The Missing Link in the Debate about US Middle East Strategy
Middle East Briefing/April 30/16
The debate about a new US strategy in the Middle East, upon the change of guards in Washington, is often dominated by a distinct military perspective and a single focus on regional security defined in an excessively narrow terms. In the debate going on now we detect that foreign aid is not given its proper place. Furthermore we argue in favor of conceiving the term foreign aid in a totally different manner than the way it exists now. We believe that the way in which foreign aid programs are currently shaped resulted in placing this element at a lower place in the list of the elements of US strategy while it potentially represents a game changer in the quest for regional security.
But first we should lay down how we define foreign assistance. Foreign assistance in this approach means targeted programs to develop the productive forces in troubled countries. It is not handouts to this or that government. It is not assistance to enhance military to military ties. It is rather an encompassing term that targets various objectives: Security, social stability, governance, respect of international law and universal rights, fighting radicalism and good neighborhood behavior are, with varying degrees, a reflection not of wealth, but rather of how wealth is generated in any given society.
Enhancing the productive forces through expansion of targeted foreign aid could ultimately yield positive results in all those accounts. The foreign aid in our context is a globally coordinated effort to democratize the economies of several Arab countries through providing targeted assistance in sectors like small businesses, integrated small farming, small transportation projects, fish farming, education and health care. A dynamic local market creates its culture and increases awareness of individual rights, the rule of law and the need for effective governance. The current aid programs are hardly targeting a specific desirable social impact. This contributes to the dilemmas US strategists face when shaping their approach to the Middle East.
In the case of human rights violations, for example, we find that the opposition between working with allies on the one hand and how “democratic” those allies are on the other, has never been solved properly yet. People condemn working with, say, Arab governments which, in the views of many, do not respect human rights, only to find themselves with no other choice but working with the regimes they have just condemned. Often, the contradiction is presented as a strategic conflict between realism and idealism. As it is not solved, it may be the source of future conceptual errors in the part of officials and administrations. Furthermore, taking it as an irreconcilable contradiction, risks either ending up with making any defense of values and respect of international norms meaningless and ineffective, or threatening alliances and interests.
So far, the “solution” offered to this contradiction divides areas of relations with any ally and picks what fits a specific objective. During the Arab Spring, for example, the common argument was that the Spring provides a perfect solution to the dilemma. It promises building democratic regimes capable of contributing to an open and liberal world space and of respecting human rights, all the while not presenting the US with any strategic threat. Yet, the failure of the Arab Spring, changes in Washington’s priorities, and the administration pursue of what it considered US regional interests in the region paved the road to a disappointments, tension and misunderstandings.
Things evolved until the emergence of the Islamic State and its turn to violence and terrorism against far countries. This looked as a way out for those who could not find a proper rationale to shape a strategy in the Middle East. Now, the rationale presented itself readymade and clear-cut: Fight ISIL. In other words, fighting ISIL helped freeze the tiring search for a theoretical framework able to define the US strategy. It covered the real theoretical problems which need to be addressed. It provided an immediate goal that no one can dispute, hence makes the debate about those problems less urgent. But the problems are still standing before our eyes and still threaten deep confusion and splits in the future. It also threatens to make the US strategy more vulnerable to the ideological inclinations of future administrations, as much as it was during the Bush and Obama’s administrations.
Certain principles have been widely talked about in recent years stirring all kinds of disputes, yet without finding a conceptual framework that addresses both sides of the spectrum. They come clear once posed by specific questions. Is it the role of the US to “revolutionize” Middle East societies? To which extent should the US go in its quest to “spread democracy”? What should the US do when one of its allies use violence against their own people? Should the US act unilaterally in regional crisis? And how? What logic should underline force sizing in regional crisis? How could the US combine its values and its alliances? Should the US make the rise of terrorism a central issue in forming regional alliances? etc., etc.
The general frame which gathers all these issues is that of finding a force multiplier to bridge the gap between capabilities and mission. And the key to this force multiplier is obviously a regional “security clubs” so to speak. Yet, even this general concept has its problems. It does not address a good part of the legitimate questions just mentioned. In other words, it does not provide the conceptual framework that combines the two opposed views of “realists” vs. “idealists”. The missing element will remain missing so far as the screen has the existing dominant military dimension and narrow definition of security and the element of economic assistance is brushed aside as a long term shot. The military dimension should be only one component of the general strategy. The current dispersion in the map of tools-which should otherwise be combined to build a strategy-is very obvious. The reason is that while the military was active in debating and formulating a “general strategy”, the economic and cultural dimension of that strategy did not go through the same level of reflection and debate. The economic dimension in any strategy is mainly thought of in a passive form-that is as a punishment (sanctions-boycott-etc.). Furthermore it is perceived as a burden (how much will that cost us?). It is one underdeveloped tool that could provide, as it did in the post Second World War Europe, a powerful base to build alliances.
Clearly, time has changed and so did the US relative economic weight and mussels. But this means shaping the proper economic aid programs to fit today’s capabilities and means on the one hand, and play an important role in the US regional strategy on the other.
The naïve concept of “exported democracy” stems from a willingness to expand the zone of peace, respect for international law, and universal human rights. But Iraq and Libya tell us that military intervention achieved exactly the opposite, at a huge cost.
US strategy should move to give prominence to the economic missing link. The current tools in the US foreign aid programs show how this link was hardly developed in the last five decades. The US spent almost $23 billion in humanitarian assistance and $14 billion in foreign military assistance in 2013. Yet, wars, famine and crisis are abundant. The security situation in the region did not improve. In fact it deteriorated rapidly. The central problem here is that in the current political culture in the US, the word strategy is often interpreted in military terms. Once the debate on the military strategy reaches a conclusion, other tools like foreign aid are quickly “attached”, parallel to the military objectives, to make a mathematical addition which claims to serve the total strategy.
The concept of foreign aid has to be revolutionized and changed profoundly. Foreign aid is not a hand out to needy countries. It should rather be a plan to introduce specific social changes within those countries. A new global blueprint for the division of labor between various regions has to be debated. The Middle East is not socio-economically developed even if some of its countries are very rich. It is not wealth that counts. It is how wealth is generated. For generating wealth through development, innovation, education, work, and market forces shape all sides of social life be it culture, gender equality, view of minorities, political rights and proper governance. It is in the “how” that we will be talking about the social structure. And it is in the social structure that we will be talking about respect of universal human rights and international law, terrorism, democracy, governance, etc. Presumably, it is a new map of global division of labor that should present the foundation of a new concept of the term global security. While this should not be taken in opposition to the “force multiplier” of regional military alliances, the US strategy should focus first on how to develop the productive forces of troubled regions.
Developing productive capacities in a given country is based on a combination of advice, assistance, sharing expertise, a proper plan of integrating small business and other sectors, help in opening trade agreements between different countries, etc. The US role as a world leader would cease to be defined in military terms. Yet, this economic link will yield its fruits on the social stability of the given countries in the troubled regions.
Would this imply that the US has to pour massive amounts of money into those regions? Not at all. What it takes is a different understanding of the real roots of crisis in the world troubled regions and a different definition of the term global security. This should be followed by a collective global effort to develop the productive capacity of those regions. Developing the productive capacities is not synonym to foreign aid. These are two completely different concepts. In countries where the productive forces are not developed, the rule is that international laws, or any laws for that matter, are not respected. Even China today is different than the Cultural Revolution China. The “prescription” of international financial institutions has to be replaced by governments led plan to end the economic misery of most countries in the Middle East. It doesn’t matter that today many of the region’s governments do not have a defendable human rights record. At one point, changing their behavior would become inevitable, not due to foreign military intervention, but due to their own natural evolution. This point comes on the road, not to wealth, but to how this wealth is generated.
Security is not a military term. It is wider than that. The stagnant economies of troubled regions should be considered the primary threat to world security. These economies should be helped to move forward. The ignition system must become the core of US strategy in the Middle East. The US must lead an international effort to implement a plan to get the region out of its current futile cycle of wars, crisis and violence. To sum up, the foreign aid program has to be globalized, based on a global division of labor and a global effort to restart the region’s economies in a targeted way which expands the peoples participating in the economic free market sphere. This should be incorporated into the structure of the US strategy, all the while targeting it towards enhancing the productive forces within troubled countries. The current formula of foreign aid programs is not only not working, it camouflages any new concept in looking at the economic dimension as the missing link in the US strategy. This should not, however, be done on the expense of delaying the establishment of regional alliances based on burden sharing under the pretext of any idealist arguments.
Splits Inside the White House about Syria while the Road Forward is Clear to All
Middle East Briefing/April 30/16
Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, said Friday April 22, “The movement of any additional Russian military support into Syria would be inconsistent with our shared objective of getting a political process moving”. Russia has repositioned artillery near the city of Aleppo, several U.S. officials told Reuters. Despite withdrawing some fixed-wing aircrafts in March, Russia has also bolstered its forces in Syria with advanced helicopter gunships, and renewed airstrikes against moderate opposition groups, said U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity”, Reuters reported the same day. The report describes as well the deepening splits in the administration over Putin’s intentions in Syria.
But splits about what exactly? Isn’t it obvious that President Putin positioned himself from the start in a win-win spot? Why would any official in the White House, if he was in Putin’s shoe, be energized to find a political way out if both military options are more attractive than the proposed solutions? Why would he grant Washington’s illusions a free lunch? If he doesn’t, he will save his dime, and still gets what he wants. In other words, Assad is making progress on the ground, the Iranians conditioned their current relations with Moscow on Putin’s support to the Syrian dictator and Russia’s presence in Syria is “secured” so long as Assad is in power. Furthermore, if the ceasefire remains respected, the Russians are sitting tight in the West of Syria. To tip the picture, the political solution as proposed does not threat Russian presence in West Syria in any way. It is a win-win situation for Putin. Time for him to pick as he pleases. But could anyone tell us one good reason why Putin should sacrifice his ties with Iran and his comfortable position this for an uncertain result of an uncertain political process? Could anyone explain why should Mr. Putin be energized one way or the other? Even if Assad goes, according to the proposed political solution, the Russians will remain. Their interests are safe either way. They only gain Iran’s gratitude if they neglect Ben Rhodes’s warnings. And they do.
As we previously said in Middle East Briefing (April 18): unless Putin exacts a fair price elsewhere for his real cooperation in Syria, he would be a fool to give up voluntarily one inch in Syria. No, not for free, and he certainly isn’t a fool. He has his own agenda, which is perfectly normal, in other spots from Ukraine to Central Asia to East Europe. He wants something in return. Something to compensate for what he may pay to buy the Obama administration lunch in Syria.
As Putin’s price is a little high, from Washington perspective, Syria’s war will drag on. But this is not the point. The point is how the Obama administration approached the diplomatic process. It should have been based on a reading of how Putin thinks, not on begging him to cooperate or eloquently explaining to him the logical reasons why he should.
Indeed, there are common Russian-American objectives in Syria: Defeating ISIL and stabilizing the country. But while the moment, as we see it now, appears to provide common grounds between Moscow and the others, it is also the very moment when others are most vulnerable to miscalculations and deception. The promoted rationality which aims at explaining a specific position in the part of Russia may be merely a smokescreen to hide different Russian objectives, all the while as it provides deceptive explanations about Russia’s moves. It could be a very convincing smoke screen set to drag the others to Moscow’s calculus. It is important to see the individual interests built in any situation in objective light regardless of what is said or of promoted explanations even if they seem credible.
Any “normal” country, say as South Africa, has in a way or another, an interest in defeating ISIL. Yet, South Africa has no say in the situation we are talking about. Mutual interests is an abstract term. It is concretized at the moment there are actual leverages and actual interests for this or that country in the given situation. But these actions should be consistent with the final objectives at all the moments. Yet, President Putin does n’t seem to be consistent, in all his moves, with the general framework agreed upon with Secretary Kerry. He is helping destroy the ceasefire he himself negotiated with Kerry and said he approves. Positioning additional forces to take Aleppo proves that common objectives used by the Obama administration as an explanation of why it is working closely with Assad, was a Russian smokescreen all along.
Yet, either Putin is sincere or not is not the point and should not be made the point. In either case the element of a country’s individual interest gains its concrete weight proportionally to the country’s leverage within the concept of a collective approach. If a given country has no tools to shape and influence the course of joint actions, it would remain a spectator as much as South Africa is in the case of Syria. Therefore, the US should have worked harder on developing its own leverages in the Syrian crisis from the start. This would have marginalized the importance of Putin intentions and would have placed questions about his real objectives in a different context where the US has multiple choices, not only to plead its case in the Kremlin or be threatened to swallow “Assad has to go” and put its role in the current desperate corner we see now.
For the Obama administration, it is not “logical” that Assad remains in power as this would lead to the Arabs and the Turks providing the opposition with all they want to carry on the fight. It will not guarantee defeating ISIL or the stabilizing Syria or preventing any future emergence of another terrorist group. This is all fine. But President Putin does not see it this way. He believes that Assad can, through brutal force and barrel bombs, remain in power and do the job nevertheless. Why wouldn’t he move to adapt to the US position? Because he does n’t have to. Because if he moves along with the US he would risk his alliance with Tehran. Because in either case, Assad or no Assad, he was given by the US an advance commitment to preserve his individual interests in Syria the moment the US gave up on the moderate opposition and the moment it structured the diplomatic approach the way it did.
From the start, the Obama administration did not do anything to change the calculus on the ground to force Putin or Assad to see it differently. The administration did not even see that Putin might interfere heavy handedly in Syria to force the American to pay him a price somewhere else in the world, and to solidify his ties with Iran. Putin was actively multiplying his leverage in Syria which was totally logical. What wasn’t is the long speeches in Washington justifying why the administration refused, for five years, many reasonable proposals to increase its own leverage there. This ultimately led to Administration officials knocking on the doors of the Kremlin to plead their case or losing sleep to try to figure out Putin’s real intentions.
Yet, we have the National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, resisting any serious step to change the calculus on the ground. As Reuters told us: “Other officials, including National Security Advisor Susan Rice, have vetoed any significant escalation of U.S. involvement in Syria”, a senior official told the news service. “Rice is the fly in the ointment, said a person familiar with the internal debate”, the agency added. But is the fly really Rice or President Obama? The President said he is faced with the following dilemma: If he helps the opposition, he will be engaged in a proxy war with Russia. But if he doesn’t, Putin will further ridicule Washington’s policies in the Middle East and further expand Russia’s influence there. Yet the question here is: Why does the President see assistance to the opposition as a proxy war against Russia? Putin helps Assad bombs groups which receive assistance from the US, as the White House repeatedly warned last fall. Isn’t this an involvement in a proxy war against the US? By stating that the US doesn’t want to be engaged in a proxy war against the Russians, the President gives the impression that he is struggling to find an acceptable explanation for a policy he chose already. It is a “post festum” rhetoric.
Rhetoric aside, the configuration on the ground is clear, and Washington still has five minutes to midnight. The Obama administration must arm carefully vetted groups all the while devising mechanisms to put the brakes on their movement when necessary by keeping strong channels within any group. Allies can help, but the US still has to keep “its own” and exclusive channels. Qualitative arms should be accounted for every hour of the day. Use of such arms should be cleared, at least in general principles, beforehand.
There is no point in embalming the Geneva peace process. James Baker allegedly said to a reluctant Israeli PM Yitzhak Shamir during the preparations for Madrid Conference of 1991 “You know how to get in touch. Call us if you need us. Good Bye”. But those were the days my friends. The US Knew what should be done and did it. Now, Secretary Kerry should say the same to both Sergei Lavrov and Bashar Al Assad instead of trying single handedly to save a hopeless administration’s policy. The US should go full steam ahead with assisting moderate opposition until the point where Assad, Iran and Mr. Putin accept a reasonable political deal that preserves the Syrian State and stops the daily blood bath. We reiterated multiple times in the past what is already known to everyone: You cannot reach a reasonable political solution unless the balance of power on the ground favors a reasonable political solution. For those who say that they had to try to stop the death of innocent civilians we would say that what is essential is not trying, but it is how you try. Sometimes trying to stop a tragedy leads to exacerbating it. President Obama told us that he tried to stop a tragedy in Benghazi in March 2011. Well, the tragedy now is the situation in all of Libya, including Benghazi.
The moment is not ripe for a favorable political solution in Syria yet.
