Detailed Lebanese & Lebanese Related LCCC English New Bulletin For November 10/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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The league of culture in Baghdad
Mashari Althaydi/Al Arabiya/November 09/18
One of the disadvantages of sectarian quotas in ministries and governmental posts is that bad models hold positions that have nothing to do with them, and the public interest is preyed on in favor of the personal interest. In this case, it’s the interest of a party or several parties that monopolize the representation of a sect since the society is only looked at and considered from a sectarian angle. The ministries of defense, interior, finance and foreign affairs are usually the sovereign ministries, and sometimes they also include the ministries of energy, oil and public works depending on the importance of each portfolio in the country that’s stricken with sectarian calculations. This is happening in Baghdad, the city of civilization and culture, the Baghdad of Al-Jahiz, Abu Nuwas, Tawhidi and Al-Ma’mun. Baghdad is thus being deprived of its civilization
Losing Baghdad
This can be seen when a cadre from the Lebanese Hezbollah holds the tourism ministry, for instance! Or to have a member of the Iraqi League of the Righteous – compared to the latter, Hezbollah is a party that resembles the Green Party that protects the environment – hold the culture ministry in Iraq!
In an article published in the Iraqi Al-Mada newspaper, Iraqi writer Ali al-Sarray sadly noted this reality amid the debates to form the Iraqi cabinet under the leadership of Adil Abdul Mahdi. He quoted Abdul Ameer Ottiban, an MP representing the League of the Righteous movement, as saying: “The ministry of culture is our right. We are the ones who taught people and the world culture…and how to act and to be a role model.”Sarray adds in bitter irony: “In order for the quote not to be out of context, (I must note) that the MP was angrily responding to Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Nineveh, who objected to giving (a party that carries arms) the portfolio of culture.”This is happening in Baghdad, the city of civilization and culture, the Baghdad of Al-Jahiz, Abu Nuwas, Tawhidi and Al-Ma’mun. Baghdad is thus being deprived of its civilization.
This is Iraq, and this is Baghdad and this fate of civilization after culture became a “prey” granted to a group that fights intellect, art and life.

Russian special forces land in S. Syria. US Raptors “deter” Syrian, Iranian, Russian combat aircraft
القوات الخاصة الروسية تتمركز في جنوب سوريا. وطائرات "رابتور" الأميركية "تردع" الطائرات المقاتلة السورية والإيرانية والروسية
DEBKAfile/November 09/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/68793/debkafile-russian-special-forces-land-in-s-syria-us-raptors-deter-syrian-iranian-russian-combat-aircraft-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84/
Unfolding Russian, US and Israeli military steps are raising the big power stakes in Syria on the eve of a Trump-Putin summit, DEBKAfile’s military sources report. Russian special forces have arrived and been attached to the Syrian military command in the southern Al-Safa region east of the Druze town of Sweida – officially as “advisers” to the Syrian offensive against ISIS, and markers of Islamist targets for Russian air strikes. Russia pulled those units out in June after helping Bashar Assad’s army capture rebel-held territory on Israel’s Golan and Jordan’s borders. Now, the Russians are attached to the Syrian Army’s elite 42nd Brigade-Ghiath Forces of the 4th Division.
DEBKAfile: The insertion of Russian units into this flashpoint border area stokes military tensions which are already rising in anticipation of the resumption of Israel’s air operations over Syria after a six-week pause. This became more likely after President Donald Trump’s special envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey, said: “Russia has been permissive, in consultation with the Israelis, about Israeli strikes against Iranian targets inside Syria, We certainly hope that that permissive approach will continue” after the deployment of new Russian S-300 air defense systems in Syria.
Jeffrey addressed this message to Moscow on Monday, Nov. 7, just one day after the Pentagon disclosed that US Air Force F-22 Raptors had recently completed their first “combat surge” in operations over Syria and, in doing so, “deterred 587 enemy” Syrian, Iranian and Russian combat aircraft in the crowded skies there. “The F-22s flew deep into Syrian territory,” said the Pentagon communique, “facing both enemy fighters and surface-to-air missiles systems.”
The US overflights therefore took place in the face of the Russian S-300s emplaced in Syria. It was the first time that the US Defense Department had described the mission of US stealth aircraft operations in Syria as deterrence against combined Syrian, Russian and Iranian forces. Until now it was defined as a counter-terror operation against ISIS.
While the F-22s’ “combat surge” over Syria was said to have been “maximized over a three-day period,” no date was offered; nor was the area covered disclosed. In the light of the Pentagon’s disclosure, James Jeffrey’s appeal to Moscow to remain “permissive” in the face of Israel air strikes in Syria takes on the aspect of a warning that US Raptors will henceforth cover Israeli’s aerial operations over Syria.
DEBKAfile’s military sources add: This week, Russia boosted its eastern Mediterranean fleet opposite the Syrian coast. On Thursday, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Admiral Makarov frigate with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles and Admiral Grigorovich passed through the Bosporus. They are to join the Admiral Essen and Pytlivy frigates, the landing ship Nikolai Filchenkov and the Vishny Volochek missile corvette, which were already in place.
The Syrian scene is clearly heating up and all the parties are maneuvering for advantageous positions just two days before Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Paris on the sidelines of events marking the World War 1 armistice centenary.

New Polls: West Bankers Oppose Both Armed Revolt and U.S. Talks
David Pollock/The Washington Institute/November 09/18
Two fresh public opinion polls taken in October paint a strikingly mixed picture of popular attitudes among the roughly 2.5 million Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The biggest surprise is that on many peace process issues, these Palestinians voice a harder political line than do their kinfolk in Gaza (see my previous post, "Most Gazans Want Israeli Jobs, Not Hamas Mobs"). Only one-quarter of West Bankers want to resume diplomatic discussions with the United States aimed at a peaceful response to their problems, though on the other hand just one-quarter say they want "armed struggle" against Israel now.For U.S. policymakers, the implications of these findings are clear. Pressing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to come back to the table, let alone to make concessions, would have precious little popular resonance in the West Bank and could even backfire. But apprehension over an explosion of mass anger in that territory is probably also misguided. Instead, popular attitudes are surprisingly more receptive to practical U.S. economic interventions in Gaza; perhaps this is where the most urgent U.S. efforts should be concentrated.
The rejection by most West Bankers of violent resistance against Israel is in line with their current personal priorities. The vast majority say their top priority is either “having a good family life” (49%) or “making enough income to live comfortably” (38%), rather than “working to establish a Palestinian state” (11%). Even as a second priority, just 23% pick that political option.
For progress toward their national goals, most West Bankers prefer “peaceful resistance,” international recognition, or even negotiations with Israel—if the latter offers some concessions first. The top three picks in that category, each with one-quarter of the responses, are: build a highway for West Bankers to bypass the Jerusalem checkpoints; stop building settlements beyond the wall; or stop settler violence. By comparison, releasing prisoners or “sharing Jerusalem as a capital” have dropped lower on this list of desired gestures of Israeli goodwill.
Significantly, one other Palestinian political option that attracts great popular support, though rarely if ever polled before, is the suggestion to “work more closely politically with Palestinians inside the 1948 lines.” In the two separate new polls reported here, three-quarters of West Bankers endorse this position, including nearly a third who say it would have “very positive” results. Given the recent nationalist political activism among Israel’s roughly 2 million Arab citizens, nearly equal in numbers to their counterparts just across the (largely imaginary) Green Line in the West Bank, this is an orientation that bears closer examination in future surveys and other analysis.
As for an American role, the rejection of talks with the United States is in line with low Palestinian expectations regarding that approach. A mere 11% think it likely that President Trump “will make a serious effort to help solve the Palestinian problem.” Asked what they would most like the United States to do for them, half pick “stay out of Palestinian and Mideast affairs altogether” (Among Gazans, in sharp contrast, just 16% are interested in this option). A distant second place goes to “put pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians,” with 22% of West Bankers selecting this option.
Alongside these negative attitudes, awareness of recent U.S. pressure seems high. Three-quarters say they have heard at least a fair amount about the funding cutoff for the UN Relief and Works Agency (though just 18% think this will yield any changes). Even more (82%) know about the U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem. The majority also say they have heard about closing the PLO office in Washington. It must be noted, however, that 36% say they have heard more than a little about “the start of official American negotiations with Hamas”—an entirely fictitious prompt, and one not actually even rumored lately, but used as a “control variable” for this question.
On another all-too-real issue, less than half (43%) claim to be familiar with the Taylor Force Act, which cuts funding to the PA because of its payments to convicted terrorists. Nevertheless, on that very controversial issue, an equally and unexpectedly large proportion agree that the government “should give prisoners’ families normal social benefits like everybody else—not extra payments based on their sentences or armed operations.” This confirms the highly counterintuitive finding first reported in a previous poll from May 2017.
On a tactical level, again surprisingly, West Bank views are also significantly more militant than Gazan views. For example, just 36% of West Bankers want Israeli firms to provide more jobs in their territory. Somewhat more (42%), but still a minority, want “direct personal contacts and dialogue with Israelis, to support those who want peace.”
More ominously, at least the same proportion in one of our latest polls favor “ending security coordination with Israel.” Findings from the other poll, where fewer respondents volunteered a “don’t know” response, are even worse: 63% say that stopping this security coordination would have at least a “somewhat positive” effect.
Notably, too, West Bank attitudes toward their own government in Ramallah are skeptical at best. Both polls show a solid majority (62-67%) saying, in opposition to current PA practice, that Hamas “should be allowed to operate politically in the West Bank in a free and open fashion.” Asked about the PA’s future prospects, only 20% expect it to remain in power more or less as it is today. The remainder are divided among a variety of other prognoses: either anarchy, or else greater control of the West Bank by Hamas, by local authorities, or even by Israel. Nevertheless, a mere 21% of West Bankers would favor “dissolving the PA and forcing Israel to take over full responsibility” for the entire territory.
The findings discussed in this article come from two independent, face-to-face surveys conducted during the period October 3-19 by highly respected Palestinian pollsters based in Ramallah and Beit Sahour. Both used standard geographic probability techniques, interviewing representative samples of 732 and 500 randomly selected respondents, respectively. Full methodological details are available on request.
**David Pollock is the Bernstein Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on regional political dynamics and related issues.