Mona Alami: What the Aleppo offensive hides/MEB: Russian Intervention in Syria Boosting Iranian Hardliners/Shlomi Eldar:Is Palestinian public leaving its leadership behind?

Russian Intervention in Syria Boosting Iranian Hardliners
Middle East Briefing/October 24/14
http://mebriefing.com/?p=1991&utm_source=MEB+VOL+-+III_+Issue+100+October+2015&utm_campaign=VOL+III+-+Issue+100&utm_medium=email
The Russian military deployments in Syria have already had repercussions across the region, and particularly inside Iran. Hardline factions, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with a segment of the Iranian clergy, have jumped on the false assumption that the Russian intervention will “save Bashar Assad,” and, as the result, have moved to shut down any efforts to build upon the P5+1 agreements to deepen cooperation with the United States and Europe. This may prove to be a tremendous missed opportunity and could lead to serious backlash against Tehran. Reflecting these internal shifts within the Iranian power structure, Supreme Leader Khamenei publicly announced recently that there would be no efforts to broaden the cooperation with the United States and the West. He shut off the channels of discussion between Foreign Minister Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry. Zarif was internally reprimanded for the impromptu hand-shake with US President Barack Obama during the United Nations General Assembly proceedings in New York City in late September. The Obama Administration has taken note of these power shifts in Tehran, and the President ordered a slow-down in the lifting of US sanctions, which will now be held off until late January 2016 at the earliest. The top leadership of the Quds Brigade of the IRGC, including its commander, Gen. Soleimani, has concluded that the Russian intervention in Syria is a “game changer.” While there have been some short-term shifts in the situation on the ground in Syria, these changes are likely to be short-lived. US estimates are that Iran would have to deploy 15,000-20,000 troops at minimum to genuinely alter the Syria situation, and that is not feasible, given the demands on Iran’s forces in Iraq, and the long lead time before the Iranian economy benefits from the lifting of sanctions. Were Iran to take further actions in league with Russia and Hezbollah in Syria, it would almost certainly lead to new US Congressional sanctions, no longer linked to the Iranian nuclear program, but tied to Iran’s destabilizing actions against neighboring Arab states. Foreign Minister Zarif and other officials who have maintained channels of communication with the US and other Western powers have been given orders to halt all those channels—unless they are approved in advance by Khamenei. If the Iranian situation continues to tilt in favor of the hardliners, due to the false hopes about the Russian actions in Syria, this will feed the overall sectarian dynamic in the region. The Russian bombing campaign in Syria, along with the recent deployment of 1,000 fresh Iranian IRGC troops, is already driving rival Sunni rebel factions to begin talks on joint operations and even mergers. A European proposal, endorsed by the Obama Administration, calls for an “interested parties” meeting on Syria, to include the United States, Russia, European powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan. In principle, Iran could have been included in the proposal, which is now being studied in Moscow. However, at the recommendation of John Kerry, Iran was kept out of the proposed consultations, out of fear that, with Zarif, for the time being sidelined, it would only further strengthen the hand of the radical factions in Iran that are banking on a Russian military victory in Syria.

What the Aleppo offensive hides
Mona Alami/Al-Monitor/October 24/15
The much-touted attack on Aleppo launched on Oct. 16 has been dovetailed by regime advances in the southern rural areas of Syria. Yet the takeover of the largest Syrian city may prove to be a long and costly battle that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime cannot afford, despite Russian air support. In addition, it may not be the regime’s first priority, as its forces are eyeing supply routes on the city’s southern flank.Thousands of Shiite militiamen were deployed on Oct. 19 in the Aleppo region under the command of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, from Iran’s elite Quds Force, in an attempt to recapture Aleppo, as reported by The Washington Post quoting officials from three Iraqi militias. The Iraqi Shiite militia, Kataib Hezbollah, has sent approximately 1,000 fighters from Iraq, who are fighting alongside 2,000 members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “The control of Aleppo is essential to President Assad’s national legitimacy. Syria was created after the First World War by the union of the provinces of Aleppo and Damascus. Losing Aleppo would mean for Assad that he is the president of half the country. Strategically, Aleppo is vital to regaining the northwest [the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo] and the control of the Turkish border, directly or via the Kurds,” Syria expert Fabrice Balanche, from the Washington Institute for Near East policy, told Al-Monitor.
The battle for Aleppo has been witnessing ebbs and flows for the last three years. The Syrian army was able to lift the siege of Aleppo in spring 2013 and patiently encircled rebels in the eastern districts. In February 2015, its attempt to cut the last road linking Aleppo to eastern Turkey resulted in failure, with rebels reinforcing their positions, explained Balanche. The city is currently divided between regime forces and the opposition, the first occupying the western flank of the city, specifically strategic locations such as the Military Academy, Keliat al Madfaiya (Canon Academy) and the Air Force Academy, according to activist Ahmad, speaking to Al-Monitor from Aleppo. The opposition controls around 60% of the city and is run by two different operating rooms, according to Col. Abdel Jabbar al-Okaidi from the Free Syrian Army. The first operating room is that of Fatah Halab (Conquest of Aleppo) in Aleppo, which includes more than 15 factions that have assembled around it, including the al-Sham Front, Nur al-Din Zanki, al-Safwa Brigade, Faylaq al-Sham, Fastaqim Kama Umirt, the Dawn of the Caliphate Brigades, Sultan Murad and Battalion 16.
The second operating room of Ansar al-Sharia is comprised of Jabhat al-Nusra, Jund al-Aqsa, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Jaish al-Sunna and Ajnad al-Sham.
“Coordination between the two operating rooms is lacking, and factions within Ansar al-Sharia cooperate with Fatah Halab on an individual level mostly, with Jabhat al-Nusra playing a marginal role,” Col. Hassan Hamadeh from Brigade 101 told Al-Monitor. While relations between opposing rebel groups are often wanting, recent Russian strikes have somewhat improved cooperation in certain cases between rival groups within the opposition. Russian strikes and regime forces are currently focusing on the southern countryside, with the brunt of the battle taking place from Jabal Azzan to the city’s southern outskirts, according to Ahmad. “The fighters’ spirits remain high despite the Russian onslaught, as rebels have been able to resist and cause losses among regime forces. Russian strikes are thankfully far from being precise, which is to our advantage,” Okaidi said. In addition, rebels in that region said they had received new supplies of US-made anti-tank missiles from states opposed to President Assad since the start of the offensive last week. Rebels from three groups including the Sultan Murad group fighting in the Aleppo area told Reuters about the delivery of the US-made TOW missiles, adding they were now well stocked. TOW missiles are the most potent weapons against regime tanks.
According to Ahmad, the southern front remains the region’s weakest link, as it has a lower military presence of opposition groups. The region’s town of Al-Eis also bears strategic importance. “It is located on the supply route between Hama and Aleppo and overlooks the Aleppo-Damascus road,” said Hamadeh. Russian strikes are not only facilitating regime advances on the southern front as rebels are also staving off Islamic State (IS) gains on their northern flank. A recent report by the Institute for the Study of War highlighted that the terror organization was benefiting from Russia’s strikes on the Syrian opposition. Oct. 9 witnessed the largest advance since August 2015 by IS against rebels in northeastern Syria. “The Syrian regime and IS have historically leveraged one another’s offensives in order to advance against rebel forces in the northern Aleppo countryside. Both IS and the regime will likely capitalize on the effects of Russian airstrikes on rebels,” according to the report. Early this week, the regime had advanced even farther north to capture a sprawling cement plant from IS. Regime forces are clenching a closing fist around Aleppo city, with the newly captured villages and other facilities in the northeastern Aleppo countryside part of an apparent drive northwest.
According to Hamadeh, this area would be the next target of the regime, which is attempting to link Aleppo to the pro-regime Shiite villages of Nubl and al-Zahra in the Aleppo countryside that have been encircled by rebels for three years now. For now, the conquest of the northern capital appears to remain on the back burner, as Aleppo sources believe that the battle for Aleppo is far from easy due to the size of the city, the remaining large civilian population and the multitude of players.”The city is surrounded by rebel Jabhat al-Nusra in the west and IS in the east. The city is also located only 50 kilometers [31 miles] from Turkey, from which rebels receive substantial logistical support. One can hardly imagine that the Syrian army can retake Aleppo completely without control of the Turkish-Syrian border,” Balanche said.

Is Palestinian public leaving its leadership behind?
Shlomi Eldar/Al-Monitor/October 24/15
In the wake of the Oct. 1 attack in Samaria, where Naama and Eitam Henkin were murdered — after which the current wave of terror in Israel broke out — I held talks with several senior Palestinian security officials as well as with a host of veteran Palestinian journalists from the volatile city of Hebron. Everyone was certain beyond any shadow of a doubt that despite the swelling frustration and despair in the West Bank, the people were too weary to embark on a third intifada. One senior Palestinian Authority official told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “If [President] Mahmoud Abbas doesn’t want an intifada, there won’t be an intifada.” He was basing himself on the assumption that even if the Palestinians do not like Abbas, the security agencies and the Palestinian establishment have the ground under their firm control. Appearing to make sense and sounding substantiated, those arguments were cited in Al-Monitor’s piece titled “Will there be a third intifada?”
Today, in the wake of three very bloody weeks and dozens of attacks and attempted attacks it is abundantly clear that the people on the ground are speaking a different language and do not adhere to the wishes of senior PA officials who have pulled out all the stops to avert a violent uprising. Indeed, in contrast to the second intifada, there are no mass demonstrations throughout the West Bank but rather a small number of confined clashes with Israel Defense Forces troops at flash points. However, the number of terrorists who committed stabbing or vehicular attacks this past month is similar to the number of attacks during the entire second intifada, which was instigated and supported by the Palestinian organizations.
Most of the perpetrators of the stabbing attacks hail from East Jerusalem, yet their actions inspire young people from the West Bank. As a result, a rise in violence across the Green Line has been observed in recent days. Despite feeling confident about their level of control, senior political and security PA officials now realize that they were wrong not only in this assessment, but also about the assumption that the Palestinian public heeds the calls of Abbas. Even in their most pessimistic assessments, they did not foresee an intifada erupting before their eyes and the Palestinian public leaving them behind.
On Oct. 21, Al-Monitor contributor Hazem Balousha wrote an article explaining why Hamas wants an intifada. A source in the organization told Balousha that the movement was interested in an uprising in the West Bank but would rather see it conducted without the movement’s involvement. The argument the source cited was that Hamas was temporarily curtailing its armed activities to avoid an Israeli crackdown on the nascent intifada. Yet, saying “curtail its armed actions temporarily” is a baseless statement because since the end of Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, Hamas has not initiated any offensive actions against Israel. Furthermore, it has actually been taking vigorous action against radical elements in Gaza that are trying to fire rockets at Israel.
Hamas, as has been extensively reported, is more interested in having a long-term agreement with Israel than engaging in another armed conflict, which could bring about the movement’s collapse. This is the reason why the organization pushes for an intifada but does not want to take part in it.
Hamas finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, if its militants actively join the brewing intifada, Israel will strike them mercilessly. On the other, as a resistance movement, it cannot afford to lag behind and lose its status as the champion of the armed struggle against Israel. The solution chosen is to speak in favor of an intifada and make blustery speeches against Israel while letting others do the work.
Senior PA officials, too, are in a bind, yet their situation is far more complex and dangerous. By now everyone understands that the PA has lost touch with the public. If Abbas’ administration tries to join the cycle of violence — even if only partially — Israel could crush the PA. By contrast, if senior PA officials try to suppress Palestinian violence, they will have to pay a stiff personal and political price. Despite the fact that the uprising is indeed aimed at Israel, it is to a great extent also a loud and clear call of defiance against the PA, its senior officials and activists, but mainly against Abbas. This week, I called a number of senior Fatah and PA officials to hear their assessments and analyses of the situation. For the first time in many years, they all dodged me, giving a variety of excuses. One senior PA official told me, rather amusingly, “At this time I do not want to talk about politics, but if you would like to talk about other things, be my guest.”
Whereas Hamas leaders have found a middle-of-the-road approach and are taking part in the current uprising through words only, PA leaders cannot afford to do even that much. Fatah militants and Tanzim (Fatah’s armed militia) leaders have tried organizing demonstrations in the West Bank, but very quickly had to toe Abbas’ line and cease those efforts. On Oct. 11, Abbas met with Tanzim chiefs, imploring them to calm the atmosphere. PA officials understand full well that if the situation shifts from stabbing attacks by so-called lone wolves to mass demonstrations and full-blown clashes, the PA will descend into chaos whose outcome nobody can predict. What this means — and this concern is shared by senior Palestinian political and security officials alike — is that the PA could collapse and they could lose their jobs, influence and standing and be replaced by a new, grassroots leadership. Abbas’ associates are concerned that all they will be remembered for by their own people is security cooperation with Israel, or as they are derisively known in the territories, “ta’amul” — collaborators. The largest Palestinian national movement — Fatah — finds itself in one of its greatest crises. Its leaders and activists understand that any action they take has serious consequences. Abbas, Saeb Erekat and Jibril Rajoub as well as Tanzim leaders are trying to curb the escalation and get the situation under control, while minimizing the damage to their image in the eyes of the Palestinian public. If they fail, this could herald the end of the Fatah movement, at least in its present format.