LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
February 13/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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How China and Pakistan could lay the Road to Peace in Afghanistan
Syed Jawaid Iqbal/Al Arabiya/February 12/18
Referred to as an interminable and protracted war, the ongoing US-led war in Afghanistan is becoming a stalemate with no end in sight in the near or long term. Since the violence and bloodshed have been the most common phenomenon in an already war-torn region, the war is perhaps an inevitable part of the life being led by the Afghan people for the past decades, while any attempt to bring peace in the region is bound to meet rabid resistance owing to the conflict of interest among the concerned stakeholders who seem to be at odds with each other, following their own agenda or list of priorities under the guise of peace-building efforts.
Despite all its military might, the US war in Afghanistan, which has seen two phases (Operation Enduring Freedom 2001–2014 and Operation Freedom's Sentinel 2015 to the present), is yet to achieve a face-saving end, while Donald Trump’s particular style of achieving results is making it even more unlikely to bring the Afghan war to an acceptable end not only for the United States, but also for its key partners and other countries in the region. The US’s arm-twisting tactics against Pakistan to ‘do more’ are at its limits and the recent aid suspension to its tested ally has not paid off.
The US State Department, for instance, has informed Congress that the US government’s decision to suspend its security assistance to Pakistan has so far failed to achieve its objective: forcing Islamabad to change its policies. “There certainly hasn’t been any change that we would consider final and irrevocable. They have engaged in discussions with us, but there hasn’t been a sufficient amount of action yet that we would be lifting that suspension of security assistance.” say John Sullivan, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State.
Commander US Central Command (Centcom) General Joseph L Votel has candidly accepted the fact that Pakistan happens to be an important US ally when it comes to maintaining peace and security in South Asia and to ensure peace in the Afghan region, it is important that the strategy to bring the Taliban to the table be implemented speedily.
“We are very busily implementing our South Asia strategy, which is designed to bring the Taliban to the reconciliation table and end this very, very lengthy conflict (in Afghanistan),” says General Votel.
Short of options
With its flawed approach towards Pakistan, the US seems to be short of options at the moment. However, the initiation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has emerged as a silver lining for the war-torn region. This is because China wants to extend the $57 billion CPEC to Afghanistan, and as per Afghan media, after the inclusion of Afghanistan, the name of the corridor will be changed into China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CAPEC), as part of China’s ambitious BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) linking China with Asia, Europe and beyond.
This is the time the Afghan leadership should come forward and decide how long a troubled Afghanistan can afford the ongoing war as well as the consistent loss of innocent lives.
According to Yao Jing, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Kabul could become part of economic activities going on in the region and, for this reason, China is ready to play its role for resumption of a peace process for bringing stability in Afghanistan. “The recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan are our concern and we are ready to play a role for resumption of the peace process. Both Pakistan and China are close neighbors and we desire a peaceful Afghanistan,” says Yao Jing.
Since both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been uneasy neighbors ever since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, China has tried to promote talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the diplomatic ties between both the countries have been severed, as Afghanistan accuses Pakistan for supporting Taliban militants who have been fighting the U.S. forces to limit the influence of India in Afghanistan.
Speaking after the first trilateral meeting, which was held between the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Wang said the economic corridor connecting China, Pakistan and Afghanistan could benefit the whole region and act as an impetus for development the war-torn region needs desperately. He said Afghanistan has an urgent need to develop and improve people’s lives and hopes it can join inter-connectivity initiatives.
“So China and Pakistan are willing to look at with Afghanistan, on the basis of win-win, mutually beneficial principles, using an appropriate means to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan,” according to Yao Jing, Chinese Ambassador.
If actualized into action, the extension of CPEC to Afghanistan will serve a long way in bringing about the much-needed stability in Afghanistan and will positively impact the socio-economic condition of the Afghan nation. However, it needs a paradigm shift the way the U.S. wants to see things taking place in the region, which seems unlikely at the moment, considering the ground realities. This is the time the Afghan leadership should come forward and decide how long a troubled Afghanistan can afford the ongoing war as well as the consistent loss of innocent lives. In Afghanistan, it is likely that the road to peace will now passing through CPEC.

ANALYSIS: How Iran’s regime enters its 40th year as an Islamic Republic
النظام الإيراني الجمهوري الإسلامي يدخل عامه الأربعين
Heshmat Alavi/Al Arabiya /February 12/ 2018
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/62537
February 11 marked the beginning of the 40th year Iran's clerics are ruling over what they describe as an "Islamic Republic."
The fact that this regime is facing a whirlwind of domestic and foreign crises goes beyond doubt. While Tehran's state media boasts massive support among the populace, remarks heard recently from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei portray a canvas of impasse, a weak entity and the road ahead being uphill, to say the least.
In response to increasing unrest across the country protesting political and economic corruption, Khamenei acknowledged the fact that "fighting cruelty and corruption is very difficult… it will not be resolved easily."
He is acknowledging the growing scope of systematic corruption riddling the ruling apparatus, and his regime's weakness in tackling such a demanding issue. Khamenei's words also indicate Iran's population will no longer tolerate discrimination, injustice and state-sponsored corruption.
Interesting is how in his latest remarks Khamenei refuses to discuss the 120-day ultimatum issued by U.S. President Donald Trump over the fate of the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This further shows his weak hand, especially since Europe is cooperating with Washington's demands of taking on Tehran's meddling across the Middle East and ballistic missile program.
Khamenei's silence is very meaningful and will be devastating for his regime in the near future.
"Systemized corruption"
Political and economic corruption is now considered institutionalized in Iran's governing systems, ranking this country as one of the world's most corrupts states. Obviously, economic corruption is merely one result of political corruption, and after 40 years we have come to learn the very subject of corruption has become an inseparable aspect of Iran's regime.
Iranian Vice President Es'hagh Jahangiri says "termite corruption" is infecting every essence of Iran's political and economic infrastructure, while Ahmad Tavakoli, head of Iran's Expediency Council goes further.
"Unfortunately, corruption has become systematic. If measures are not taken, corruption will most definitely bring an end to the Islamic republic," he adds, cited by the semi-official Tasnim news agency.
Changing times
Once known for its chest-thumping in refusing to discuss its role in the internal affairs of countries across the Middle East and the so-called "defensive" ballistic missile program, Iran, sensing the changing times, is now signaling steps back in this regard.
In a public acknowledgment of increasing international pressures and Europe distancing away from Iran, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in Paris how Tehran would be willing to discuss "other issues" if the West makes certain the JCPOA remains "a successful experience."
Although these remarks may seem rather harsh, those familiar with the language used by Iranian officials understand this is saber-rattling to save face, knowing discussions over "other issues" will be grueling and far more demanding than anything Tehran experienced during the Obama years.
Obvious is how Iran's hardliners fiercely oppose such talks, yet all parties of this factionalized regime are realizing there is no good option ahead, and only choosing from bad and worse.
With Trump providing a last chance for what he describes as "the worst deal ever," the Europe trio of Britain, France and Germany, all seeking to preserve the JCPOA due to their economic interests in Iran, are scrambling to blueprint a plan addressing Trump's concerns over Tehran's destructive role in the Middle East and ballistic missile drive.
Dirty money
Despite Araqchi's claim of there being no link between the Iran nuclear accord and its influence across the region, new evidence shows the U.S. government tracing portions of the $1.7 billion released by the Obama administration to Tehran – as part of the JCPOA signing – has found its way into the hands of Iran-supported terrorists.
Informed sources are indicating how Tehran has been allocating such funds to pay members of the Lebanese Hezbollah, known as Iran's main proxy group and provide the budget needed for the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards element described as Iran's leading foreign intelligence arm involved also in covert action.
The Houthis of Yemen should also be sending their gratitude to Team Obama as evidence shows they, too, have received dividends of the notorious cash load airlifted to Iran. Tehran is using the Houthis to exert pressure on Riyadh from its own backyard.
This is not good news for Iran as such findings will most likely further convince Trump in his effort against the JCPOA. As heard from Araqchi, Tehran understands perfectly well the scrapping of this accord and the return of crippling sanctions, coupled with ongoing domestic protests, are a recipe for disaster.
Troubling months
In another sign of the Trump administration's determination to take on the issue of Iran's belligerence, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is in the region, paying visits to Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Kuwait.
Iran is most definitely a major topic of his discussions and Tehran is bracing for possibly a new onslaught of regional pressure, similar to that of Europe, making costing demands.
With Iran protests taking a toll on the regime – as seen on Sunday with many cities witnessing people boycotting pro-regime rallies and protesters hitting the streets at night – and increasing word of banks going bankrupt, the months ahead look grim for Iran. This regime understands better than anyone that the public's increasing wrath will be demanding, and it is using the JCPOA, its regional influence and ballistic missile program to bargain with the international community.
The difference between now and 2015 is that the White House is not at all fond of Iran's bellicosity, and more importantly, the Iranian people are making serious demands of regime change.

Israel Signaling a Heavy Price for Iranian 'Entrenchment' in Syria
David Makovsky/The Washington Institute/February 12/2018
اشارات إسرائيلية للثمن المرتفع لتمدد إيران في سوريا
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/62554
If Tehran keeps trying to increase its military foothold in Syria, Israel may ramp up its strikes, so Washington should consider a more active posture that reduces the risks of escalation.
By striking Syrian antiaircraft forces and installations where Iranian personnel are located this weekend, Israel seems intent on forcing key players to recognize its deep interest in limiting Tehran's military presence in Syria. If Iranian leaders ignore this interest, they risk triggering a rapid military escalation.
In Israel, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and various military leaders have repeatedly stated that their main concern is avoiding Iranian military "entrenchment" on their northeastern doorstep. During his speech to the UN General Assembly last September, Netanyahu warned that Israel will not accept Tehran's development of advanced missile production capabilities in Syria and Lebanon, and that it "will act to prevent Iran from establishing permanent military bases in Syria for its air, sea, and ground forces." At a time when the Islamic Republic's main proxy, Hezbollah, is pointing more than 100,000 rockets at Israel, fears of a joint Lebanon-Syria front are growing.
The weekend clashes attracted international attention for a variety of reasons. They marked the first time an Israeli fighter jet has been shot down over Syria since the early 1980s. Moreover, the jet in question was part of an operation targeting an Iranian command center at a Syrian base—an unusual move given that Israeli strikes in Syria typically focus on discrete Hezbollah forces. The command center strike came on the heels of an Iranian drone infiltrating Israel, so the exchange could lead to further escalation.
Whatever the case, Israel seems keen on sending messages to several players:
The Assad regime. Although an Iranian-backed Assad victory in Syria is not in Israel's strategic or moral interests, Jerusalem appears to understand that it cannot decisively affect the war's outcome. It has therefore focused more on altering Iran's role there. Toward that end, it wants Damascus to realize the price of allowing Iran to house military personnel at Syrian bases. A number of Israel's strikes this weekend targeted bases far from the site where the drone was launched, so deterrence was likely as much a part of the game plan as retaliation.
To be sure, Bashar al-Assad is deeply indebted to the Iranians for helping to salvage his rule, so he cannot simply dictate orders to them. Yet if Israel continues exacting a serious cost because of Iranian involvement, Assad may feel compelled to request—whether directly or via Russia—that they dial back their presence. The regime has already shown signs of trying to persuade Tehran in this regard; according to Israeli officials, the Iranian chief of staff had to cool his heels during a recent visit to Damascus while Assad delayed signing any long-term military commitments.
When signaling Damascus, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seem to distinguish between the Assad regime's domestic military activities and Iran's role in backing them. Senior Israeli military officials have sent messages to Assad via third parties indicating that they do not oppose him extending his sovereignty in Syria on his own, but that they will view the situation very differently if he does so with Iran, Hezbollah, and Shia militias in tow.
Iran. The strikes were also intended as a warning that the IDF will not accept Iranian military activities or installations that threaten Israel. Contrary to some reports, such strikes are not a response to recent Iranian phosphate contracts or other economic moves in Syria. Rather, Israeli officials aim to hinder the development of major military infrastructure—seaports, airports, bases for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units, or precision-guided missile production facilities for Hezbollah.
Israel has launched other strikes in recent months to define specific cases of unacceptable entrenchment and emphasize its redlines. In September, it reportedly hit a facility near the northwest Syrian town of Masyaf that IDF officials say was used to dramatically upgrade old rockets. In December, it struck a barracks for Iranian-backed Shia militias at al-Kiswah, within fifty kilometers of the Golan border. And it has repeatedly retaliated against Hezbollah for violating the de-escalation zone in southern Syria.
The United States. Following the latest strikes, the Trump administration issued statements supporting Israel's right to self-defense, but it has not provided any military assistance (at least publicly) for operations against Iranian forces in Syria. Washington has announced that it will retain some 2,000 troops east of the Euphrates River in northern and eastern Syria, but their mission remains unclear beyond defeating the Islamic State. The administration has also focused on managing Turkish-Kurdish tensions, with both Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster visiting Ankara recently. In contrast, there are few tangible indications on the ground that Washington is actively trying to limit Iranian activity in Syria, apart from Tillerson's general statements that the continued U.S. military presence is partly designed to curb Tehran's local influence.
Some IDF officials have expressed hope that President Trump's frequent criticism of Tehran's regional ambitions presages a wider U.S. military effort against Iranian activity in Syria, but others remain skeptical. At the very least, a U.S. presence along the Syria-Iraq border could help prevent Iran from transferring weapons to Hezbollah and other actors by land. Due to array of political sensitivities, however, Israel will likely be careful not to goad Washington into direct military action against Iranian sites.
At the moment, it is unclear whether the risks posed by the weekend strikes will spur Washington to shift its policy in any way. For instance, will the threat of wider conflict between Israel and Iran make the administration more wary of escalation, more active in pursuing the Geneva peace talks toward a new political arrangement in Syria, and more willing to coordinate U.S. actions there with Turkey and Israel?
Russia. The author's recent meetings with political and security officials in Israel suggest that Jerusalem sees Russia as its best hope for constraining Iran's activities next door, at least in the short term. It is no coincidence that Netanyahu has visited President Vladimir Putin seven times in the two-and-a-half years since Moscow launched its intervention in Syria. Given Russia's own competition with Iran over Syria and its concerns about widening the war, Israeli officials hope that Moscow views IDF strikes as a welcome check on Iran's influence. They also believe that Damascus needs Russia more than it needs Iran, especially now that the objective of maintaining Assad's rule has been achieved.
Indeed, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to tolerate Israeli strikes, which offer a far easier means of constraining Iran's presence in Syria than doing so itself. Senior IDF officials are also very pleased that Moscow has not allowed Iran to build new military infrastructure near Russian facilities at Syria's Tartus port or Hmeimim Air Base—something Tehran has seemingly longed to do in order to deter attacks by Israel or other actors. In addition, Russia has refrained from using its advanced S-400 antiaircraft systems to prevent Israeli strikes.
Jerusalem does not publicly highlight these favorable steps, mainly to avoid embarrassing Moscow among its Iranian and Hezbollah partners. At the same time, however, Israel is sober about the limits of Russian influence. Although Putin seems willing to constrain Tehran's operations in Syria and deny its base requests, he has not taken any military actions against Iranian installations there. For now, the alliance with Tehran still serves Russia's regional interests, and the Kremlin's objectives are far more aligned with Iran's than with Israel's. The Islamic Republic has been a significant purchaser of Russian arms, and both countries have partnered with Hezbollah to keep Assad from being toppled.
CONCLUSION
Although Israel does not seek military escalation in Syria, it is determined not to let Iran develop the military capacity to change the equation on its northern borders. And Israeli officials will no doubt maintain this posture even if they have to keep acting alone, albeit with indirect assists from Moscow and Washington. This means that continued Iranian efforts to establish a military presence in Syria will likely be met with increased Israeli strikes. At a certain point, persistent Iranian efforts may convince Israel that deterrence has failed. Predicting that point is difficult, but if it is reached, the prospects of escalation in Syria and perhaps even direct Israeli-Iranian conflict will become far more likely.
*David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute.