LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
August 17/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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New evidence to back UN’s finding about Tehran role in nurturing al-Qaeda
اثباتات جديدة تدعم تقارير الأمم المتحدة الخاصة بدور إيران في تقوية واحتضان القاعدة
Staff writer, Al Arabiya English/Thursday, 16 August 2018
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/66789/new-evidence-to-back-uns-finding-about-tehran-role-in-nurturing-al-qaeda-%d8%a7%d8%ab%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%85-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7/
A United Nations report mentioned that ISIS still has as many as 30,000 members distributed almost equally between Syria and Iraq and is supported by the al-Qaeda organization, which has become much stronger in some places due to increased Iranian support.
According to the Associated Press, the report which was prepared by UN experts on Monday, and presented to the UN Security Council, reveals that despite the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and most of Syria, it is likely that a “secret copy” of the extremists group will exist in both countries, with supporters in Afghanistan, Libya, Southeast Asia and West Africa.
Experts said the global al-Qaeda network is much stronger than in some locations, including Somalia, Yemen, South Asia and the African Sahel area.
Experts said al-Qaeda leaders in Iran had become more capable and working with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri, and they were highlighting his authority more effectively than before, particularly with regard to events in Syria.
Iran increases support for al-Qaeda
The report by UN experts on Iran’s increased support for al-Qaeda reinforces several documents and reports that Iran is working to bring together ISIS and its pockets in Syria to rehabilitate and build al-Qaeda by using its strategic and historical ties with the organization’s leaders.
A report published in the Sunday Times in January by both writers Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clarke said al-Qaeda today has rebuilt itself to the point where it can summon tens of thousands of elements with the help of Iran.
Tehran is working to annex al-Qaeda remnants, coordinating with al-Qaeda military leaders who have traveled to Damascus to assemble the ranks of ISIS fighters and establish a “new base” similar in to its Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah militias.
Appropriating credit for ISIS defeat
Since controlling the last strongholds of ISIS group in Syria and Iraq, Iran’s media machine has been trying to appropriate the defeat of the extremists group to Tehran, its allies and militias, and has tried to diminish the role of the US-led international coalition in defeating ISIS.
It also tried to falsify the facts by appropriate credit for the defeat of ISIS, where Iranian propaganda ignored the role of the Revolutionary Guards and its militias in the emergence of ISIS, as a result of suppressing the peaceful Syrian revolution and the release and feeding of extremist groups.
Iran lost more than 3,500 fighters according to semi-official statistics and tens of billions of dollars to save Assad in 2012 in battles against the Syrian opposition.
Al-Qaeda leaders in Iran
Adrian Levy and Kathy Scott-Clarke have confirmed that the commander of the elite Quds force, affiliated to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Qassim Suleimani, has played the most prominent role in managing the relationship with al-Qaeda since he provided refuge for the family of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda leaders after they fled Afghanistan in 2001 and built a residential complex at the heart of a Revolutionary Guard training camp in Tehran.
Iranian support and funding played an important role in reviving al-Qaeda, which had only 400 members when it carried out the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001. The organization was fragmented because of the US invasion of Afghanistan, but it recovered with the emergence of ISIS group in 2013.
Suleimani playing al-Qaeda card
According to the Sunday Times, Qassim Suleimani, who uses his relations with al-Qaeda in his maneuvers, is used to play on all sides of the conflict to keep Iran at the forefront by using all extremist groups cards.
According to the report, among the evidence, unpublished notes and interviews with senior members of al-Qaeda and the Osama bin Laden family show how Suleimani is mastering the relationship with the Sunni extremist organization, described by Iranian official circles as “a terrorist takfirist.”
He added that al-Qaeda’s military leaders had been stationed in Tehran until 2015, when Suleimani sent five of them to Damascus, including Mohammed al-Masri, with the task of contacting fighters and leaders of ISIS, to encourage them to split and unite al-Qaeda according to US intelligence reports.
The reports confirmed that al-Masri was “the most experienced and capable operational planner among non-detainees in the United States or in any allied country.”
The information adds that the coordination between al-Qaeda leaders and ISIS is through the military commander of ISIS Saif al-Adl, a former Egyptian army colonel who entered into a major row with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who wanted to unify al-Qaeda and ISIS to fight in Syria, but Saif al-Adl ordered his fighters to wait until ISIS is defeated.
An ideological meeting
Experts believe that Iran’s relationship as an extremist Shiite religious ruling regime with extremist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaeda and even Tehran’s political and military ties with both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, is not seasonal, as some imagine.
The ideology of Khomeini’s regime is influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood scholar Sayyid Qutb, from whom pro-Tehran Shiite groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the rest of the militias in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen have adopted the concept of “jihad”, hence it is an ideological and historical as well as the confluence of political interests, which makes the relation between the Iranian regime and Sunni extremist groups a permanent relationship.
Bin Laden documents
The Abottabad documents obtained by US forces from the hideout of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden following his killing in 2011 in Pakistan and published by the CIA last November revealed details of part of Iran’s relationship with al-Qaeda.
Of the 470,000 documents obtained from Bin Laden’s cache, 19 were devoted to this large archive of al-Qaeda’s high profile ties with the Iranian government.
A senior member of al-Qaeda said in a letter that Iran was ready to provide all that al-Qaeda needed, including funds and weapons, and training camps for Hezbollah in Lebanon in return for the terrorist group attacking US interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, according to an investigation by Thomas Jocelyn and Bill Rajev of the Institute for the Defense of Democracies about the 19-page details of al-Qaeda's links to Iran, from the Abottabad documents.
According to the document, the Iranian intelligence services, in some cases, facilitated the issuance of visas for the elements of the al-Qaeda in charge of carrying out operations, and at the same time has housed other groups.
“Iran’s intelligence services agreed to provide al-Qaeda operatives with visas and facilities and to harbor other members of al-Qaeda,” said another document, which was negotiated with Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, an influential al-Qaeda member, before the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Iran fined
Last year, a US court in New York fined Iran for co-operating with al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks with $ 10.7 billion and other fines of $21 billion for the families of American victims of bombings in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Kuwait carried out by Iranian Revolutionary Guards cells.

Iranians’ anti-regime anger not limited to the economy
الدكتور ماجد ربيزاده: غضب الإيرانيين على نظام الملالي ليس مقتصراً على الإقتصاد
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/August 16/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/66795/dr-majid-rafizadeh-iranians-anti-regime-anger-not-limited-to-the-economy-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87/
Some policy analysts and news outlets have been characterizing the Iranian people’s disaffectedness with the political establishment as a result of economic hardship. It goes without saying that economic austerity is a critical factor behind people’s frustration with the theocratic regime, but arguing that this is the sole reason for the discontent is simplified and unsophisticated, and fails to accurately describe the nature of people’s dissatisfaction with the regime.
If one meticulously examines the social, religious, political and economic landscapes in Iran, it becomes evident that the reasons behind the widespread unhappiness are multi-faceted.
First of all, many people are indeed suffering financially. For the last 10 years, Iran’s unemployment rate has been in the double digits. Although Iran has an educated youth population, which constitutes more than 60 percent of the population, almost 30 percent of them were without jobs in the fourth quarter of 2017. Also, more than 40 percent of the population, which is approximately 32 million citizens, live below the poverty line.
Even those who are lucky enough to have a job are still struggling to make ends meet. The average rent exceeds the salaries many full-time workers earn, let alone other basic necessities such as food, medicine, transportation, school fees, etc. Darioush, a full-time teacher who has been working in public schools in Tehran for more than 10 years, pointed out: “The average teacher’s salary is around IR12,000,000 ($250) a month. The rent for a one-bedroom apartment in the suburbs of Tehran is about IR20,000,000 a month. A normal doctor visit will cost you about IR1,100,000 (approximately 10 percent of the salary).”
But this is not the whole story. People’s disenchantment includes a religious character because many people do not want to have a Shiite theocracy imposing its extremist beliefs and teachings on society. In other words, the targets are the ruling mullahs, and that is why protesters have been attacking religious seminaries, according to Iran’s semi-official Tasnim News Agency.
Although Iran has an educated youth population, which constitutes more than 60 percent of the population, almost 30 percent of them were without jobs in the fourth quarter of 2017
Young men and women have been demonstrating their resistance to the regime’s religious laws by defying the state’s rules through various platforms in both public and private spheres. Movements or actions, such as taking off headscarves in public or dancing, do not mean that ordinary people dislike religion, but they are different modes of resistance against Iran’s theocracy.
In addition, there exists a human rights dimension, which is clear by the role that human rights activists, defenders and lawyers have been playing in disclosing violations in the country. The Islamic Republic remains one of the worst human rights abusers in the world. The situation is continuing to worsen, even under the leadership of the so-called moderate administration of Hassan Rouhani. The Iranian regime is responsible for carrying out more than half of all executions in the world, according to the latest report by international human rights watchdog Amnesty International, which is based in the UK. Surpassing China, Tehran is ranked top in the world when it comes to the number of executions per capita.
More recently, the regime’s forces have escalated their crackdown and suppression of the people due to nationwide protests. The judiciary and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps wield significant power in Iran and thousands have been arrested and imprisoned without due process, and many have also been killed. Amnesty International last week released a statement demanding the release of all detainees, stating that: “Reports and videos on social media have also shown the use of unnecessary and excessive force by security forces to disperse demonstrations.” Instead of releasing the detainees, the Iranian leaders threatened that protesters and dissidents could face the death penalty.
Finally, the political nature of people’s dissatisfaction with the regime should not be disregarded. People are robustly opposing authoritarianism and despotism. That is why many were risking their lives when they chanted “Death to Khamenei” — a crime that can be punishable with the death penalty in Iran. Many others chanted “Death to Rouhani,” “Death to the Islamic Republic,” “Shame on you Khamenei, step down from power,” and “Death to the Dictator.” People are risking their lives by continuing to tear down the banners of Iran’s Supreme Leaders, Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei.
In addition, many people appear to vehemently stand against the regime’s foreign policies, as they made the following chants popular in the country: “Forget about Palestine, forget about Gaza, think about us,” “Death to Hezbollah,” and “Leave Syria alone, think about us instead.”
In summary, what highlights the complexity of Iran’s crisis is that the Iranian people’s disenchantment with the regime is not solely due to economic reasons, but also due to political, social, human rights, and religious factors.
**Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh

Moment of reckoning for Idlib approaches
Sharif  Nashashibi/Arab News/August 16/18
Tuesday’s press conference held by the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers displayed two very different stances on the rebel-held Syrian province of Idlib, which the Assad regime has stated is its next target in its campaign to retake the whole country.
Turkey’s Mevlut Cavusoglu said he hoped Ankara and Moscow could find a solution. In contrast, Russia’s Sergey Lavrov said the Assad regime has “the right to defend itself” against attacks from Idlib, and “we have to support” its operations to that end.
The timing of their meeting may have determined its bleak outcome. It took place amid a further and unprecedented deterioration in relations between Washington and Ankara, subsequent economic troubles in Turkey, a ramping up of the Assad regime’s rhetoric and bombardment of Idlib, its recent victory over rebels in southwest Syria, and ongoing talks between Damascus and Syrian Kurds, who control around a quarter of the country.
Lavrov’s remarks at the press conference are being seen as a green light for the Assad regime to launch its threatened ground assault on Idlib regardless of Turkey’s position on the province and its presence there (specifically its 12 military posts that monitor the “de-escalation zone” agreed by Ankara, Moscow and Tehran). But that is not necessarily the case.
Moscow is likely using the extra leverage that it has gained over Ankara from the crisis in US-Turkish relations. “Washington must… come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives,” said Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Russia knows it is the obvious and primary alternative, and so can pressure Ankara regarding Idlib.
But Moscow cannot completely ignore the position and interests of a regional powerhouse with which it has markedly improved ties since 2016. And sanctioning and backing an all-out assault by the Assad regime on Idlib, while Turkish forces are still present there, would likely rupture those ties, particularly if it resulted in Turkish casualties.
Erdogan values rapprochement with Moscow, but the nationalist leader values his strongman image at home above all else. Russian President Vladimir Putin knows this as he is cut from similar cloth. So, rather than facilitating the possibility of direct clashes between pro-regime and Turkish forces, Moscow is likely angling to force Ankara’s acceptance of a face-saving formula that will eventually see Idlib’s return to state rule.
To avoid direct clashes between Syria and Turkey, Russia is likely trying to force Ankara’s acceptance of a face-saving formula that will eventually see Idlib’s return to state rule.
This would suit the Assad regime, as a Turkish withdrawal from the province would weaken rebel forces and avoid the potential for direct conflict with Ankara, which did not hesitate to strike at pro-regime convoys that tried to come to the aid of Kurdish forces during the Turkish-led military operation in the Syrian canton of Afrin.
Ankara has proposed working with Syrian rebels in Idlib to take on certain extremist groups as a means to stave off an assault by the Assad regime. But that will only delay such an offensive, as Damascus will not accept the province being outside its control in the long term, particularly with the war’s tide now decidedly in its favor. As such, the efficacy of Turkey’s proposal is questionable, as it would be undertaking a major military operation for the ultimate benefit of the Assad regime, which would make its move after the operation’s completion.
Finding a face-saving formula will be no easy task. Turkey’s leverage at present may be weakened, but Erdogan will need to be convinced that he can sell it domestically as something other than a major climb down. After all, developments in northern Syria are not viewed in Turkey as simply a foreign policy affair, but as an important domestic matter, given its massive refugee burden and the Kurdish issue, which transcends national borders.
But the Assad regime and its allies must tread very carefully. An assault on Idlib without Turkey’s acquiescence — no matter how reluctant — and with its army still present in the province would be a major military and diplomatic risk for a side that presently has the upper hand in the Syrian conflict. That risk would have domestic, regional and even international repercussions.
• Sharif Nashashibi is an award-winning journalist and commentator on Arab affairs. Twitter: @sharifnash

Trump vs. Turkey: U.S. Punishes Strategic Ally, but Is Erdogan Really Willing to Leave NATO?
اليكسندر كرفينك من الهآررتس: ترامب بمواجهة أردوغان: الولايات المتحدة تعاقب حليف استراتيجي ولكن هل أردوغان حقيقة ينوي ترك حلف الناتو
Alexander Griffing/Haaretz/August 16/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/66798/alexander-griffing-haaretz-trump-vs-turkey-u-s-punishes-strategic-ally-but-is-erdogan-really-willing-to-leave-nato-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%86/
As the U.S.-Turkish relationship continues to deteriorate, the key question is how far can Trump push Erdogan before Turkey leaves NATO.
With Turkey’s economy in a downward spiral and U.S. President Donald Trump vowing to enforce punishing tariffs and sanctions, one of America's oldest and most strategic military alliances in the Middle East is being put under even more severe stress – with immense political and regional implications for both countries.
As the Turkish lira hit record lows earlier in the week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Trump in The New York Times of stabbing him in the back. Turkey, the defiant president warned, would “start looking for new friends and allies.” The statement was a thinly veiled reference to Russia, which has called for dropping the dollar as the main international currency, a move that could help bolster the lira.
However, ties between Turkey and the U.S. may not be so easily upended – thanks largely to NATO. Turkey has been a key U.S. ally since 1946 and the Incirlik Air Base, which the two countries share and which houses U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons, serves as the key staging ground for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in the Middle East.
Aaron Stein, a Middle East and Turkey expert at the Atlantic Council, argues that “there is no indication Turkey wants to blow this up yet,” emphasizing the fact that Erdogan is all but out of leverage in this current spat.
“Turkey’s primary leverage is to end the anti-ISIS coalition from operating out of Incirlik,” Stein says. Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and Incirlik can only be used for NATO missions. “But it’s an empty threat, as the operation is winding down anyways; much of it is now out of Jordan and Erdogan doesn’t want to be seen as aiding ISIS.”
Trump hitting Turkey with metal tariffs was “low-hanging fruit” designed to create “maximum pain” to push Turkey to release the imprisoned American pastor Andrew Brunson and leave Erdogan with few options.
In March this year, the Wall Street Journal reported the U.S. military was already scaling back its presence at Incirlik, quoting an official who linked the drawdown to U.S.-Turkish tensions over Trump’s Syria policy. Stein cautions, however, that the base will not shutter so quickly, given its international status; he notes that Spain, for example, has a Patriot missile battery there for Syrian operations.
After the failed coup in 2016, anti-American rhetoric and anger spiked within the Turkish government, leading to public discussion of the U.S. removing its nuclear weapons from Turkey – especially as Turkey unilaterally shut down the air space over the base during the coup. “Does it seem like a good idea to station American nuclear weapons at an air base commanded by someone who may have just helped bomb his own country’s parliament?” asked Jefferey Lewis in Foreign Policy in July 2016.
However, Stein argues that any threat of kicking the U.S. out of Incirlik or limiting operations is overblown; operations out of Incirlik are governed by multinational agreements, including NATO, and require parliamentary approval within Turkey. The bigger issue here, Stein notes, would be if Erdogan threatens to limit NATO operations out of Incirlik, which doesn’t appear to be on the table yet.
Additionally, the nuclear weapons in Turkey can only be used with NATO consensus and any drawdown of that arsenal would require not only a NATO consensus but also Russian involvement – making them largely a non-issue.
A NATO exit?
Against the background of the current U.S.-Turkey spat, Erdogan has actually been committing to an increased role in NATO. He has proposed using the Turkish army’s military headquarters in Istanbul for the new land command structure of NATO, and Turkey will likely send a deputy commander and military advisers to NATO’s newly-launched training mission in Iraq.
Turkey is also set to take command of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2021. At the NATO Summit in Brussels in July Erdogan said Turkey is doing well in terms of military spending, with 1.8 percent of its GDP going to defense. He also backed Trump's push to up the 2 percent goal to 4 percent – a clear move away from Russia.
However, Erdogan’s new NATO commitments are not necessarily the whole story, he’s playing a double game, also taking Turkey away from the alliance while Trump publicly criticizes NATO and questions its relevance.
Turkey has been willing to ruffle its NATO allies for a while now, with plans for a $2 billion purchase of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missiles. NATO has clearly said the purchase is incompatible with allied systems and NATO restrictions on the use of Incirlik. Fears persist that the S-400 radar could capture the stealth signature of the F-35 and help Russia to thwart that technology.
Turkey's future in NATO in doubt?
New Hampshire Democrat Jeanne Shaheen said in the U.S. Senate in July, while trying to block the delivery of U.S. F-35s to Turkey: "NATO partners need these F-35s to counter Russian activity. We would be handing this technology over to the Kremlin if we granted Turkey these planes, and Congress will not stand for it."
On Monday, Trump signed a sweeping defense bill that blocked delivery of those F-35s, which Turkey has already largely paid for – until Brunson is returned.
However, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics points out to Bloomberg, that Erdogan may simply be following Trump’s lead with public moves that appear to defy NATO conventions. "For an administration or a president that doesn’t give much value to NATO, the value of Turkey as a staunch NATO ally also has declined,” claims Kirkegaard. “The Trump administration isn’t going to walk an extra mile to save an organization it doesn’t value.”
Erdogan too appears to harbor an anti-NATO sentiment. Therese Raphael adds, “Erdogan never quite recovered from his anger at the way his allies seemed to sit on the fence in the hours after an attempted coup was announced in July 2016.” Erdogan, with typical bluster, has been pushing a plan, which Russia backed on Monday, to dump the dollar in retaliation to U.S. sanctions and begin bilateral trade using local currencies.
“Shame on you, shame on you,” Erdogan declared at a rally last week in response to Trump. "You are swapping your strategic partner in NATO for a pastor.” The question now is whether or not Turkey will be willing to split with NATO and further wreck its own economy in order to keep a pastor in jail.

Iran Oil Sanctions Will Hurt More Than You Think
Julian Lee/Bloomberg/August 16/18
The first US sanctions have been reimposed on Iran with little sign of either side softening its position. Curbs on oil exports will follow in early November and the effect will be bigger and swifter than last time around. Oil forecasters don’t seem to have grasped that yet.
There’s no doubt that President Donald Trump will be tougher on Iran than Barack Obama was, with no gradual ratcheting-up of pressure. Importers are expected to have tapered off Iran oil purchases by Nov. 5, when the curbs come into effect.
Any waivers granted to buyers will still require much bigger cuts than they did last time, when a 20 percent reduction every six months was enough to win exemption from retaliation. And this time, Iran’s exports of condensates, a light form of crude extracted from gas fields, will be covered by the sanctions.
It doesn’t matter that European governments oppose Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. Politicians and bureaucrats may work on "the continuation of Iran’s exports of oil and gas," but it’s companies, not governments, that buy Iran’s oil. The threat of exclusion from the US market and banking system is enough to stop them buying it, international shipping companies from moving it and insurers from covering that trade.
So what would the loss of Iranian oil exports look like?
In July, crude and condensate exports were already down by 430,000 barrels a day, or 15 percent, from their levels in April, the month before Trump announced the start of the sanctions process — and the curbs haven’t even come into effect yet.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Total SA have stopped buying. Other European refiners will surely follow. By July, EU crude imports from Iran were down by around 220,000 barrels, or 41 percent, from April. Don’t be surprised to see them drop to zero by November.
shows a similar split between politicians and companies. While Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci says US sanctions aren’t binding, imports of Iranian crude by Tupras Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri AS are down 45 percent from April.
While Iran's biggest buyers boosted purchases ahead of sanctions, others made large cuts.
In Asia, Iran’s biggest market, South Korea has stopped buying both crude and condensate since late June. This is critical, because the Koreans are the top buyers of its condensate, accounting for more than 50 percent of shipments over the 12 months through June.
Condensate deliveries to the United Arab Emirates also appear to have stalled. Emirates National Oil Co., the Dubai-based buyer, has been sourcing supplies from places as distant as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, the US and the Russian Arctic.
Japan won’t defy the US, either. Its imports of Iranian crude plunged under the Obama sanctions and rebounded only modestly when they were relaxed in 2016. Although officials are still talking to their US counterparts, companies don’t expect to receive waivers and imports could fall to zero before November.
That leaves India and China. Neither has cut purchases yet — indeed, India has boosted them, with much of the extra apparently going into storage at Mangalore. This may be temporary, though, if refiners are building stockpiles ahead of anticipated shortages. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. is unlikely to buy any more Iranian oil until India gets a waiver from the US, and the oil ministry has asked refiners to tread carefully.
Indian officials still hope for at least partial relief, arguing that cutting imports to zero isn’t feasible.
China has said that while it won’t cut purchases, it won’t boost them either. July shipments of crude and condensate were up by 105,000 barrels a day, or 14 percent, compared with April, but they may decline now that US crude has been removed from a list of good targeted by Chinese tariffs.
Where does all this leave us? Under Obama, Iran’s crude and condensate exports fell by around 1.2 million barrels a day over a period of about two years. Under his successor it looks like the decline will be bigger and faster, even without the political support of US allies.

In Islam, Jerusalem is not Mecca
A. Z. Mohamed/Gatestone Institute/August 16/18
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12844/islam-jerusalem-mecca
When the time for the Muslim prayer came, Omar declined the invitation by Sophronius, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to pray inside the Church and instead prayed outside. Omar's fear was that that Muslims who would come after him might establish a mosque in place of the church if he would pray at the site. Omar, then, was conscious of what belonged to the Muslims and what belonged to the Christians.
Naming the Jerusalem mosque Al-Aqsa was an attempt to say that the Dome of the Rock was the very spot from which Mohammed ascended to heaven, thus connecting Jerusalem to divine revelation in Islamic belief. The problem however, is that Mohammed died in the year 632, which was 73 years before the first construction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque was completed.
Intriguingly, only when non-Muslims are in control of Jerusalem do Muslims seem to remember the city. Otherwise, as history shows, Muslims have never attached real significance to it. They never claimed Jerusalem as the capital of any country or empire. In fact, Muhammad instructed his people not to pray toward Jerusalem, as they had done previously, but to Mecca:
"And We did not make the qiblah which you used to face except that We might make evident who would follow the Messenger from who would turn back on his heels. And indeed, it is difficult except for those whom Allah has guided. And never would Allah have caused you to lose your faith." — Quran 2:143, Sahih International.
Certain Quranic verses, moreover, emphasize Jerusalem's connection to the Jews and contradict its Islamization. The Quran does not promise Muslims to enter or rule Jerusalem. In fact, one of its verses quotes the Prophet Moses instructing the Jews to enter the Holy Land (al-ard al-muqaddesa) that God has given to them — including Jerusalem. This is a verse, however, that the majority of Arabs and Muslims choose to ignore:
"O my people, enter the Holy Land which Allah has assigned to you and do not turn back [from fighting in Allah 's cause] and [thus] become losers." — Quran 5:21, Sahih International.
An interpretation of the verse identifies al-ard al-muqaddesa as Beit al-Maqdis, or Jerusalem and its surroundings (here, here), or the region stretching from Egypt to Euphrates river (here).
In another verse, God Himself instructs the Children of Israel to dwell in the land:
"And We said after Pharaoh to the Children of Israel, "Dwell in the land, and when there comes the promise of the Hereafter, We will bring you forth in [one] gathering." — Quran 17:104, Sahih International.
Again, "the land" in this verse is al-Sham (Levant), a region on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and north of the Arabian Peninsula and south of Turkey.
"It was for the British that Jerusalem was so important — they are the ones who established Jerusalem as a capital," said Professor Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, a historical geographer at Hebrew University, to the New York Times. "Before, it was not anyone's capital since the times of the First and Second Temples," Ben-Arieh added.
In December 1917, the British general Edmund Allenby seized control of Jerusalem from its Ottoman Turkish rulers.
In December 1949, the State of Israel decided to hold its Knesset sessions in Jerusalem and declared Jerusalem its capital. Then, In 1980, its Knesset passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel and declared Jerusalem, complete and united, to be Israel's "eternal and indivisible capital."
Jerusalem was not even mentioned in the original Palestine National Charter (1964) or in the 1968 amended Palestinian National Charter. In the 1996 amendment, Jerusalem (Al-Quds) was only mentioned in the context of talking about UN resolutions relating to the status of the city.
Only in the transitional constitution of the Palestine authority (the Palestine Basic Law, approved by PLC in 1997, signed in 2002), does one find an article stating that Jerusalem is the capital city of "Palestine."
It is remarkable that in spite of almost 1,200 years of Muslim rule, Jerusalem "never served as capital of a sovereign Muslim state, and it never became a cultural or scholarly center. Little of political import by Muslims was initiated there." Islam and Muslims' real connection to Jerusalem only came about six years after Prophet Muhammed's death, when in 638 CE, the Caliph Omar and his invading armies captured Jerusalem.
Upon his arrival in Jerusalem, Omar was given a tour of the city, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. When the time for the Muslim prayer came, Omar declined the invitation by Sophronius, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to pray inside the Church and instead prayed outside. Omar's fear was that that Muslims who would come after him might establish a mosque in place of the church if he would pray at the site. Omar, then, was conscious of what belonged to the Muslims and what belonged to the Christians.
Jerusalem's Temple Mount and the Rock (or "Foundation Stone") located there have been sacred to the Jews for millennia in their daily lives. According to Jewish tradition, the Rock is where Abraham, the progenitor and first patriarch of the Hebrew people, had prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac. The Temple Mount was also the site of Solomon's Temple and its successor, the Second Temple (also known as Herod's Temple). Since the Temples' destruction -- the First Temple at the hands of Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar II in 587 BCE, and the Second Temple at the hands of the Romans in 70 CE -- the "Western Wall" of the Temple Mount (a retaining wall) is all that remains of the Temples, and the Temple Mount has since been the the direction towards which Jews face when praying.
According to al-Tabari [1] and Ibn Kathir [2], when Omar arrived at the Temple Mount, he prayed with his back to the Rock, facing Mecca in the southern corner of the platform, where the Al-Aqsa Mosque was later constructed.
Omar was therefore the first Muslim to pray on the Temple Mount. However, he clearly showed that the Mount and the Rock were no longer Muslims' Qibla (the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays). The Mount was the direction of Muslim prayers till 622 CE, when it was changed to the Kaaba in Mecca for eternity (Quran 2:142–145). However, the Mount and Rock were still sacred, and supposedly Islamic, because in 621 CE Prophet Muhammad told his followers that he had ascended into heaven from the site of the Rock.
In an attempt to transform Jerusalem into an Islamic sanctuary, or to Islamize it, the Dome of the Rock shrine was built over the Rock in 691-692 CE, and Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount in 705 CE by the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān, some 55 and 70 years respectively after Muslim armies captured Jerusalem.
Although the Dome of the Rock structure (Arabic: Qubbat al-Ṣakhrah) is "the oldest extant Islamic monument," it is not a mosque and does not fit easily into other categories of Muslim religious structures. The Dome's "grand scale and lavish decoration," as well as the extravagant services to its visitors, prompted some Muslim historians, such as Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taymiyyah to report that the Damascus-based Abd al-Malik built the Dome in an attempt to divert Muslims away from the Kaaba and toward Jerusalem while Mecca was under the control of rebels led by Abdullah Ibn al-Zubayr. That was probably the first time the Muslims had used Jerusalem in an internal political rivalry.
Scholars have also argued that Abd al-Malik built the Dome to proclaim the emergence of Islam as a supreme new faith. According to Encyclopedia Britannica:
"The Dome's grand scale and lavish decoration may have been intended to rival that of the Christian holy buildings of Jerusalem, especially the domed Church of the Holy Sepulchre. According to this view, the message of Islam's supremacy was also conveyed by the Dome's Arabic inscriptions, which present a selection of Quʾrānic passages and paraphrases that outline Islam's view of Jesus—i.e., denouncing the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus, while emphasizing the unity of God and affirming Jesus' status as a prophet."
Notably, Ibn Taymiyyah decried not only the lavish decoration, but also the construction of the Dome itself as a kind of bidaa (heresy).
In a further Islamization of Jerusalem, the Temple Mount mosque was named Al-Aqsa, meaning in Arabic, "the farthest mosque", the same phrase used in a key passage of the Quran called "Al-Israa, the Night Journey":
"Exalted is He who took His Servant [Mohammed] by night from al-Masjid al-Haram to al-Masjid al-Aqsa, whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing." — Quran 17:1, Sahih International.
Naming the Jerusalem mosque Al-Aqsa was an attempt to say that the Dome of the Rock was the very spot from which Mohammed ascended to heaven, thus connecting Jerusalem to divine revelation in Islamic belief. The problem however, is that Mohammed died in the year 632, which was 73 years before the first construction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque was completed.
For Muslims, Jerusalem's significance is dependent upon political and religious rivalries; its importance appears evident when non-Muslims (including the Crusaders, the British, and the Jews) control or capture the city. Only at those phases in history did Islamic national leaders claim Jerusalem as their holiest city after Mecca and Medina.
Unsurprisingly, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas once decried Hamas leader Mahmoud Al-Zahar, claiming that the latter had minimized Jerusalem's significance by saying that "Jerusalem is not Mecca," when Abbas had insisted on 2006 legislative elections being held in Jerusalem. If Al-Zahar had said that "Jerusalem is not Mecca and is not sacred," he would have said the truth.
In Islam, Jerusalem is only blessed, but not sacred. Mecca it is not.
*A. Z. Mohamed is a Muslim born and raised in the Middle East.
[1] The History of al-Tabari Vol. 12: The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine A.D. 635-637/A.H. 14-15, pages 194-195. Published by State University of New York Press, Albany, 1992.
[2] Ibn Kathir (in Arabic, Bidaya), published by Maktabit AlMaaref, Beirut, 1966, II, page 96; VII, pages 54-56.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

France: The Rise and Fall of Emmanuel Macron
Guy Millière/Gatestone Institute/August 16/18
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12850/emmanuel-macron-rise-fall
France's Justice Department is not independent of the government; no judge will seek to know more about Macron's scandal. No thorough and deep investigation will take place. The French media are largely subsidized by the government and no more independent of the government than the Justice Department is.
Even the French media that are not funded by the state self-censor what they report, because they are supported by businesses that depend on government contracts. No French journalist will try to discover a thing.
The economist Charles Gave recently used statistical data to demonstrate that if nothing changes, the non-Muslim population of France could be a minority in 40 years. He added: "What happened to Spain or Asia Minor in the 10th and 11th centuries will happen to Europe in the 21st century, that is a certainty."
When Emmanuel Macron was elected president of France in May 2017, he was portrayed as a reformer who was going to change everything in France and beyond.
Fourteen months later, illusions are gone. The reforms carried out have been essentially cosmetic and failed to slow France's sclerotic decline. Economic growth is close to zero: 0.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2018. Unemployment, at around 8.9%, remains high. French public spending as a percent of GDP is, at 56.4%, still the highest in Europe. The country is still frequently paralyzed by public transportation strikes. No-go zones continue to spread, and Macron himself recently admitted his helplessness by asking for a "general mobilization" of the population. Riots are frequent; large-scale public events lead to looting and arson. The night after the French team's victory at the soccer World Cup, hundreds of thugs mingling with the crowds broke windows, vandalized banks and ATMs, destroyed street signs and torched cars.As most economic activity in France stops in July and August, Macron might have thought he could enjoy a summer break. He could not.
On July 19, the daily Le Monde published a video from May 1 showing a man in a police helmet brutally assaulting two people in the center of Paris. A description accompanying the video explained that the violent man was "Alexandre Benalla, in charge of the head of state's security."
Benalla was, in fact, Macron's personal bodyguard. He protected Macron at all times, including during private trips to a ski resort or on the beach. Documents were made public showing that Benalla claimed to be "deputy chief of staff of the President"; however, on any official list of staff members, his name never appeared. Benalla also obtained secret security clearance without apparent justification, and although he did not pass the exam to become a gendarme, he magically received the title of lieutenant-colonel of the Gendarmerie -- the same title as Arnaud Beltrame, a hero with more than two decades of exemplary service, crowned by exchanging himself for a woman held hostage by an Islamic terrorist who then slit Beltrame's throat.
Benalla enjoyed all sorts of perks, from a chauffeur-driven car to a 2,000-square-foot apartment in a sumptuous state-owned building. He also was not prosecuted for a recent hit-and-run.
Macron's political opponents, left and right, asked for a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The Minister of the Interior said he was aware of the May 1 assault but added that he only learned Benalla's name by reading it in the newspapers. The Paris police chief spoke of "unhealthy friendships" but refused to give any details. The secretary-general of the main police officers' union (SGP Police FO) spoke up about the presence in the president's entourage of shady security guards "acting beyond any legal control" and clashing with members of the official protection services.
Macron remained silent for six days. Then, at a private meeting with parliamentarians and ministers from his party, he said that he "takes responsibility" for the Benalla affair. At the same time, he blasted the media, saying "We have a press that is no longer pursuing the truth... What I see is media power that wants to become judicial power."
It seemed he was hoping to intimidate critics and impose silence. He did not succeed.
The anger of his opponents only intensified. They called Macron's reaction to the scandal insulting and inappropriate. They insisted that many details looked strange, and that a thorough investigation was indispensable. A rival politician spoke of the scandal as rising to "the level of Watergate."
But the Justice Department in France is not independent of the government; no judge will seek to know more. No thorough and deep investigation will take place. The French media are largely subsidized by the government and no more independent of it than the Justice Department is. Even the media that are not funded by the state self-censor what they report, because they are supported by businesses that depend on government contracts. No French journalist will try to discover a thing.
As the French Constitution does not provide for impeachment, French Presidents enjoy almost complete immunity.
Macron knows that his predecessors were able to stay in power despite their many scandals. Charles de Gaulle created a highly questionable militia that existed for thirty years: the SAC (Civic Action Service). François Mitterrand dissolved the SAC after several of its members were involved in a bloody killing near Marseilles. Mitterand then created a "counter-intelligence" unit -- based at the Élysée [Presidential] Palace -- in charge of intimidating those who might reveal the existence of his hidden second family. In 2005, nine years after Mitterrand's death, members of the unit were tried in court for illegal wiretapping during Mitterrand presidency. Only in 2011, four years after his second term was completed, was Jacques Chirac given a lenient two-year suspended prison sentence for having diverted public funds and abused public trust during his presidency.
The columnist Ivan Rifoul, in a recent book, described Macron's victory as a "masquerade" organized by "socialists in decline", "EU apparatchiks", supporters of the Islamization of Europe, and crony capitalists.
Macron will remain president. He will nevertheless be a diminished president. Macron pretended to embody an "exemplary Republic"; he will not be able to do that anymore.
While Macron had previously been able to marginalize his political opponents, those days seem to be over. His opponents have already been criticizing the absence of results of his economic policy -- slight income tax cuts but many new regulations, and small changes in a very rigid labor code – as well as his weak response to the rise of burglaries, car- jackings, rapes and social unrest.
Now all Macron's decisions will be treated with suspicion and scrutinized without mercy. He has already postponed a reform of the constitution that was supposed to strengthen presidential power (namely, his own). Other projects he began -- such as mass civil-servant layoffs and early-retirement buyouts and unemployment insurance reform -- will likely be abandoned. His approval rates are falling.
The deterioration of France rolls on.
A violent fight recently broke out between the residents of Calais and illegal migrants living in a vast slum encampment -- home to approximately 6,000 migrants -- that reporters call the "Calais Jungle". The government has promised many times to take care of the situation, but has not solved the problem. Meanwhile, Calais, with 75,000 inhabitants, is a ravaged city: home prices have collapsed, shops and restaurants have closed their doors, and people are moving away.
In May, some members of parliament published a report on the situation in the Paris suburb of Seine Saint Denis. According to the report, 20% of the area's population consists of people similar to those living in the "Calais Jungle"; hundreds of businesses are on the verge of bankruptcy and the police are too frightened to do effective work.
The same situation exists in other parts of the country. Riots recently erupted between Muslim gangs in Nice, on the French Riviera, as well as near Porte de La Chapelle, inside Paris.
The demographic changes in France's population that began several decades ago are not easing. A few months ago, the economist Charles Gave used statistical data to demonstrate that if nothing changes, the non-Muslim population of France could be a minority in 40 years. He added: "What happened to Spain or Asia Minor in the 10th and 11th centuries will happen to Europe in the 21st century, that is a certainty."
Polls show that if a presidential election were held now, no other French politician could replace Macron, even though Macron won only 23.8% of votes in the first round of the 2017 election. The majority of those who voted for him in the second round seemed to be voting more against his opponent than for Macron. He never had popular support.
As for the rest of the continent, Macron is one of the main defenders of a multicultural, post-national, post-democratic and post-Christian Europe. A growing number of Europeans see that trend as leading to the destruction of their own civilization and have been voting for leaders who resist it.
Politicians who support the same vision of Europe as Macron have, in recent months, been eliminated from the political scene or reduced to faltering positions. Italy's Matteo Renzi was badly defeated in the 2018 elections. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, once described as "the most powerful leader in Europe", now survives in office only because she agreed to measures aimed at limiting further immigration to Germany.
Macron may not fall as abruptly as Renzi, but his position at the moment looks as precarious as Merkel's.
Leaders embodying resistance to post-national multiculturalism, on the other hand, have been gaining ground. Hungarian President Viktor Orbán won reelection in April and is currently serving his third consecutive term. He had campaigned for defending Europe's Judeo-Christian roots, for national sovereignty, and against Muslim immigration. Austria's new Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, has a program similar to Orbán's. The Polish and Czech governments also hold positions similar to those of Kurz and Orbán. Matteo Salvini, leader of The League (an anti-mass-migration party), is now Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister of Italy.
Macron recently revealed what he thinks of "populists" such as Orbán, Kurz and Salvini: "a leprosy all across Europe," and called on Europeans to "fight" them.
*Dr. Guy Millière, a professor at the University of Paris, is the author of 27 books on France and Europe.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.