Russia Faces Israel Deconfliction Dilemma
Middle East Briefing/October 10/15
The Netanyahu government in Israel is deeply disturbed by the unfolding situation in Syria and the lack of a solid understanding with Russia over how to deal with the ongoing threat from Hezbollah and Hamas. On Tuesday, Oct. 6, a Russian military delegation, led by Deputy Chief of Staff Nikolai Bogdanovsky, arrived in Israel to continue talks that began last month in Moscow, when Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot visited the Russian capital to confer with President Vladimir Putin and Valery Gerasimov.
While the Russians and Israelis announced they would establish a working group at the general staff level, significant disagreements remained after the Moscow talks, and there is skepticism that the issues have been resolved during the Russian delegation’s visit to Israel.
In the Moscow talks, Netanyahu sought Russian approval for Israel to continue military operations inside Syrian territory, whenever Israel got intelligence on weapons convoys moving towards the Lebanese border. The Syrian route is one of the primary channels for the smuggling of Iranian weapons into Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Putin outright rejected Israel’s blanket authorization to continue air operations against Hezbollah inside Syrian territory. He pledged, instead, that Russia would not permit Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel from inside Syria and would not permit Russian weapons to be turned over to Hezbollah. This left an enormous gap between the Israeli demands and the Russian promises. Most of the weapons obtained by Hezbollah and Hamas come from Iran, not Russia. Syria is known to be the storage depot for components of advanced rockets, which are smuggled into Lebanon and Gaza and are then assembled.
In the second round of negotiations in Israel, Netanyahu and the IDF leadership made clear that they consider it a high national security priority to have a free hand to block weapons smuggling into Lebanon and Gaza from Syria. Israel will not accept any deal that falls short of ironclad promises that the smuggling routes will be verifiably shut down.
Israel has already conducted reconnaissance sorties into airspace along the Syrian-Lebanese border, profiling for weak spots that can be penetrated. In one instance, Russian MIGs chased Israeli F-16s out.
Pentagon planners in Washington know that the deconfliction deal between Russia and Israel is a vital element of the overall conflict-avoidance architecture now being put in place, and they are deeply worried that the Israel-Russia dispute can blow apart the entire situation, regardless of the level of cooperation achieved between the US and Russian militaries. There is no doubt among Washington national security planners that Israel will take whatever actions it deems necessary to prevent the expansion of Hezbollah and Hamas capabilities to attack Israel with devastating rocket and missile assaults.
Among the proposals on the table when the Russian delegation sat down with IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan and top officials from Israeli military intelligence and the IDF Air Force: Israel would provide Russia with actionable intelligence against rebel forces in Syria, in return for permission for the IDF to carry out bombing runs against Hezbollah arms caravans crossing Syrian territory into Lebanon. Israel would provide advance warning to Russian military officials before launching any such actions.
From Israel’s standpoint, such a deal would be a win-win proposition. It would give Israel a leg up on Iran, as a source of intelligence for Russia’s military operations inside Syria, and it would put pressure on Russia to block Hezbollah from conducting any actions against Israel for the duration of the Russian military operations inside Syria. Israel would be a de facto stakeholder in the future of Syria, whatever the outcome of the new phase of combat and diplomacy.
From the Russian standpoint, such a deal would mean that Israel is neutralized as a border factor. In order to combat what all Israeli factions view as the greatest threat—Iran and Hezbollah—Israel had been providing limited support to some Syrian rebel factions, including some units affiliated with the Nusra Front, to keep Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps forces out of the border region. Israel could move to take control over larger portions of the Golan Heights as part of an enhanced security buffer zone.
Russian-Israeli relations have always been close (historically, the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the State of Israel). But in their Moscow talks, Putin made clear to Netanyahu that the one million-plus Israeli citizens of Russian descent are a voting bloc that he can influence. Avigdor Lieberman, who was once a close Netanyahu ally, serving as his chief of staff and later as his foreign minister, has broken from the Likud leader and could, at some point, help bring Netanyahu down.
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