بارعة علم الدين: هل يتجه السودان إلى طريق الديموقراطية أم الدكتاتورية/Baria Alamuddin: Does Sudan’s road ahead lead to democracy or anarchy?

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Does Sudan’s road ahead lead to democracy or anarchy?
بارعة علم الدين: هل يتجه السودان إلى طريق الديموقراطية أم الدكتاتورية
Baria Alamuddin/Arab News/May 05/2019

Having spent time in Sudan, I was captivated by the elation felt by protesters at removing the widely loathed Omar Al-Bashir after 30 years in power — but I also felt a heavy sense of trepidation. Looking across the region, it is difficult to identify blueprints for successful transition, though there are numerous templates for failure.

These protesters, a significant proportion of whom are courageous young women, remain in the streets because they fear their revolution could be a mirage. Yes, we are told that Bashir and his henchmen are in jail, but they have been put there by many of the same military figures who had underpinned this regime. Will free and fair elections occur, and will people be given a genuine say in the nature of the new governing system? Will investigations into regime abuses be sufficiently rigorous? Will Bashir eventually be escorted to The Hague?

The Muslim Brotherhood neither inspired nor led the 2011 Cairo uprising, yet they hijacked it by being the best-organized entity. Sudan’s Islamists similarly enjoy organizational muscle thanks to periods of proximity to the regime. This makes them widely disliked by demonstrators who attacked meetings of Islamist organizations. However, in a devout society, Islamists could fare better than urban, middle-class movements associated with the protests, which lack common goals beyond removal of the regime.

A worst-case scenario would be following Libya and Yemen into inter-factional conflict. Given Sudan’s size, ongoing insurgencies, and the weakness of civil society, such a danger is genuine. This could be exacerbated by foreign interference: During the 1990s, Tehran and Osama bin Laden were among the few friends of the pariah Bashir regime. Sudan was a conduit for smuggled Iranian arms destined for African rebels, terrorists, rogue states and Palestinian militants. Qatar and Turkey recently sought to meddle in Sudan, and Sudanese Islamists view them as potential patrons. Russia and China will also act to protect and expand their interests.

The odds are thus stacked against a happy ending for Sudan, and also for Algeria which is undergoing its own parallel transition. The “Arab Spring” was catastrophic for regional stability, exacerbated by hostile powers such as Iran in Bahrain and Syria. Tunisia is endlessly cited as a success, but a close look reveals a highly dysfunctional situation of chronic political and economic crises, stalled reforms, corruption and non-existent public confidence.

Along Europe’s southern shores, Libya and Tunisia could have played out very differently. The West’s rush to disengage from Libya after Gaddafi’s death was one of the most disgustingly shortsighted pieces of statecraft I ever witnessed. The West helped rebels destroy the regime — they should have stayed to pick up the pieces.

Sudanese are among the most generous-spirited of peoples, but to enjoy the fruits of their revolution they will require infinitely more than good intentions.

Western political scientists are often unbelievably ignorant about how democracies are constructed. Figures such as the French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy panglossianly propagated the criminally naïve impression that 2011 post-revolutionary states could sail off into blissful democratic futures. But cultivating institutions, civil society, democratic values, and enshrining checks and balances is a massively complex process. Economic turmoil and loss of investment and tourism revenue have fueled immense social volatility. Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia needed their own equivalent of the post-Second World War Marshall Plan; instead they were left to disintegrate.

The corrupt, brutal Gaddafi and Saleh regimes were truly repugnant, but we have painfully learned that even the worst governments are better than no government. When a governing system collapses into anarchy, it is impossibly tough to put the pieces back together — as the Americans found to their cost in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite glaring foreign policy failings, Barack Obama at least appeared to care about the consequences of his actions. His successor offers no such confidence, and Donald Trump’s private language reveals his contempt for, and incomprehension of, African and developing nations. European leaders follow his lead in shunning international responsibilities. Yet state collapse in Libya and Syria had extraordinarily destabilizing consequences for Europe, with panicked responses to refugee crises kicking open the door for the populist right’s ascendancy. Europe cannot afford to be passive observers and shoulder the cumulative ramifications of instability in Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia — combined with the extreme fragility of other sub-Saharan states such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, themselves plagued by extremist forces.

I will never forget traveling as a journalist with Bashir’s entourage as part of his 2010 election campaign and seeing the open contempt expressed toward voters: There were no realistic policies; just his usual belligerent rhetoric — and endless dancing. Bashir touted the International Criminal Court indictment as a war criminal as a badge of honor. Although independence for South Sudan was just months away, Bashir — as if in denial —never mentioned this when he rolled up in cities such as Juba and Malakal. South Sudan may remain in a protracted state of civil war, but at least Bashir is no longer around to stir the pot and bankroll insurgents.

Few protesters realize how precarious the road ahead of them will be and how desperately they require international support to prevent their revolution veering off course. GCC states have adopted a highly constructive approach to the uprising and already pledged $3bn; yet spiralling inflation, unaffordable subsidies and the virtual collapse of the banking system are just some of the structural crises a new leadership must address.

Sudanese are among the most generous-spirited of peoples, but to enjoy the fruits of their revolution they will require infinitely more than good intentions. They still have a mountain to climb in sidelining remnants of the Bashir regime, but it is then that the most difficult decisions begin. Nevertheless, we the international community have an historic opportunity to buck the region’s track record of failed revolutions and help make Sudan the glorious exception.

*Baria Alamuddin is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster in the Middle East and the UK. She is editor of the Media Services Syndicate and has interviewed numerous heads of state.