Detailed Lebanese & Lebanese Related LCCC English New Bulletin For November 05/2018
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Why Do Middle Eastern Refugees Vandalize Christian Structures?
الصحافي التركي بمراك بكديل: لماذا يخرب اللاجئون الشرق أوسطيون المؤسسات المسيحية االأوربية
Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/November 04/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/68655/burak-bekdilwhy-do-middle-eastern-refugees-vandalize-christian-structures-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A8%D9%83/
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13195/refugees-vandalism
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has often argued that Christian Europe should admit more Muslim refugees.
"I'll tell you strictly Muslim-to-Muslim. These (European social workers) are funny. I don't know why on earth they are in love with a Muslim cause that even we Muslims despise." — Syrian migrant to the author, Lesbos, Greece.
"The Syrian refugee crisis in lands stretching from the Middle East into the heart of Europe is another episode in a grandiose, multi-faceted Middle Eastern dilemma: Muslims in this part of the world view the Christian West as 'evil;' yet they know Christian lands are the most decent places to live economically and politically." — Burak Bekdil, 2015.
The local population on the Greek island of Lesbos has been extremely helpful to all Muslim migrants, but recent clashes there show the more realistic side of the Muslim immigration into Christian lands. Pictured: Pope Francis meets migrants at the Moria migrant camp on Lesbos, April 16, 2016. (Photo by Andrea Bonetti/Greek Prime Minister's Office via Getty Images)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September, launched a scathing attack on the European Union. He accused the EU of having not done enough to support the refugees and claimed that the EU should pay Turkey more than it pledged (three billion euros).
Erdoğan has often argued that Christian Europe should admit more Muslim refugees. In a 2016 speech, he angrily threatened to open the floodgates of migrants into Europe again (in 2015 alone, three quarters of a million migrants passed through Turkey on their way to Europe).
Is Erdoğan using the mostly Syrian migrants as a bargaining chip to recalibrate his country's failed admission to the EU? Is he simply carpet-trading by trying to maximize the amount of European money coming as aid into Turkey? No doubt, but not only that. His Islamist ideology dictates that the number of Muslims living in all corners of the Old Continent should one day herald a demographic victory for Islam.
"Occupying infidel lands" by the force of sword was an Ottoman idea. Occupying infidel lands through demographics is one of the features of post-modern Islamism, as Muslim nations, unlike the Ottoman Empire, lack the military might needed for military invasion.
Recent events on the Greek island of Lesbos, where the welcoming local population has been extremely helpful to all Muslim migrants, show the more realistic side of the Muslim immigration into Christian lands. Even Pope Francis visited the mostly Syrian migrants in two camps on the island of Lesbos in April 2016 to express his solidarity with them and raise awareness regarding their plight.
In April, however, serious clashes between migrants and locals were reported in the main square of Mytilene, the chief port town of Lesbos. For about a week, migrants occupied the main square to protest their conditions. The demonstrations first sparked the anger of locals, and then some far-right groups who wanted the square cleared.
The clashes were followed by more serious news. A television report by Deutsche Welle claimed that criminal gangs of Syrians sympathetic to the Islamic State (ISIS) had established a reign of terror in the Moria migrant camp on Lesbos. The report, partly shot in secret, showed pro-ISIS slogans on the walls of the overcrowded camp.
Apparently, it was not only the inhumane conditions at the Moria camp about which the migrants felt sick. Unidentified migrant groups vandalized a crucifix on Lesbos. Only a few days later, and in a second act of desecrating Orthodox symbols, extremist Muslims on the island vandalized and destroyed a small proskinitari (a small shrine that holds an icon).
This much tension on an otherwise peaceful Greek island does not happen without a reason. In 2017, a Syrian migrant on Lesbos told this author, "I'll tell you strictly Muslim-to-Muslim. These [European social workers] are funny. I don't know why on earth they are in love with a Muslim cause that even we Muslims despise."
The same year on the same island to the same author, an Afghan said, "One day, we good Muslims will conquer their infidel lands."
At the start of the refugee crisis in 2015, you can read in this journal:
"The Syrian refugee crisis in lands stretching from the Middle East into the heart of Europe is another episode in a grandiose, multi-faceted Middle Eastern dilemma: Muslims in this part of the world view the Christian West as 'evil;' yet they know Christian lands are the most decent places to live economically and politically. Wealthy Arab states rigidly turn their back on the plight of fellow Muslims who are in need of a helping hand; and Islamist hypocrites blame it all on the West."
Three years later, it is truer than ever.
**Burak Bekdil, one of Turkey's leading journalists, was recently fired from the country's most noted newspaper after 29 years, for writing in Gatestone what is taking place in Turkey. He is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Tale of a Christian Mother in a Non-Christian Land
د. ماجد ربيزاده: قصة أم مسيحية في بلد غير مسيحي
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/November 04/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/68650/dr-majid-rafizadeh-tale-of-a-christian-mother-in-a-non-christian-land-%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A/
It is time for the international community and human rights groups to turn their focus on the plight of these children, held hostage by a faith they are never given an option to choose.
Everyone should be free to practice any faith he or she desires without threats, without fear that their children will be tormented and ultimately executed for their beliefs.
One can only hope that one day this will be true for her family, and the multitudes of other families faced with the same oppression.
The Christian mother said it had all started out as a young woman might hope: with romance. She had fallen in love with a Muslim man and was certain that she wanted to spend the rest of her life with him. She moved with him to his country, a place where radical Islamist laws govern the society. It seemed to her an adventure, a chance to see another part of the universe. But after the consequences it had for her and her family and their safety, she asked to remain anonymous.
As she entered into the dreamed-of wedded bliss with her husband, she had no idea, she said, of the legal and religious ramifications of her marriage that would follow. Yes, she noticed differences about her new way of life, but it was not until she gave birth to two children that these differences began to set in.
Her husband was away most of the time; she spent her days at home caring for her children. She raised them as she herself had been raised, the most natural way she knew, practicing Christianity. Although she had her own beliefs, she allowed her children the freedom to choose whatever faith they preferred. Their father was a Muslim, and the country they were born into practiced Islam, but they chose to follow the Christianity.
One day, as her children grew, she was confronted by a radical Muslim preacher who insisted that she needed to bring them to the mosque to pray. They were Muslims, he said. What she did not know, not then, and not when she agreed to marry her husband, was that in the eyes of a sharia court, her children had been considered Muslim from the day they were born.
While many religious traditions require a commitment to a faith, in Islam, a child does not need to state the Shahaadatayn ("There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his Messenger") to become a Muslim.
In Islam, the Muslim preacher explained, if even only one parent is Muslim and the other parent practices another religion, the children are considered Muslim.
He referred her to Al-Mawsoo'ah Al-Fiqhiyyah ("The Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence"), which points out that Islam prevails over all other religions:
"Muslim jurists have unanimously agreed that if a father embraces Islam and has young children, or someone who is legally like them, such as an insane child who has reached puberty, then they are considered Muslims, as a consequence of the father. The majority of Muslim scholars (Hanafis, Shaafi'is and Hanbalis) maintained that the key factor in this regard is that either parent is Muslim, be it the mother or father; the children are then Muslims as a consequence of their Muslim parent, because Islam prevails and no other religion prevails over it, since it is the religion of Allaah which He is pleased with for His slaves."
Her children and she are now are forced to live two different lives. While out during the day, especially at school, they must adhere to Islamic beliefs, but at home, and apparently in their hearts, they continue to be faithful to Christianity. As confusing as this is for the children, it is necessary for their safety. If they are ever suspected of rejecting their Muslim status, in the eyes of extremist Muslims, they will be considered kufaar (unbelievers) -- apostates. When the fundamentalist preacher informed her of this, he proved it by quoting the instructions from a source:
"... if after reaching puberty he says or does something that indicates that he is not content with Islam, then he is to be regarded as an apostate and is to be treated as one who has apostatised from the religion of Islam."
What would be the punishment for these children? They would be put to death and further humiliated with a dishonorable funeral.
It is stated:
"If a Muslim apostatizes and meets the conditions of apostasy – i.e., he is of sound mind, an adult and does that of his own free will – then his blood may be shed with impunity. He is to be executed by the Muslim ruler or by his deputy – such as the qaadi or judge, and he is not to not be washed (after death, in preparation for burial), the funeral prayer is not to be offered for him and he is not to be buried with the Muslims."
They will also be stripped of all basic rights such as inheritance.
The teachings of most religious instructors encourage acceptance of the beliefs of others; they do not demand punishment for choosing a different faith. In many families in the U.S., when one parent is, say, Christian and the other Jewish, the children grow up practicing any or some or none of their parents' religions. They are free to explore and to believe as they choose. Sometimes, one child will practice Christianity and the other Judaism.
It is time for the international community and human rights groups to turn their focus on the plight of these children, held hostage by a faith they are never given an option to choose.
While the Christian mother holds her breath and hopes her children will be safe, many other families share her fear.
Women and children in Muslim-majority countries are all too familiar with these strictures. Subjected to the dictates of the most rigid interpretation of Islam at the hands of their patriarchal societies, they live as second-class citizens across the Middle East. Those who dare to go against the grain in any fashion -- even by belonging to another religion -- can meet the cruelest fate.
Everyone should be free to practice any faith he or she desires without threats, and without fear that their children will be tormented and ultimately executed for their beliefs. One can only hope that one day this will be true for her family, and the multitudes of other families faced with the same oppression.
**Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated scholar, businessman, political scientist, board member of Harvard International Review, and president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He has authored several books on Islam and US Foreign Policy. He can be reached at Dr.Rafizadeh@Post.Harvard.Edu
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13197/christian-mother-children

The Iran Deal Pullout: How Will Tehran Respond?
Michael Eisenstadt/The Washington Institute./November 04/18
What can the Trump Administration do to shape Iran’s choices?
Iranian leaders have doubtless been assessing their options in the wake of President Trump’s May 8 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and pursue a policy of maximum pressure designed to force them back to the negotiating table. We may soon learn how their assessment concluded, since far-reaching sanctions are about to be reimposed on Iran’s oil sector (its main source of government revenue and foreign exchange) and foreign companies that do business with it—on November 4. Many foreign customers have already cut or halted purchases of Iranian oil in anticipation of this deadline. The challenge for Washington is to apply sufficient pressure to induce Tehran to renegotiate, while deterring it from using force to enhance its diplomatic leverage or impose costs on the United States.
In the past, Tehran has generally responded to pressure on its nuclear program by accelerating its nuclear activities in order to show that the greater the pressure, the greater Iran’s progress. Thus, despite the escalation of pressure from 2006 to 2015, Iran increased the number of operating centrifuges from zero to nearly 20,000. And as pressure on it broadened and intensified, Tehran responded more or less in kind—while eschewing escalatory steps that could have sparked a broader conflict with the United States. Thus, it countered joint U.S.-Israeli cyberattacks on its nuclear program with cyberattacks on U.S. banks and financial institutions (2012); it answered the assassination of its nuclear scientists with attacks on Israeli diplomats in several Asian countries (2012); and it responded to intensified U.S. drone overflights with attacks on U.S. drones in the Persian Gulf (2012-13).
Iran, however, now faces a more complex dilemma: It is suffering under U.S. sanctions that may cut deeply into its oil income but that Europe and many other countries oppose; yet the European powers have told the Iranian leadership that if it violates or withdraws from the JCPOA, they will vote to snap-back UN sanctions on Iran, ensuring that the U.S. policy of maximum pressure will be even more effective.
Thus, as long as Tehran stays in the JCPOA, it is constrained in what it can do in the nuclear domain to push back against U.S. pressure. It could approach but not cross JCPOA limits by, for example, ramping up production of enrichment feedstock and centrifuge components, pushing up against caps on enrichment levels and stockpiles, and conducting research on nuclear power plants for naval vessels. Or it could engage in low-level nuclear brinkmanship by crossing various JCPOA thresholds to see if there is any wiggle room with the Europeans.
If U.S. sanctions truly hurt, Iran could try to gain leverage over the United States by going far beyond JCPOA enrichment and stockpile caps, interfering with International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring or, in extremis, reviving its nuclear weapons program. Or it could push back in areas that have not generally been linked to its nuclear program. It could: accelerate the detention and imprisonment of U.S. dual-nationals (resumed earlier this year following a 2016 hiatus); ramp up medium-range missile tests (halted in 2017) or the harassment of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf (likewise halted in 2017, after U.S. vessels fired warning shots across the bow of Iranian patrol boats); try to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (which it has threatened to do if it can no longer export oil); and resume offensive cyber operations against the United States (halted when nuclear negotiations gained traction in 2013). Iran could also use its militant proxies in Iraq to renew attacks on U.S. personnel there (which ceased following the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011). The U.S. government has warned of severe consequences should it do so, though this has not deterred recent proxy rocket attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Basra.
Tehran faces several difficulties, however. Kidnappings, missile tests, and the harassment of naval vessels would probably not provide leverage over Washington and could easily backfire. Attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz would gravely harm Iran’s own interests, as nearly all of its oil exports and imports pass through this chokepoint. It would make sense to do this only if all Iranian oil and gas exports were halted. While the United States may be vulnerable to Iranian cyberattacks, it can inflict much greater harm on Iran in this area. And the killing of U.S. personnel in Iraq or elsewhere could prompt the U.S. government to unleash its own lethal campaign against the IRGC’s Qods Force, employing techniques perfected in its war against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS).
Such actions would carry many dangers for Iran. Although Iranian leaders have learned since the 1980s that they can wage proxy warfare against the United States without incurring the risk of military retaliation, they nonetheless view the United States as an unpredictable and potentially dangerous adversary. After informing Baghdad that it had no position on the crisis leading up to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the George H.W. Bush Administration mobilized a global coalition to counter Iraqi aggression. George W. Bush, having rejected “nation-building” during the 2000 presidential campaign, ordered the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attacks, as well as costly nation-building efforts in both countries. And after pledging to avoid yet another Middle Eastern war, President Barack Obama launched a campaign against ISIS following its conquest of Mosul and northern Iraq in June 2014.
President Trump’s volatile personality and erratic policies have reinforced Iranian concerns about U.S. unpredictability. After declaring his intention to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, the latter dug in and pushed back against probes and attacks by pro-Iran militias near Tanf and pro-regime forces near Deir al-Zour. U.S. forces also conducted two strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons by regime forces. Military officials have threatened to respond even more forcefully to future chemical attacks.
Tehran has taken a more cautious approach toward the United States since then, and for good reason. American officials have indicated that U.S. forces will remain in Syria as long as necessary to ensure the “enduring defeat” of ISIS and the departure of Iranian forces and their proxies. Tehran will likely continue its highly successful proxy activities, though at a level that it believes will not prompt the United States to use military force against it. And there will be an ever-present temptation to strike a painful blow against U.S. interests, entailing a risk of escalation.
In the face of firm U.S. ripostes in Syria and the Gulf, Tehran has ratcheted up pressure on America’s foremost regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. It provided the Houthis in Yemen with missiles capable of reaching Riyadh (which has been targeted repeatedly since late 2017). It has likewise accelerated efforts to build up missile production facilities and other military infrastructure in Syria and Lebanon. And in February of this year, it sent a drone packed with explosives into Israeli airspace (it was shot down by Israel), prompting a series of clashes that led to a major Israeli strike against Iran’s military infrastructure in Syria in May. Iran has also intensified activities against opposition groups that it fears may be used by the U.S. government against it, plotting an attack against a Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) rally in Paris in June, conducting a missile strike against the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) headquarters in northern Iraq in September, and launching another missile strike against ISIS facilities in Syria in October, in response to a terrorist attack on a military parade in Khuzestan.
Iran’s response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA will largely depend, then, on how deeply renewed U.S. sanctions bite. If Iran is able to muddle through—because it sells enough oil, repatriates sufficient funds from foreign customers, benefits from higher oil prices, or some combination of these—it may continue to observe JCPOA limits and try to wait President Trump out, hoping for a different U.S. President in January 2021. Meanwhile, it may push back against U.S. efforts by largely symbolic means—in order to avoid a military confrontation with the United States, while lashing out however it can against U.S. allies, partners, and perceived proxies.
This is not necessarily a bad place for the U.S. government to be, with the Iranian leadership contained by the JCPOA and rigorous sanctions. It is not, however, what the Trump Administration had in mind when launching its policy of maximum pressure. As with so much else about the Administration’s policies, it’s not clear whether real but unanticipated benefits will share the same thought-space as likely unattainable maximal goals.
Should sanctions cut deeply and exacerbate ongoing domestic unrest, Iran will face a choice: agree to a new round of negotiations with the United States in which it offers concessions in return for sanctions relief, or undertake various destabilizing activities—violating JCPOA limits, intensifying proxy attacks on U.S. allies, or even conducting proxy operations against U.S. interests and personnel—so that it can re-engage Washington from a position of strength. If hardliners in Tehran win the day, destabilization efforts could even include waging a low-level, open-ended struggle to oust the United States from the region. This being the case, what considerations should guide U.S. policy toward Iran, and what can the Trump Administration do to shape Iranian choices?
First, U.S. officials should strive to keep tensions with Tehran below the threshold of armed conflict. Domestic opinion won’t support another Middle Eastern war, with heightened tensions with North Korea, Russia, and China now making competing claims on U.S. military resources. Nor, by all appearances, would President Trump. Moreover, long-term strategic competitions of the sort that characterize U.S.-Iranian relations aren’t decided by a single knockout blow. U.S. policy must be tempered by and reflect that reality.
Second, hardliners in Iran may push for a military riposte in response to real and imagined U.S. actions, especially if the pressure campaign destabilizes Iran internally. And they might get their way if the influence of the IRGC grows, or the Supreme Leader becomes incapacitated or dies. Preserving the credibility of the U.S. deterrent will therefore be key to avoiding escalation.
Third, at least for the time being, Washington needs to avoid crossing red lines that might prompt Tehran to respond to U.S. pressure with proxy attacks or military action. In practical terms, this means permitting Iran to sell just enough oil and repatriate just enough income to keep its economy on life support, while eschewing efforts to actively foment regime change in Tehran. It is not a bad thing for Iranian leaders to know that the U.S. quiver still contains many arrows.
Thus, Washington should apply sufficient pressure to incentivize Tehran to re-engage in order to salvage its economy but avoid cornering Iran so that it feels it has no other choice than to fight back. Washington should also avoid sanctions so crushing that they could, in tandem with Iran’s ongoing water crisis, eventually transform it into another failed Middle Eastern state. With Iran, acting prudently will be the key to managing escalation, avoiding further instability and conflict, and achieving an acceptable policy outcome.
**Michael Eisenstadt is the Kahn Fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute.

Indian mother killed with daughters for failing to produce male child
Manoj Chaurasia Special to Al Arabiya English/November 04/18
Women bearing girl babies continue to be treated with disdain in the eastern Indian state of Bihar despite billions having been spent on launching campaigns to generate awareness about the fair sex. Sounds strange but torture of women producing girl child goes on unabated in the sate even in this jet age, mocking the much-flaunted “Save Girl Child Campaign” or the “Selfie With Daughter” campaigns. The issue triggered public debate again when a woman was burnt alive along with her two little daughters by her in-laws earlier this week just because she had failed to bear male child, highlighting the acute gender discrimination. Victim Pushpa Devi, 40, was married to Manoj Soni, a resident of Siswar village in Kaimur district, some 20 years back. During this period, she was able to produce only two daughters but no male child, ultimately leading to tension in the family.
With her in-laws hell-bent on having a son at all cost, her husband took her to various doctors and also sought helps from exorcists to ward of any “evil spirits” if any gripping the woman but to no avail. Eventually, her husband decided to get rid of the lady who was unable to fulfill his wishes.
On Wednesday night when the entire world was sleeping, her in-laws soaked the woman and her two daughters aged eight and five with kerosene oil and set them afire after apparently gagging them, police said. The victims prayed for mercy by the accused continued watching them going up in flames until they had fallen lifeless.
Billowing smoke
The incident came to light when local villagers saw the balls of smokes billowing from the house and a stench of burning human flesh filling the air. Subsequently they informed the police. However, by the time the police arrived on the scene, all the accused persons had fled the scene.
“They (in-laws) had been torturing my sister for long for not producing a son but we had never imagined this fancy would turn out to be so deadlier one day,” victim’s brother Santosh Soni told the police after registering a case with the police. Woman’s husband, his mother and sister were made named accused in the case. The killing of girl babies or their mother for the very reason is nothing new to Bihar. Only this weekend, a newborn baby girl was buried alive in Banka district by her parents but thanks to local villagers the baby could be saved after seven hours.
The villagers rescued her after hearing her shrill cries coming out from the grave and when they dug out the grave they were amazed to see a barely month-old baby battling for survival inside. They soon rushed her to the local health center where she was given immediate medical treatment. The baby is safe now but her parents are still to be searched. Another such horrible tale was reported in March this year from Vaishali district where the parents killed their seven-month-old daughter by throwing out from the roof of the house. Even more horrible story was reported from Samastipur district where a family killed their six-day-old baby girl by dumping her into toilet tank. The incident took place in January this year.
Injecting poison
Last year, a man from Bhagalpur district had injected poison into his infant girl as she didn’t want girl child while a man from Nawada district even handed out divorce to his wife for giving birth to a girl. One of the women got so much frustrated at her routine tortures at the hands of her in-laws that she ultimately poisoned her three daughters aged three and eight to death before ending her own life by consuming poison. The incident took place in Gaya district in May this year. Social scientists find the trend serious and say this highlights the deep-rooted social bias. “In Hindu society, sons are still considered the natural inheritors of fathers’ properties and also they hold the right to light the funeral pyres of their parents. These are the reasons why Hindu family opts for a son,” explained prominent social scientist Sachindra Narayan. Narayan who earlier worked with the Patna-based AN Sinha Institute of Social studies feels education can pay a significant role in changing the existing situation but laments the pathetic condition of schools in the rural pockets of Bihar.  “Education indeed can bring social, cultural change in the society but the schools are in very pathetic state in the rural areas, imparting no quality education due to absence of qualified teachers. The government looks more attentive towards providing food to the students, rather than improving the quality of education,” says Narayan.

How will the new Iraqi government perform over the next four years?
Adnan Hussein/Al Arabiya/November 04/18
Iraqis had to wait for more than five months after the parliamentary elections to form a new government. On the day of the announcement of the formation of the cabinet, they had to stay up after midnight for the announcement of two-thirds of the names of the new ministers.
They now have to wait two more weeks to learn about the names of the other one-third in the government. Due to this incomplete formation, the new cabinet came as a disappointment in terms of what it can do for the country, which has been greatly suffering for 15 years, in the next four years.
The elite return to power
The conditions of Iraq when the parliamentary elections were held and afterwards necessitated a speedy government formation and not delaying the process of forming a new government to replace the previous one which like its predecessors failed to carry out its basic tasks, such as improving public services and resolving the problems of unemployment, poverty and administrational and financial corruption.
These circumstances also made it imperative that influential forces form a strong government which everyone – including the parties which won in the elections – had publicly agreed that it appoints honest and competent experts without being impaired by the quota system which has been adopted in the distribution of state posts and functions and which has proven to be a total failure, as acknowledged by everyone.
This delay in forming the cabinet is one of the reasons for the outbreak of the strongest and largest protest movement in the history of Iraq last July, which started in the province of Basra which although it floats on a sea of oil, it has suffered from the lack of clean water for drinking and agriculture.
This delay was due to conflicts between powerful forces as they do not only aim to ensure their survival but also want to maintain their hegemony over state administrations – an influence that the election results showed it’s this time seriously threatened since 60 percent of voters expressed their apathy towards the electoral process which always brings the failed parties to manage the state. As for those who voted, the majority of them voted against traditional candidates belonging to powerful parties hence blocking the return of some of them to parliament.
All of this was a bad omen for the influential powers which are mostly Shiite and Sunni Islamist groups. Therefore, they tried to shuffle their cards again. First, they challenged the election results and the integrity of the election commission which was replaced by a new commission that recounted the votes in areas which raised suspicions but the result, which took weeks, remained the same. Thus began a long series of conflicts, schemes and clashes regarding the largest bloc to be entrusted with the formation of the new government.
It was not easy, but these forces found a way to agree on a neutral figure with no connection to them, but who was from the Shiite political class, which has been monopolizing the task of forming a government under the system of sectarian and national consensus that’s been agreed on since 2003. Adel Abdul Mahdi who was selected as prime minister had previously held ministerial positions and the post of vice president, and he was accepted by the two main players in the Iraqi arena: Iran and the United States.
New crown of thorns
In a maneuver to absorb popular anger over the electricity, water and jobs crises in southern Iraq, all powerful forces announced that they would leave Abdul Mahdi free to choose members of his government who meet the conditions of integrity, competence and experience. These traits were among the demands of the protest movement that was accompanied by unprecedented acts of violence.
At first, this announcement made it seem like the path of Abdul Mahdi would be paved with a red carpet and welcomed with flowers but when it was time to finally appoint members of the cabinet, Abdul Mahdi found himself besieged by conflicting wills of powerful forces, sometimes under the pretext of "the electoral merit" and sometimes under the pretext of merits based on sectarian and national concerns.
Out of the 14 picks– and who constitute two thirds of the cabinet – who won the parliament’s vote of confidence, only four or five ministers met the specifications of experience and efficiency. The rest were not assigned to suitable positions based on their competence. The same applies to the other one third whom the parliament did not vote on. As for integrity, which is one of the main conditions to be appointed as a minister in Abdul Mahdi’s cabinet, it’s not something that can be proven because during the discussion at the parliament, it turned out that Abdul Mahdi did not run the name of the ministers by the integrity commission and by the accountability and justice commission so they can look into the political history of the candidates, in relation to their connections to the former regime or terrorist groups. Some media outlets and social media pages have shared shocking information challenging the integrity of quite a few candidates and their political history.
More of the same
The list of ministers, of which some were endorsed while others were not, showed that they were actually chosen according to the quota system, and some of them are actually relatives of the leaders of the influential parties!
Abdul Mahdi has eight ministers left to add them to his government on November 6. If he chooses them they way he chose others, or if they are imposed on him, then he will likely doom himself and his government to failure as his government will not be any different or better than the previous failed governments. This will be the case as long as Abdul Mahdi’s cabinet is not free of the quota system, and this means that we are probably faced with four more lean years for Iraq.

Afghan elections: Good news amid pessimism
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/November 04/18
The latest general election in Afghanistan has provided a new occasion for pundits and experts, once again, to label the country as a lost cause and invite the major powers still involved there to get out as fast as they can.
The elections are dismissed as a meaningless charade if only because fewer than 40 percent of those eligible to vote actually did so while reams of reports have been produced on all kinds of fraudulent practices to affect the outcome.
The problem today is that the average citizen is faced with a tsunami of information, which seems impressive in its depth and diversity but, on closer examination, is revealed to be produced by a cancer-like multiplication of a few often narrow partisan views.
The current fashionable view would have us believe that Afghanistan would be more comfortable with rule by the Taliban than an ersatz form of democracy imposed by Western powers.
The fact that at the height of their power the Taliban never managed to make their rule acceptable to more than a fraction of the Afghan population is quietly ignored.
In the year 2000, the Taliban controlled Kabul and pretended to be the legitimate government of Afghanistan and with mediation by Qatar had persuaded the Clinton administration in Washington to grant them full diplomatic recognition. President Clinton’s special envoy Bill Richardson had visited Kabul and met with Taliban leader Mullah Omar to put the final touches to a grand bargain.
Afghanistan had never had an over-centralized system of government if only because of its rich religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity which is best reflected by a parliamentary system of government
Clinton presidency
A number of minor diplomatic hitches prevented the scheme to be completed before the end of the Clinton presidency.
The incoming administration of President George W Bush was not opposed to the deal hatched by Clinton but wanted to take time and shape its own version. Then came the 9/11 attacks which destroyed the scheme. Without it, we might have had yet another obnoxious Islamist regime backed by the US and its allies.
Interestingly, Washington policymakers paid no attention to the fact that the Taliban were in meaningful control of no more than half of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces. Nor did they mind that, at the time, almost half of the nation’s population had become refugees, mostly in Pakistan and Iran.
Despite the fact that the claim of Taliban’s popularity has never been tested in anything resembling an election, we still have pundits who insist that the antediluvian gang is the true representative of the Afghan people.
Even if the new Afghan regime installed with help from the US was far from ideal, the ultimate failure of the Taliban experiment was good news for the “Muslim world” and beyond. It showed that Islamist extremism in its various forms, from Khomeinism in Iran to Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria are never able to submit to a genuine electoral test in any shape or form.
Those who dismiss the Afghan election because of the low voter turnout forget the fact that it takes a long time for electoral politics to become part of a nation’s ambient culture.
In Great Britain, where electoral politics started, voter participation was limited to between 10 and 12 percent only because few people were classed as eligible while women didn’t have the vote until the 1920s. It took Britain and the US 150 years to reach their cruising speed in electoral politics.
Historic difference
A Western observer has little difficulty in imagining the geographical distance between London and Kabul but would find it hard to gauge the historic difference in the two societies insofar as politics is concerned.
For me, however, it is almost a miracle that millions of Afghans seem to have developed a liking for elections and regard the exercise as an efficient means of impacting the decision-making process.
If British and American democracies needed 20 to 30 elections to reach their level of maturity, should we not give the Afghans time and space to go through at least 10 elections?
A survey of the issues raised, the platforms presented, the speeches made and the debates conducted reveals a quality that this writer, for one, did not expect to witness so soon in Afghanistan.
It seemed that the whole of Afghanistan, especially the urban areas, were turned into a giant-size school of political practice. By one unscientific survey, more than 100 new words and phrases referring to politics in an open society have entered the average Afghan’s vocabulary.
Equally impressive was the level of participation by women both as candidates and as voters. To be sure, the results are unlikely to be commensurate with the energy and commitment deployed by Afghan women. But a solid foundation has been laid for further progress.
The election campaign also witnessed the raising of a vital issue of a possible reform to replace the presidential system imposed by the US with a parliamentary one. Afghanistan had never had an over-centralized system of government if only because of its rich religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity which is best reflected by a parliamentary system of government. That reality assumes more importance at a time that the so-called identity politics appears the favorite flavor across the world.
Outsiders may not appreciate how important it is to have the average citizen in a society used to deference and fascination with the hierarchy to publicly express anger and/or scorn against any grandee in a position of power.
Afghan democracy is a young plant (or setak in Persian Afghan) threatened by strong adverse winds. The fact that it is still standing and growing may indicate a profound change in the socio-cultural configuration of a society emerging from decades of confusion, violence and war.
The latest elections will not solve Afghanistan’s problems ranging from tribalism to systemic corruption. But these elections could strengthen those institutions that, if made effectively accountable to the people, would be able to shape the policies needed to do so.
The parliamentary election could also be regarded as a dress rehearsal for next year’s presidential election which could speed up Afghanistan’s march towards a better future. Keep fingers cross!

Parcel bombs: Reminiscent of the Unabomber
Fahad Suleiman Shoqiran/Al Arabiya/November 04/18
The parcel bomb war has invaded the US these days. This is a cruel type of violence that was prevalent in the 1980s. Anyone who watched ‘Manhunt: Unabomber’ series, produced by Discovery channel in 2017, would know about Fitzgerald, the personality analyst in the FBI, searching for the murderer who was distinguished for his rare brutality that was not driven by any kind of usual motives of political terrorism as he had personal and psychological problems, as one can tell from the series. The murderer’s name is Ted Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber) as he sent parcel bombs to universities and airline companies.
The anarchist professor
Born on 22 May 1942, he was a mathematics professor, who lived as a recluse in a remote place and was opposed to technology. He has been described as the most violent serial bomber in history as he sent parcel bombs over a 17 year period. In November 1979, he nearly blew up an airliner (Flight no. 444 of the US Airways). His parcel bombings peaked in 1981-82, when he targeted several universities.
What is strange is that he issued messages against the world and broadcasted his mysterious messages through various means and even the US press, under threat, provided coverage to his ideas. His statements read: “They want you to be sheep like they are sheep. When your only tool’s a hammer, everything looks like a nail. The only way to be human, the only way to be free, is to rebel. Stand up, play your heart out so the whole world can hear you. (Human beings have been reduced to) engineered products and mere cogs in the social machine, etc.”
In order to find him, investigators established a specific unit that employed “criminal linguistics”; a method whose legal validity stirred much debate, but resulted in great success.
Suicide bombings
In his book ‘Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World’, psychologist Jerrold M. Post narrates a story which he says changed his life: “A funny thing happened on the way to my career in my academic psychiatry. In my final year, as a clinical associate at the National Institute of Mental Health, planning to return to Boston where I had been offered an appointment in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, I received a cryptic phone call from a medical school acquaintance who wanted to discuss ‘a most unusual job opportunity.’ I was intrigued, and we met over lunch.”
“To my astonishment, I was offered an opportunity to start a pilot program for the United States government developing indirect assessments of the personality and political behavior of foreign leaders. The unit would be based at the Central Intelligence Agency but would serve as an analytic unit of common concern, providing in-depth personality studies of world leaders to assist the president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and other senior government officials in conducting summit meetings and other high-level negotiations, as well as in dealing with crises. I thought that would be an interesting divertissement for several years, and then I would return to the groves of the academe. The planned two-year diversion ended up lasting twenty-one years, from 1965 to 1986, in what became a remarkable intellectual odyssey. It quickly became apparent that the field of psychodynamic psychiatry would be insufficient to the task at hand. Accurately locating the political actor in his historical, cultural, and political context would require substantial expertise to complement that of the psychiatrists in the unit. Accordingly, I proposed and received support to develop an interdisciplinary unit,” he added.
The author talks about one of the interviewed commandeered, Hassan Salameh — the man who led a terror squad that carried out a series of bombings in 1996 leading to the death of 46 Israelis resulting in the defeat of Shimon Peres and the election of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Salameh, who was sentenced to 64 consecutive life sentences, said: “A suicide bombing is the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of the more important articles of faith.”Another commander, asserted: “It is suicide attacks which earn the most respect and elevate the bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom.”
Counter-terror expertise
The author shares his experience when he talks about his experience as an “expert witness” in the trials of al-Qaeda terrorists, who were convicted in bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He had a copy of the Justice Department documents on al-Qaeda terror handbook “Jihad Declaration”; which is an exceptional document that goes very far in explaining how the terrorists of the September 11, 2001 attacks managed to maintain their cover in the US; in the so-called ‘enemy’s country’.
In the eighth lesson, part of what the precautions which the “undercover” member should do was that his appearance should not indicate an Islamic orientation and that he should avoid visiting famous Islamic places.
The book shows how intelligence and security agencies can renew investigation units depending on the type of crime. There is the criminal linguistics unit as we saw in Ted’s story and the personality analysis unit through observing the behavioral and psychological pattern, like Post did. This clarifies the crisis of terrorism and the necessity to confront it with security methods that merge with scientific expertise, be it linguistic or psychological skills.

The West/Rest divide and the quest for destroying third world’s autonomy
Dr. Mansour Almarzoqi//Al Arabiya/November 04/18
There exists a divide between Western countries (the West), and the other countries of the World (the Rest). Also, there is a considerable skepticism in the Rest towards the Western discourse on human rights. It is based on conceptual justifications, on past and contemporary events, and on international norms that provide a framework for the functioning of international relations. These justifications suggest that the West claims to have a “moral superiority”. They also suggest that the West is systematically instrumentalizing this supposed “moral superiority” in order to secure internal gains, mainly electoral, as well as external ones, such as political and economic concessions.
The West/Rest divide
There exists an important level of diversity among Western countries. Yet, one could argue that they remain a widely unified entity at the level of discourse when contrasted with other countries of the World, that is to say with the “Rest”.
If one takes the scientific discourse in social sciences, one remarks this gap between the "Center", the West, and the "Periphery", the Rest. At the beginning of social sciences in the 19th century, the Center was studied by political science, economics and sociology. As to the Periphery, it was studied by anthropology and orientalism (1). Although this approach has much changed, the legacy as well as many ideas of this epoch still persist. And if one takes the political discourse, one observes the same gap, between the “free World” and the “non-free World”. The Cold War and the war on "terrorism" provide ample examples.
Moral superiority, “selflitis,” and the “Final Solution”
There seems to be a tendency when we are talking about human rights, that the talk is one-sided: from the West to the Rest. In other words, it is a lecture, not a dialogue. And it is not only a matter of arrogance and self-righteousness, but also a strategic position with more than four colonial centuries dragging behind.
As a strategic position, this tendency concerns World Order. Hedley and others have noted that the postwar international system is essentially the European states system made large (2). This essentially European international system suffers from what Julien de Sanctis calls "Ethno-centered universalism". According to him, the West tries to extend its value system to the World, in a way that does not take into consideration contextual, historical, and civilizational boundaries (3). Only a claim to a “moral superiority” could be used by the West to justify transcending those boundaries. Despite its origins in the Age of Enlightenment, this claim still persists.
Both, World system and the aforementioned universalism, have historical trajectories that left enduring traits, such as "colonial accumulations". These accumulations are visible in the retaining of zones of influence in previous colonies as part of the price they paid to colonizers to gain independence. Indeed, at a certain moment in history, a set of circumstances of strength helped the West secure a set of mechanisms that protect and advance Western privileges and interests—which were accumulated during the colonial period. A critique of this ethno-centered universalism, and having a two-sided talk, necessarily implies a critique of colonial accumulations, that is to say Western privileges and interests. It is here that lies the real motive behind the persistence of the claim to a “moral superiority” which justifies the one-sided talk from the West to the Rest. This one-sidedness is a defensive tool, among many others, of colonial accumulations.
It is very difficult to believe that the West attempts to advance the cause of freedom whenever it is possible, and when it is not possible, it sits in waiting for the first glimpse of an opportunity to do so. But there is every reason to think that the cause of freedom for the West is a flail intended to crush Third World’s autonomy and is a share in a cruel, capitalist stock market.
There seems to be in the West a deep entrenchment in this one-sidedness, a passionate unwillingness to consider a different perspective, something that I could call “the virus of selflitis”. This inflammation of the self makes it difficult for the West to listen, to consider, to understand. And in the midst of this difficulty, the West strikes with « judgmentalism ».
The rise of populist and extreme right movements across the West is neither accidental nor a passing phenomenon. Rather, it is a product of many complicated factors, one of which is selflitis. The greatest fear is that selflitis would one day lead to some form of the “Final Solution”. The West has done it several times before - such as in the concentration camps of indigenous peoples in the Americas, the massacres in the Congo, and the atrocities of Auschwitz. There is absolutely no assurance that the West would not do it again.
Extortion, destroying the Rest’s autonomy, and hypocrisy
Claiming “moral superiority” was the spearhead of colonialism in the past, and the persistence of the same claim now is the spearhead of capitalism. During the negotiations of a free trade agreement between the Arab Gulf states and the EU, the latter used the card of promoting human rights and democracy in a pragmatic way so as to extort economic concessions from the GCC, particularly in the aluminium and petrochemical industries, as Ahmad Qasim Hussein remarks (4).
Moreover, there is what Amitav Acharya calls “subsidiary norms,” whereby state-actors from the Third World would create their own norms, judged to be regional responses to regional problems. According to him, subsidiarity led to two effects. The first is resistance and challenge to Western bias. Second, regional state-actors support only the norms of the “international community” which are judged to be helpful in preserving Third World states’ autonomy, otherwise known as “rules of all, by all, for all”. Such rules include sovereignty, equality of states, and nonintervention (5).
These norms are subject to power relations between states. As many experts have pointed out, the United Nations charter has a problem of reconciling principals such as sovereignty on the one hand with the protection of human rights on the other (6). As a consequence, reconciliation of the two principles then becomes a matter of continuous negotiations (7). And of course, power relations are the only framework in which these negotiations can take place. Under the pretext of protecting human rights, more powerful states infringe upon the sovereignty of the less powerful states and intervene in their domestic affairs.
These infringements upon sovereignty are sometimes viewed as systematic attacks on the few important norms in international relations that help the less powerful states protect their autonomy. Destroying the autonomy of those states renders them more vulnerable to big powers, and hence more likely to cede economic and political concessions, as was intended in the free trade negotiations between the EU and the GCC. Moreover, by systematically attacking these norms, the West hopes to disperse and undermine any potential movement of revolt against, and liberation from, the capitalist Western hegemony of the World.
One must always remember that such an infringement upon sovereignty never happened to the U.S. in the “black lives matter,” Guantanamo, Abu Guraib prison, invasion of Iraq or the on-going American drones campaign in the World. Somehow these U.S. violations of human rights, as well as of international law, are invisible to the West, including Canada, Germany, France, and the UK. Israeli Apartheid, colonialism, testing of chemical weapons on Palestinians, open-prison of Gaza are equally invisible to the « free World ». This is seen by the Rest as a gruesome hypocrisy. There is a selectiveness in the West when it comes to promoting human rights, as is evident in Canada‘s thundering silence towards human rights violations in China and Iran.
It is very difficult to believe that the West attempts to advance the cause of freedom whenever it is possible, and when it is not possible, it sits in waiting for the first glimpse of an opportunity to do so. But there is every reason to think that the cause of freedom for the West is a flail intended to crush Third World’s autonomy and is a share in a cruel, capitalist stock market.
References:
1- Wallerstein, Immanuel, “Les sciences sociales battent de l'aile. Quel phénix en renaîtra ? Perspectives théoriques”, Cahiers de recherche sociologique, No. 24, 1995, pp. 209-222.
2- Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, Eds., The Expansion of International Society, 1984, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
3- Conversations with Dr. Julien de Sanctis, in Lyon, July 10, 2018. He is a researcher at the IRSEM in Paris and is an expert of the philosophy of French military strategy in Africa.
4- Hussein, Ahmad Qasim, “The European Union and the Gulf Crisis: Context and Attitudes”, Siyasat Arabia, No. 30, 2018, pp. 63-79.
5- Acharya, Amitav, “Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2011, pp. 95-123.
6- Volsky, Alexander, “Reconciling Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Justice and the Law in Humanitarian Interventions”, International Public Policy Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007, pp. 40-47; Saporita, Christopher, “Reconciling Human Rights and Sovereignty: A Framework for Global Property Law”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003, pp. 255-281; Massa, Anne-Sophie, “Does Humanitarian Intervention Serve Human Rights? The Case of Kosovo”, Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, pp. 49-60. Available at: <http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/63/120>. Date accessed: 16 aug. 2018.
7- Scheipers, Sibylle, Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: International society and the International Criminal Court, 2009, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Why is Tehran recruiting Daesh militants?
Baria Alamuddin/Arab News/November 04/18
I am constantly astounded at how otherwise-sensible journalists and diplomats are willing to believe Iranian and Russian professions of good faith, despite all evidence to the contrary. Earlier this year, many credulous figures pronounced the end of Iranian expansionism in Syria. Why? Because Russian President Vladimir Putin had promised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in good faith that Iranian proxies would be purged from southern Syrian.
Iran has invested tens of billions of dollars in the Syrian meat-grinder, with dozens of Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel killed. It will not meekly depart Syria with its tail between its legs at the first hint of pressure from Netanyahu. Despite a token withdrawal of some Hezbollah foot soldiers, the group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah defiantly announced that Hezbollah would remain in Syria as long as President Bashar Assad desired — as if Assad is even allowed to sneeze without asking Iran’s permission first.
Tehran understands that to perpetuate its dominant position in Syria, it must rely on local assets. Sectarian militias responsible for the worst massacres were trained and armed by Iran. Now it is reportedly recruiting a new generation of Syrian militias. IRGC and Hezbollah officers have embarked on a recruitment campaign throughout refugee camps, and batches of trainees recently graduated near the Syrian city of Deraa.
Hezbollah has reportedly paid around 2,000 former rebels to change sides, particularly among those forces that recently lost US funding. American officials sent WhatsApp messages to rebel commanders saying they should not go into battle with the “expectation of military intervention by us.” One commander bitterly interpreted Washington’s betrayal as meaning: “Go to Russia, go to the (Assad) regime, go to Iran.”
For rebels with their backs against the wall — many of whom picked up a gun when they were scarcely out of primary school — the prospect of a regular wage for performing the only role they know must be highly seductive, no matter whose agenda they will be serving.
Meanwhile, Iran-backed Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi paramilitaries in Iraq are recruiting Daesh fighters by offering them a salary, a military ID and a clean record. Around the flashpoint town of Jalawla, Al-Hashd has recruited dozens of militants. A Kurdish official observed how these extremists resurfaced “wearing new uniforms.”
Local Daesh commanders Mutashar Al-Turki and Zaid Mawlan, who fought the Kurds in 2014, have been identified fighting for Al-Hashd. According to one Al-Hashd source, Al-Turki “turned out to be a good man right after he changed allegiance, and now he is ensuring the security of the town of Tawuq against Daesh.”
Iran is often portrayed as having a pro-Shiite agenda, yet the Zaidi Houthis and Syria’s Alawites hail from significantly different schools of Islam. Also, Tehran exports weapons to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and after 2005 it was observed transferring munitions to Sunni extremists fighting the Americans in Iraq.
The recruitment of militants in Syria and Iraq illustrates Tehran’s desperation as it grapples with US sanctions. Iran hopes to put its regional proxies on a war footing as a bargaining chip, and in readiness to recommence their war with the West when the time is right.
Anti-Shiite terrorist leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi repeatedly took refuge in Iran and received training from its Quds Force. Iran for decades hosted Al-Qaeda leaders, sometimes detaining them, sometimes offering them safe passage or allowing terrorists such as Saif Al-Adl to coordinate atrocities such as the 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia that killed around 20 US personnel.
When US President Donald Trump previously speculated about siding with Assad against Daesh, he risked getting into bed with the creators of the monster he wanted to slay. Assad’s relationship with the figures who established Daesh dates back to the 2004-2011 period when his regime flooded Iraq with jihadists to fight the Americans.
Evidence from Syrian military defectors illustrates how Assad, with Iranian support, cultivated and released future Daesh leaders after the 2011 uprising began. Daesh was wielded both as a force to weaken the rebels, and as a bogeyman to terrorize the West.
Almost no major battles have been recorded between these supposed mortal enemies. Experts note how Syrian regime and Russian bombing raids touted as attacks against Daesh have mainly hit civilians. Iran, Russia and Daesh coordinated assaults against rebel forces for maximum impact.
Documents show how the city of Palmyra repeatedly changed hands peacefully, with the regime entrusting central Syrian regions to the militants whenever it lacked the capacity to hold them itself. Around 72 percent of Daesh’s wealth from oil trading came from the regime, which facilitated Daesh’s commercial activities, redeployments, and the arrival of new batches of terrorists.
Iran is not the defender of Shiites, but the patron of terrorist groups that inflicted the greatest harm on Shiite communities, fueling sectarian conflicts that killed countless thousands of innocent Arabs. Through the facilitation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the mobilization of Shiite militants against US forces, the nurturing of Daesh in Syria, and the creation of the largest paramilitary force of them all — Al-Hashd — Iran sits octopus-like at the nexus of regional terrorism.
Bloody terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah and the Quds Force during the 1980s in Lebanon, the Gulf and globally invented the genres of coordinated suicide bombings and Islamist terrorism, culminating in the 9/11 attacks.
Whenever Iran, Assad and Russia seek legitimacy by proclaiming their roles in combatting terrorism, we must not forget the fateful role they played in empowering the very forces they pretend to fight. Al-Hashd brought together pre-existing Tehran-sponsored militias in 2014 under the guise of fighting Daesh, yet most of their energies were thrown into sectarian cleansing campaigns against Sunnis and other vulnerable groups.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently said the Quds Force is conducting “covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe.” Along with the attempt in Denmark to assassinate oppositionists, Tehran was behind a botched bomb plot in Paris and a 2015 assassination near Amsterdam. European police recently arrested an Austria-based Iranian diplomat and a succession of other figures complicit in such attacks.
The recruitment of militants in Syria and Iraq illustrates Tehran’s desperation as it grapples with US sanctions. Iran hopes to put its regional proxies on a war footing as a bargaining chip, and in readiness to recommence their war with the West when the time is right.
Across Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America and even Europe, Iran has been a reliable patron of terrorists and criminal networks. As fast as militants in Iraq, Yemen and Libya can be defeated, they regain strength and return to the offensive. The world will continue to be blighted by terrorism as long as Iran enjoys a free hand to meddle with impunity. Is any further argument required for why the containment of Tehran’s terrorist leadership must be a top global priority?
*Baria Alamuddin is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster in the Middle East and the UK. She is editor of the Media Services Syndicate, and has interviewed numerous heads of state.

US sanctions on Iran take full effect
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/November 04/18
The full re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran will put an unprecedented level of pressure on its theocratic establishment. When US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, a period of time went into effect in order to re-impose two sets of sanctions that were lifted by the Obama administration to appease Tehran and reach the deal.
The sanctions were divided into primary and secondary. The US Treasury Department had a 90-day and 180-day period respectively to re-impose all economic sanctions on Iran. These windows were designed to give adequate time and warning to foreign companies to leave Iranian markets and halt their dealings with the country.
The first set of sanctions took effect on Aug. 6, 2018. It was leveled against Iran’s automotive industry, its precious-metals industry, major transactions in its currency, the buying or selling of dollars by its government, any direct or indirect purchases, trade, transfers or selling of major construction materials, and any action associated with the regime’s sovereign debt.
Although the primary sanctions put pressure on Tehran, today’s sanctions are much more vital. To begin with, they are targeting Iran’s oil industry. Any oil-related transactions with the regime — including affiliated institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Co., the Naftiran Intertrade Co. and the National Iranian Tanker Co. — are illicit. Some 80 percent of Iran’s total exports are linked to its oil exports, and revenues from its petroleum industry account for roughly 30 percent of the country’s total budget and revenues.
Sanctions are also hitting another major part of Iran’s energy sector: The gas industry. Iran holds the world’s fourth-largest and second-largest proven crude oil and natural gas reserves, respectively. Tehran was hoping to become a major provider of gas to Europe.
Despite Tehran’s efforts to dismiss US sanctions, Iranian leaders are very concerned and apprehensive.
When the nuclear deal was reached, Total — one of the seven “supermajor” oil companies in the world — signed a deal worth an estimated $5 billion to develop Iran’s South Pars, which was going to be the world’s largest natural gas field after completion. But Total, like many other foreign companies, quit its project recently and took immediate action to back out of Iran’s market thanks to the US sanctions.
Iran’s oil revenues have already begun sinking, and will likely continue to do so. In fact, its oil revenues and exports have been steadily falling since the US withdrew from the JCPOA. In the first week of October, Iran’s oil exports dropped to approximately 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd). In April, before the US pulled out of the nuclear deal, Iran was exporting more than 2.5 million bpd. That represents a decline of more than 50 percent.
Today’s sanctions are also significant because they will cut off the flow of funds to the regime and significantly impact its efforts to fund and sponsor terrorist and militia groups across the region. Furthermore, sanctions against some Iranian individuals that were lifted by the Obama administration in January 2016 will be re-imposed.
Despite Tehran’s efforts to dismiss US sanctions, Iranian leaders are very concerned and apprehensive as they have already witnessed the financial repercussions of the previous sanctions.
Tehran will likely frame them as solely affecting US citizens, but the sanctions are also applied to non-US citizens and entities. As the Treasury Department previously stipulated: “Non-US, non-Iranian persons are advised to use these time periods to wind down their activities with or involving Iran that will become sanctionable at the end of the applicable wind-down period.”
Although the US may not try to bring foreign entities to court for violating the sanctions, non-American persons and companies run the risk of losing their business with the US and being sanctioned. As such, large corporations and foreign firms ought to be extremely cautious in conducting any business with Iran.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh

Turkish-US relations continue to fluctuate
Yasar Yakis/Arab News/November 04/18
Turkish-US tensions eased slightly last week with Ankara’s release of American pastor Andrew Brunson, who was detained for two years in Turkey. Washington and Ankara subsequently lifted reciprocal sanctions. The thaw continued when the US decided to keep eight countries outside the scope of sanctions on Iran because of their dependence on Iranian oil. Turkey’s energy minister said his country was among the eight.
Ankara and Washington also agreed to carry out joint patrols on the outskirts of the northern Syrian city of Manbij. It remains to be seen whether the agreement will be implemented to Turkey’s satisfaction and lead to the withdrawal of all fighters of the Syrian-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from Manbij.
If the Turkish-US thaw continues, it may contribute to easing other tensions. One of them is the ban imposed by the US Congress on the delivery of F-35 fighters to Turkey. The irony is that Turkey manufactures several components of the aircraft, so the entire production program may be affected negatively. It may take more than a year to fill the gap if Turkey stops delivery of these components. Another defense-related issue is Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which is not interoperable with the NATO air defense equipment that the Turkish military is equipped with.
If the S-400 identifies an imminent threat directed at Turkey, it will not be able to convey this message automatically to the country’s air defense system, rendering useless billions of dollars’ worth of Turkey’s defense infrastructure. This is a major shift in defense doctrine, which is conceivable only if there is a major shift in the threat perception.
If the Turkish-US thaw continues, it may contribute to easing other tensions.
The extradition of Turkish cleric Fetullah Gulen is another thorny issue. Ankara considers him the mastermind of the attempted military coup in July 2016, and is pushing hard to secure his extradition. But the US, where Gulen resides, has not been forthcoming.
Then there is the fine to be imposed on Turkish state-owned lender Halk Bankasi for its involvement in circumventing US sanctions on Iran. The US Treasury Department is yet to announce the amount of the fine. If it turns to be sizeable, Turkey’s economy will become even more fragile.
None of the aforementioned disagreements is as important as the one about US support for the YPG. On Oct. 26, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced preparations for a military operation against the group east of the Euphrates River in northern Syria.
The day after the announcement, a summit meeting in Istanbul between the leaders of Turkey, Russia, France and Germany issued a final communique confirming Erdogan’s statement in different words, saying the leaders “expressed their determination to reject separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the national security of neighboring countries.”
But support for the “security of neighboring countries,” in other words Turkey, does not mean that if Turkish and American forces clash east of the Euphrates, Russia, Germany and France will side with Ankara. Last Tuesday, Erdogan said: “We will soon crush the (YPG) terrorist organization with more comprehensive and effective operations. We have completed our preparations.” If this means a military operation east of the Euphrates like the ones in the Syrian cities of Al-Bab or Afrin, the risks will be higher this time for two reasons.
Firstly, the YPG is better armed and trained than in the past. Secondly, the operations in Al-Bab and Afrin were carried out with tacit US consent, and there was no American military presence in these areas. There are now more than 20 US military bases and several thousand American troops in YPG-held territory, and there is no US consent this time.
On the contrary, the State Department’s spokesman said: “Unilateral military strikes into northeast Syria are of great concern to us because there may be American personnel in the vicinity.” One can only hope that Turkish decision-makers have thoroughly considered all the potential consequences of such an operation.
*Yasar Yakis is a former foreign minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Twitter: @yakis_yasar

Iraq calls on US to stop meddling in its internal affairs
Mina Aldroubi/The National/November 04/18
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces march as they hold their flag and posters of Iraqi and Iranian Shiites spiritual leaders during "al-Quds" or Jerusalem Day, in Baghdad, Iraq. AP
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces march as they hold their flag and posters of Iraqi and Iranian Shiites spiritual leaders during "al-Quds" or Jerusalem Day, in Baghdad, Iraq. AP
Iraq has called on Washington to stop meddling in it's internal affairs after the US Department of State said Iran must respect Baghdad's sovereignty and disarm Shiite militias that operate in the country.
The department last week published 12 requirements for Iran to behave like a "normal state" before new sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sector would take effect on Monday. The demands, published on Twitter, include calls for Tehran to demobilize and end support for it's proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine and Lebanon.
The far-reaching demands were translated into Arabic and shared on the US embassy in Baghdad's Twitter page, drawing criticism from Iraqi officials.
"Iraq's foreign ministry rejects the embassy's statement. It is seen as an interference in Iraq's internal affairs," foreign ministry spokesman, Ahmed Mahjoob, told The National on Sunday.
Mr Mahjoob said the statement violated diplomatic norms and disregarded Iraq's sovereignty.
Both Tehran and Washington have competed for influence in Iraq since the 2003 US invasion that toppled former dictator Saddam Hussein. In an interview with The National last week, Brett McGurk, the US envoy for the global coalition to defeat ISIS, said that Washington wanted to help Iraqi's strengthen their country's sovereignty and independence.
"That is the objective for the new government and we look forward to do all we can to help them in that regard," Mr McGurk said. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a controversial organization that consists of around 50 predominantly-Shiite paramilitary groups, including factions linked to Iran, were formed in 2014 after Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, Iraq's top Shiite cleric, urged citizens to take up arms against ISIS.
The PMF provided instrumental support to the Iraqi army and security forces in the many battles against ISIS since the militants overran large areas of the country in 2014. This critical auxiliary role awarded them semi-official status as an an independent military formation that is part of the Iraqi armed forces. However, the Iraqi government has so far failed to bring them under complete state control, even after the defeat of ISIS in December.
A sizable portion of the country's Shiite majority view the PMF as the primary bulwark against radical militant groups, making the task of disarming the militias one of the biggest challenges facing newly appointed Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi.
However, many in the country, including Shiite followers of the powerful cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, see the PMF as an instrument of Tehran's regional ambitions.
Washington has continuously called on Iran to end it's support for the PMF especially as sanctions approach. "Here’s a reminder about the second requirement for the Islamic Republic of Iran to behave like a normal state: The Iranian regime must end the IRGC-Qods Force’s support for terrorists and militant partners," the State Department said in a tweet on Saturday.

Tehran’s terror reaches the shores of Denmark
Ali Alfoneh/The Arab Weekly/November 04/18
Regardless of which agency was behind the suspected terror plot in Denmark, Europe must brace itself for more assassination attempts.
Iran has a long history of espionage and even assassination of political opponents abroad. For some time, however, while the espionage continued, the regime appeared to have abandoned the practice of political assassinations. Members of the opposition never posed a real threat to the regime in Tehran and the diplomatic cost of such operations was too high.
However, the arrest of an Iranian/Norwegian dual national in Sweden indicates a change in calculations and mode of operation by some group in Tehran.
On September 28, Danish police started a manhunt that paralysed the country because the eastern island of Zealand, home to Copenhagen, was cut off. Danish police said they were looking for a black Swedish-registered car with “possibly three people onboard” in connection with “serious criminality.”
A few days later, it became clear that Danish police expected the imminent assassination or kidnapping by Iranian agents of an individual known by the pseudonym Yaquob Hurr al-Tisteri.
The target, who lives in Ringsted, 60km south-west of Copenhagen, is the spokesman of the secessionist Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA).
Tisteri publicly defended the September 22 terrorist attack against an Iranian military parade in Ahvaz. In an interview with Iran International TV in London, Tisteri credited the Ahvaz National Resistance (ANR) with the attack. He said the Ahvaz independence movement endorsed “armed struggle against the military and legitimate targets, including oil pipelines and facilities, the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] IRGC and military forces of the Islamic Republic, to the extent that ordinary citizens are not harmed.”
The other organisation that claimed responsibility for the attack was the Islamic State (ISIS). On September 23, ISIS released a video allegedly showing three perpetrators on their way to the parade, which largely discredits Tisteri’s claim on behalf of the Ahvazi group.
Authorities in Denmark remain tight-lipped but, in an October 30 news conference, Danish Security and Intelligence Service chief Finn Borch Andersen said an arrest had been made in Gothenburg, Sweden. Andersen said the individual had been arrested on suspicion of helping an unspecified Iranian intelligence service “to act in Denmark” and for alleged involvement in a plot to assassinate members of the ASMLA.
Norway’s TV2 reported that the arrested man is a father in his 30s. He is said to have achieved a residence permit — possibly political asylum — in Norway by claiming he was opposed to the regime in Iran. He has a “technical education” from Iran and worked with different companies in the IT sector in Norway.
He attracted the interest of Danish police when he photographed ASMLA’s small office from a car with Swedish registration plates. He shook off the Danish police tailing him but was apprehended in Sweden.
It is not yet known which Iranian intelligence service the Iranian/Norwegian dual national was working for. However, considering the IRGC was targeted in the Ahvaz terror attack, the suspect probably cooperates with the IRGC Intelligence Organisation. This intelligence outfit’s calculations may differ from those of the more professional Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
The MOIS has, from the mid-1990s, generally shied from the assassination of Iranians abroad but the IRGC Intelligence Organisation is just asserting itself as the premier agent of extraterritorial assassinations.
Had the IRGC Intelligence assassinated Tisteri and his associates, it would have accomplished two things: intimidating the Iranian opposition at home and embarrassing President Hassan Rohani and his technocratic government abroad.
In any case, regardless of which agency was behind the suspected terror plot in Denmark, Europe must brace itself for more assassination attempts.

Husband of Pakistan Blasphemy Case Woman Pleads for Asylum
الحكومة الباكستانية لم تطلق سراح المسيحية اسيا بيبي بعد تبرئتها من تهمة التجديف وزوجها يطالب باللجوء خوفاً على حياة عائلته
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/68661/husband-of-pakistan-blasphemy-case-woman-pleads-for-asylum-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%85-%d8%aa%d8%b7%d9%84/