LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
August 26/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Macron's Partition of France?
Yves Mamou/ Gatestone Institute.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12909/macron-partition-france
The first legislative rider abolished the obligation of religious associations to declare themselves as lobbying groups -- a measure that clearly opens the way for entities such as Muslim Brotherhood to lobby Members of Parliament without leaving a trace.
Is it, however, the business of the secular State of France to organize Muslims and train "republican" imams?
The tradition in France ever since the 1905 secularism law -- one accepted by all religions except Islam -- is that religion may not to impose its rules on secular society. Now it is France that must adapt to Islam.
The big question is: Who will be heading and managing this new framework? Will it be the Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful organization, which controls more than 2,000 mosques in France? Or a young guard of Muslim technocrats close to the president but with no ties to mosques, imams and the organized Muslim community in general?
In a confessional book, "A President Shouldn't Say That...", published in 2016, a few months before the 2017 French presidential election, France's then President François Hollande admitted that France has "a problem with Islam. No one doubts it," he wrote. He wrote as well that France has a problem with veiled women in public and with mass immigration. Then he added: "How can one avoid a partition? Because that is still what is happening: a partition".
The "partition" about which Hollande was talking was the partition of France -- one part for Muslims and another for non-Muslims.
Hollande's successor, President Emmanuel Macron, elected to office in 2017, appears to think that this risk of partition is actually the solution. Looking at what he has said and done since his election, one can say that the division of the country is in progress. Officially, of course, Macron continues to be the guardian of the Constitution, which embodies national unity. But step by step, a strategy of the partition of France appears to be at work.
The first step of this partition process was, it seems, to create a new adversary. For Macron, the adversary was not radical Islam, which some see as having murdered hundreds of people in France in recent years, but radical secularism, which has never murdered anybody. In December 2017, for instance, a few months after his election, Macron organized a meeting with the representatives of six religions (Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist) at the presidential Elysée Palace. At this meeting, Macron reportedly "critically questioned the radicalization of secularism." Not much filtered out of this meeting beyond that little quote -- presumably on purpose. In October 2016, before his election, Macron had denounced the defenders of "a spiteful vision of secularism." After his election, however, the presidential creed has never varied. According to it, political Islam is a not the problem; the resistance to it is.In this strategy -- to isolate secularism and build it up as the new adversary -- Macron needed allies. He found one easily in the guise of the Catholic Church, which has suffered in France since a law in 1905 broke the link between Church and state. In April 2018, Macron accepted an invitation from the Conference of Bishops of France, and, in the sumptuous decor of the College of the Bernardins, in front of more than 400 Catholic personages, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, delivered an erudite and lyrical speech, empty of any proposition apart from an allusion to "repair the damaged link" between the Church and the state. After the speech, the 400 Catholic officials jumped to their feet and gave him a standing ovation.
In June 2018, Macron revitalized his vision by visiting Pope Francis in the Vatican and accepting from him the inherited title of Honorary Canon of the Basilica of St. John Lateran. Macron also reaffirmed his willingness "to deepen our relations of friendship and trust with the Holy See".
With this powerful Catholic ally in his pocket, Macron could launch the second stage of what seems his partition strategy: To launch a process of empowering the Muslims in France by entrusting them with the keys of "urban policy," the synonym for France's integration and assimilation policy. In the last 30 years, the French state has poured 48 billion euros into renewal projects in the poor suburbs that house millions of immigrants -- including millions of first-, second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants. The new buildings, new roads and new public transit vehicles, however, seem to have produced the opposite of the desired effect: recurrent riots, attacks on schools and police precincts, drug dealing on almost every corner, a proliferation of Salafist mosques and more than 1,700 jihadists gone to join ISIS.
In May 2018, Macron skillfully rejected the recommendation of the Borloo Report to pour another 48 billion euros over another 30 years, a policy that has already failed. Instead of continuing to buy a (shaky) social peace with billions of taxpayers' money, Macron did better: he created the "Presidential Council of the City", a political structure, composed mostly of Muslim notables (two third of the total members of the Council) and representatives of organizations working in the suburbs. Today, this body is in charge of monitoring the urban policy. There are no more billions, but there is a "Muslim advisory committee" to redirect the money from the old policy. Two agencies are involved in financing the renovation of neighborhoods in "sensitive urban areas": ANRU (National Agency for Urban Renewal) and ACSÉ (Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities). Both of these agencies will soon be replaced by the Office of the Commissioner General for Territorial Equality. The budget devoted to the urban policy, described in the draft budget, law amounts to 429 million euros for 2018.
The idea of entrusting the keys of the Muslim suburbs to Islamic organizations is not new. It was first formulated by State Counselor Thierry Tuot in a famous report, "The Great Nation: For an Inclusive society", presented in 2013 to then-Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault. The main proposal in the report was to transfer urban policy to Islamic organizations, with the role of the State being reduced merely to subsidize them.
To complete this scheme of empowering political Islam in France, two legislative riders were voted in the "Law for a State in the Service of a Trusting Society", at the end of June 2018. The first legislative rider abolished the obligation of religious associations from declaring themselves as lobbying groups. This measure clearly opens the way for entities such as the Muslim Brotherhood movement to lobby Members of Parliament without leaving a trace. The second legislative rider -- in contravention of the secularism law of 1905 -- authorized all religious organizations to act as private actors in the real estate market. According to the Comité Laïcité République (Committee for Secularism of the Republic, CLR), this legislative rider would deprive a municipality or a region of the ability to appropriate land or buildings sold by a church or a mosque. "Thus, the code of town planning and the law of 1905 would be modified for this purpose" said CLR. In other words, private funding for creeds is allowed.
The third stage of partition is a work in progress. It concerns the tentative plan to build an "Islam of France" -- disconnected from the old "Islam in France." In other words, the Grand Mosque of Paris may no longer be considered as if it is the equivalent of the Algerian Embassy. "As soon as this autumn, we will give to Islam a framework and rules to be sure this religion will be exercised in a manner consistent with the laws of the Republic", Macron said. It was a surprising declaration because the tradition in France since the 1905 law -- and a tradition accepted by all religions except Islam -- is that religion may not to impose its rules on secular society. Now it seems that France has to adapt to Islam.
What will happen in September? The government seems to be thinking of doing what Austria did: cutting the financial ties between French Muslim communities and their countries of origin (e.g. Turkey, Algeria, Morocco); creating a tax on the halal business (which makes more than 6 billion euros annually), and then using these new tax revenues to train "republican" imams in France.
The government also appears to intend to create a kind of national agency to organize pilgrimages to Mecca. Estimated at more than 250 million euros, the business of pilgrimages is trusteed by about 40 Muslim travel agencies approved by the Ministry of Hajj of Saudi Arabia to receive their quotas of visas. Many Muslim travel agencies are rumored to operate illegally and charge exorbitant prices for bad service. So, Macron is supposed to reform and give the system an appearance of "normalcy". These are the "framework" and "laws" Macron is talking about.
The big question is: Who will be heading and managing this framework? The Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful organization, which controls more than 2,000 mosques in France? Or a young guard of Muslim technocrats close to president but with no ties to mosques, imams and the organized Muslim community in general? We will soon know. Additionally, rumors are spreading that Tareq Oubrou, an imam in Bordeaux, and known to be a prominent figure of Muslim Brotherhood, could become "Grand Imam of France".
Is it, however, the business of the secular State of France to organize Muslims and train "republican" imams? No, not even slightly. Is it a problem that two-thirds of the imams serving in France are not fluent in French? Can Islamist imams be trained the "republican" way? Yes, but for what result? The imam of Brest, in Brittany, became famous because he was filmed explaining to children that music could transform a listener into a pig or a monkey, and he filmed himself drinking camel urine; it is written in a Hadith that camel urine is good as medicine. In 2017, the same imam of Brest was graduated, "referent-secularity" – meaning, an Islamist informed about what is secularism but with no obligation to respect it -- from the University of Rennes in Brittany.
Back in 1627, Cardinal de Richelieu, the prime minister of King Louis XIII, stormed the city of la Rochelle in southwest France to bring back the Protestants to the bosom of France. Now, in 2018, Macron is providing aid to French Muslims to bring back the Muslims to the bosom of France.
*Yves Mamou, author and journalist, based in France, worked for two decades as a journalist for Le Monde. His next book, "Le Grand abandon, les élites françaises et l'islamisme," (The Great Abandonment, French Elites and Islamism) is to be published in October, 2018.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Analysis Everyone Wants to Get Iran Out of Syria. But No One Knows How to Do It
أمير تيبون من الهآررتس: الجميع يريد اخراج إيران من سوريا ولكن لا أحد يعرف كيف يفعل ذلك
Amir Tibon/Haaretz/August 25/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/67016/amir-tibon-haaretz-everyone-wants-to-get-iran-out-of-syria-but-no-one-knows-how-to-do-it-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A2%D8%B1%D8%B1/
Russia would essentially have to fight Iran to get it out of Syria, where Tehran aims to continue the 30-year alliance and benefit from the reconstruction after the civil war, experts say
WASHINGTON — The U.S. national security adviser, John Bolton, has devoted the past week to discussions with Israel and Russia on the future of Syria. At the beginning of the week, just before he arrived in Israel, Bolton said Russia agreed with the United States that Iranian forces must leave Syria, but Moscow doesn’t think it has the ability to force them out. At the end of the week, as Bolton heads back to Washington, that statement still seems true.
On paper there seems to be a consensus among Israel, the United States, Russia and leading Arab countries that Iran must get out of Syria. “The military threat Iran poses in Syria is a big concern everywhere in the region,” a senior White House official told Haaretz. The sticking point, however, is the best way to deal with that military threat. Everyone wants Iran out, but does anyone have a credible plan to achieve this?
So far, Israel has laid the responsibility for pushing Iran out on Russia. The Moscow-Tehran alliance helped Syrian President Bashar Assad emerge victorious from seven years of civil war. Iran played an important role in Assad’s victory, but Russia’s role was decisive, and Israeli officials were hoping that President Vladimir Putin would use his influence to drive Iran out.
Russia, however, has told Israel a number of times that it doesn’t have this ability. At one point, Putin told Bolton that he also wants Iran to leave Syria, but that Russia alone can’t achieve this. So far, Russia has kept Iranian forces 85 kilometers (53 miles) from the Israeli border, with one notable exception: Iranians are still present in and around Damascus.
The Trump administration, meanwhile, has included an Iranian withdrawal from Syria among the dozen conditions for any new agreement between Tehran and Washington that would replace the 2015 nuclear deal. U.S. policy is to tighten financial pressure on Iran through sanctions in the hope that Tehran either returns to the negotiating table and agrees to leave Syria, or its economic crisis worsens and the Islamic Republic is forced to minimize its investment in military interventions abroad.
Waiting for the reconstruction
Still, some analysts believe that the entire debate over “pushing Iran out of Syria” is unrealistic. Iran has thousands of soldiers and Shi’ite militia fighters on Syrian soil, and it’s anxiously waiting to reap the benefits of Syria’s reconstruction process. Getting all of its military and loyal militias out of Syria could hurt its plans to profit from the rebuilding at a time when the country desperately needs income because of the American pressure.
Tamara Cofman Wittes, a Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution, wrote last month on Twitter that “Iran and Syria have an alliance of 30+ years’ duration,” adding that the idea that the United States, even with Russia’s concurrence, could engineer Iran’s ouster from Syria was preposterous. She called this “yet another dishonest statement of U.S. policy toward this horrific war.”
Hussein Ibish, an expert at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told Haaretz that for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, three of Iran’s main rivals in the Middle East, the key objective right now is to contain Iran’s presence in Syria. “They originally wanted to see Iran rolled out of Syria, but there is an understanding that right now, this will be very hard to achieve,” Ibish said. “A more realistic goal, for the time being, is to deny Iran any further victories and achievements in Syria.”
One concern for those countries and Israel is the possibility of Iran creating a “corridor” of military and political power stretching from Tehran to Iraq, Syria and into Lebanon. Israel considers that scenario a strategic threat and has shown that it won’t hesitate to take military action to stall the emergence of such a corridor. But there’s a big difference between blocking that scenario and completely kicking Iran out of Syria.
“Bolton’s assessment is sadly realistic. It would take a level of commitment by Russia that is not in the cards – essentially to fight Iran in Syria – to ensure Iran’s full departure,” said Dan Shapiro, the previous U.S. ambassador to Israel.
“So Israel and the U.S. should focus on ensuring that Israel continues to have the freedom of action necessary to strike Iranian targets in Syria as needed to keep the threat from reaching unacceptable proportions. And U.S. troops should remain in Syria, which helps impose limits on areas Iran can operate.”
One option that has been raised by some Israeli officials is that Assad could eventually become a partner for ensuring Iran’s ouster. The logic is that just like Russia, Assad has no use for an Iranian presence in his country once he ensures his victory in the civil war.
In fact, Iran can only become a source of danger for Assad because of Tehran’s possible confrontations with Israel. But Assad contradicted this thesis by saying last month that he wants Iran and Hezbollah to remain in Syria for a long time and help him ensure his country’s stability.
Keeping Assad
Also, some experts believe that trying to work with Assad will be inevitable for the United States and other players in the region as he deepens his control over his country. “Normalization of Assad” is how Aaron David Miller, a former Middle East adviser to Republican and Democratic administrations, described the emerging policy.
Assad is “the problem but will likely be part of a solution,” Miller wrote on Twitter, adding that this process “began under Obama; has accelerated under Trump’s courting of Putin. Israel has bought on; the Lebanese too; Turkey will have no choice; and Jordan as well.”
A senior European diplomat has told Haaretz that European leaders are concerned about possible U.S.-Russian understandings on Syria that would include Washington allowing a “normalization” of Assad.
But can some level of acceptance of Assad help drive out Iran? The same European diplomat said the chances of that happening are “very low,” explaining that “Assad needs Iran and will continue to need Iran in the near future. His rule is not going be strong and stable even once he controls the entire country. Iran’s presence will help him deter the angry and oppressed population of his country from even thinking about reigniting the civil war. He won’t give up on that anytime soon.”
A key aspect of Iran’s support for Assad has been its use in Syria of Shi’ite militias from countries in the wider region such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Any discussion about Iran’s future in Syria includes those militias, and there are no signs at the moment that the Assad regime is willing to get rid of them.
“Their continued presence in Syria provides the regime with an opportunity to consolidate its rule and expand its authority beyond major urban population centers,” said Ali Alfoneh, an expert on Iran who has written about the various militias operating in Syria. “In the longer term, we may even witness a permanent presence of those militias on Syrian territory and a demographic-sectarian change in strategic areas.
Alfoneh added that “I have the sense that we have reached a point where all parties involved are used to the presence of these militias, including Israel. As long as there is no or very small Shi’a militia presence at the Israeli border, all parties can live with status quo.” Despite all the rhetoric about kicking Iran out of Syria, that last observation seems to be true – at least for now.

The social media phenomenon and bullying the authority
Fahad Suleiman Shoqiran/Al Arabiya/August 25/18
There is at least one smart device in every person’s hand. The Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission states that there are 43 million mobile phone subscribers in Saudi Arabia.
Certainly, the number in other Gulf States is close to this. Most of the subscribers use the applications found on these phones – applications which are deceitful and which disillusion users as it makes them think their ability to influence is huge. However, anyone who has been observing this social media phenomenon knows that a generation of idiots is fast spreading in a terrible way.
The new agent of chaos
This phenomenon has weakened intelligence, destroyed the book, dissipated the gift of memorizing and made hobbies like writing with the pen a memory from the past.
The gravity of this phenomenon is represented in its disastrous consequences on societies. The smart device is about to replace the social construct. For example, at the peak of Saudi preparations for the Hajj season, a person assaulted a security personnel, thus threatening and disobeying public order. This is an assault against the party which represents “the state’s legitimate use of force” as Max Weber puts it.
It is not enough to merely regulate the price of advertisements on social media networks. What is more important is to limit their misuse and employ them for the right purposes because this bullying as such deeply threatens the state’s entity and its stability, misleads the public perception, disrespects rules and laws and causes chaos that has audaciously turned against the values regulating the public domain.
What’s also noticeable is that these tools are used to exacerbate existing ills or to spread new contagion, thus promoting chances of sedition, igniting symbolic civil wars and waking up eradicative identities.
Social media tools are often used to exacerbate existing ills or to spread new contagion in society
Terrorist governments may exploit the influence of those to whitewash their projects and root their militant situation via those involved in this phenomenon and of whom the majority of them belongs to the young and enthusiastic generations. They either become rogue revolutionaries, destructive terrorists or professional criminals. The countries that are addicted to supporting such social media users are well known, and the countries of the region and the world have suffered from the consequences.
It is foolish to equate being garrulous with exercising freedom of expression. The truth is that these forums are mere platforms for financial dealings, verbal buffoonery and for venting idiocy. We must stop the public from such activities, and state institutions must undertake extensive legislative studies to rationalize the use of social media.
Assault on intelligence
It’s dangerous how this phenomenon has strengthened values that are hostile to humanity. One of the most dangerous side effects of this malaise is the rise in unjustified egocentrism. The blight increases when governmental institutions make things worse by polarizing these groups to eradicate certain phenomena or by utilizing them for publicity, and we have seen the negative results of such use.
The social media phenomenon has also blurred the difference between arguments made in chat forums and analyses conducted by using scientific standards. The masses by their nature, as Gustave Le Bon put it, are not too inclined to reflect. Le Bon said that knowing the temperament of the masses is very important for rulers of a state in order to be wary of the consequences of any negligence of a reckless act that may happen and harm the state entity.
Despite the differences between the two phenomena, i.e. what Le Bon discusses and what we suffer from, it seems that some of the matters that he discussed could be of use to us. For example, Le Bon said that the individual forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to voluntarily yield to instincts in an irresponsible manner. He said that great decay happens when the conscious personality disappears, making way for a blind fellowship with the joint blind conviction of the need to go through a journey which limit is the mirage.
Need for studying social media
We must admit that the menace of social media has reached its limit. The state must immediately take the initiative to investigate and analyze this phenomenon, and then assess the situation to finally rationalize its effectiveness and control its limits. As for the slogans of freedom of expression and the right to have a say, then these all come in second after guaranteeing the security of the state and its institutions and are dependent on it.
This creeping trend has not stopped at flaunting, boasting and being audaciously ignorant but its waves have reached security men. This is a very dangerous indicator because it threatens the foundations of the state.
In his book Al-Basa’ir wa al-Dhakha’ir, Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi said that when Abu Hubayra was asked: What are the limits of stupidity?! He said: It has no limits.
The same applies to the social media phenomenon. It’s a state of a disastrous collective stupidity.

Iran and Haider al-Abadi’s battle
Hazem Saghieh/Al Arabiya/August 25/18
The recent political and media backlash faced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, as well as Tehran’s refusal to receive him, has not only exposed the criticality of the Iraqi situation and position but also hints there is an available opportunity that must not be ignored.
Abadi said he disagrees with the policy of sanctions but he added that he cannot but commit to them out of concern for Iraq’s national interests. This stance also expresses the country’s humble capabilities.
Following the attack against him, he had to ease his position and decided against having any financial deals with Tehran in dollars.
National interest trumps sectarianism
Abadi’s stance is correct as any statesman has to give priority to his country’s national interests and give due consideration to the balance of power. Even Iran had taken a similar decision when Iraq was facing severe economic sanctions that impoverished its people but did not affect Saddam Hussein’s hold on power.
However, Abadi’s position clashes with facts and interests that have accumulated since 2003, particularly since the US troops’ withdrawal which began in 2007 and which concluded in 2011 leaving Iraq under Iran’s mercy as the only player.
Haider al-Abadi’s conviction of the necessity to take an unusual step to limit Iraqi collapse is most probably sensing approval by Al-Sistani reference
In Iraq, two major wills converged. The first was of Iran that sought to fill the vacuum left by the West, especially by the US, and that sought through neighboring Iraq to control an imperial geographic range that stretches from Yemen in the south to Gaza in the west so it (Tehran) can have the final word regarding the situation of some Arab countries, mainly Syria, and to control the course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The second will is that of certain Iraqi Shiite parties that have always had Iran’s sponsorship and support. These parties, primarily former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Forces and its militias, have since the beginning preferred to hand over Iraq to Iran on a golden plate.
This relationship, among other issues, causes this confusion between the national identity and the religious and sectarian identities, and which our region suffers from.
Iran’s diabolical design
Anyway, the confluence of these two dynamic wills established a huge network of interests and loyalties that obstructed the Iraqi state and its proper operation. It also provoked Iraqi nationalism and mobilized non-Shiite Iraqis, whether Sunnis, Kurds and others.
The process of collapse recently reached an advanced stage, as evident in the popular protests against corruption and against the water and electricity crises. These protests were preceded by the position of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose bloc came in first in the parliamentary elections in Iraq.
Meanwhile, the protesters did not hesitate to call out Iran and to demand liberation from its influence and from its followers. This further revealed how critical the situation is.
On the other hand, the Iraqi national project amid these policies is threatened by unprecedented challenges, such as the emergence of ‘southern unrest’ demanding to separate Basra from Iraq.
Haidar al-Abadi’s conviction of the necessity to take an unusual step to limit Iraqi collapse is most probably sensing approval by al-Sistani reference.
The weight represented by the Shiite reference will be major to face the forces that have rushed to attack the prime minister and who are striking with Iran’s sword. However, it is also certain that Iran’s situation itself has provided an encouraging factor that cannot be underestimated.
Throwing off Iran’s yoke
The terrible economic conditions, the growing conflicts within the ruling elite and the rising accusations among its parties are encouraging to go ahead and regain Iraq’s freedom from Iran’s clutches.
This does not negate the fact that Iran will try, be it directly or through its proxies, to resume its battle against Abadi by all means, as losing Iraq will be an inevitable prelude to the end of the regional and imperial project which it sponsors.
After all, Iraq is too important for Iran to give up. Since that’s the case, it’s urgent that Arab countries say their word and associate it with actions in a confrontation the consequences of which are not limited to Abadi or even the Iraqis but go beyond.

East is East, West is West, but is investing at home best?
Dr. Mohamed A. Ramady/Al Arabiya/August 25/18
The on-going saga about Tesla and the now infamous tweet by its CEO Elon Musk to take it private, apparently done while driving and under the influence of taking a sleep inducing medication Ambien but which unfortunately for him and Tesla investors, seemed to have caused the opposite hyper active effect, has raised questions about investing surplus funds abroad in such companies or at home.
Apparently, the Saudi Public Investment Fund already holds around 5 percent of Tesla shares and Mr Musk was under the impression that he had received encouragement and a commitment from the PIF to take the company private, when in all probability the Saudi sovereign wealth fund advised that more due diligence was needed.
Musk said his confidence was based on conversations with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, which first expressed interest in helping take the company private in early 2017. What ever Mr Musk believed, even Tesla’s Board of Directors were taken by surprise by the tweet and the company is now under investigation by the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission after investor lawsuits were filed.
The famous saying that countries, and by extension companies, do not have permanent friends but permanent interests is very apt today, exemplified by the exit of many companies from Iran after the USA imposed sanctions on that country and affecting any companies doing business in the USA. The bewildering ebbs and flows of regional and international geo political alliances and divisions adds to economic and financial risk for investment decisions. Questions then arise for the Gulf oil producers on the central issue of diversifying their economies from oil reliance and whether the investment decisions taken create a true non oil goods and service base, preferably export led, and not dependent on the vagaries of high oil prices and government incentives and pay-outs?
The oil producers raise revenues either from energy related exports or through domestic fees and taxes. The use and direction of these revenues are of crucial importance for the future well being of the single resource economies. Do they use these primarily as part of a “financial diversification” through investments abroad in a variety of assets, hoping to gain above average financial returns, or do they primarily use these funds for “economic diversification”, investing in domestic infrastructure, and local job generation projects, with possibly lower short term economic returns until the projects cab stand on their feet and be weaned away from government subsidy support? Are these two objectives fundamentally at odds and lead to completely different outcomes, and above all, if financial diversification is the primary route, who will be the custodian of these revenue investments to ensure accountability and transparency in decision-making?
It is not that Gulf countries do not have the necessary mechanisms in place for such oversight, given their long experience with Central Banks and Monterey Agencies who have been the conservative custodians of sovereign reserves in a prudent manner, albeit on lower financial return basis. But these institutions will argue that their mandate is for prudent monetary and investment policies, primarily high rated sovereign bonds and not investment in potentially more attractive but riskier private sector institutions. Over the past few decades, there has been an emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds ( SWF’s ) who have actively sought out international and local participation whether direct or private equity investments as economic globalization, fear of concentration in one or more financial market, credit downgrades have made SWF’s become more adventurous in their investment choices.
But the problems these SWF’s face remains the same – where to invest, which asset class, directly or thorough professional managers, how to assess risks and monitor on-going investments in the face of conflicting demand for domestic investments and societal pressure to do so, are they active Board members or passive investors, and, of major importance, do they possess the necessary professional capacity to do all these tasks.
Strategic desire
Where to invest and their consequences can be no trivial matter in an age of immediate social media scrutiny, given the collateral impact on SWF investments from potential lawsuits and inappropriate social behaviour by management as some of the more high profile SWF investments have been exposed to. Learning by doing from international investment mistakes is sometimes not a luxury that some of these SWF’s can afford.
Besides Tesla, the PIF has made substantial commitments to other technology companies or investments, including a $45 billion agreement to invest in a giant tech fund led by Japan’s Softbank. Then there’s $3.5 billion invested in U.S. ride-sharing firm Uber, the $1 billion pumped into Virgin Group’s space ventures, and another $20 billion tentatively committed to an infrastructure investment fund planned with Blackstone. The PIF fund is estimated to have over $250 billion in asset but also has many claims on its resources, both financial and political. More than half of its assets are tied up in large Saudi companies, such as SABIC and others whose stocks could be difficult to sell en masse. Above all, there is now pressure to spend money at home to create jobs, especially through a more invigorated “local content” policy that advocates some minimum local content production from foreign joint venture partners. The landmark Saudi Aramco IKTVA or In- Kingdom Total Value Added localisation program - launched in 2015 with the aim of ensuring a 70 percent local content by 2030 and many new jobs, is now emulated in the wider economy especially in the strategic big ticket defence sector.
The debate and pros and cons on where to invest, abroad or at home will continue, and it could be complementary instead of being mutually exclusive, especially if the international investment promises to transfer technology back home and help to establish a viable industrial base and job creation. This should really be one of the key criteria for international investment selection. It could be that the PIF’s initial investment in Tesla was motivated by a strategic desire to eventually set up an electric car industry in Saudi Arabia that reduces global fossil fuel consumption, although it seems difficult to square on how this fits in with an oil export dependent economy like the Kingdom.

Where is the dissociation policy in Lebanon?
Randa Takieddine/Al Arabiya/August 25/18
أين النأي بالنفس في لبنان؟
رندة تقي الدين/الحياة/24 آب/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/67024/randa-takieddine-where-is-the-dissociation-policy-in-lebanon-%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7/