جونسون سباير: فهم الحرس الثوري الإسلامي التنظيم الشرير بفرادته، المكلف الحفاظ على نظام الملالي وتعزيز الأفكار الإسلامية الثورية والمستولي في ظلها على السلطة في إيران
جونسون سباير/نقلاً عن موقع ميديل ايست فوروم/02 أيلول/2025
Uniquely Malevolent: Understanding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Jonathan Spyer/The Australian/Middle East Forum Online
Its Remit Is the Preservation of the Regime and the Advancement of the Revolutionary Islamist Ideas Under Which It Seized Power
The decision by the government of Australia to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, and to expel the Iranian regime’s ambassador to Canberra represents the latest, belated but welcome acknowledgement by a western government of the nature of this entity, and of the unique and dangerous role it plays in global affairs.
The decision by the government of Australia to designate the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation, and to expel the Iranian regime’s ambassador to Canberra represents the latest, belated but welcome acknowledgement by a western government of the nature of this entity, and of the unique and dangerous role it plays in global affairs. The Albanese government’s decision came after evidence was discovered by the Australian security services linking the IRGC to two recent antisemitic arson attacks – against the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne and the Lewis Continental Kitchen, a kosher restaurant in Bondi, Sydney. The attacks caused millions of dollars of damage.
The details that have emerged regarding the attacks, and indeed the nature of the targets themselves, will make familiar reading to any seasoned observer of the IRGC and its modus operandi. In both instances, the organisation appears to have made use of local elements to carry out the attacks. In the case of the restaurant in Bondi, a member of a local motorcycle gang has been arrested. Regarding the Adass Yisrael synagogue, two young Melbourne men, Younes Ali Younes and Giovanni Laulu, have been charged. This is in line with the known practice of the IRGC in comparable cases in the United States, Britain and Scandinavia.
They fit comfortably within the known practices of the IRGC, which has a long history of targeting Jewish communal institutions and Jewish individuals globally, as part of the broader ideological and religious project to which the Iranian regime is committed.
The nature of the targets is also of interest and tells us much about the unique nature of this organisation.
The notion of foreign intelligence or covert warfare agencies carrying out assassinations or acts of sabotage related to their states’ interests on foreign soil is a familiar one. The Russian SVR and GRU services, for example, have engaged in such practices in a variety of western countries. Foreign agencies seeking to infiltrate the political systems of target countries in order to acquire information or influence and to subvert political processes is also a familiar element of international affairs. But the Melbourne and Sydney fires don’t fit with either of these contexts. They were the kind of acts one might more readily associate with a local hate group or with a racist domestic terror organisation. These kind of acts, however, fit squarely within the particular modus operandi of the IRGC, and offer clues regarding the nature of this organisation.
So what exactly is this body, which seems to defy the usual categories? It is both an organisation engaged in practices usually associated with terror organisations, yet also an agency of a state. Such bodies exist in other contexts, perhaps, but this one seems to have a broader remit than other comparable agencies. Neither the Melbourne synagogue nor the Sydney restaurant were targets of any relevance whatsoever to the Iranian state interest, as it would commonly be understood. They do, however, fit comfortably within the known practices of the IRGC, which has a long history of targeting Jewish communal institutions and Jewish individuals globally, as part of the broader ideological and religious project to which the Iranian regime is committed.
A Unique Presence on the Global Stage
Most countries possess domestic and foreign intelligence and security services. The IRGC is something different. The Islamic Republic of Iran, incidentally, does maintain a conventional foreign intelligence structure, which operates parallel to the IRGC. This is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), previously known as VEVAK, and usually referred to by Iranians as the ‘Etelaat.’
Like the IRGC, MOIS also has a global remit, and also engages in terror activity. Like the IRGC, its commanders report directly to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. But the MOIS’ track record more closely resembles the kind of activities engaged in by other repressive regimes. An example of the type of attack carried out by the MOIS on foreign soil is the attempted bombing of an opposition rally in Paris in 2018. This act, involving a diplomat based at the Iranian embassy in Belgium who was also a MOIS operative, fits into a practice adopted by many dictatorships – namely the violent targeting of regime opponents overseas. The arson attacks in Australia, against targets of no political relevance but chosen purely because of their ethno-religious affiliation, bear by contrast the particular hallmarks of the IRGC, and resemble attacks it has carried out elsewhere.
The regime in Teheran is both a state entity, but also the self defined center of a global movement for Islamic revolution.
The German authorities, for example, consider the IRGC responsible for a string of attacks on Jewish communal buildings in Germany in the course of 2022. These included the firebombing of a synagogue in the town of Bochum, an attempted act of arson against a synagogue in Dortmund, and the firing of shots at a synagogue in Essen.
In 2016, an IRGC operative was arrested in Norway as he carried out surveillance around the home of a prominent, native Norwegian pro Israel advocate. Further back, IRGC operatives were involved in 1989 in the attempted assassination in Norway of William Nygaard, publisher of Salman Rushdie’s ‘The Satanic Verses.’ IRGC personnel, in cooperation with Lebanese Hezballah operatives, also carried out the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1994, with the loss of 85 lives.
So no regular state agency, and no ‘normal’ terror group. What then, exactly, is the IRGC? Established immediately following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, it is a unique, and uniquely malignant presence both within Iran and on the global stage. Its remit is the preservation of the regime, and the advancement of the revolutionary Islamist ideas under which it seized power. Its activities, managed by its multiple commands, run the gamut from business activity, via conventional and irregular military capacities, to internal repression of dissent within Iran, and to subversive and violent acts abroad.
Its existence as a parallel structure is testimony to the dual role and dual self-perception of the Iranian regime itself. The regime in Teheran is both a state entity, but also the self defined center of a global movement for Islamic revolution. MOIS, broadly, relates to the former role. The IRGC represents the latter.
Multiple Roles
The IRGC plays a central role in Iranian power projection. Indeed, it was responsible for probably the most significant Iranian foreign policy achievement of recent years- namely, the successful seeding of proxy political-military organisations in countries neighbouring Iran, and the subsequent use of these entities as tools of state policy.
The IRGC’s Quds Force (QF), responsible for external activities, manages this process. The Lebanese Hezballah movement, the prototype of Iranian proxy groups, was established under the tutelage of the IRGC in 1982. Later, the IRGC applied the same model in Iraq, with its establishment of a variety of Shia militia groups in that country. The Badr Organisation, Ktaeb Hezballah and Asaib Ahl al Haq are the most prominent of these. In Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, these proxy groups are today the most powerful political and military players, present in the governing coalition, and embedded deeply within state agencies.
All this is testimony to the IRGC’s unique and effective methodology of irregular and political warfare. The Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad and Hamas among the Palestinians are examples of a slightly different element of the IRGC toolbox. Whereas Hezballah et al. are direct IRGC creations, these latter groups are authentic local players, who the IRGC identified and then allied with. The IRGC was responsible for probably the most significant Iranian foreign policy achievement of recent years- namely, the successful seeding of proxy political-military organisations in countries neighbouring Iran, and the subsequent use of these entities as tools of state policy.
The assassination of veteran Qods Force commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani, by the US in January 2020 struck a powerful blow against this Iranian regional strategy. Israel’s recent decimation of Hezballah and Hamas has further set it back. Yet the IRGC and its methods remain a powerful instrument for power projection across the Middle East, enabling the regime to bypass its conventional weaknesses. The Houthis’ successful near closure of a vital maritime trade route, the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea route is the latest testimony to the efficacy of these methods.
Regarding internal repression, the IRGC controls the Basij militia inside Iran. This is the main instrument used to suppress internal dissent, often in the most brutal of ways. It was largely responsible for the violent actions that crushed the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement in 2022. Credible evidence exists to suggest that on occasion, the IRGC has also made use of members of its Arab proxy groups to assist in crushing dissent within Iran.
The IRGC has its own conventional military units, including ground, air and naval forces. These number around 135,000 fighters in total. Their methods again make up for conventional inferiority by the use of sometimes innovative guerrilla tactics. The IRGC naval force, for example, has pioneered the use of small fast attack craft and asymmetric hit-and-run tactics.
The IRGC possesses a vast economic empire. This encompasses, according to a report by Iranian analyst Reza Parchizadeh, “trade, industry, energy, banking, transportation, mining, medicine, entertainment, sports, and import and export.” The IRGC’s construction and public works company, known as Khatam al-Anbia, is Iran’s largest engineering and development contractor. It is often awarded contracts by the state without any competitive tender, because of the central role of the IRGC in the state. As a result, the IRGC has managed many crucial infrastructural projects. The organisation, for example, built Terminal one of the Imam Khomeini International Airport. At the same time, in its security iteration, it is responsible for security management at the airport.
So that element of the Qods Force responsible for subversion abroad, and for the recruiting and directing of the kind of individuals who carry out attacks against Jewish-owned businesses and communal facilities, constitutes a single cog in a vast machine dedicated to the advancement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its founding ideas. What this cog has in common with the other elements is the employment of methods indifferent to legality, the bypassing of international norms, and indeed the dismissal of anything resembling acknowledgement of the legitimate rights of individuals and countries outside of the circle of the regime itself and its allies.
What will the designation mean?
There is a growing awareness in western countries of the nature and methods of the IRGC, and of its aims. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain’s designated the organisation in 2018, the United States in 2019, Sweden in 2023, Canada in 2024 and Paraguay in 2025. Designation will allow the Australian authorities to act swiftly against anyone expressing support for the group, and enable the rapid freezing of funds maintained within Australian jurisdiction by any individual or body linked to or supportive of the IRGC. It will also allow for enhanced targeting of IRGC business activity, and of individuals or bodies engaging in economic activity with IRGC related businesses. In addition, it will make possible enhanced law enforcement activity against organisations expressing support for the IRGC, or seeking to spread its ideological messages.
In the west, including in Australia, the IRGC has engaged in the systematic targeting both of opponents of Iran’s regime, and of individuals entirely innocent of any connection to Iran, who happen to belong to ethnic or religious communities that the regime sees as its enemies.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has in recent years been responsible for the production of violence against innocents, and misery on an industrial scale, across the Middle East and beyond it. Its support and its methods have led to the rise or preservation of vastly repressive regimes across the region, from Gaza to Yemen, and to situations of ongoing instability, conflict and fragmentation.
In Iran itself, it has played a central role in the preservation of a repressive and unpopular regime which has mismanaged the nation’s resources and impoverished the population. In playing this role, the IRGC’s leaders have gained vast wealth for themselves. In the west, including in Australia, the IRGC has engaged in the systematic targeting both of opponents of Iran’s regime, and of individuals entirely innocent of any connection to Iran, who happen to belong to ethnic or religious communities that the regime sees as its enemies. The designation of the IRGC in Australia is hence both deserved, and long overdue. Hopefully, those countries which have yet to designate the organisation, notably in Western Europe, will now learn from and follow the Australian example.
https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/uniquely-malevolent-understanding-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps
**Published originally on August 29, 2025, under the title “Setting an Example in Fight Against Tehran’s Grip on Terror.”
