beqaa, Rachaya, Hasbaya Province of Damascus Armed resistance (guerrilla war)
Beirut & Sidon Sanjaks Province of Beirut / Province of Haifa Political resistance (strikes, civil disobedience)
Tripoli Province of Tripoli Strong political resistance (strikes, civil disobedience)
This early divergence between armed resistance in the South and Beqaa, and political resistance in coastal cities, reveals deeper fractures within Lebanese society — fractures that predated the state’s creation and continued to resurface thereafter.
The “Golden Age”: Superficial Prosperity, Deep Inequality
After full independence in 1943 and the establishment of the Lebanese Republic under its sectarian system, Lebanon experienced an unprecedented economic and social boom during the 1950s and 1960s. Beirut earned nicknames like “the Paris of the Middle East” and “the California of the Eastern Mediterranean.”
Signs of Prosperity and Modernization
This boom was built on services, particularly banking and tourism. Beirut became a regional financial and tourist hub, attracting visitors from across the world. Cultural and artistic life flourished, with thriving nightclubs, cafés, and theaters. Landmarks like the Phoenicia Hotel and Casino du Liban, which hosted international figures, symbolized the era. Infrastructure also improved, including trams and railways.
Roots of Economic and Social Crisis
But the boom was superficial, masking deep contradictions. The Lebanese economic model was unbalanced — a “dependent capitalism” relying heavily on foreign capital and remittances, centered on services at the expense of agriculture and industry. This produced severe income inequality: families in Beirut and Mount Lebanon disproportionately benefited from opportunities. By 1954, average annual income in Beirut was five times that of rural agricultural families. Just 4% of Lebanese controlled 33% of national income, while most suffered from poverty. These regional and class disparities — with sectarian dimensions — formed a ticking time bomb awaiting ignition.
From Fragile Balance to Civil War: Palestinian Presence and the National Movement
Lebanon’s “golden age” rested on a fragile internal balance, which soon collapsed under regional pressures.
The Rise of Armed Palestinian Presence
Initially, Palestinians in Lebanon lived quietly. But after the 1967 defeat, fedayeen activity escalated, leading to clashes with the Lebanese army in 1968–1969. The situation worsened after the PLO leadership relocated from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970 following Black September.
The Cairo Agreement: A State within a State
Signed on November 3, 1969, between the Lebanese army and the PLO under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s mediation, the Cairo Agreement effectively granted the PLO semi-autonomous authority in the camps and the right to launch armed operations from Lebanon. This created a “state within a state,” undermining sovereignty and dividing Lebanese society between supporters and opponents.
The Lebanese National Movement
The Palestinians were not the sole cause of civil war; they were the spark that ignited pre-existing contradictions. Armed Palestinian presence found strong support from the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of leftist, Arab nationalist, and Syrian parties led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. The Movement’s goals went beyond supporting Palestinians: it called for abolishing political sectarianism, implementing social and economic reforms, and affirming Lebanon’s Arab identity. It included members from various sects — Muslims, Druze, and even some Christians — showing it was not merely sectarian, but a transformative force challenging Lebanon’s system. Thus, Lebanon’s war was not Lebanese vs. Palestinians, but an internal struggle over Lebanon’s identity and future. The Palestinian cause became a tool in domestic battles, leading to civil war on April 13, 1975.
Key Clauses of the 1969 Cairo Agreement and Consequences for Lebanese Sovereignty
Right to armed struggle from Lebanese territory → undermined sovereignty.
Increased Israeli retaliatory raids → weakened the army.
Creation of autonomous committees in camps → state within a state.
Camps turned into security zones beyond state control.
Facilitated fedayeen movement across borders → weakened border control.
Heightened tensions between army and Palestinian factions.
Failure of the Experience or National Necessity?
One hundred and five years after the proclamation of Greater Lebanon, a critical re-examination is necessary, away from founding myths.
Foundational Myths: Critical Deconstruction
Lebanon’s identity was built on narratives such as being a “refuge for minorities” or a “Mediterranean Phoenician entity.” Its identity remained contested between “Mediterranean” and “Arab”.
Conclusion: Can It Continue?
The Greater Lebanon experiment has not been a total failure, but as proclaimed, it has proven unsustainable. The liberal economic model was fragile, dependent on external wealth, and incapable of ensuring social justice. It deepened inequalities between rich and poor, center and periphery.
The sectarian system, designed as a political solution for power-sharing, was never applied in its spirit; sectarian elites exploited it for influence, obstructing state-building on the basis of citizenship and equality. The problem was not the idea of Lebanon itself, but the flawed foundations on which it was built, and the fact that parts of the Muslim community never truly embraced it, preferring an Arab-Islamic entity.
Centralized sectarianism was never a permanent solution — at best, a temporary fix. Once it became the problem itself, it opened the door to Palestinian, Syrian, and later Iranian penetration, leading to the state’s collapse. Lebanon now requires a “new national formula”, one that establishes a just civil entity based on federalism. But before moving to federalism, a precondition is the complete disarmament of all Lebanese, Iranian and Palestinian militias, and the dismantling of their educational, military, intelligence, and financial structures, so that all communities and regions stand equal. A federal system would guarantee each sectarian and ethnic community its rights, preserve its identity, history, and culture, and enable coexistence within a fair and viable state.
