LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
August 18/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Mr. Abadi, there’s no time to fool us
Adnan Hussein/Al Arabiya/August 17/18
Who does Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi want to fool by referring former ministers and several officials to the Integrity Commission to investigate with them in cases related to administrative and financial corruption?
Mr. Abadi cannot fool Iraqis any more, be they the tens of thousands of youth, elderly, women and men who took to the streets and squares in the hot weather to express their anger and resentment against this government, former governments, the state’s higher institutions and their chiefs and officials. The protests were due to the unprecedented corruption that has ruined the economic, social, political and cultural life of Iraqis across all of its ethnicities, religions and sects.
Mr. Abadi, for the last four years, you have caused us a headache and we have repeatedly heard your pledges and promises of reform and of confronting corruption, but there it is, ‘your roaring mountain just gave birth to a mouse!’
Fed up Iraqis
Those who protested in Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Al Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Kut, Baghdad and the subdivided districts and villages were not only protesting against the two former ministries. They were also protesting against corrupt officials of the administrative bodies and local councils in their governorates as they are the ones who directly embezzled funds allocated for their villages, districts and governorates.
The protesters were practicing their constitutional right to express their views, but Haider al-Abadi and his military and security aides sent in armed forces; which resulted in the killing of 14 demonstrators and injured hundreds.
Those people who have demonstrated since 2010 have not only been harmed by the corruption of the education and industry ministries, but by all ministries, institutions and organizations that are involved in general and comprehensive destruction.
Mr. Abadi, for the last four years, you have caused us a headache and we have repeatedly heard your pledges and promises of reform and of confronting corruption, but there it is, ‘your roaring mountain just gave birth to a mouse!’ Three former ministries and other three or four dozens of officials are being probed, and perhaps most of them have already stashed their illegal assets overseas!
Corruption cannot be fought in bits and pieces. It should be confronted through a clear, comprehensive and specific strategy that does not exclude anyone even if he belongs to the current government or your party. If this is not possible, then let someone else assume the task and acknowledge your incapability to combat and reform; hence, you will rest and we can rest too!This selective and limited method of confrontation, that is perhaps politicized too, is not effective by any means and people cannot be fooled by it. Actually, it seems to make us laugh over the misery of this thinking pattern.

The Algerian sheikh who is disliked by Juhayman
Mashari Althaydi/Al Arabiya/August 17/18
When the death of Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Jaza’iri was announced two days ago, the first thing that came to my mind was that it’s just a similarity of names, as I thought that the Sheikh Jaber al-Jaza’iri we know had passed away a long time ago!
However, the fact that Sheikh al-Jaza’iri was distant during his older withering years is what gave me that impression. Sheikh Jaber, may he rest in peace, had gotten old by then.
Today, I remember this man who immigrated with his family in the beginning of the 1950s to Saudi Arabia and “neighbored” the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina like many scholars from all over the world did throughout centuries.
The pious Algerian young man, a descendent of royal traditions and the schools of Algerian scholars association led by the first revolutionary religious symbol Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, later become a star in the sky of preaching and religious movement in Saudi Arabia and the Islamic world.
The story of the Islamic University in Medina and the case of Juhayman’s group, which occupied the Grand Mosque for two weeks in 1979, won’t be complete without the remarks, opinion, vision and testimony of Abu Bakr al-Jaza’iri
Where it all began
He was born in Lioua in Biskra, South of Algeria, in 1921, making him just under 100-years-old when he died. He worked as a teacher in some schools of the education ministry and in Dar al-Hadith in Medina. When the Islamic University opened in 1960, he was among the first lecturers there, until he was referred to retirement in 1986. The significance of this man who taught in the halls of the Prophet’s Mosque and interpreted the Quran for half a century – I’ve personally attended some of his lessons at the Prophet’s Mosque – is that he’s a maker and a witness of religious and active life in Saudi Arabia, especially in Medina. The story of the Islamic University in Medina and the case of Juhayman’s group, which occupied the Grand Mosque for two weeks in 1979, won’t be complete without the remarks, opinion, vision and testimony of Abu Bakr al-Jaza’iri. In the beginning, the man was a guide to Juhayman’s group upon the directions of the country’s late mufti Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz. This is according to many testimonies, including a testimony by Nasser al-Huzyaimi. Then he disagreed with them later when they attacked a few shops in Medina and destroyed for hanging photos. This was in 1965, according to Huzyaimi, who was an intelligent member of the group and who is currently a renowned researcher and writer.
The situation then developed when Juhayman announced religious hostility and rejected the legitimacy of governance. This is where the separation occurred, and Juhayman began to accuse Jaza’iri of writing reports about them to the authorities.
I do not know if Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Jaza’iri wrote down these memories. Not just about his complicated relation with Juhayman’s group, and the “house of Al-Hurra Al-Sharqiya” in Medina, but about the atmosphere of the Islamic University and the religious intellectual political debate that had erupted at the time in the local scene which was new to these arriving controversies.
What is certain is that if the late sheikh did not do this, like others have, we will have lost an important part of history.
May he rest in peace.

Obituary: Former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a distinctive stamp on Indian politics
C. Uday Bhaskar/Al Arabiya/August 17/18
Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (born 25 December 1924) who died on Thursday (August 16) will be long remembered by an India that is now in deep mourning, for the values and principles that he embodied.
Atal-ji, as he was popularly and affectionately referred to, had the rare and perhaps chequered distinction of being sworn-in as Prime Minister of India on three occasions. The first time was in May 1996 when his minority BJP (Bharatiya Janata party) government lasted all of 17 days.
He was back as PM in March 1998 and this time around his government lasted for just under 19 months. However this was also the period when he took a momentous decision that enabled India to cross the nuclear Rubicon and declare itself a nuclear weapon power.
Calling an early election, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (ABV) was sworn in again as PM in October 1999 and this time around, he completed a five-year term. In his last tenure he imparted his distinctive stamp on Indian politics and grew in stature even as he battled severe health constraints.
There are many significant and definitive contributions associated with the Vajpayee years that have transformed India across the political, economic and security domains but perhaps none more tectonic than his ‘lonely’ decision to conduct the Indian nuclear tests of early May 1998
ABV entered national politics in 1957 when he was elected to the Indian Lok Sabha (lower house) for the first time and remained an active parliamentarian until 2007 when his health deteriorated.
Associated with the Hindu right wing in his youth, he witnessed the Nehru years from close quarters and as a novice member of parliament, the young ABV often crossed swords with India’s first PM over issues of governance. To the credit of the legislative ethos at the time, Nehru encouraged the young Atal, praised his opponents oratorical skills and noted that this rising star would one day become the PM of India.
Becoming right wing party leader
It took almost 40 years through the vicissitudes of Indian politics for ABV to emerge as the leader of the Hindu right wing BJP, which in turn drew its core ideological strength from the Nagpur-based RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) that was formed in 1925 as a Hindu socio-cultural organization. ABV was deeply imbued with the Hindu ethos of tolerance and the acceptance of diversity but was uneasy with the more strident and aggressive form of Hindutva politics that was entering the Indian polity in the early 1990’s.
Yet it was this consolidation of Hindu electoral relevance that enabled ABV (assisted by his trusted deputy LK Advani) to become the political alternative to decades of Congress rule and he was elected as the PM – more than once.
Indian politics in the first 50 years ( 1947 to 1997 ) were nurtured in the Nehruvian template – one that kept religion relatively muted and emphasized the ‘idea of India’; one that rejected the ‘two-nation’ theory and was committed to an inclusive ethos of equitable citizenship and attendant identity.
ABV despite his RSS grooming was more inclined towards the tolerant and accommodating ethos of liberal Hinduism and had deep misgivings about the assertive Hindutva politics associated with the hard-liners in his party. The demolition of the Babri masjid in December 1992 by Hindu right wing elements saw him distancing himself from this orientation and he was consequently isolated within the BJP party. But an element of ambiguity remained – ABV distanced himself from the Babri demolition but did not sever the umbilical linkage with the RSS.
It is testimony to ABV’s political acumen that he was able to navigate the opposition to him within the RSS and the BJP and emerge as the unopposed candidate to be elected the PM of India. This was enabled by his colleague LK Advani in considerable measure. But the fault-line between Hinduism and Hindutva that ABV had to grapple with were sown.
Definitive contributions
There are many significant and definitive contributions associated with the Vajpayee years that have transformed India across the political, economic and security domains but perhaps none more tectonic than his ‘lonely’ decision to conduct the Indian nuclear tests of early May 1998. This was done in total secrecy barely two months after ABV was sworn in as PM on 19 March 1998. ABV exercised the Indian nuclear option that had been left suspended by PM Indira Gandhi in May 1974, when she authorized the ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ but did not weaponize this nascent technological demonstration.
Under Vajpayee’s stewardship, India weathered the predictable US outrage and was confronted with a major security challenge – the 1999 Kargil War. Despite reaching out to his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif and signing a historic Lahore accord that outlined a template for ending the adversarial bi-lateral relationship – ABV received a jolt (similar to Nehru and the 1962 Chinese ‘betrayal’) when the Pakistani army intruded into Indian territory in the summer of 1999 - thereby leading to a limited war.
This was the first war between two nuclear-armed neighbors and the world was legitimately alarmed. There was no precedent to this military challenge with deep strategic implications but to his credit – in his monosyllabic manner – PM Vajpayee demonstrated resolve, restraint and political perspicacity. The Kargil war was concluded under ‘firm’ US advice rendered to Pakistan and the fall-out was an uptick in the long estranged India-US relationship.
Then US President Bill Clinton made a historic visit to India in March 2000 and the foundation for a robust bi-lateral between the world’s older and largest democracies was laid. At the time Vajpayee in his expansive, eloquent manner described India and the USA as ‘natural allies’ and years of estrangement gave way to tentative and cautious engagement.
Terrorism posed complex challenges on the Vajpayee watch. The December 1999 hijacking of an Air India aircraft and an audacious terror attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 revealed the inadequacies in India’s security response matrix.
Internal security remained an intractable challenge and the Gujarat killings of 2002 saw an ineffective and anguished PM Vajpayee, who could only voice his dismay (the reference to ‘rajdharma’ – the sanctity of governance) to little effect. Hindutva was on the ascendant within the BJP and Vajpayee was clearly in the minority camp.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s contribution to India will remain definitive and distinctive with all the certitudes and ambiguities associated with this brooding poet-politician-statesman. Vajpayee squared the circle on the nettlesome nuclear issue in an adroit manner. India will have to rise to the challenge of squaring the circle on the Hinduism-Hindutva dissonance that troubled ABV until the very end of his life.

Turkey Sanctions: Navigating a Historic Bilateral Crisis
Amanda Sloat, Max Hoffman, and Steven A. Cook/The Washington Institute/August 17/18
Three experts examine the past drivers and near-term consequences of Washington’s rapidly escalating diplomatic conflict with Ankara.
On August 16, Amanda Sloat, Max Hoffman, and Steven Cook addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Sloat is a Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe. Hoffman is the associate director of national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks.
AMANDA SLOAT
The detention of U.S. citizen Andrew Brunson was only the latest in a long list of bilateral grievances between Ankara and Washington. On the Turkish side, officials have domestic security concerns about U.S. cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), an offshoot of Ankara’s domestic nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). They are also worried that Halkbank, a major Turkish financial institution, may be heavily fined for violating sanctions against Iran. And they remain on edge about Washington’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen, whom many Turks blame for the failed 2016 coup.
On the U.S. side, some question whether Turkey is still a reliable ally. In their view, if Ankara procures both the Russian S-400 missile defense system and U.S. F-35 fighter jets, then critical U.S. military data could be leaked to Moscow once the two systems are integrated together. Another concern is the decline of rule of law in Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seemingly resorting to hostage diplomacy, with authorities arresting U.S.-Turkish dual nationals and three local hires working for the American foreign mission.
Until recently, the downslide in relations seemed like it might come to an end amid several positive developments: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s February visit to Turkey culminated in bilateral working groups to address various concerns; a roadmap for easing tensions around the Syrian town of Manbij was declared in June; charges were dropped against eleven of the seventeen Turkish bodyguards who took part in a public melee during Erdogan’s May visit to Washington; the FBI reportedly initiated an investigation into Gulen; and the Trump administration managed to keep Congress from implementing sanctions on Turkey. Yet this trajectory changed when Ankara refused to release Brunson, an American pastor accused of sedition and other crimes. In response, the White House adopted a harder line on Turkey than even Congress had proposed.
With U.S. relations in crisis, Erdogan may be pivoting to other allies. Qatar gave Turkey a $15 billion loan this week, and Ankara is moving forward with efforts to normalize relations with the Netherlands and Germany. The EU may decide to upgrade its customs union with Turkey, perhaps pressuring the government to implement much-needed reforms in exchange for economic incentives.
As for future relations with Washington, officials should keep in mind that countries are bigger than their leaders, and Turkey is bigger than Erdogan. Bilateral military dialogue remains strong and could serve as a bridge for repairing and expanding the alliance in the future. All of this comes down to the amount of economic pain Erdogan is willing to stomach while he tries to use Brunson as a political bargaining chip.
MAX HOFFMAN
Turkey is in the midst of an economic crisis. Its central bank could alleviate this stress by raising interest rates, but the institution no longer has the autonomy needed to overrule Erdogan’s objections to the move.
Much of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s domestic legitimacy has been built on economic growth fueled by construction projects, which in turn depended on loans and other credit. Beginning in the 1990s, Erdogan built an extensive patronage system as mayor of Istanbul by handing such projects to his cronies, and he realizes that these and subsequent debts are coming due. Foreseeing the economic crisis as early as 2013, he focused on blaming the West for this downturn, even though his own efforts to flout the rule of law, bureaucracy, and fair competition played a major role in turning investors away.
Yet the United States has also created problems in the relationship by adopting a seemingly bipolar stance toward Turkey. While the Defense Department stuck with its traditionally restrained approach, the White House swung between reaching out to Ankara and announcing sanctions and harsh warnings via Twitter. Going forward, the State Department will likely advise President Trump that he has made his point and built credibility for future U.S. warnings, so he should refrain from further action and give Erdogan the opportunity to save face. In all likelihood, however, Trump’s next shoe will drop prior to Brunson’s next hearing on October 12. Given the uncertain outcome of this crisis, the U.S. government needs to develop a contingency plan for losing Turkey as an ally.
A large fine for Halkbank’s violation of Iran sanctions would be particularly devastating to both the Turkish financial sector and investor confidence. An IMF bailout would be a tough sale in Washington, since U.S. officials have been warning Ankara about its financial problems for years now. European governments are unlikely to offer such help either—besides being preoccupied with financial problems in Italy, Greece, and Spain, they also face the moral dilemma of whether to bail out a strongman.
On top of all this, Ankara is still struggling under the burden of 4 million Syrian refugees. If the Assad regime retakes the rebel stronghold of Idlib, another 3.5 million would likely flee to Turkish-controlled safe zones or Turkey itself, with potentially catastrophic effects on the country’s stability.
In geopolitical terms, all of these pressures will likely push Erdogan even further toward confrontation rather than reconciliation. He constantly states that the world is bigger than “the five” (referring to the permanent members of the UN Security Council), and that the United States is in decline. His support base of conservatives and nationalists agrees, arguing that Turkey needs to thrust itself into global power status. This dangerously fervent brand of nationalism has backed Erdogan into a corner, and he needs a face-saving way out.
STEVEN COOK
President Trump’s dramatic shift in Turkey policy is a welcome one; in fact, he should place even more public pressure and tariffs on Ankara. The problem with the relationship is not the personalities of Trump and Erdogan, but rather the fact that the glue holding the two countries together for decades—the Cold War—has disappeared, leaving Ankara with motivations and priorities that do not align with Washington’s. Turkey was once thought to be a strategic model, a force for peace and stability in the region. Over the past ten years, however, Washington has talked about Turkey as if it were a strategic ally even when it did not act as such. Today, Ankara only creates headaches for U.S. policymakers and should no longer be considered such an ally.
It is difficult to make a case for retaining close relations given the many differences between the two countries: Turkey opposes U.S. sanctions against Iran, is trying to buy missiles from Russia, poses a threat to U.S. interests in Syria, has become a patron of Hamas, and has been increasingly aggressive toward Greece since 2016. The list goes on: fifteen to twenty Turkish Americans remain under arrest; the Halkbank case was the world’s largest scheme for evading Iran sanctions; Turkish courts and media are no longer independent; and polls indicate that 80 percent of Turks believe the United States was complicit in the 2016 coup attempt and the current economic breakdown.
These problems could have repercussions on a number of looming political and economic decisions. Regarding the prospect of an IMF bailout, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has already agreed to oppose any such assistance as long as Turkey continues to detain Brunson and others. This is one of the very few issues capable of mustering bipartisan support in a deeply divided Congress—a fact that should trouble Ankara.
Regarding NATO, there is no mechanism for throwing Turkey out of the alliance, and even if it left voluntarily, the sky would not fall. The above list of bilateral problems shows that there is little more Ankara could do to complicate U.S. policy if it were no longer a NATO member.
Regarding Ankara’s latest charm offensive in Europe, EU governments are unlikely to side with Washington in pressuring Erdogan. The stakes are a lot higher for Europe than they are for the United States, since an unstable Turkey would create major headaches for the EU.
*This summary was prepared by Egecan Alan Fay.

Iran Is Throwing a Tantrum but Wants a Deal
دنيس روس: صحيح هناك مشهدية نوبات غضب إيران إلا أنها تريد صفقة ما مع ترامب
Dennis Ross/Foreign Policy/August 17/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/66825/dennis-ross-foreign-policy-iran-is-throwing-a-tantrum-but-wants-a-deal-%d8%af%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b3-%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%8a%d8%ad-%d9%87%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%83-%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%87%d8%af%d9%8a/
Defiant warnings aside, Tehran will eventually negotiate with President Trump—as long as Vladimir Putin mediates.
Even in its afterlife, the Iran nuclear deal continues to polarize. Those who supported the agreement proclaim loudly that Iran will never negotiate any adjustment to it, while its opponents argue U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of it will produce a better deal.
Trump himself seems to believe a better deal is possible, having recently offered to talk to the Iranians without preconditions. On Monday, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei indicated he disagrees, declaring: “I ban holding any talks with America... America never remains loyal to its promises.” Khamenei’s ban came after Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had already insisted: “The Iranian people will never allow their officials to meet and negotiate with the Great Satan, we are not North Korea.”
That sounds strong, but I suspect Trump’s backers have the better case. History and basic political dynamics suggest Iran’s defiant attitude about negotiations will soften before long, and it’s entirely possible to imagine the two sides reaching an agreement. The next round of U.S.-Iranian negotiations, however, won’t look anything like the first—and Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely play a starring role as peacemaker.
Let’s first dispense with some mistaken assumptions on the U.S. side. Jafari’s reference to North Korea is telling, both because Iran is not a one-man show and because Trump seems to believe that his “maximum pressure” approach worked on North Korea and can work on Iran. Leaving aside whether it has worked, the two cases are quite different. On North Korea, a strong international consensus existed on stopping the regime’s nuclear program—and the Trump administration mobilized support for new, tougher sanctions. On Iran, by contrast, the president broke the international consensus by walking away from the nuclear deal. It is hard to apply maximum pressure when other governments, especially our European allies, oppose our efforts and are adopting regulations to protect their companies from U.S. sanctions for doing business with Iran. At a minimum, our allies and others are not going to be vigilant in plugging loopholes in the sanctions regime and preventing the Iranians from evading the sanctions—a practice that they have honed over time.
So much for maximum pressure. In fact, with oil prices rising, Iran is likely to be able to cover revenue losses that may occur when the Trump administration applies the second round of sanctions on Nov. 4—sanctions that require countries to reduce their oil purchases from Iran or risk not being able to do business with the United States.
But before simply accepting that Iran need not, and will not, negotiate changes to the nuclear agreement, consider the following. First, notwithstanding the new blocking regulations the European Union has adopted, European banks and companies are pulling out of Iran. When faced with the choice of doing business with the United States or with Iran, there is no choice. Already, big energy, automobile, and shipping corporations such as Total, Peugeot, and Maersk, as well as banks such as Germany’s Deutsche Bank, have pulled out. Banks and multinational corporations will do what their bottom lines, not governments, tell them to do.
Second, even before the first round of sanctions were reimposed on Aug. 6, the Iranian economy was reeling. Since April, Iran’s currency has lost 50 percent of its value, meaning Iranian bank accounts are worth half of what they were then, and the Iranian public is clearly unhappy. They have been expressing their unhappiness in widespread demonstrations since last December—well before Trump pulled out of the Iran deal—over the regime’s foreign adventures, mismanagement, and pervasive corruption. Strikes are increasing, with vendors in the Tehran Bazaar holding a work stoppage on June 25. Truckers held a strike throughout the country in July; more recently, riot police were called out in response to strikes in the cities of Mashhad, Isfahan, Rasht, Ahvaz, and Karaj. Other than Ahvaz, these are conservative cities typically supportive of the regime. Not anymore, with angry demonstrators carrying placards that say, “Death to Palestine” and “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon” as well as “Death to the dictator.” They want money spent on their needs, not billions on saving Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad or supporting Hezbollah or Hamas. For a regime that depends for its stability on fear and some semblance of popular legitimacy, this must be unnerving.
Third, when the regime feels truly squeezed, its historic pattern is to adjust its behavior. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader, proclaimed Iran would fight Iraq for as long as it took to defeat it. Yet he ended the war in August 1988 when U.S. forces in the Gulf destroyed Iranian naval vessels and oil platforms and accidentally downed an Iranian civilian airliner—seemingly in support of Saddam Hussein. In the 1990s, Iran stopped killing dissidents in Europe when Germany threatened sanctions. Following the U.S. defeat of Saddam’s army in 2003, and fearing Iran might be next, the regime made far-reaching offers to limit its nuclear program and support for Hezbollah and Hamas. And, after declaring that they would never negotiate on their nuclear program so long as they were under sanctions—and the Obama administration doubled down on the sanctions—the Iranians negotiated.
All this suggests that as the economy falters and pressure rises in Iran, the regime will, in time, look for a way out and be willing to talk. Oil at over $70 a barrel will give the Iranians some cushion, especially because their budget was based on $55 a barrel. In addition, Iran’s leaders will wait to see how much European buyers of Iranian oil cut back and whether anyone fills in.
Still, Iran is likely to seek a way to talk—not directly, because that would look like a surrender. Instead, early next year Iran’s leaders will likely approach the Russians. They see how Trump relates to Putin, and with Putin’s interest in demonstrating Russian clout on the world stage, he will gladly be the arbiter between the United States and Iran. (Not least because Putin would likely be eager for the talks to include discussions about Syria’s future.)
One can envision Putin, perhaps in his upcoming summit meeting with Trump in early 2019, bringing a proposal to extend the nuclear deal’s limits on Iranian centrifuges and enriched material for 10 to 15 years in return for the United States dropping all its sanctions. In other words, in return for the restrictions on Iranian enrichment being extended from 2030 until 2045, the United States would drop all its existing sanctions—nuclear and nonnuclear—so there would be no remaining ambiguity about Iran’s ability to do business with U.S. banks.
In theory, such an offer falls well short of the Trump administration’s posture embodied in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 12 demands of the Iranians—demands that require an end not only to nuclear enrichment but also to Iran’s destabilizing threats and actions in the region. But if Putin comes with such a proposal, and presents it privately to Trump, it is hard to believe that the president would simply turn it down. More likely, he will see it as an opening—even “an incredible offer,” or some other such superlative.
Anyone certain that the Iranians won’t negotiate any modifications on the nuclear deal shouldn’t be so sure. Domestic pressures and the readiness of the Russians to play the arbiter role can provide the Iranians an out. Their history suggests they will go for it.
**Dennis Ross is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute.