رابط فيديو جلسة استماع (بالإنكليزية) في الكونغرس الأميركي بشأن لبنان عنوانها: السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان…”عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة”، شارك فيها دانا سترول، ديفيد شنكر وحنين غدار/A video link to a US Congressional hearing (in English) on Lebanon, titled: US Policy Towards Lebanon… “Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power,” featuring Dana Stroul, David Schenker, and Hanin Ghaddar
Video link to a US Congressional hearing on Lebanon, titled: US Policy Towards Lebanon… “Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power,” featuring Dana Stroul, David Schenker, and Hanin Ghaddar
رابط فيديو جلسة استماع (بالإنكليزية) في الكونغرس الأميركي بشأن لبنان عنوانها: السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان…”عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة”، شارك فيها دانا سترول، ديفيد شنكر، حنين غدار
جلسة استماع في الكونغرس بشأن لبنان: حزب الله لا يزال يشكّل تهديدًا
المركزية/03 شباط/2026
انطلقت جلسة الاستماع في الكونغرس بشأن لبنان تحت عنوان “السياسة الأميركية تجاه لبنان: العقبات أمام تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة”. في الإطار، اعتبر النائب الأميركي مايك لولر أنّ “لبنان يقف اليوم عند مفترق طرق تاريخي”، مشيرًا إلى أنّ “اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في تشرين الثاني 2024 أتاح فرصة غير مسبوقة للمجتمع الدولي لدعم الحكومة اللبنانية في التحرّر من النفوذ الإيراني وتعزيز سيادتها”، وفق ما أفاد مراسل mtv في واشنطن. وقال، خلال جلسة الكونغرس بشأن لبنان: “واشنطن تريد رؤية لبنان شريكًا حقيقيًا في المنطقة، مع احتمال الانضمام مستقبلًا إلى اتفاقات أبراهام ومسار التطبيع”.
ورأى لولر أنّ “هناك فرصة تاريخية لإضعاف نفوذ حزب الله مع التغيّرات الإقليمية الأخيرة، لكنّ هذه الفرصة ضيّقة، وقد تضيع إذا لم تُتخذ قرارات سريعة”، كما شدّد على أنّ “واشنطن يجب أن تدعم استقرار لبنان، مع الضغط لمنع إعادة بناء القدرات العسكرية للحزب، وحذّر من تقليص المساعدات الأمنية في لحظة يعتبرها حسّاسة بالنسبة لمستقبل الدولة اللبنانية”.
أمّا دايفيد شينكر، فقال في كلمته أمام النواب: “حزب الله لا يزال يشكّل تهديداً للأميركيين والإسرائيليين واليهود حول العالم، وله تاريخ طويل في العمليات الخارجية، ورغم إضعاف الحزب عسكرياً أخيراً، إلا أن عملية نزع السلاح بطيئة جداً والحكومة اللبنانية مترددة، والمساعدات الأميركية يجب أن تكون مشروطة بالأداء وليس دعماً مفتوحاً، والجيش اللبناني ضروري للاستقرار”، مضيفاً: “لكن الدعم للجيش يجب أن يرتبط بتقدم فعلي ضد نفوذ حزب الله، كما أن الإصلاحات المالية والسياسية جزء أساسي من استعادة سيادة لبنان، وليس فقط الملف العسكري”.
من جهة أخرى، رأت الصحافية حنين غدار أن “قوة حزب الله اليوم لم تعد عسكرية فقط، بل أصبحت قائمة أساساً على شبكة مالية نقدية موازية للدولة، ولذلك فإن أي حديث عن نزع السلاح لن ينجح من دون ضرب الاقتصاد النقدي غير المنظّم الذي يمكّنه من البقاء”.
واعتبرت أنّ “حزب الله لم ينهَر رغم الضربات، لأنه أعاد التموضع داخل النظام المالي النقدي (cash economy) بعد انهيار المصارف في لبنان”، لافتةً إلى أنّ “شركات تحويل الأموال، الصرافين، والأسواق النقدية غير المنظمة أصبحت بيئة مثالية لتمويله بعيداً عن الرقابة”، مشيرة الى أنّ “إعادة الإعمار قد تتحول إلى أداة لتمويل الحزب إذا لم تُدَر عبر مؤسسات الدولة الرسمية مثل مجلس الإنماء والإعمار”.
كما لفتت الى أنّ “الضغط الأميركي يجب أن يشمل: شبكات الأموال والتحويلات، الجهات المشاركة في إعادة الإعمار، الجهات الرسمية التي تسمح بتجاوز الدولة، السلام والاستقرار الاقتصادي عنصران أساسيان، لأن نزع السلاح بدون أفق اقتصادي وسياسي لن يكون مستداماً”.
ورأت غدّار أن “معركة واشنطن مع حزب الله لم تعد فقط أمنية، بل مالية فالحزب يعيش اليوم داخل اقتصاد نقدي موازٍ، وأي خطة لنزع سلاحه ستفشل إذا لم تُستهدف هذه الشبكة أولاً”.
أمّا دانا سترول، نائبة وزير الدفاع الأميركي لشؤون الشرق الأوسط سابقاً، فرأت أن “ما يحدث في لبنان هو فرصة تاريخية لكنها محدودة زمنياً، وأن التركيز الأميركي على نزع سلاح حزب الله وحده غير كافٍ، بل يجب توسيع الاستراتيجية لتشمل الانتخابات، إعادة الإعمار، والاقتصاد والسياسة معاً”، مشرة إلى “تحوّل إقليمي مهم، فإيران أضعف وأقل قدرة على دعم وكلائها، والحكومة اللبنانية الجديدة تقول “الأمور الصحيحة” ويجب دعمها لكن مع ضغط أكبر، ونزع السلاح مهم لكنه جزء فقط من الحل وليس الاستراتيجية كاملة”. ولفتت الى أنّ “واشنطن يجب أن تربط دعم الجيش اللبناني بالأداء والشفافية، وأن تتدخل سياسياً لدعم انتخابات تُنتج طبقة سياسية مختلفة، وأن تربط إعادة الإعمار بخطوات واضحة نحو سيطرة الدولة على السلاح، وأن تحذّر من أن الفراغ الأميركي سيسمح لقوى أخرى بملء الساحة وإعادة تقوية نفوذ حزب الله، وترى أن هناك فرصة واقعية لفتح مسار طويل نحو تهدئة وربما سلام مستقبلي مع إسرائيل إذا استمر المسار الحالي”. وقالت سترول، إن “واشنطن أمام نافذة قصيرة لإعادة تشكيل لبنان، لكن ذلك لن يتحقق بالضغط العسكري فقط، بل عبر هندسة سياسية واقتصادية كاملة تربط الدعم الأميركي بالإصلاحات والانتخابات وإعادة الإعمار”.
السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان: عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة (U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power)
House Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans
The House Foreign Affairs Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee holds a hearing titled, “U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power,” featuring the following witness:
The Honorable David Schenker
Taube Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Hanin Ghaddar
Friedmann Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Dana Stroul
Director of Research
Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان: عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة (U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power)
الجهة المنظمة: الجمهوريون في لجنة الشؤون الخارجية بمجلس النواب الأمريكي.
تفاصيل الجلسة: عقدت اللجنة الفرعية لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا التابعة للجنة الشؤون الخارجية بمجلس النواب جلسة استماع بعنوان: “السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان: عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة”، بمشاركة الشهود التاليين:
السيد ديفيد شينكر (The Honorable David Schenker): زميل أقدم (Taube Senior Fellow) في معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى.
السيدة حنين غدار (Ms. Hanin Ghaddar): زميلة أقدم (Friedmann Senior Fellow) في معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى.
السيدة دانا سترول (Ms. Dana Stroul): مديرة الأبحاث وزميلة أقدم (Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow) في معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى.
ملخص أبرز النقاط التي وردت في الجلسة
فرصة تاريخية: ركز المتحدثون على أن اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في نوفمبر 2024 والضربات التي تلقاها حزب الله وفرت فرصة “غير مسبوقة” للبنان لاستعادة سيادته [06:04].
دور الجيش اللبناني: تم التأكيد على ضرورة قيام الجيش اللبناني بدوره كالسلطة العسكرية الوحيدة والشرعية، مع الإشارة إلى أن عملية نزع السلاح تسير ببطء شديد وتواجه عرقلة من حزب الله [06:39].
الإصلاح الاقتصادي: شددت الجلسة على أن “الاقتصاد النقدي” (Cash Economy) غير المنظم في لبنان يسمح لحزب الله بالالتفاف على العقوبات، وأنه لا يمكن تفكيك نفوذ الحزب دون إصلاحات هيكلية واقتصادية شاملة [07:37].
التوصيات السياسية: اقترح الشهود شروطاً أكثر صرامة على المساعدات المقدمة للجيش اللبناني، وفرض عقوبات على الشخصيات السياسية التي تعرقل الإصلاح، ومنع حزب الله من استغلال أموال إعادة الإعمار [18:25].
السلام مع إسرائيل: أشارت حنين غدار إلى أن فكرة السلام لم تعد “تابو” (محرمة) في الشارع اللبناني، وأن التطبيع الإقليمي قد يكون وسيلة لضمان استقرار لبنان الدائم وتفكيك مبررات وجود سلاح الحزب [24:20].
اللجنة الفرعية المعنية بالشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
Chair Michael Lawler
Witnesses:
The Honorable David Schenker
Taube Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Hanin Ghaddar
Friedmann Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Dana Stroul
Director of Research
Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
—
The House Foreign Affairs Committee is responsible for oversight and legislation relating to:
Foreign assistance – including development assistance, Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Account, HIV/AIDS in foreign countries, security assistance, and Public Law 480 programs abroad
National security developments affecting foreign policy
Strategic planning and agreements
War powers, treaties, executive agreements, and the deployment and use of United States Armed Forces
Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement of United Nations or other international sanctions
Arms control and disarmament issues
The International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development
Activities and policies of the State, Commerce, and Defense Departments and other agencies related to the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign assistance Act, including export and licensing policy for munitions items and technology and dual-use equipment and technology
International law
Promotion of democracy
International law enforcement issues, including narcotics control programs and activities
International cyber issues
U.S. Agency for Global Media
Embassy security; international broadcasting
Public diplomacy, including international communication and information policy, and international education and exchange programs; and all other matters not specifically assigned to a subcommittee.
The Export Administration Act, including the export and licensing of dual-use equipment and technology and other matters related to international economic policy and trade not otherwise assigned to a subcommittee, and with respect to the United Nations, its affiliated agencies, and other international organizations, including assessed and voluntary contributions to such organizations.
اللجنة الفرعية المعنية بالشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا
الرئيس: مايكل لولر
الشهود:
السيد ديفيد شينكر
الزميل الأول (تاوب)
معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى
السيدة حنين غدار
الزميلة الأولى (فريدمان)
معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى
السيدة دانا سترول
مديرة الأبحاث
الزميلة الأولى (شيلي ومايكل كاسن)
معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى
تختص لجنة الشؤون الخارجية في مجلس النواب بالإشراف والتشريع المتعلقين بما يلي:
المساعدات الخارجية، بما في ذلك المساعدات الإنمائية، ومؤسسة تحدي الألفية، وحساب تحدي الألفية، وبرامج مكافحة فيروس نقص المناعة البشرية/الإيدز في الدول الأجنبية، والمساعدات الأمنية، وبرامج القانون العام 480 في الخارج.
تطورات الأمن القومي التي تؤثر في السياسة الخارجية.
التخطيط الاستراتيجي والاتفاقيات.
صلاحيات الحرب، والمعاهدات، والاتفاقيات التنفيذية، ونشر واستخدام القوات المسلحة للولايات المتحدة.
عمليات حفظ السلام وفرض السلام، وتنفيذ عقوبات الأمم المتحدة أو غيرها من العقوبات الدولية.
قضايا ضبط التسلح ونزع السلاح.
مؤسسة تمويل التنمية الدولية، والوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية الدولية.
أنشطة وسياسات وزارات الخارجية والتجارة والدفاع وغيرها من الوكالات ذات الصلة بقانون مراقبة تصدير الأسلحة وقانون المساعدات الخارجية، بما في ذلك سياسات التصدير والترخيص للمواد والتقنيات العسكرية والمعدات والتقنيات ذات الاستخدام المزدوج.
القانون الدولي.
تعزيز الديمقراطية.
قضايا إنفاذ القانون الدولي، بما في ذلك برامج وأنشطة مكافحة المخدرات.
القضايا الدولية المتعلقة بالفضاء السيبراني.
الوكالة الأمريكية للإعلام العالمي.
أمن السفارات؛ والبث الإذاعي والتلفزيوني الدولي.
الدبلوماسية العامة، بما في ذلك الاتصالات الدولية وسياسات المعلومات، وبرامج التعليم والتبادل الدولي؛ وجميع المسائل الأخرى غير الموكلة تحديدًا إلى لجنة فرعية.
قانون إدارة الصادرات، بما في ذلك تصدير وترخيص المعدات والتقنيات ذات الاستخدام المزدوج وغيرها من المسائل المتعلقة بالسياسة الاقتصادية والتجارة الدولية غير الموكلة إلى لجنة فرعية أخرى، وكذلك ما يتعلق بالأمم المتحدة ووكالاتها التابعة والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى، بما في ذلك المساهمات الإلزامية والطوعية لتلك المنظمات.
Congressional Testimony/In Lebanon, Pushing the Ball Forward Before the May Election David Schenker/The Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Without electoral law modifications, sanctions against pro-Hezbollah elites, prosecutions for long-delayed cases like the port explosion, and other urgent measures, the group and its allies could wind up regaining their grip in Lebanon during the next round of nationwide voting.
The following is an excerpt from testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. To read the full testimony, download the PDF on this page.
Last year, Lebanon’s new president and government articulated an ambitious and positive program, which was largely welcomed inside the country and overwhelmingly applauded by the international community. Improbably, at the beginning of 2025—with Hezbollah defanged and a competent, nationalist government in place—it seemed possible that a perennially hapless and dysfunctional Lebanon might finally be turning the corner. Alas, the exuberance was premature. While diminished, Hezbollah remains dangerous. At the same time, the progress of the Lebanese Armed Forces has been insufficient, government efforts to legislate significant economic reform have largely fallen short, the judiciary remains anemic, and electoral reform—a key initiative required to meaningfully enfranchise Lebanon’s enormous expatriate electorate—languishes in purgatory on the desk of the eighty-seven-year-old parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri…
**David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics. He is the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
Targeting Hezbollah’s Broader Ecosystem of Power Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
The ongoing disarmament process is crucial, but completing it will be impossible without more attention to Hezbollah’s cash economy, judicial interference, political intimidation, and other elements of domestic power.
The following is an excerpt from testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. To read the full testimony, download the PDF on this page.
While much of the current international focus is on Hezbollah’s possession of weapons, these assets are just one part of a wider ecosystem that enables the group to maintain power within state institutions, ensure a continued cash flow into its coffers, and rebuild its broken military infrastructure. This ecosystem is what keeps Hezbollah alive today—if the group loses its cash flow and influence within the state, it will not be able to sustain its arsenal. Hence, even as all eyes are on the disarmament process carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah has been quietly focused on other tools. Despite domestic and regional challenges, it has managed to maintain the financial and political foundation needed for its survival. Hezbollah’s plan thus far has been threefold…
*Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute’s Rubin Family Arab Politics Program, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant.
In Lebanon, Pushing the Ball Forward Before the May Election David Schenker/The Washington Institute/February 3, 2026 Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
Israel’s degradation of Hezbollah in late 2024 along with the subsequent election in early 2025 of a new Lebanese president and the naming of a new government constituted a rare moment of opportunity for Beirut and the region. For decades, Iran-backed Hezbollah utilized the country as a hub for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operations, murdering opponents, dictating domestic policy, and deciding matters of war and peace for the state.
The terrorist militia’s military setback and loss of its longstanding leadership weakened the organization’s grip over Lebanese politics, allowing a window to stabilize a failing state that has long been a global outpost for crime and terrorism. On taking office, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam articulated a novel agenda for a Lebanon no longer subjugated by Hezbollah and its masters in Tehran: state sovereignty.
For the new government in Beirut, sovereignty implied not only the disarmament of Hezbollah, but the implementation of rule of law. To emerge from the crippling financial crisis, rebuild Lebanon after the war, and have a successful state, Lebanon would require significant economic and judicial reforms to ensure transparency, accountability, and curb the endemic corruption that had facilitated Hezbollah’s operations.
The November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement that ended Hezbollah’s war with Israel provided a framework for Hezbollah disarmament. In that accord—signed prior to Aoun and Salam’s mandates—Lebanon committed to implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, disarming Hezbollah both south and north of the Litani River (i.e., throughout the entirety of Lebanon). During his inaugural speech, President Aoun affirmed his support for this objective. He noted that as supreme commander of the armed forces, he would carry out his duty by “working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons.”
Consistent with the ceasefire agreement, Aoun also pledged to secure Lebanon’s borders. Beyond decommissioning Hezbollah weapons, President Aoun pledged to pursue a broader agenda to improve Lebanese governance. He promised to push for an independent judiciary, to prioritize “competence over patronage” in administrative appointments, prevent monopolies in the private sector, and advance transparency. The prime minister has been equally adamant in pressing for Hezbollah disarmament and transforming an “all-too-prevalent culture of impunity and corruption.”
The new president and government articulated an ambitious and positive program, which was largely welcomed in Lebanon and overwhelmingly applauded by the international community. Improbably, at the beginning of 2025—with Hezbollah defanged and a new competent, nationalist government in place—it seemed possible that a perennially hapless and dysfunctional Lebanon might finally be turning the corner. Alas, the exuberance was premature. While diminished, Hezbollah remains dangerous. At the same time, entrenched elites and patronage networks disinclined to reform persist, constituting a significant obstacle to systemic change.
Perhaps expectations were too high. Regardless, the first year of the Joseph Aoun era has been disappointing. Despite the new government’s rhetorical embrace of its ceasefire obligations, Beirut vacillated for months before it took the decision in the cabinet to disarm Hezbollah in the south. Since then, the progress of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has been insufficient. Meanwhile, government efforts to legislate significant economic reform have largely fallen short, the judiciary remains anemic, and electoral reform—a key initiative required to meaningfully enfranchise Lebanon’s enormous expatriate electorate, which opposes Iranian occupation—languishes in purgatory on the desk of the eighty-seven-year-old perpetual parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri.
During a December 23 Policy Forum at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, H.E. Youssef Raggi, concisely summed up the dynamic, noting there is some disappointment in Washington that Beirut is not doing enough or moving quickly enough to disarm Hezbollah and exert full sovereignty throughout the country. In his view, “those who hold such views might be right.”¹
Protracted Disarmament.
The new Lebanese government was seated in early February 2025, more than a month after the ceasefire was signed. It wasn’t until August, however, that the cabinet approved the LAF plan for disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani. Concerns over Hezbollah violence—the group’s repeated threats of “civil war”—paralyzed the government. Rather than moving forward, President Aoun announced that Beirut would not forcibly disarm the militia. Instead, he said he would try to convince Hezbollah to dispense with its arms through dialogue and negotiations—a strategy that has repeatedly failed over the last two decades. He even floated the controversial idea—reminiscent of the Hashd Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, which are replete with U.S.-designated terrorist organizations—that the militia’s troops could be integrated into the LAF.
Hezbollah didn’t bite. Indeed, it doubled down on its threats against the government—especially in regard to disarmament north of the Litani. Meanwhile, Israel continued to occupy five hilltop locations in Lebanese territory and, starting on day one of the ceasefire, itself undertook Lebanon’s ceasefire obligations to disarm Hezbollah. On an almost daily basis since then, Israel has been striking Hezbollah arms caches, positions, and key personnel, both south and north of the Litani. Lately, as Hezbollah has reportedly focused on rearming, Israel has been focused on targeting personnel involved in arms smuggling.
Since the LAF began operating earnestly in the south, it has made some modest progress. The “Mechanism” established in the U.S. ceasefire agreement provides intelligence information to the LAF to operationalize. (The LAF itself does not appear to be generating its own intelligence as to the whereabouts of Hezbollah weapons.) For the most part, this arrangement appears to be working relatively well. To be sure, the LAF is understaffed and under-resourced and is not particularly proactive in its mission. Like the government, the LAF is also averse to confrontation with Hezbollah, in part because the militia has no compunction about attacking the army. To wit, just days after the cabinet vote to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani, six LAF soldiers were killed near Tyre while removing militia ordnance, an explosion believed to have been a booby trap. Despite the risks, however, the LAF has been mostly responsive to tasking.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its relatively good performance to date, incidences of LAF collusion, collaboration, and deconfliction with Hezbollah persist. In December 2025, Israel targeted alleged Hezbollah member Ali Abdullah along with two terrorist colleagues in a drone strike near Sidon. The LAF protested the killing of Abdullah, who concurrently served as a warrant officer in the army, but did not apparently dispute the Hezbollah affiliation of his dead colleagues. During another incident in January 2026, acting on Israeli intelligence provided by the Mechanism, the LAF entered the southern town of Yanouh to seize a Hezbollah arms cache. Prior to the operation, the LAF engaged with a Hezbollah liaison officer, who assembled a crowd that obstructed the military from searching and seizing the weapons. The LAF returned the following day, but only after Hezbollah had removed the arms.²
Just days ago, it was reported that Lebanese security forces interdicted two shipments of weapons smuggled by Hezbollah from Syria being brought to the southern suburbs of Beirut. When the trucks were stopped, Hezbollah arrested a LAF soldier, who was subsequently released after LAF negotiations with Hezbollah. The shipments were allowed to proceed to their destination.³ While some Lebanese complain about continuous Israeli airstrikes targeting the group, what has emerged is a productive division of labor. Both Washington and Jerusalem believe that Beirut’s progress has to date been insufficient. In the absence of a more comprehensive and aggressive Lebanese effort, Israel is filling an important gap, preventing Hezbollah from rearming and targeting militia locations and personnel the LAF deems too sensitive to engage.
In mid-January, Foreign Minister Raggi told Sky News Arabia publicly what many Lebanese, civilians and defense officials alike, say privately: “So long as Hezbollah is not completely disarmed, Israel has the right to continue its attacks.”⁴ Given Hezbollah’s long track record of murdering its Lebanese opponents, Beirut’s reticence to take on Hezbollah is understandable. More than a year after Israel decapitated the group’s leadership and severely degraded its capabilities, however, the continued deference afforded to Hezbollah is stunning.
To date, no discernible effort has been made to hold Hezbollah accountable for the dozens of assassinations it perpetrated, nor for the deadly August 2020 port explosion, in which the group was implicated. Yet this past September, a minister in Salam’s government announced it would provide official disability cards and full benefits to thousands of Hezbollah members injured in Israel’s September 2024 pager operation. Adding insult to injury, the minister justified this Lebanese version of a “pay for slay” social safety net for terrorists by comparing wounded Hezbollah fighters to the civilian victims of the massive 2020 port explosion.
Lebanon clearly has a long way to go in terms of Hezbollah. This past fall, the United States approved a $230 million aid package for Lebanese security services, including $190 million for the LAF. The assistance was a down payment—or an advance—to assist the LAF with its disarmament mission. Future U.S. largesse greatly depends on how the LAF performs in both the south and the north. It will also determine how much support the LAF receives in March, when a conference to support the army convenes in Paris with the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt in attendance.
Ultimately, though, Hezbollah disarmament is not dependent solely on LAF capabilities, but on Beirut’s continued will—and perhaps risk tolerance. Recently, President Aoun has been criticizing Hezbollah with unusually harsh language. It’s unclear whether this change of tone will be accompanied by a more robust approach on the ground. The Trump administration’s advocacy at the United Nations in August 2025 to end the forever mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon was a positive step to force action in the south. UNIFIL will end in December 2026, compelling Beirut and the LAF to establish a permanent presence and exert sovereignty in the south. But sovereignty and the process of rebuilding what was destroyed during Hezbollah’s war on Israel will be delayed indefinitely absent the disarmament of Hezbollah throughout the entire state.
Stalled and Anemic Reforms
The heady rhetoric articulated by the new president and government fueled high expectations that significant reforms would be forthcoming in Beirut. As with the Hezbollah disarmament process, however, the pace of economic and judicial reforms has been glacial. While a comprehensive reform process has been launched—replete with committees and an ambitious “restructuring and renewal plan”—few concrete accomplishments have been realized during the government’s first year. The persistence of entrenched elites and a fractious legislature—led by Speaker Nabih Berri, the Hezbollah-adjacent Amal Party leader—are at least partly to blame for the lack of progress.
One of the few government reform successes to date has been the passage of legislation in April 2025 lifting banking secrecy. Based on the new law, government institutions, including the Central Bank and the Banking Control Commission, will now have access to banking records and account details up to a decade prior. The legislation is a significant step toward transparency and, perhaps, accountability. Upon request, Lebanese commercial banks will be required to provide the government with personal account information, enabling authorities to deter, prevent, and/or prosecute illicit financial transactions, money laundering, and ubiquitous tax evasion. Theoretically, this law will also enable Beirut for the first time to target corruption and actions that contributed to or exacerbated the current financial crisis.
The other ratified reform legislation advanced by the government was the Bank Resolution Law. Passed in April, this law focuses on assessing the financial health of banks and providing a framework for the restructuring or liquidation of insolvent financial institutions. The process is overseen by the purportedly independent Higher Banking Commission, but critics of the legislation note that the commission is “heavily influenced by banking interests,” lacking the impartiality necessary to oversee and restructure the banking sector.⁵
Banking secrecy legislation is a notable but relatively isolated government accomplishment toward economic reform. It was also a prerequisite for additional legislation. Yet several of these other priority initiatives have since stalled in parliament or en route. The Financial Stability Law, better known as the “Gap Law”—intended to address the roughly $80 billion shortfall in the banking sector and compensate depositors for their losses—is an especially controversial government effort that has encountered difficulties. Per the draft law, account holders with deposits up to $100,000 (roughly $20 billion total) would be repaid over four years in cash and government bonds. Higher deposit holders would also be compensated but forced to take a significant haircut. Banks would also bear some of the burden, losing their equity. The state would underwrite an estimated $10 billion of the cost.
The draft law is stuck because no one likes it. The International Monetary Fund says the legislation is insufficiently specific in stipulating a hierarchy of claims. Influential financial elites believe banks—who were compelled to loan money to the Central Bank and generated enormous returns from this business for decades—will disproportionately lose out. Depositors feel they will bear the brunt of the losses and fear that the bankers and other depositors who managed to spirit their funds out of Lebanon during the financial crisis will avert accountability. To be fair, this is a heavy lift for the government, but it will be necessary to push forward, even if imperfect, to extricate Lebanon from the crisis.
Of course, the success of economic reform in Lebanon depends on the completion of a comprehensive audit of the Central Bank and the commercial banking sector. An audit is essential not only to ascertain the causes of the 2019 financial crisis, but also to assign accountability and track the illegal transfer of funds abroad by elites when public access to deposits was severely limited. Six years into Lebanon’s man-made economic meltdown, no such audit has been concluded. Absent a thorough systemic and public inspection, impunity will persist, and it will be difficult to reestablish confidence in the banking sector.
A normal functioning banking sector is critical. Lacking traditional banking, over the past six years, Lebanon has largely devolved to a cash economy. Today, there are reportedly 57 operating banks and 531 other varieties of financial institutions operating in the state. These institutions include cash transfer service companies, e-wallets, exchange houses, et cetera, which have filled the gap left by banks, along with Hezbollah’s own al-Qard al-Hassan financial services firm. While some punitive and kinetic actions have been taken against al-Qard al-Hassan, the organization still functions, and other entities—many of which are licensed—are less closely monitored and are believed to facilitate money laundering and illicit activities. In an effort to close loopholes, the Central Bank has limited transfers to $1,000 at a time and has required “know your customer” and currency transaction paperwork to be filed.
On a positive note, the government has appointed a financial prosecutor, who appears to be reaching out to banks seeking information, trying to obtain evidence of financial crimes. Whether the prosecutor will have the political backing to actually prosecute cases targeting the state’s financial and/or political elites remains unclear. The same goes for newly staffed government committees overseeing the state’s long inefficient and corrupt electricity and telecommunications sectors. Lebanon’s Banking Control Commission appears to be competent and focused on its supervisory role, and eager to claw back depositor funds that were immorally if not illegally disappeared.
Concerns persist about the government’s willingness and ability to end impunity and impose accountability. Consider that last month, the government appointed Gracia Azzi as director-general of customs—a department long associated with corruption in Lebanon. Azzi was a subject of investigation in the 2020 port explosion, as well as in another corruption case in 2018. At the time of the 2020 blast, she served on the Higher Customs Council, responsible for oversight of customs operations at the port. To be sure, one is innocent until proven guilty, but Azzi’s nomination provoked outrage among the families of the more than 200 Lebanese killed in the explosion. Nearly six years after that event, not a single person has been held accountable. Despite government promises of reform, for many Lebanese the Azzi appointment suggests business as usual.
While the reform and Hezbollah disarmament process has been halting, improbably, there are some modest signs of increased confidence and a rebound of economic life in the state. Since 2019, Lebanon’s economy has contracted by 40 percent or more. In 2026, though, according to World Bank predictions, the state’s GDP will grow by an impressive 4.7 percent. The market price for Lebanon’s Eurobonds, which it defaulted on in March 2020, has gone up as well. In recent months, the cost has shot up from 23 cents to 29-30 cents on the dollar, suggesting the market’s increased confidence in financial recovery.
U.S. Policy Implications
In May 2026, Lebanon is slated to return to the polls to elect a new parliament and government. For a host of reasons, this election may not happen. Absent a change in the electoral law—which seems unlikely—Hezbollah and its allies could obtain even more seats in the next parliament, undermining Salam’s chances for a return to the premiership and impeding hopes for progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament and implementation of deep economic reform.
Accordingly, there should be more of a sense of urgency for Washington and Beirut. Indeed, in July 2021, I testified before this committee in a hearing called “Lebanon: Assessing Political Paralysis, Economic Crisis, and Challenges for U.S. Policy.” Today’s panel could have had the same title. It’s critical to start capitalizing on the unprecedented opportunities so the next time the committee convenes to discuss Lebanon, the discussion will be focused on how Washington can build relations with a sovereign Lebanese partner. The Trump administration should take several steps to disrupt the inertia and push the ball forward:
Encourage electoral law modifications. The Lebanese parliament should reflect the new realities on the ground. As it currently stands, Lebanon’s vast expatriate community—a population greater than Lebanon’s itself—can vote for just six of 128 parliamentary seats. The reality is that many of these citizens emigrated in search of safety, stability, and opportunity far away from Hezbollah’s dominant culture of death. Washington has seemingly not engaged on this important but largely domestic political matter. But elections will determine Lebanon’s future, and the next balloting is critical to maintain momentum on reform. As things currently stand, Speaker Berri alone will decide whether changes in the law are even debated, much less voted. Yet even a small change—such as allowing Shia displaced from the south to vote not in their destroyed villages but in “mega-centers” in or around Beirut, free from Hezbollah intimidation—could make a difference.
Target Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanese security institutions. Existing U.S. sanctions have largely focused on Hezbollah’s own finances. To break the organization’s grip on Lebanon’s security institutions, however, the Trump administration should consider targeting the key officials within these institutions who collude with Hezbollah. The United States and the international community provide the entirety of the LAF’s procurement budget and support recurrent salary outlays, providing the leverage to demand the dismissal (or early retirement) of officers and enlisted soldiers in key positions within the military hierarchy who are affiliated with or sympathetic toward Hezbollah. The LAF should not undergo a “de-Baathification” process, but continued incidents of collusion and collaboration undermine the disarmament mission and should not be tolerated. Washington should also press for the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to finally end their coordination with Hezbollah. While these contacts might help the LAF avoid confrontation with the militia, they also help Hezbollah evade disarmament.
Time to sanction Lebanese again. Washington should resume its practice of sanctioning Lebanese political elites, regardless of sect, who obstruct reform and perpetuate the system of endemic corruption that continues to plague the state. It would be helpful if the Trump administration could also encourage European states to likewise designate deserving Lebanese elites. In many ways, Lebanese elites have closer financial, familial, and recreational relations with Europe than the United States, making European (and particularly French) designations more impactful. Until now, sanctions have been too few and far between to encourage meaningful and sustained changes in behavior.
Broaden the coalition against Hezbollah. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack was wrong when he described Hezbollah in July 2025 as a “political party…[that] also has a militant aspect to it.” Hezbollah is a terrorist militia established by Iran in the early 1980s to kill Americans and fight Israel. Barrack’s understanding of Hezbollah reflects a more traditional European view, albeit one that is changing over time. Hezbollah has demonstrated little interest in becoming a normal Lebanese political party. Indeed, it has progressively become more “Iranian.” If this wasn’t evident in 2008 when Hezbollah attacked the Lebanese state, killing hundreds in a bid for more political power, it became clear when Hezbollah deployed its forces to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria on behalf of Iran. Lebanon’s new government would benefit from broader international support in its effort to disarm Hezbollah and roll back the group’s political dominance of the state. To help Beirut succeed and hold the organization accountable for its murders, Washington should press states like France to designate the entirety of Hezbollah.
The urgency of accountability. To convince Lebanese that the new government is committed to accountability and the end of impunity, heads must roll. In the year since the Salam government took power, the Lebanese judiciary has only prosecuted, indicted, or convicted a small handful of nationals for financial crimes and/or corruption. Not a single individual has been held to account for the 2020 port explosion, nor has the government indicted a Hezbollah member for any one of the dozens of political murders the group allegedly perpetrated. The lack of justice is having an impact on the government’s credibility. Washington should be encouraging Beirut to finish investigating and initiate long-delayed prosecution of some politically sensitive, high-profile cases. If not now, when? The port blast is an obvious place to start. Both Lebanon and Washington also have an interest in the pursuit of justice for Lokman Slim, a longtime critic of Hezbollah and a recipient of U.S. development assistance who was murdered—almost certainly by the militia—in February 2021.
No reconstruction until Hezbollah is disarmed. Beirut has a lengthy history of deferring or avoiding difficult decisions. This government has taken the courageous and decisive step toward disarmament and should be commended. Seeing this process through is going to be difficult, especially north of the Litani, which Hezbollah has threatened to resist. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam appear committed, but experience suggests that Washington should maintain the pressure to avoid backsliding, unproductive compromise, and conflict between the LAF and Hezbollah. Accordingly, Washington should continue to oppose the rebuilding of Hezbollah’s heartland in south Lebanon until the organization disarms or is disarmed. Qatar’s recently reported offer of $450 million toward the reconstruction of Lebanon should serve as motivation for disarmament. It is premature to rebuild what surely will again be destroyed given the continued presence of Hezbollah arms in the region. Moreover, Hezbollah will exploit reconstruction to embed its military assets in civilian centers as it did after the 2006 war, when the group was allowed to play a significant role in the reconstruction process.
Engage Lebanon’s Shia community. Hezbollah claims to speak for the entire Shia community, while Berri claims to be the representative of Hezbollah. Notwithstanding some sporadic engagement with other Shia stakeholders, U.S. and international engagement with the community has been quite limited. At the end of the day, to end Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon, Shia will require credible alternatives. Once the group finds itself without weapons, extensive Iranian funding, and narco-money, other Shia voices may emerge. In the meantime, Washington should be talking to a wider range of Lebanese Shia. Representation of the community can no longer be reduced to Hezbollah communiques via Amal intermediaries.
Don’t perpetuate corruption during reconstruction. In June 2025, the World Bank gave the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) $250 million to begin the rebuilding of south Lebanon, a region in which Hezbollah has still not been disarmed, despite ceasefire obligations. CDR is widely recognized as a corrupt organization that has been implicated in several scandals involving financial mismanagement, political patronage contracts, and failed implementation of large projects. The organization, along with the so-called Council for South Lebanon, is controlled by Berri and his family. The Trump administration should oppose channeling U.S. and international aid in Lebanon for this problematic organization.
Back the LAF based on performance. The LAF is imperfect, but it is also a capable national organization that serves a key role at present. Since 2005 and the Cedar Revolution, the United States has played a central role in backing the LAF, and largely only expected the force to take on Sunni counterterrorism missions. Now the LAF has been tasked with a Shia CT mission, and it is doing the job. It can do more and can do better. Washington should continue to provide support for the LAF, but it should be conditioned on performance. Ultimately, the LAF may have to confront Hezbollah north or south of the Litani. Its willingness to take on that challenge, root out collaboration with the militia, and work toward state sovereignty should determine whether and to what degree Washington continues to invest in this force.
The division of labor is working. As Lebanon’s foreign minister recently told Sky News Arabia, “As long as the weapons are not totally monopolized by the state, Israel will unfortunately retain the right to continue its attacks in accordance with this agreement.” While Israeli strikes on Lebanon are jarring and not politically helpful for the government, the division of labor—Israel hitting targets too sensitive for the LAF—is by and large supported (quietly) by the Lebanese defense establishment. Unless and until the LAF is prepared to do the work, Israel will remain a partner in fulfilling Lebanon’s ceasefire obligations to disarm Hezbollah.
Footnotes & Sources:
“Lebanon’s Outlook on Sovereignty, Disarmament, and Peace: A Discussion with Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 23, 2025.
Ido Bar-Nes, “Hezbollah’s ‘Rabet’ exposed for the first time. And this is how the IDF is working to thwart it,” Israel Defense Forces website, January 26, 2026.
“Hezbollah yufawad aldawla fil thunknat al Tayouna,” YouTube, January 27, 2026.
Tsvi Jasper, “‘Israel has a right to continue its attacks,’ Lebanese Foreign Minister,” Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2026.
Fouad Deebs, “Lebanon’s Bank Resolution Law: A Missed Opportunity for Accountability and Reform,” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, December 23, 2025.
Targeting Hezbollah’s Broader Ecosystem of Power Hanin Ghaddar/February 03/ 2026 TESTIMONY OF HANIN GHADDAR
Friedmann Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa Hearing: “U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power” February 3, 2026
Introduction
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Schneider, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Lebanon is at a historic crossroads. The current ceasefire and the dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics—most notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—have left Hezbollah in its weakest state since its inception. However, there is a dangerous misconception that military setbacks alone will lead to Hezbollah’s disappearance.
While much of the current international focus is on Hezbollah’s possession of weapons, these assets are just one part of a wider ecosystem that enables the group to maintain power within state institutions, ensure a continued cash flow into its coffers, and rebuild its broken military infrastructure. This ecosystem is what keeps Hezbollah alive today. If the group loses its cash flow and influence within the state, it will not be able to sustain its arsenal.
I. The Parallel Cash Economy
Hezbollah has spent years “de-risking” from the formal Lebanese banking sector to avoid international sanctions. Today, it operates almost entirely through a parallel cash economy.
Al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH): This institution acts as Hezbollah’s unregulated bank. It is the primary vehicle for paying salaries and providing loans to its base, entirely outside the reach of the Central Bank of Lebanon.
The Shadow Budget: Through illicit trade, drug trafficking (Captagon), and control of the Port of Beirut, Hezbollah generates “black” revenue that bypasses state oversight.
Crypto and Digital Assets: We have seen an increasing shift toward the use of cryptocurrency to move Iranian funds into Lebanon, bypassing traditional financial monitoring systems.
II. State Capture and Institutional Control
Hezbollah’s grip on power is cemented through the infiltration of state institutions. Even if its fighters retreat from the border, its officials remain in the ministries.
Judicial Interference: Hezbollah has effectively paralyzed the Lebanese judiciary to ensure that no investigation—including the probe into the 2020 Beirut Port explosion—reaches its leadership.
Security Infiltration: While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are our primary partner, Hezbollah maintains “coordination units” that often influence operational decisions in certain sectors of the country.
III. The Syrian Factor
The fall of Bashar al-Assad has severed Hezbollah’s primary land bridge to Iran. For the first time, the “Resistance Axis” is geographically broken. Hezbollah is currently struggling to find new supply routes. This is the moment to ensure that the Lebanese-Syrian border is not just monitored, but sealed against military smuggling.
IV. Policy Recommendations
To truly dismantle Hezbollah’s grip, U.S. policy must move beyond the “security-first” approach and target the ecosystem:
Sanction the Facilitators: The U.S. Treasury should expand sanctions to include the non-military facilitators—the businessmen, lawyers, and accountants who manage Hezbollah’s cash economy and the AQAH branches.
Condition Aid on Judicial Independence: Future economic support to the Lebanese government should be conditioned on the protection of judges and the resumption of major investigations into corruption and port security.
Empower Shia Alternatives: Hezbollah maintains its base through a monopoly on Shia representation. The U.S. should support civil society initiatives that empower independent Shia voices, journalists, and political movements that are currently silenced by intimidation.
Border Enforcement: Use the current transition in Syria to demand a permanent international or technical monitoring presence on the Lebanon-Syria border to prevent the re-establishment of Iranian supply lines.
Conclusion
Hezbollah is currently wounded, but it is not dead. It is waiting for the international community to lose interest so it can begin the process of “tashjir” (re-planting) its infrastructure. We must not give them that time. By targeting the group’s financial and political ecosystem now, we can ensure that Lebanon finally emerges from Hezbollah’s shadow.
Congressional Testimony/U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power Dana Stroul/Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Meeting the moment requires greater investment and attention from Washington, including additional targeted security assistance, robust diplomatic efforts, expansion of the U.S. team tasked with handling the Lebanon file, and more.
The following testimony was submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important topic. Lebanon today presents a historic and time‑limited opportunity for U.S. and regional engagement. Multiple shifts have converged that should energize an expanded U.S. policy.
First, Lebanese Hezbollah’s profound military setbacks offer a narrow window to reorient the country. Hezbollah’s capabilities, weapons arsenal, and ability to threaten Israel are significantly degraded since the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and Hezbollah’s decision to drag Lebanon into war by opening a second front against Israel. Moreover, the other means by which the terrorist group undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability are at risk, including its political stranglehold on the Lebanese government. The November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah confirmed this state of affairs: the agreement’s terms are favorable to Israel, with a separate side letter that allows Israel to respond to immediate threats. Since the ceasefire came into effect, Hezbollah has repeatedly challenged it. Targeted Israeli strikes against Hezbollah operators and reconstituting efforts continue, underscoring that the group will continue to seek ways to rebuild. Although Hezbollah is under significant pressure, the United States should do more to make clear that this Iran-backed terrorist group’s continued unwillingness to give up its arms is what has been holding Lebanon back from stabilization and recovery.
Second, the Iranian regime is unprecedentedly weak at home and abroad, and the regional ecosystem in which Iran-backed terrorist groups thrived is changed. Tehran is currently mired in its own brutal repression against Iranian citizens at home while its traditional means of projecting influence across the region are compromised. Iran’s strategy to cultivate nonstate groups like Hezbollah and expand its missile arsenal to threaten the region failed. Sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism are depriving Hezbollah of cash in Lebanon. Tehran also lost its partnership in Syria with the December 2024 ouster of Bashar al‑Assad, depriving the regime of a state partner in funneling cash, weapons, and advisors to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The ecosystem of strategic and operational support around Hezbollah is fundamentally changed, but other illicit networks and relationships persist. Without more effort to capitalize on their historic weakness, illicit actors will find workarounds. It is now possible for the United States and its partners to imagine a Middle East with new leaders who are focused on responsiveness and accountability to their own people and free of Iran’s menace.
Third, new leaders in Beirut are empowered after more than a decade of political paralysis. Under the leadership of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the government formed in early 2025 charged the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with bringing all weapons south of the Litani River under state control by the end of last year. Although this mandate was not completely achieved, important steps should be acknowledged, and the trajectory is promising. Beirut is also taking early economic reform measures, including banking sector restructuring—important initial steps that require sustained follow‑through. The new government is sincere regarding relations with Israel, recently appointing a senior Lebanese civilian to join the ceasefire military mechanism with a mandate to expand dialogue with Israel on security arrangements and beyond. These developments constitute a narrow window for Lebanon to claim state authority and advance long‑overdue reforms.
However, current U.S. attention and investment are not aligned with this historic opportunity. U.S. policy is largely focused on Hezbollah and its disarmament. To keep focus on this objective, the Trump administration is maintaining pressure and attention through the military mechanism that coordinates the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and supporting the LAF with non-advanced equipment. These critical elements of U.S. policy should continue, but on their own they form only a partial strategy. To consolidate the gains from Hezbollah’s weakness, the United States must broaden its engagement beyond security. A more developed U.S. policy approach should proactively encourage continued reform, articulate the conditions under which it would provide non-security assistance to the long-suffering Lebanese people across different communities, and engage other governments inclined to meddle in Lebanon’s messy politics ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election. It is also important to channel complementary efforts by regional leaders, Europeans, and others into a comprehensive strategy that lends additional credibility to the current government. In short, more investment and attention from Washington are needed in order to meet the opportunity of the moment.
Security Assistance
Akey element of U.S. policy in Lebanon has been training, equipping, and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces as the most credible national institution with broad public support for the past twenty years. Over the course of the partnership, the United States has provided roughly $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and additional assistance to bolster the LAF’s capabilities. This policy has long been contentious, with skeptics questioning whether the LAF could or would confront Hezbollah and seize its illegal weapons. Nevertheless, recent progress merits acknowledgement.
The LAF has taken important steps, asserting authority over Beirut’s airport, removing weapons from Palestinian refugee camps, increasing deployed forces in southern Lebanon, and conducting searches of some private homes. The LAF’s announcement that it has achieved “operational control” over Lebanese territory south of the Litani River is an important milestone, but it does not mean every private home and business has been cleared of Hezbollah assets. More work is needed, and the LAF should be encouraged to move quickly north of the Litani while maintaining operational control in the south and completing the clearing out of Hezbollah fighters and weapons. This work must move faster: reports indicate that Hezbollah is moving quickly to rebuild and increasing its indigenous production of weapons north of the Litani.
If the LAF is to consolidate and expand these gains, targeted support is essential while holding the LAF accountable for effective operations. The LAF will need more vehicles, continued training, and sustainment to patrol and project presence. Recent U.S. announcements about transferring key equipment are important. The Trump administration approved four military support packages last year, including a presidential drawdown of $14.2 million in September and a $240 million package in October. Sustained funding will be required to increase force size so the LAF can hold southern gains while extending operations northward. Salary support programs (including U.S.-backed efforts begun in 2022) remain critical to morale and retention. Finally, the LAF must be empowered and resourced to enter private businesses and homes where Hezbollah stores weapons and conceals activities if Lebanon is to reunify the monopoly of force under the state.
U.S. officials should seize two near‑term opportunities to signal focus on completing Hezbollah’s disarmament while supporting the LAF: the French‑hosted conference in early March, and the LAF commander’s visit to Washington this week. The objective should be to make clear that U.S. support comes with expectations for performance and transparency: the United States has invested in the LAF for two decades in preparation for this moment, and the LAF needs to live up to that investment. Beirut’s civilian leaders and LAF commanders should understand that continued support will be tied to the effectiveness of the disarmament process. These expectations must go beyond numbers of houses cleared and announcements of Hezbollah weapons decommissioned—Beirut must also transparently explain what it is doing with the seized weapons and the actions it is taking to shut down the illicit rearming process if it is to earn the confidence of the international community.
Beyond Security Assistance
While Trump administration officials have warned about the negative consequences of postponing Lebanon’s May election, there is little indication of U.S. focus on supporting a free, fair, and credible vote that reflects the will of Lebanese voters, including those in the diaspora. The worst‑case outcome would be a parliamentary makeup that mirrors the pre‑October 7 one, leaving Hezbollah‑affiliated politicians with influence. In the absence of visible U.S. leadership, regional actors—Qatar, Turkey, and others—are stepping into the political void, increasing external meddling to favor politicians beholden to outside priorities rather than focused on the needs of Lebanese citizens. The United States should make clear it will be difficult to work productively with a government that does not commit to meaningful economic reform, tackle corruption, and respond to the needs of all Lebanese. Importantly, any new parliament must empower and back the mandate of Lebanon’s president and prime minister to bring all weapons under state control.
U.S. policy must also articulate a reconstruction and assistance strategy—especially for southern Lebanon—tied to disarmament incentives. The World Bank 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) estimates that postwar reconstruction and recovery in Lebanon will cost approximately $11 billion. Many in Lebanon’s Shia community may choose not to rely on Hezbollah as their defender within the country, but acute humanitarian and rebuilding needs risk driving them back to the group if Beirut cannot deliver. Washington should pair concrete steps on Hezbollah’s disarmament with support for reconstruction, quick‑impact projects, and longer‑term livelihood programs to ensure an inclusive post‑Hezbollah future. This approach should build on multilateral efforts—including the World Bank’s recent loan to the Council for South Lebanon—and coordinate donor financing to make disarmament politically and materially sustainable.
Assistance, as well as advocacy with international financial institutions and other donors, should be part of a U.S. conditional package to Lebanon. Historically, the United States has provided Lebanon with billions of dollars in economic and humanitarian assistance, supporting governance, development, refugee relief, and emergency response after crises such as the 2020 Beirut port explosion. The Trump administration’s suspension of most U.S. foreign assistance and termination of some programs impacted all U.S.-funded non-security activities in Lebanon. Restoring and refocusing that assistance can reinforce U.S. focus on supporting both reform and reconstruction.
Without something tangible on the table, the United States is ceding much of its influence to others and risks re-empowering ministries and local government entities that are still under Hezbollah’s influence. Consider the Qatari government’s recent announcement of $480 million to rebuild three communities in southern Lebanon, and then another $400 million for Lebanon’s electricity sector. Absent any performance benchmarks or expectations for continued Hezbollah disarmament, this generous assistance does not reinforce U.S. priorities for Lebanon. The United States should work with the international community—and donors like Turkey and Qatar—to ensure that funding does not benefit Hezbollah-linked entities.
There are many steps the Trump administration can take to seize this narrow window in Lebanon. First, it should expand the U.S. policy team in Lebanon beyond Ambassador Michel Issa. Employing additional diplomatic and technical experts will sustain engagement across security, governance, and reconstruction portfolios. A larger team would improve coordination with partners, better monitor on‑the‑ground progress, and signal sustained U.S. attention.
Second, President Trump should offer President Aoun a White House visit at the appropriate time this year to acknowledge progress and encourage further reforms, preferably before the May parliamentary election. A carefully timed visit would publicly reward concrete steps while reinforcing U.S. expectations for continued action and transparency on disarmament, anti‑corruption, and inclusive governance.
Third, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Lebanon beyond Hezbollah’s disarmament, the administration could publicly articulate the requirements for expanding U.S. support for Lebanon’s recovery and present a plan for assistance beyond the security sector. Specifically, phased economic and reconstruction aid should be conditioned on defining a timeline for implementation of the remaining phases of the ceasefire agreement with Israel, affirming expectations for a transparent, credible election cycle, and seating a government like the current one—that is, technocratic, not shackled by persistent corruption, and committed to prioritizing the needs of the Lebanese people.
Finally, the United States must continue its critical role in facilitating direct dialogue between Lebanon and Israel toward eventual normalization. U.S. certification of Lebanese and Israeli confidence‑building measures is critical. For its part, Beirut must implement all phases of the ceasefire and continue demonstrating commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Israel must be prepared to do its part, including withdrawing from its outposts in Lebanon after Hezbollah’s complete disarmament is validated by a credible third party. Security agreements to end hostilities, demarcate remaining border areas, and related measures would be a watershed for Lebanon, Israel, and the region.
**Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
السياسة الأمريكية تجاه لبنان: عقبات تفكيك قبضة حزب الله على السلطة دانا سترول/معهد واشنطن/03 شباط/2026
تتطلب مواجهة اللحظة الراهنة مزيداً من الاستثمار والاهتمام من واشنطن، بما في ذلك مساعدات أمنية إضافية موجهة، وجهود دبلوماسية قوية، وتوسيع الفريق الأمريكي المكلف بالتعامل مع الملف اللبناني، وأكثر من ذلك.
الشهادة التالية قُدمت إلى لجنة الشؤون الخارجية الفرعية للشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في مجلس النواب.
السيد الرئيس، النائب الأول، وأعضاء اللجنة، أشكركم على دعوتي للإدلاء بشهادتي حول هذا الموضوع المهم. يمثل لبنان اليوم فرصة تاريخية ومحدودة زمنياً للمشاركة الأمريكية والإقليمية. لقد تلاقت تحولات متعددة يجب أن تعطي دفعة قوية لسياسة أمريكية موسعة.
أولاً، النكسات العسكرية العميقة التي مُني بها حزب الله اللبناني توفر نافذة ضيقة لإعادة توجيه البلاد. تدهورت قدرات حزب الله وترسانة أسلحته وقدرته على تهديد إسرائيل بشكل كبير منذ الهجوم الإرهابي الذي شنته حماس في 7 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، وقرار حزب الله بجر لبنان إلى الحرب عبر فتح جبهة ثانية ضد إسرائيل. علاوة على ذلك، الوسائل الأخرى التي قوض بها التنظيم الإرهابي سيادة لبنان واستقراره باتت مهددة، بما في ذلك قبضته السياسية الخانقة على الحكومة اللبنانية. وقد أكد وقف إطلاق النار بين إسرائيل وحزب الله في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024 هذا الوضع: شروط الاتفاق مواتية لإسرائيل، مع وجود رسالة جانبية منفصلة تسمح لإسرائيل بالرد على التهديدات الفورية. منذ دخول وقف إطلاق النار حيز التنفيذ، تحدى حزب الله مراراً وتكراراً بنوده. وتستمر الضربات الإسرائيلية الموجهة ضد عناصر حزب الله وجهود إعادة التشكيل، مما يؤكد أن الجماعة ستستمر في البحث عن طرق لإعادة البناء. رغم أن “حزب الله” يواجه ضغوطاً كبيرة، يجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تفعل المزيد لتوضيح أن عدم رغبة هذا التنظيم الإرهابي المدعوم من إيران في التخلي عن أسلحته هو ما يعيق لبنان عن الاستقرار والتعافي.
ثانياً، النظام الإيراني ضعيف بشكل غير مسبوق في الداخل والخارج، والنظام البيئي الإقليمي الذي ازدهرت فيه الجماعات الإرهابية المدعومة من إيران قد تغير. طهران غارقة حالياً في قمعها الوحشي ضد المواطنين الإيرانيين في الداخل، بينما تعرضت وسائلها التقليدية لبسط النفوذ في المنطقة للخطر. فشلت استراتيجية إيران في تنمية جماعات غير حكومية مثل حزب الله وتوسيع ترسانتها الصاروخية لتهديد المنطقة. والعقوبات المفروضة على دعم إيران للإرهاب تحرم حزب الله من الأموال النقدية في لبنان. كما فقدت طهران شراكتها في سوريا عقب الإطاحة بـ”بشار الأسد” في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2024، مما حرم النظام من شريك دولة في ضخ الأموال النقدية والأسلحة والمستشارين إلى حزب الله في لبنان. تغير النظام البيئي للدعم الاستراتيجي والعملياتي حول حزب الله بشكل جوهري، لكن الشبكات والعلاقات غير المشروعة الأخرى لا تزال قائمة. وبدون مزيد من الجهد للاستفادة من ضعفهم التاريخي، سيجد الفاعلون غير الشرعيين حلولاً بديلة. من الممكن الآن للولايات المتحدة وشركائها تصور شرق أوسط بقادة جدد يركزون على الاستجابة والمساءلة أمام شعوبهم ومتحررون من تهديد إيران.
ثالثاً، تمكّن قادة جدد في بيروت بعد أكثر من عقد من الشلل السياسي. تحت قيادة الرئيس “جوزيف عون” ورئيس الوزراء “نواف سلام”، كلفت الحكومة التي تشكلت في أوائل عام 2025 القوات المسلحة اللبنانية بوضع جميع الأسلحة جنوب نهر الليطاني تحت سيطرة الدولة بحلول نهاية العام الماضي. ورغم أن هذه المهمة لم تتحقق بالكامل، يجب الاعتراف بالخطوات المهمة، والمسار لا يزال واعداً. كما تتخذ بيروت أيضاً تدابير إصلاح اقتصادي مبكرة، بما في ذلك إعادة هيكلة القطاع المصرفي – خطوات أولية مهمة تتطلب متابعة مستدامة. والحكومة الجديدة صادقة فيما يتعلق بالعلاقات مع إسرائيل، إذ عينت مؤخراً مدنياً لبنانياً رفيع المستوى للانضمام إلى آلية وقف إطلاق النار العسكرية بتفويض لتوسيع الحوار مع إسرائيل بشأن الترتيبات الأمنية وما بعدها. تشكل هذه التطورات نافذة ضيقة للبنان للمطالبة بسلطة الدولة ودفع الإصلاحات المتأخرة منذ فترة طويلة.
ومع ذلك، الاهتمام والاستثمار الأمريكيان الحاليان غير متوافقين مع هذه الفرصة التاريخية. تركز السياسة الأمريكية إلى حد كبير على حزب الله ونزع سلاحه. وللحفاظ على التركيز على هذا الهدف، تحافظ إدارة ترامب على الضغط والاهتمام من خلال الآلية العسكرية التي تنسق وقف إطلاق النار بين لبنان وإسرائيل، ودعم القوات المسلحة اللبنانية بمعدات غير متقدمة. يجب أن تستمر هذه العناصر الحاسمة من السياسة الأمريكية، لكنها وحدها تشكل استراتيجية جزئية فقط. لتعزيز المكاسب من ضعف حزب الله، يجب على الولايات المتحدة توسيع مشاركتها خارج نطاق الأمن. يجب أن يشجع نهج السياسة الأمريكية الأكثر تطوراً بشكل استباقي على مواصلة الإصلاح، وأن يوضح الشروط التي بموجبها ستقدم المساعدة غير الأمنية للشعب اللبناني الذي عانى طويلاً عبر المجتمعات المختلفة، وأن ينخرط مع الحكومات الأخرى التي تميل إلى التدخل في سياسات لبنان الفوضوية قبل الانتخابات البرلمانية القادمة. من المهم أيضاً توجيه الجهود التكميلية من قبل القادة الإقليميين والأوروبيين وغيرهم نحو استراتيجية شاملة تضفي مصداقية إضافية على الحكومة الحالية. باختصار، هناك حاجة إلى مزيد من الاستثمار والاهتمام من واشنطن لاغتنام فرصة اللحظة.
المساعدة الأمنية
كان عنصراً رئيسياً في السياسة الأمريكية في لبنان تدريب وتجهيز ودعم القوات المسلحة اللبنانية باعتبارها المؤسسة الوطنية الأكثر مصداقية والتي تحظى بدعم شعبي واسع على مدى السنوات العشرين الماضية. على مدار الشراكة، قدمت الولايات المتحدة حوالي 3 مليارات دولار في التمويل العسكري الأجنبي ومساعدات إضافية لتعزيز قدرات القوات المسلحة اللبنانية. هذه السياسة كانت مثيرة للجدل منذ فترة طويلة، إذ تساءل المشككون عما إذا كانت القوات المسلحة اللبنانية قادرة أو راغبة في مواجهة حزب الله ومصادرة أسلحته غير الشرعية. ومع ذلك، فإن التقدم الأخير يستحق الاعتراف.
اتخذت القوات المسلحة اللبنانية خطوات مهمة، بتأكيد السلطة على مطار بيروت، وإزالة الأسلحة من مخيمات اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، وزيادة القوات المنتشرة في جنوب لبنان، وإجراء عمليات تفتيش لبعض المنازل الخاصة. إن إعلان القوات المسلحة اللبنانية أنها حققت “السيطرة العملياتية ” على الأراضي اللبنانية جنوب نهر الليطاني يعد علامة فارقة مهمة، لكنه لا يعني أن كل منزل خاص وشركة قد تم تطهيرها من أصول حزب الله. هناك حاجة إلى مزيد من العمل، ويجب تشجيع القوات المسلحة اللبنانية على التحرك بسرعة شمال الليطاني مع الحفاظ على السيطرة العملياتية في الجنوب وإتمام تطهير مقاتلي حزب الله وأسلحته. يجب أن يتحرك هذا العمل بشكل أسرع: تشير التقارير إلى أن حزب الله يتحرك بسرعة لإعادة البناء وزيادة إنتاجه الداخلي للأسلحة شمال الليطاني.
إذا كان على القوات المسلحة اللبنانية تعزيز وتوسيع هذه المكاسب، فإن الدعم الموجه ضروري مع محاسبة القوات المسلحة اللبنانية على العمليات الفعالة. ستحتاج القوات المسلحة اللبنانية إلى مزيد من المركبات والتدريب المستمر والدعم للقيام بدوريات وإظهار الحضور. وتعد الإعلانات الأمريكية الأخيرة بشأن نقل المعدات الأساسية مهمة. وافقت إدارة ترامب على أربع حزم دعم عسكري العام الماضي، بما في ذلك سحب رئاسي بقيمة 14.2 مليون دولار في أيلول/سبتمبر وحزمة بقيمة 240 مليون دولار في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر. سيكون هناك حاجة إلى تمويل مستدام لزيادة حجم القوة حتى تتمكن القوات المسلحة اللبنانية من الاحتفاظ بمكاسب الجنوب بينما تمدد العمليات شمالاً. تبقى برامج دعم الرواتب (بما في ذلك الجهود المدعومة من الولايات المتحدة والتي بدأت في عام 2022) حاسمة للروح المعنوية والاحتفاظ بالأفراد. وأخيراً، يجب تمكين القوات المسلحة اللبنانية وتزويدها بالموارد لدخول الشركات الخاصة والمنازل حيث يخزن حزب الله الأسلحة ويخفي الأنشطة إذا كان لبنان سيعيد توحيد احتكار القوة تحت سلطة الدولة.
يجب على المسؤولين الأمريكيين اغتنام فرصتين قريبتي المدى للإشارة إلى التركيز على إكمال نزع سلاح حزب الله بينما يدعمون القوات المسلحة اللبنانية: المؤتمر الذي تستضيفه فرنسا في أوائل آذار/مارس، وزيارة قائد القوات المسلحة اللبنانية إلى واشنطن هذا الأسبوع. يجب أن يكون الهدف هو توضيح أن الدعم الأمريكي يأتي مع توقعات للأداء والشفافية: استثمرت الولايات المتحدة في القوات المسلحة اللبنانية لعقدين استعداداً لهذه اللحظة، ويجب على القوات المسلحة اللبنانية أن ترقى إلى مستوى هذا الاستثمار. يجب أن يفهم القادة المدنيون في بيروت وقادة القوات المسلحة اللبنانية أن الدعم المستمر سيكون مرتبطاً بفعالية عملية نزع السلاح. يجب أن تتجاوز هذه التوقعات أعداد المنازل التي تم تطهيرها والإعلانات عن الأسلحة التي سحبها حزب الله – يجب على بيروت أيضاً أن توضح بشفافية ما تفعله بالأسلحة المصادرة والإجراءات التي تتخذها لوقف عملية إعادة التسليح غير المشروعة إذا كانت تريد كسب ثقة المجتمع الدولي.
ما بعد المساعدة الأمنية
بينما حذر مسؤولو إدارة ترامب من العواقب السلبية لتأجيل انتخابات لبنان في أيار/مايو، لا يوجد مؤشر كبير على التركيز الأمريكي على دعم تصويت حر ونزيه وذي مصداقية يعكس إرادة الناخبين اللبنانيين، بما في ذلك أولئك الموجودين في الشتات. ومن ثم، أسوأ نتيجة ممكنة ستكون تشكيل برلماني يعكس ذلك الذي كان قبل 7 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، مما يترك للسياسيين المنتمين لحزب الله نفوذاً. في غياب القيادة الأمريكية المرئية، تتدخل جهات إقليمية فاعلة – قطر وتركيا وغيرها – في الفراغ السياسي، مما يزيد من التدخل الخارجي لصالح السياسيين المدينين بالولاء للأولويات الخارجية بدلاً من التركيز على احتياجات المواطنين اللبنانيين. يجب على الولايات المتحدة أن توضح أنه سيكون من الصعب العمل بشكل منتج مع حكومة لا تلتزم بإصلاح اقتصادي ذي مغزى، ومعالجة الفساد، والاستجابة لاحتياجات جميع اللبنانيين. والأهم من ذلك، يجب على أي برلمان جديد أن يمكّن ويدعم ولاية رئيس لبنان ورئيس الوزراء لوضع جميع الأسلحة تحت سيطرة الدولة.
يجب أن توضح السياسة الأمريكية أيضاً استراتيجية إعادة إعمار ومساعدة – خاصة لجنوب لبنان – مرتبطة بحوافز نزع السلاح. يقدر تقييم الأضرار والاحتياجات السريع للبنك الدولي لعام 2025 أن إعادة الإعمار والتعافي بعد الحرب في لبنان سيكلف حوالي 11 مليار دولار. قد يختار الكثيرون في المجتمع الشيعي اللبناني عدم الاعتماد على حزب الله كمدافع عنهم داخل البلاد، لكن الاحتياجات الحادة للإغاثة الإنسانية وإعادة البناء تخاطر بدفعهم مرة أخرى إلى الجماعة إذا لم تتمكن بيروت من التسليم. يجب على واشنطن أن تقرن خطوات ملموسة بشأن نزع سلاح حزب الله بدعم إعادة الإعمار ومشاريع سريعة التأثير وبرامج كسب العيش طويلة الأجل لضمان مستقبل شامل بعد حزب الله. يجب أن يبني هذا النهج على الجهود المتعددة الأطراف – بما في ذلك القرض الأخير من البنك الدولي لمجلس الجنوب اللبناني – وتنسيق تمويل المانحين لجعل نزع السلاح مستداماً سياسياً ومادياً.
يجب أن تكون المساعدة، وكذلك الدعوة لدى المؤسسات المالية الدولية والمانحين الآخرين، جزءاً من حزمة أمريكية مشروطة للبنان. تاريخياً، قدمت الولايات المتحدة للبنان مليارات الدولارات من المساعدات الاقتصادية والإنسانية، لدعم الحوكمة والتنمية وإغاثة اللاجئين والاستجابة للطوارئ بعد أزمات مثل انفجار ميناء بيروت عام 2020. أثر تعليق إدارة ترامب لمعظم المساعدات الخارجية الأمريكية وإنهاء بعض البرامج على جميع الأنشطة غير الأمنية الممولة من الولايات المتحدة في لبنان. يمكن أن تعزز استعادة تلك المساعدة وإعادة تركيزها التركيز الأمريكي على دعم كل من الإصلاح وإعادة الإعمار.
بدون شيء ملموس على الطاولة، تتنازل الولايات المتحدة عن الكثير من نفوذها للآخرين وتخاطر بإعادة تمكين الوزارات وكيانات الحكومة المحلية التي لا تزال تحت تأثير حزب الله. لنأخذ في الاعتبار إعلان الحكومة القطرية الأخير عن 480 مليون دولار لإعادة بناء ثلاث مجتمعات في جنوب لبنان، ثم 400 مليون دولار أخرى لقطاع الكهرباء في لبنان. في غياب أي معايير أداء أو توقعات لاستمرار نزع سلاح حزب الله، فإن هذه المساعدة السخية لا تعزز أولويات الولايات المتحدة للبنان. يجب أن تعمل الولايات المتحدة مع المجتمع الدولي – والمانحين مثل تركيا وقطر – لضمان عدم استفادة الكيانات المرتبطة بحزب الله من التمويل.
هناك العديد من الخطوات التي يمكن لإدارة ترامب اتخاذها لاغتنام هذه النافذة الضيقة في لبنان. أولاً، يجب أن توسع فريق السياسة الأمريكي في لبنان بما يتجاوز السفير “ميشال عيسى”. سيؤدي توظيف خبراء دبلوماسيين وتقنيين إضافيين إلى استدامة المشاركة عبر محافظ الأمن والحوكمة وإعادة الإعمار. سيؤدي فريق أكبر إلى تحسين التنسيق مع الشركاء، ومراقبة أفضل للتقدم على الأرض، والإشارة إلى اهتمام أمريكي مستدام.
ثانياً، يجب على الرئيس ترامب أن يعرض على الرئيس عون زيارة إلى البيت الأبيض في الوقت المناسب هذا العام للاعتراف بالتقدم وتشجيع المزيد من الإصلاحات، ويفضل أن يكون ذلك قبل الانتخابات البرلمانية في أيار/مايو. ستكافئ الزيارة الموقوتة بعناية الخطوات الملموسة علناً بينما تعزز التوقعات الأمريكية للعمل المستمر والشفافية بشأن نزع السلاح ومكافحة الفساد والحوكمة الشاملة.
ثالثاً، لإظهار الالتزام الأمريكي تجاه لبنان بما يتجاوز نزع سلاح حزب الله، يمكن للإدارة أن توضح علناً المتطلبات لتوسيع الدعم الأمريكي لتعافي لبنان وتقديم خطة للمساعدة خارج القطاع الأمني. على وجه التحديد، يجب أن تكون المساعدة الاقتصادية وإعادة الإعمار التدريجية مشروطة بتحديد جدول زمني لتنفيذ المراحل المتبقية من اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار مع إسرائيل، وتأكيد التوقعات لدورة انتخابية شفافة وذات مصداقية، وتشكيل حكومة مثل الحكومة الحالية – أي تكنوقراطية، وغير مقيدة بالفساد المستمر، وملتزمة بإعطاء الأولوية لاحتياجات الشعب اللبناني.
أخيراً، يجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تواصل دورها الحاسم في تسهيل الحوار المباشر بين لبنان وإسرائيل نحو التطبيع النهائي. إن اعتماد الولايات المتحدة لتدابير بناء الثقة اللبنانية والإسرائيلية أمر حاسم. من جانبها، يجب على بيروت تنفيذ جميع مراحل وقف إطلاق النار ومواصلة إظهار الالتزام بنزع سلاح حزب الله. يجب أن تكون إسرائيل مستعدة للقيام بدورها، بما في ذلك الانسحاب من مواقعها في لبنان بعد التحقق من اكتمال نزع سلاح حزب الله من قبل طرف ثالث ذي مصداقية. ستكون الاتفاقات الأمنية لإنهاء الأعمال العدائية وترسيم المناطق الحدودية المتبقية والتدابير ذات الصلة نقطة تحول بالنسبة للبنان وإسرائيل والمنطقة.
**دانا سترول هي “مديرة الأبحاث” و”زميلة أقدم في زمالة “شيلي ومايكل كاسن” في معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى.
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