English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For September 18/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Bible Quotations For today
If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life
Mark 08/31-38: “Then he began to teach them that the Son of Man must undergo great suffering, and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again. He said all this quite openly. And Peter took him aside and began to rebuke him. But turning and looking at his disciples, he rebuked Peter and said, ‘Get behind me, Satan! For you are setting your mind not on divine things but on human things. ’He called the crowd with his disciples, and said to them, ‘If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life? Indeed, what can they give in return for their life? Those who are ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of them the Son of Man will also be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on September 17-18/2020

Ministry of Health: 685 coronavirus cases, 4 deaths
More than 200 Virus Cases at Roumieh Prison
Body of Lebanese who died inside occupied lands repatriated under ICRC auspices
US dollar exchange rate: Buying price at LBP 3850, selling price at LBP 3900
Adib delays Aoun meeting, no breakthrough yet
Lebanon’s PM-designate to hold more talks in faltering bid to appoint cabinet
Adib Meets Aoun, Says Counting on 'Everyone's Cooperation'
Adib Meets Khalil and al-Khalil ahead of Baabda Talks
Adib 'Won’t Step Down' at the Moment, Govt Talks Extended until Sunday
Pompeo: Hizbullah Exploits Corrupt System Just Like Other Parties
Jerusalem librarian arrested after being recruited by Hezbollah
U.S. Sanctions 2 Lebanon-Based Firms, 'Hizbullah-Linked' Person
US sanctions Hezbollah-linked companies, official as new Lebanon govt on hold
Hezbollah setting up caches of the same Beirut explosion chemicals across Europe: US
Hizbullah Bloc Insists on Govt. Demands, Slams U.S. and ex-PMs
Report: Paris Sees ‘Dominance’ Ambitions in Rigidity to Retain Finance Ministry
On Lebanon's Shores, the Poor Board Deadly Dinghies
Beirut fire: the design story of the building Zaha Hadid conceptualised 12 years ago
Lebanon between France’s roadmap and US sanctions/Hanin Ghaddar/Al Arabiya/Thursday 17 September 2020
‘Inmates are panicking’: coronavirus outbreak spreads in Lebanon’s biggest detention centre/Hind Al Soulia - Riyadh/Al Khalegi Today/September 17/2020
The Advantages of Intimidation/Soubhi Amhaz/Carnegie MEC/September 17/2020
Playing Politics: International Security Sector Assistance and the Lebanese Military’s Changing Role/Hijab Shah and Melissa Dalton/Carnegie MEC/September 07/2020
 

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on September 17-18/2020

First of its kind: UAE, Bahrain channels share live broadcast with Israeli channel
UAE ‘will never abandon’ Palestinians, senior official says after Israel deal
U.S. Charges Two Iranians Over 'Cyberintrusion Campaign'
US President Trump plans executive order to punish arms trade with Iran: Report
Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, Bahrain’s FM
Trump: Other countries want to make peace with Israel
U.S. plans to enforce U.N. sanctions on Iran with its own action
Canada congratulates Israel, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on bilateral deals
Syria Blames U.S. for Harsh Fuel Crisis Paralyzing the Country
Russia Says No Mideast Peace without Solving 'Palestinian Problem'
Libyan Unity Government Chief Says Ready to Step Down
Mexican President Seeks to Avoid Row after Trump Drug Warning
FBI Worried about Clashes between Violent Groups before U.S. Vote
Turks want peace on Turkey, Greece dispute despite politicians’ heated rhetoric

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on September 17-18/2020

Was God really the peace broker on the White House lawn?/Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
The Abraham Accord: No details, no devil - analysis/Herb Keinon/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
No, Israel Doesn't Prefer Undemocratic Mideast Regimes/Seth Frantzman/ Middle East Forum/September 17/2020
MEF Plays Key Role in Designation of Al Jazeera Subsidiary as Qatari Agent/News from the Middle East Forum/September 17/2020
Goal of Natanz explosion was to send ‘clear’ message to Iran/Yonah Jeremy Bob/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
Iran’s axis worried about Israel-Saudi ties/Seth J. Frantzman/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
Arabs: Israel Is Not Our Enemy/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/September 17/ 2020
The Possible Limits of China-Russia Cooperation/Lawrence A. Franklin/Gatestone Institute/September 17/2020
Pioneer Kitten: A New Iranian Cyber Threat Group Emerges/Annie Fixler and Trevor Logan/FDD/September 17/2020
Iran Must Be Banned From International Sports/Benjamin Weinthal and Alireza Nader/FDD/September 17/2020
How the Israel-Bahrain Peace Deal Will Reshape the Middle East/James Phillips/The National Interest/September 17/202020
A New Look At Iran's Complicated Relationship With The Taliban/Barnett Rubin/War On The Rocks/September 17/202020
Oil and OPEC: Step aside Seven Sisters, it’s time for the Seven Brothers/Cyril Widdershoven/Thursday 17 September 2020

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on September 17-18/2020

Ministry of Health: 685 coronavirus cases, 4 deaths
NNA/September 17/2020
685 اnew cases of the novel coronavirus have been confirmed in Lebanon a statement by the Ministry of Public Health said on Thursday, raising the tally of infected people in the country to 26768. 669 cases were locally detected and 16 among returnees. Four new deaths have been recorded over the past 24 hours.

More than 200 Virus Cases at Roumieh Prison
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
Lebanon's largest prison has more than 200 coronavirus cases, the head of the country's doctors' union warned Thursday, calling for speedy trials to ease overcrowding. "There are more than 200 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Roumieh prison," Sharaf Abu Sharaf told journalists in Beirut, after authorities first announced 22 cases at the weekend. Abu Sharaf did not specify whether the new cases were all inmates or if they also included prison guards. But he blamed prisoners for the spike in infections, saying they were not abiding by health measures. He also called on authorities to speed up trials to ease overcrowding, in a country where suspects can languish in jail for months without a hearing. Roumieh prison houses more than 4,000 prisoners, around three times its intended capacity, and has long been infamous for its poor conditions. A video leaked from the prison and shared widely across social media on Wednesday showed nearly 100 inmates demanding immediate measures to ease overcrowding in light of the virus outbreak. A prisoner speaking on the group's behalf threatened a "river of blood" unless steps are taken. Security authorities had first announced 22 coronavirus cases there on Saturday. They include nine guards and 13 detainees who had been transferred to an isolation unit inside the jail. Dozens of families of Roumieh detainees staged a protest in front of a Beirut courthouse Monday, demanding a general amnesty for their relatives over fears the pandemic was spreading in the jail.
Speaking to AFP on Monday, Beirut Bar Association head Melhem Khalaf called the outbreak there a "humanitarian time bomb." Caretaker health minister Hamad Hassan has said his ministry was working with the ministries of interior and defence to prepare two hospitals in the eastern Bekaa region and one in the capital to treat detainees. Covid-19 infections have surged in Lebanon in recent weeks, especially after a massive explosion at Beirut port on August 4 that killed more than 190 people, wounded thousands and ravaged large parts of the capital. Since February, Lebanon has recorded a total of 26,083 Covid-19 cases, including 259 deaths.

Body of Lebanese who died inside occupied lands repatriated under ICRC auspices
NNA/September 17/2020
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) oversaw today the repatriation of a Lebanese man who had died inside the occupied Palestinian lands, our correspondent reported on Thursday. The ICRC has transferred the body via Ras Naqoura crossing, and handed it over to the Lebanese Red Cross who shall transport it to Yaroun, the hometown of the deceased, identified as Daher Elias Haddad.

US dollar exchange rate: Buying price at LBP 3850, selling price at LBP 3900
NNA/September 17/2020
The Money Changers Syndicate announced in a statement addressed to money changing companies and institutions Thursday’s USD exchange rate against the Lebanese pound as follows:
Buying price at a minimum of LBP 3850
Selling price at a maximum of LBP 3900
 

Adib delays Aoun meeting, no breakthrough yet
The Daily Star/September 17, 2020
BEIRUT: Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib Thursday delayed his planned consultation with President Michel Aoun on the formation of a new Cabinet as political leaders struggled to break the impasse over which sect will helm the Finance Ministry. A source at the presidential palace told The Daily Star that the meeting between Adib and Aoun, originally planned to take place at 11 a.m., will now begin at 5 p.m. Adib was expected to either present his draft Cabinet lineup to Aoun or resign over the deadlock. Efforts to form a new government have hit an impasse with Amal Movement head Nabih Berri, backed by Hezbollah, insisting that the Finance Ministry be excluded from Adib's proposed shake up of the leadership of the ministry along with that of the defense, interior and foreign ministries. The PM-designate is in favor of rotating the leadership of these ministries among the main sects, while Berri is adamant that a Shiite should stay at the helm of the Finance Ministry. A senior political source told The Daily Star Thursday that French Ambassador to Lebanon Bruno Foucher met Hezbollah's head of international relations Ammar Moussawi in an effort to smooth over differences on the matter. But Berri in comments published Thursday doubled down on his position that there be no change in the leadership of the key ministry that will be instrumental in leading the country out of its worst ever financial and economic crisis. "We support the success of the French initiative and we are dedicated to that,” Berri told Al-Joumhouria about French President Emmanuel Macron’s efforts to facilitate the swift formation of a new government. “At the same time we have national constants. What we demanded is that we are all partners in the administration of this country, and we will certainly not accept that there are [double standards].”
Berri, who has been Parliament Speaker since 1992, dug his heels in against the proposed rotation after the US last week sanctioned his chief advisor former Finance Minister Ali Hasan Khalil for aiding Hezbollah.
In addition to insisting that the Shiite sect keep the Finance Ministry, Berri is also demanding that he has a say in choosing a Shiite candidate to lead the ministry. Adib, however, has vowed to create a 14-member Cabinet of “independent specialists.”“We did not hear that the French initiative had signaled that it is for or against the rotation [of leadership] in the Finance Ministry, and of course, had this rotation been suggested, the formation [of the Cabinet] would have proceeded along a different path to the current one,” Berri said. Despite Berri claiming that it is the “norm” for Shiites to lead the Finance Ministry, multiple Sunnis and Maronites have held the position in the past.

Lebanon’s PM-designate to hold more talks in faltering bid to appoint cabinet
Reuters/Thursday 17 September 2020
Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib said on Thursday he would give more time for talks about the formation of a new government as his faltering efforts raised doubts about a French initiative to lift the country out of a deep economic crisis.
France has been leaning on Lebanon's sectarian politicians to form a new cabinet and embark on reforms to exit the crisis that is the worst facing the country since its 1975-1990 civil war. But a deadline of September 15 that politicians had promised Paris they would meet has already been missed.
The process has been bogged down as Lebanon's dominant Shia Muslim factions, the Iran-backed Hezbollah and Amal Movement, have insisted on naming Shia ministers in the cabinet and said these must include the finance minister.
Political sources say Adib has been working on proposals to switch control of ministries, many of which have been held by the same factions for years, as he seeks to deliver a government of specialist ministers to deliver reforms mapped out by France. Lebanese media reports had indicated he might step down.
But after meeting President Michel Aoun, Adib said he had agreed "to hold off a bit to give more time for consultations". "I presented to the president the difficulties that are facing forming the government," he said. "I know full well that we do not have the luxury of time. And we count on everyone's cooperation." Adib, a Sunni Muslim, was designated prime minister on August 31 by a clear majority of Lebanese parties under French pressure. He enjoys the backing of former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, Lebanon's leading Sunni politician.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the Amal chief, became more insistent on naming the finance minister after Washington last week imposed sanctions on his senior aide for corruption and for enabling Hezbollah, political sources from several parties say.
The aide, Ali Hassan Khalil, is a former finance minister.
The United States imposed sanctions on Thursday on two Lebanon-based companies and one individual it said were linked to Hezbollah, according to the US Treasury Department's website. The US Treasury Department blacklisted Lebanon-based Arch Consulting and Meamar Construction.

Adib Meets Aoun, Says Counting on 'Everyone's Cooperation'
Naharnet/September 17/2020
Prime Minister-designate Mustafa Adib on Thursday met President Michel Aoun in Baabda after which he announced that more time will be given to the efforts aimed at forming a new government. “I discussed with the president the difficulties that we are facing in the formation of a new government,” said Adib after the talks. “I fully understand that we don't have the luxury of time and I'm counting on everyone's cooperation in order to form a mission government whose jurisdiction will be the implementation of what was agreed on with (French) President (Emmanuel) Macron,” the PM-designate added. “I agreed with the President to wait and give more time to the ongoing consultations,” said Adib after the talks. The Presidency for its part announced that Aoun “called on the PM-designate to continue the necessary contacts as soon as possible because the current situations require a quick rescue effort, especially that 16 days have passed” since Adib was tasked with forming the government. Aoun also stressed keenness on “the French initiative and all its stipulations,” noting that it had won “the consensus of the political leaders.”Shortly before his meeting with the president, Adib had held talks with Speaker Nabih Berri's aide Ali Hassan Khalil and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's assistant Hussein Khalil in a bid to reach an agreement over the thorny issues of the finance ministerial portfolio and Shiite representation in the new government. Macron, who traveled to Beirut twice since an August 4 port explosion disfigured the city, had demanded Lebanon's factions set no conditions on the line-up of the crisis government. France had warned that the combined effects of one of the largest explosions in history and of a critical debt crisis posed an existential threat to the 100-year-old state. However, Hizbullah and Amal, the two main Shiite groups in Lebanon's usual power-sharing arrangement, have insisted on retaining the finance ministry, effectively blocking Adib's efforts. In a statement, Hizbullah's parliamentary bloc said it "categorically" rejects any effort to impose names or block names for "any cabinet portfolio, especially the finance ministry."According to political officials, the young premier-designate has been pushing for a tighter cabinet of 14 ministers while the dominant alliance in parliament wants 24. Lebanese media had raised the possibility he would throw in the towel if the French deadline was not met, but Adib looked set to pursue his efforts.

Adib Meets Khalil and al-Khalil ahead of Baabda Talks
Naharnet/September 17/2020
Prime Minister-designate Mustafa Adib held a meeting Thursday afternoon with Speaker Nabih Berri’s aide Ali Hassan Khalil and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s assistant Hussein Khalil in a bid to reach an eleventh-hour agreement over the finance ministerial portfolio. The meeting came ahead of a crucial 5pm meeting between Adib and President Michel Aoun at the Baabda Palace. MTV later reported that Khalil and al-Khalil told Adib during the meeting that "the Shiite duo is insisting on the finance portfolio and on naming the Shiite ministers." "There are intensive domestic and foreign contacts aimed at dissuading the PM-designate from quitting during his visit to Baabda in order to give the French initiative a last chance," it added. Al-Jadeed TV had earlier reported that “Adib will step down if no agreement is reached in his meeting with Hussein Khalil and Ali Hassan Khalil.”MTV also earlier reported that “despite all the attempts, finding an exit to the governmental deadlock remains very difficult and an unlikely possibility.”“This makes the possibility of Adib stepping down in Baabda in the afternoon the most likely,” the TV network added.

Adib 'Won’t Step Down' at the Moment, Govt Talks Extended until Sunday
Naharnet/September 17/2020
Prime Minister-designate Mustafa Adib will not step down and is expected to visit Baabda for Cabinet talks, but without carrying a lineup format, LBCI television reported on Thursday. The station added that Adib was likely to meet with Speaker Nabih Berri after he meets President Michel Aoun for government formation consultations. Aoun-Adib meeting was postponed until 5:00 p.m. Thursday, said the National News Agency. It was initially scheduled to take place Thursday before noon. Adib was poised to step down from his mission to form a government if no breakthrough was achieved in the next 24 hours.
A statement by French President Emmanuel Macron's office said on Wednesday it regretted that Lebanese political leaders have failed to form a new government in line with a commitment made to Macron, but that it was not too late to do so. The statement came after Lebanese politicians missed a 15-day deadline to form a crisis Cabinet, with many remaining deadlocked on Wednesday on which political faction gets to have the key portfolio of the finance ministry. The deadline was set as part of a French initiative by Macron who has been pressing the leaders in Lebanon to form a Cabinet made up of specialists who can work on enacting urgent reforms to extract the country from a devastating economic and financial crisis.

Pompeo: Hizbullah Exploits Corrupt System Just Like Other Parties
Naharnet/September 17/2020
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo charged Thursday that Hizbullah “exploits Lebanon’s corrupt system just like other parties,” as the U.S. Treasury slapped sanctions on two Lebanon-based firms and a man described as a Hizbullah official. “Lebanon’s political leaders have long exploited the lack of transparency in Lebanon’s economy to conceal their self-enrichment, while pretending they are defending the rights of their people. Despite its claims to the contrary, the terrorist group Hizbullah is every bit as involved in this deception as other actors,” Pompeo added in a statement. “This scheme involving political leaders directing contracts to political allies while enriching themselves is exactly the type of corruption against which the Lebanese people are protesting,” he said. Pompeo added: “The Lebanese people have been demonstrating against corruption for nearly a year and demanding that their government address their basic needs after decades of political dysfunction. The Lebanese people deserve better, and the United States will continue to support their calls for an end to corruption and more responsive governance.”In his statement, the top U.S. diplomat noted that “Arch Consulting and Meamar Construction are two of many companies subordinate to Hizbullah’s Executive Council.”Hizbullah has used these companies to “conceal its economic activity and evade U.S. sanctions,” he charged. “Hizbullah collaborated with former Lebanese Minister Youssef Fenianos to ensure that Arch and Meamar won Lebanese government contracts worth millions of dollars, and the companies sent a portion of those funds to Hizbullah’s Executive Council,” Pompeo said. He noted that Arch Consulting was previously part of and continues to “provide funds to Jihad al-Bina, a prominent Hizbullah construction company designated by the United States in 2007.”“Sultan Khalifa As’ad oversees Arch, Meamar, and other Hizbullah companies in his position on Hizbullah’s Executive Council, where he helps manage the terrorist group’s municipal affairs. As’ad coordinates directly with Hashim Safi al-Din, head of Hizbullah’s Executive Council, to guide the activities of Arch, Meamar, and other Hizbullah companies,” Pompeo explained.

Jerusalem librarian arrested after being recruited by Hezbollah
Arutz Sheva/September 17/2020
Israeli security forces arrest Jerusalem woman recruited by Iran and Hezbollah, after breaking up secret terrorist cell. Israel’s internal security agency, the Shin Bet, announced Thursday that it has arrested a resident of eastern Jerusalem as part of a larger operation against a terrorist cell operating in the capital and in Ramallah. The Jerusalem resident, Yasmin Jaber, is an employee of the National Library at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as is alleged to have been recruited by the Lebanon-based Hezbollah terrorist organization and by Iranian operatives. Jaber, who lives in the Old City of Jerusalem, is said to have been first noticed by Hezbollah during a conference in Lebanon in 2015, and in 2016 was recruited by Hezbollah and the Quds Force, a wing of the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.After returning to Israel, Jaber was given instructions from her handlers in Hezbollah and the Quds Force. On several occasions, she met with Iranian and Hezbollah operatives during visits to Turkey. Jaber, the Shin Bet said, was tasked with recruiting female terrorists inside of Israel, with the goal of forming a terrorist cell which would carry out intel work and plan potential terrorist attacks. Israeli authorities arrested Jaber last month, along with several accomplices from eastern Jerusalem and Ramallah, including Tasnim Elqadi, a resident of Ramallah who operated in recent years out of Turkey.

U.S. Sanctions 2 Lebanon-Based Firms, 'Hizbullah-Linked' Person
Associated Press/Naharnet/September 17/2020
The U.S. Treasury on Thursday imposed sanctions on two Lebanon-based companies and a man described as a Hizbullah official. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, sanctioned the companies Arch Consulting and Meamar Construction "for being owned, controlled, or directed by Hizbullah." OFAC also sanctioned Sultan Khalifah Asaad, saying that he is a Hizbullah official closely associated with both companies. "Hizbullah leverages Arch and Meamar to conceal money transfers to Hizbullah's own accounts, further enriching Hizbullah's leadership and supporters, and depriving the Lebanese people of much-needed funds," the Treasury said. “Through Hizbullah’s exploitation of the Lebanese economy and manipulation of corrupt Lebanese officials, companies associated with the terrorist organization are awarded government contracts,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States remains committed to targeting Hizbullah and its supporters as they corruptly abuse Lebanese resources to enrich their leaders while the Lebanese people suffer from inadequate services," he added. He noted that Hizbullah's activities "permeate all aspects of the Lebanese economy, including the construction and infrastructure sectors."Munchin also charged that Hizbullah "conspires with Lebanese officials, including the recently designated former Minister of Public Works and Transportation, Youssef Fenianos, to direct government contracts worth millions of dollars to these companies, which are overseen by Hizbullah’s Executive Council." "The Council also receives the corrupt profits from these companies," he said. In a statement, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Hizbullah collaborated with Fenianos to "ensure that Arch and Meamar won Lebanese government contracts worth millions of dollars," noting that the companies "sent a portion of those funds to Hizbullah’s Executive Council."He also noted that Arch Consulting was previously part of and continues to "provide funds to Jihad al-Bina, a prominent Hizbullah construction company designated by the United States in 2007."“Sultan Khalifa As’ad oversees Arch, Meamar, and other Hizbullah companies in his position on Hizbullah’s Executive Council, where he helps manage the terrorist group’s municipal affairs. As’ad coordinates directly with Hashim Safi al-Din, head of Hizbullah’s Executive Council, to guide the activities of Arch, Meamar, and other Hizbullah companies,” Pompeo explained.

US sanctions Hezbollah-linked companies, official as new Lebanon govt on hold
Joseph Haboush, Al Arabiya English/Thursday 17 September 2020
The United States issued more sanctions against Hezbollah Thursday as efforts to form a new government in Lebanon were further hindered by the Iran-backed group and its allies insisting on maintaining hold of the Finance Ministry portfolio. Arch Consulting Company, based out of the Hezbollah-stronghold in the southern suburbs of Beirut, was designated for being linked to Hezbollah. Meamar SARL, in Lebanon, was also designated for its links to the group. Sultan Asaad, a senior Hezbollah Executive Council official, was designated as well. He is reportedly the deputy to Executive Council Chairman Hashem Saffieddine. The US said that Asaad also serves as the senior official for Hezbollah’s central municipal portfolio. "As of early 2019, Asaad was responsible for dozens of companies subordinate to the Executive Council, including Arch and Meamar. He provided project guidance to these companies and was involved in their financial and legal issues," the Treasury Department said. Thursday’s move came days after two senior politicians close to Hezbollah were sanctioned for their support to the group and for corruption. Former Finance Minister Ali Hasan Khalil and former Public Works Minister Youssef Fenianos were hit with sanctions, arguably the most aggressive step taken by the US against high-level politicians outside of Hezbollah’s official circle. Following the sanctions, Parliament speaker Nabih Berri who has been in his role since 1992, took the move personally and refused to allow a finance minister to be named by someone other than his Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Khalil is also Berri’s top political aide and has been active in the attempts to form a new government under Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib. Adib vowed to form a government of independent ministers and remained adamant about not allowing political parties to name ministers. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Thursday that Hezbollah exploits Lebanon’s corrupt system “just like other parties, as today’s designations and our September 8 designation of former ministers demonstrate. “The Lebanese people deserve better, and the United States will continue to support their calls for an end to corruption and more responsive governance,” he added.

Hezbollah setting up caches of the same Beirut explosion chemicals across Europe: US
Joseph Haboush, Al Arabiya English/Thursday 17 September 2020
Hezbollah is moving the same explosive chemicals across Europe that resulted in the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut, a senior US official revealed Thursday. US Coordinator for Counterterrorism Nathan Sales also told reporters that the Iran-backed group was the cause of Lebanon’s problems and that the European Union needed to expand its designation to cover the group in its entirety. Sales revealed that since 2012, Hezbollah had established caches of ammonium nitrate in Europe using first aid kits. “I can reveal that such caches have been moved through Belgium to France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. I can also reveal that significant ammonium nitrate caches have been discovered or destroyed in France, Greece and Italy, have reason to believe that this activity is still underway,” Sales told reporters during a phone call. Sales said this proved the threat Hezbollah poses to Washington’s European allies. “And that is why we renew our call for more countries to designate Hezbollah in its entirety, and for the European Union to expand its 2013 designation of the so-called military wing to reach the entire organization,” he said.
Lebanon's problem is Hezbollah
As for Lebanon, Sales said the group was a terrorist organization in its entirety. “The solution [in Lebanon] is that Hezbollah is not a political organization. It’s a terrorist organization to shed blood around the world and act at the behest of its master in Tehran,”Sales called on the European Union, which currently differentiates between Hezbollah’s political and military wing, to “call it for what is and marginalize and isolate Hezbollah.”France has been at the forefront of efforts to try to help Lebanon exit its unprecedented financial, economic and political crisis. However, Paris is coordinating with Hezbollah as part of its ongoing discussions with various political parties in Lebanon. “We have to recognize that we have some pretty substantial disagreements on how to achieve that goal,” of forming a new government, Sales said. Sales said that French engagement with Hezbollah only serves to legitimatize “what is, in fact, a terrorist organization.”UAE, Bahrain deal with Israel will brighten future of youth in region: US official

Hizbullah Bloc Insists on Govt. Demands, Slams U.S. and ex-PMs
Naharnet/September 17/2020
Hizbullah’s Loyalty to Resistance parliamentary bloc on Thursday condemned a perceived attempt by “those who are forming the government behind the scenes to usurp the representation of the country’s other components by preventing the PM-designate from consulting with the blocs.”“They have invented a new mechanism aimed at preventing the components from naming their ministers in the government on the one hand, and at disrupting the governmental balance through seizing the finance portfolio from others and running it on the other hand,” the bloc added in a statement issued after a periodic meeting. “The attempts by some to rely on the influence of foreign forces to form a government whose representation is tipped in favor of a single camp are attempts aimed at emptying the French initiative of its content and toppling the bridges of confidence with the other components on which we have always been keen,” Loyalty to Resistance said. It also noted that U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has “criticized the French after their president met a senior Hizbullah official,” in reference to the recent brief meeting between Emmanuel Macron and Mohammed Raad. “This issue clearly highlights the very negative American role, which aims to sabotage all the efforts that are being exerted to form a government in Lebanon that enjoys the consensus of the various parties,” the bloc added. “We categorically reject that anyone name on our behalf the ministers who should represent us in the government, and we also categorically reject that anyone put a veto on the allocation of a certain portfolio to the component we belong to, especially the finance portfolio,” Loyalty to Resistance went on to say, while noting that it is open to discussing all other details related to the new government. And stressing “the importance of the French initiative,” the bloc said “the U.S. administration, which backs the Israeli enemy’s interest in undermining Lebanon’s stability and preventing the improvement of its situations, is the party responsible for obstructing the government formation efforts.”

Report: Paris Sees ‘Dominance’ Ambitions in Rigidity to Retain Finance Ministry
Naharnet/September 17/2020
Paris considers as “flexible” the 15-day imposed deadline by President Emmanuel Macron for the formation of Lebanon’s government, but sees “covet for dominance of government decisions" in the rigidity of the “Shiite duo” to retain the finance ministry, the Saudi Asharq al-Awsat reported on Thursday.
Paris wants a breakthrough in forming a cabinet capable of addressing a “very dangerous” situation the Lebanese are reeling under, said the daily. It has "no problem" with regard to the sect of the Minister of Finance or any other minister there be, but only wants a “rescue” cabinet. However, the fact that “yielding to the desire of the Shiite party is tantamount to overthrowing the essence of the French initiative and of the principles agreed upon,” that is moving away from quotas and forming a government of specialists. In this adamant insistence, Paris sees a desire for “continuous domination of the government decisions, which jeopardizes the reform plan leaving it at the mercy of parties,” added the daily.A “confrontation government” is also not an option because it means more obstacles could stand in the way of the PM-designate Mustafa Adib who seeks to form a harmonious and productive government garnering broad support, added the daily.

On Lebanon's Shores, the Poor Board Deadly Dinghies
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
Suad Mohammad had hoped for a better life when her husband climbed into a dinghy to flee poverty-hit Lebanon, but he disappeared into the waves before he reached Cyprus. In her family home in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, Mohammad, 27, said she believed the Syrian father of her two small children, 35-year-old Shady Ramadan, was dead. "I'm waiting for my husband's body," she said, tears streaming down her face, as she clutched her baby boy on her lap. Ramadan is among dozens of Lebanese and Syrians to have tried to make the illicit sea crossing to European Union-member Cyprus in recent weeks, fleeing Lebanon's worst economic crisis in decades. His family said he was on a boat that drifted without food or water for a week in the Mediterranean sea before a United Nations peacekeeping ship rescued survivors on Monday. Mohammad recounted how desperation drove her diabetic husband to embark on the dangerous trip to the shores of the island of Cyprus, 160 kilometres (100 miles) away. "He fled Lebanon because of the grinding poverty to try to find us some money," she told AFP, a lively toddler girl playing at her feet. Lebanon's financial crunch has seen tens of thousands lose their jobs or part of their salaries, sparked sharp inflation and pushed poverty rates up to encompass more than half the population. Tripoli was one of Lebanon's poorest cities even before the crisis, which has been compounded in recent months by the novel coronavirus pandemic and a catastrophic explosion at Beirut's port that killed 190 people.
'Stranded at sea'
Before he left, Ramadan had tried to peddle ice creams from a cart, but earned no more than 20,000 Lebanese pounds a day (now worth around $2.50 at the black market rate). "A bag of nappies alone costs 33,000 pounds, without even considering rent," his wife said. The UNIFIL peacekeeping force rescued 25 Syrians, eight Lebanese and three others from a boat off the country's coast on Monday, the UN refugee agency said. UNIFIL also said it retrieved the body of someone who had died at sea. But relatives of those on board -- who included several other members of Mohammad's extended family -- claim at least four more either died or have gone missing. Ziad al-Bira, a relative, said two children had died of hunger and thirst, and their bodies had been pushed overboard, while Ramadan and another had disappeared at sea. It all started on September 7, when they climbed into a dinghy after having paid a smuggler five million pounds each (more than $660 at the market rate), he said. With the boat far over capacity, the smuggler "prevented them from coming aboard with their belongings, which included water, food and baby milk," Bira said. They ended up "stranded at sea without a guide, with communication cut off for days on end, until the UNIFIL ship found them," he added.After the two children died, Ramadan swam off to try to find help."He left and never came back," Bira said.
'Slow death' at home
Another young man -- 27-year-old Mohammad Mohammad -- tried the same and also disappeared. Sitting in front of his home in Tripoli, his father Khaldoun, 54, said his son was unemployed and had left along with relatives without telling him."The smuggler kept reassuring us that the boat had arrived safely, until we discovered three days later that he was lying -- by which time we could no longer speak to any of our children," he said. Distraught family members have filed three legal complaints against the smuggler, who has since disappeared. In Tripoli, however, not everybody is relying on a smuggler. This month, dozens of people chipped in to buy their own boat and spent 40 hours at sea trying to reach Cyprus before being turned back by the Cypriot navy. Two of them said they would jump at the opportunity to try again. Khaled Abdallah, 47, said life was no longer sustainable working 17-hour shifts as a school security guard for a daily wage of 25,000 pounds (around $3). "I'm determined to try again, whatever the cost," he said. Mohammed al-Khanji, 37, said he could no longer provide for his two young children as an ambulant vegetable seller. "I will do the impossible to feed my children," he said. "In the end, we will go. We might get there or we might die straight away, but in this country, we are dying a slow death."

Beirut fire: the design story of the building Zaha Hadid conceptualised 12 years ago
The five-storey structure was near completion when a fire broke out on Tuesday
Alexandra Chaves/The National/September 17/2020
An unfinished project by Zaha Hadid Architects caught fire in Beirut on Tuesday.
The building, named North Souks Department Store, is a five-storey structure located in the Beirut Souks development complex in the Lebanese capital, close to the port.
Designed by the late Zaha Hadid and her team, the building – which was nearing completion when the fire broke out – includes a cinema complex and entertainment annex designed by other architects.
The department store has a retail area of 22,497 square metres. The South Souks, designed by architects Rafael Moneo and Kevin Dash, comprises the development’s jewellery markets.The late Iraqi-British architect and her team began developing the concept for the building 12 years ago. Their finished design responds to the structure’s site and surroundings, specifically the historic area of Khan Antoun Bey, a former caravanserai, or rest stop for traders, which was demolished in 1983.
The site of Khan Antoun Bey is now being converted into a public square by developer Solidere, which is also the company behind Beirut Souks. The wide, lush piazza will serve as the entrance to the department store.
The overall design of the building is modelled on Hadid’s architectural style, with its twisted shape that mimics an infinity sign when seen from above. The Pritzker Architecture Prize winner, who died in 2016, was known for incorporating fluid curves and undulating forms in her projects.
Inside, an atrium brings in natural light and circulation to the space. The interiors are stark white, adding to the brightness and airiness of the hallways. Meanwhile, the building’s exterior features an asymmetrical mesh-like pattern that accentuates the appearance of the structure’s fluidity. In the design concept for the Beirut Souks Department Store, Zaha Hadid Architects describe the intention of “blurring the envelope of the building with the piazza”, to ensure that it seamlessly blends in with its surroundings.
The building is Hadid’s second project in Beirut. In 2014, the Issam Fares Institute, part of the American University of Beirut, was completed. The angular structure appears to float above its courtyard entrance, a deliberate design feature to preserve the landscape underneath.Pictures from Tuesday’s fire show that the Beirut Souks Department Store’s exterior was badly scorched, with parts of the exterior cladding falling away.
The cause of the fire is unknown. No injuries have been reported so far, and plans for repairing the building are yet to be announced.

Lebanon between France’s roadmap and US sanctions
Hanin Ghaddar/Al Arabiya/Thursday 17 September 2020
It seems Paris and Washington are playing “good cop, bad cop” when it comes to Lebanon.
French President Emmanuel Macron promises aid money the country desperately needs if the Lebanese political class abides by the road map he put in place, and threatens with sanctions if they don’t, while Washington escalates its sanctions policy toward Lebanon by imposing an unprecedented batch of sanctions against Hezbollah’s allies. Whether Washington and Paris are coordinating or not, one thing is clear – Hezbollah and its allies are feeling the heat. Right after the conclusion of the visits of Macron, and the US State Department’s David Hale and David Schenker, the US Treasury hit Lebanon’s political elite with exceptional sanctions, targeting two of Hezbollah’s main allies, in a rare move against politicians close to the Iran-backed group.
Unprecedented Sanctions
The sanctioned officials are former Finance Minister and Member of Parliament Ali Hassan Khalil and former Public Works and Transportation Minister Youssef Fenianos. In a strong message to Lebanon’s political elite, these sanctions were perceived as a warning to Hezbollah and its allies. Khalil is a senior official in the Amal political party while Fenianos is a member of the Christian Marada group, and according to the US Treasury, they both “provided material support to Hezbollah and engaged in corruption.”
Hezbollah used its relationship with officials in the Lebanese government to siphon funds from government budgets to ensure that Hezbollah-owned companies won bids for Lebanese government contracts worth millions of dollars, the US Treasury said. It added that Fenianos also helped Hezbollah gain access to sensitive legal documents related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and served as a go-between for Hezbollah and political allies. Khalil used his position as finance minister to attempt to have US financial restrictions on Hezbollah eased and helped Hezbollah move money.
Although issued as counter terrorism sanctions, the context and rationale are focused on corruption, and the link between corruption and Hezbollah, something that the Lebanese street has been focusing on as well. And for the first time, the US has targeted officials outside Hezbollah’s official circles.
These sanctions – although they spared the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Gebran Bassil for the moment – they were perceived as a warning sign to President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law Bassil, the latter of which has been threatened with sanctions before. Immediately, Bassil understood the message and felt threatened, to the extent that he criticized Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during his visit in Beirut last week, saying that the Hamas chief’s visit hurt Lebanon’s sovereignty and did not serve the Palestinian’s cause. Bassil also indicated to Macron that his party would not interfere with Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib’s attempts to form a government. Where France gave Adib two weeks to form a Cabinet, talks have stalled, and there is now talk that Adib will step aside.
But whether Bassil will actually refrain from interfering remains to be seen, especially given that Bassil has a record of throwing promises at the international community while adhering to Hezbollah’s agenda and interests in Lebanon and the region.
Next steps
The coming days will be decisive for Lebanon, as the country stands at a crossroad and looks at two very different scenarios. First, if the “good cop, bad cop” dynamics between Washington and Paris succeed and Mustafa Adib manages to form an independent government, Hezbollah and its allies would be forced to surrender to the international community’s conditions. Lebanon would then stand at a new crossroad, which is the long and complicated process of implementing reforms and restructuring its financial system. The new government should also be able – without hindrances – to oversee early elections based on a new, non-confessional, and representative electoral law. Eventually, hope for Lebanon and its institutions will be restored.
Second, if Adib fails to form a government and resigns from his post as a designate prime minister, Lebanon returns to square one in terms of government formation, and eventually the French initiative will be ceased, leaving Lebanon to face tougher circumstances. If the good cop decides to leave the scene, all measures and tools will be left to the bad cop – meaning more sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and conditionality on aid, including humanitarian aid. Lebanon will further fall into the abyss of financial and economic collapse. All international efforts to help Lebanon – such as the conditional aid promised at the 2018 Paris donor conference and the IMF negotiations – will stop, and it is likely that security incidents and clashes will increase. Of course, forming the government won’t be the magical solution that will open the door for international aid and the bail out that Lebanon needs, but it is a small first step toward a process of reform, elections, and restructuring of the political system, without which Lebanon will surely become a failed state. The coming days will show if the political elite – mainly Hezbollah’s allies – want to help Lebanon or if they remain more concerned with maintaining their power. Alas, the track record is not very reassuring.

‘Inmates are panicking’: coronavirus outbreak spreads in Lebanon’s biggest detention centre
Hind Al Soulia - Riyadh/Al Khalegi Today/September 17/2020
Warnings of a humanitarian catastrophe inside Lebanon’s prisons are growing after dozens of people at the country's biggest detention centre tested positive for Covid-19.
According to a security source at Roumieh prison, who asked to remain anonymous, more than 200 inmates and at least a dozen guards have tested positive for the virus.
“Everyone in the prison is panicking, it’s chaos,” Mohammed Sablouh, a human rights lawyer who has clients in Roumieh, told The National.
The Internal Security Forces, the body responsible for prison security, issued a statement on Sunday saying that 13 inmates and nine staff members had tested positive. They have not publicly announced an updated figure.
The outbreak has sparked protests among inmates, who have been calling for improved sanitation and virus protection measures since March.
“We’ve been warning for months that if the coronavirus entered the prison, it would be a mass execution,” Mr Sablouh said.
Lebanon’s detention facilities are dangerously overcrowded, holding on average 220 per cent of their intended capacity. The Roumieh prison was built in the 1960s to hold 1,100 inmates, but now houses more than 4,000.
Earlier this week, footage taken inside the prison showed men lying on thin mattresses placed just centimetres apart on the floor of a corridor.
Prison overcrowding is in large part due to the large number of detainees who are held for months, and in some cases years, before facing trial.
According to statistics gathered by Alef, a human rights NGO, about 70 per cent of current inmates are in pre-trial detention, often in police stations or courthouses.
Prisoners are packed into cramped cells, with no natural light, no space for social distancing and no access to the outdoors.
“These are the exact conditions that allow the virus to spread,” said Suzanne Jabbour, chief executive of the Restart Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture.
Though the virus is a pressing concern in itself, it also exposed two major crises in Lebanon’s prison system, Ms Jabbour said.
The first is the failure of the judiciary to hold trials and proceedings quickly to ease overcrowding. Second is a lack of fair treatment and health care.
“The people inside Lebanese detention centres are vulnerable and the government has a responsibility to protect them,” Ms Jabbour said.
Lebanon’s unprecedented economic crisis has worsened already dire conditions over the past year as prison authorities struggle to provide essential services.
A Lebanese army soldier throw stones at anti-government protesters during a protest on the road leading to the Presidential palace in Baabda, east Beirut. EPA
Sanitary conditions in the prison are poor, with even basic items such as soap in short supply. Inmates are also receiving less food – a 200-gram serving of the strained yoghurt labneh has been halved to 100g and a single plate of green beans is split between four.
“The authorities do not view the prisoners as human beings,” Mr Sablouh said.
In one video leaked from the prison this week, an inmate calls on the authorities to act quickly to prevent the spread of the virus and protect prisoners from infection.
“Why should we die inside this prison? Why should our families take us home in body bags?” the man says.
In its statement on Sunday, the Internal Security Forces listed various hygiene measures that had been put in place, including thorough sanitisation, visits only permitted behind glass, and judicial proceedings taking place via video call.
Prisoners who tested positive for the virus have been moved to a quarantine unit in the prison’s J Block. However according to testimonies recorded by Mr Sablouh, some inmates with mild symptoms of the coronavirus are attempting to conceal them from prison staff so they are not transferred to the unit, which would essentially act as solitary confinement.
Caretaker Health Minister Hamad Hassan said on Saturday that his ministry was working to prepare three hospitals to receive infected detainees.
The families of detainees have held a series of demonstrations since authorities announced the first confirmed cases on Saturday, holding protests outside the Beirut courthouse and blocking the road leading to Beirut’s airport with burning tyres and rubbish bins.
Melhem Khalaf, the lawyer who heads the Beirut Bar Association, called on the judicial authorities to take “rapid steps” to release some prisoners charged with minor crimes and alleviate overcrowding.
“The situation in the prison is extremely dangerous,” he said.
The outbreak has renewed calls among prisoners, their families and some politicians for a general amnesty that would allow inmates to be granted early release in certain cases. It is a highly politicised issue, with political parties proposing different versions of a general amnesty bill according to the interests of their support bases.
A bill was put to Parliament in May, but ultimately failed due to disagreement between MPs over which crimes should be included.
Also in April, Justice Minister Marie-Claude Najm, now in a caretaker position, told The National she aimed to reduce the prison population by about 3,000 to ease overcrowding.
Mr Khalaf said that out of 3,600 release requests, only 780 inmates had been freed due to the inability, or unwillingness, of judges to move proceedings along.
The caretaker justice minister has also been collating a list of inmates to present to President Michel Aoun as part of a “special amnesty” that would see the release of some prisoners, including those who are old, sick, or have less than six months remaining on their sentence. Mr Aoun has not yet signed the decree that would allow their release.
Lebanon is currently in the midst of a severe spike of Covid-19 infections, placing already fragile healthcare facilities under additional strain.
Since the first confirmed case of Covid-19 in February, Lebanon has registered 26,083 cases of the virus and 259 deaths.
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The Advantages of Intimidation
Soubhi Amhaz/Carnegie MEC/September 17/2020
In Ba‘lbek-Hermel, there was support for the Lebanese uprising until the main Shi‘a parties gained the upper hand.
From the start of Lebanon’s uprising in October 2019, villages in the northeastern region of Ba‘lbek-Hermel openly backed the protest movement, joining the calls for change in domestic politics.
The region is known for its deprivation but also its resistance to the marginalization and poverty it has experienced since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. It has became a symbol for Lebanese protesters who seek a just state and more balanced development. But the region’s protesters were forced to back down from their revolutionary ardor, for fear of provoking the opposition of peers and family members who had adopted the discourse of the two main Shi‘a parties Hezbollah and Amal.
Support for Lebanon’s October 17 “revolution”—which had reached every village in the northern Beqa‘ Valley, from Ba‘lbek and nearby Douris to Laboueh, as well as the Sunni-majority towns of ‘Arsal and Fakeha—has now waned. Early on, activists took the tactical decision to limit their protests to the region’s two urban centers, Ba‘lbek and Hermel, where the population had diverse political affiliations that could help the movement weather Hezbollah’s attacks. The movement saw that Ba‘lbek was capable of facing down Hezbollah, thanks to its political and confessional diversity, with its large Sunni population alongside its Shi‘a population.
But Ba‘lbek and Hermel, despite being active from the start of the uprising, have since retreated. Hezbollah, a dominant force in the region, began accusing those who expressed opposition to corruption of treachery. The party sought to label them in ways bound to raise hackles in the region—“foreign proxies” or “traitors to the Shi‘a sect”—which could overrule Christians, Sunnis, and others sympathetic to the uprising.
The situation in Lebanon’s provinces can only be understood in the context of the sectarian political system in place since independence, and the dominant political forces—or those who represent each region in parliament and the executive branch. A quick overview of the 2018 parliamentary election results gives us an understanding of the governorate’s demographic and political reality. Ba‘lbek-Hermel has some 308,000 voters, including 226,000 Shiites, 42,000 Sunnis, and the remaining 40,000 voters divided among Christian sects, including Maronites, Greek Catholics, and a Greek Orthodox minority.
Candidates on the various lists were competing for ten seats. The Hope and Loyalty list led by the Hezbollah-Amal Shi‘a alliance won eight seats, while the Dignity and Development list of the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement won the other two—a Sunni seat in ‘Arsal that went to Bakr al-Hujeiri and a Maronite seat in Deir al-Ahmar that was won by Antoine Habshi.
The Ba‘lbek-Hermel electoral district has been represented continuously by Hezbollah and Amal since the 1992 elections—the first after the end of the civil war—in which they had won eight seats. They increased that figure to nine in the elections four years later, and then in 2000 they and their allies won all ten seats. This continued until the 2018 vote, when a proportional representation-preferential voting law allowed the Future Movement and the Lebanese Forces to make inroads. But that meant little with regard to the Shi‘a voting lineup. Neither Habshi nor Hujeiri garnered the backing of more than 800 Shi‘a.
The 2018 elections demonstrated an important political reality, with the Lebanese Forces winning a majority of the Christian vote, even in Greek Catholic villages including Qa‘, traditionally a stronghold of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Habshi came first there, as well as taking 800 votes in the Christian town of Ras Ba‘lbek, beating local parliamentarian Albert Mansour, who won only 500 votes in his hometown.
Beyond the numbers, Hezbollah’s status among Shi‘a voters as the “resistance” had great significance in a region that has given many of its sons to that effort. Hermel is known as the “city of martyrs.” Hezbollah has also managed to market itself as protecting the region from Sunni Islamist militants based in the border hinterland of Qusayr, which encompasses 23 Lebanese villages, as well as shielding them from the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in the ‘Arsal hinterland—including the Christian villages of Fakeha, Jadida, Ras Ba‘lbek, and Qa‘. It is in this context that the region’s protesters launched their first rallies on October 17, facing ever more pressure after the uprising was demonized and portrayed as targeting Hezbollah.
An examination of political and family factors surrounding the “revolution” in the region shows that public support for it has dissipated in the Shi‘a villages between Ba‘lbek and Hermel. This started after Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s televised address on October 19, two days after the outbreak of the uprising, in which he asserted that nobody could bring down the government. This was followed on October 25 with an address shortly after an attack by what he called “undisciplined elements” who beat up protesters and smashed protest camps in Riad al-Solh and Martyrs Squares in Beirut.
Baalbek was not cut off from events in Beirut. The region’s public, largely supportive of Hezbollah, began exerting psychological pressure on activists as soon as Nasrallah had indicated that the Shi‘a partnership of his party and Amal did not support the uprising. In the village of Laboueh, the uprising had unified youths with those of ‘Arsal following years of tense relations following the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. But activists there paused, seeking to avoid dragging the village into conflict.
At the start of the uprising, young Sunnis from ‘Arsal had visited their nearby Shi‘a neighbors and organized a unified protest against the government and the marginalization of the region. But on November 20 Hezbollah, seen as the main protector of the political system, mobilized opposition from supporters of the two Shi‘a parties during a rally on the road joining ‘Arsal and Laboueh. This forced the activists to change their strategy and take into account that Hezbollah’s supporters rejected any pro-uprising activities in Shi‘a villages.
The example of these two villages quickly spread to other communities in the area. Given the great influence of family pressure in the Beqa‘, and in order to prevent any conflict in the region, activists from Shi‘a villages decided to move their protests to the Sunni village of Zaitoun, where the Shi‘a parties have little presence. A short time later the uprising had lost its momentum entirely in the region, except at the Khalil Mutran Square in Ba‘lbek. Even there, the protests waned after Hezbollah attacked protesters, including with gunfire.
On June 6, 2020, hundreds of Lebanese protesters returned to the streets to protest against the government’s inability to rein in an accelerating economic collapse. The protesters adopted a variety of slogans and demands—from demanding urgent steps to prevent a collapse to toppling the government and holding early elections. But a small number of people with little popular support also demanded implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the “disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias”—including the armed wing of Hezbollah.
There was far from universal support for the slogan from those backing the uprising, who wished to avoid provoking the Shi‘a with emotional links to Hezbollah. But the party immediately began spreading rumors in Ba‘lbek and Hermel that the protest movement was targeting Hezbollah, its weapons arsenal, and even Shi‘a who were supportive of the uprising. Many in Ba‘lbek-Hermel were influenced by this propaganda and withdrew their support on the same day. June 6 thus became a turning point in Lebanon’s uprising.
With these factors in mind, it is clear that Hezbollah, and especially its supporters in Ba‘lbek-Hermel, fear any opposition and will use any means to demonize such action or portray it as threatening the security of the region—of which Hezbollah poses as being the sole guarantor. But the security of Ba‘lbek-Hermel, and of Lebanon as a whole, can only be assured by laws and institutions.

Playing Politics: International Security Sector Assistance and the Lebanese Military’s Changing Role
Hijab Shah and Melissa Dalton/Carnegie MEC/September 07/2020
Summary: Following the August Beirut port explosion, the Lebanese Armed Forces must rebuild trust with the civilian population. The LAF can serve as a critical pillar in Lebanese government efforts to strengthen national security and identity in the midst of the crisis, in light of security sector assistance from the United States and other Western partners.
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INTRODUCTION
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and Lebanon more broadly, is one of the largest recipients of foreign assistance in the Middle East. The United States and allied governments have sought to build the capabilities and professionalism of the LAF since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, focusing primarily on counterterrorism and border security. The LAF stood in stark contrast to other Lebanese security services in their restraint vis-à-vis the civilian population during the 2019 protests. However, recent reported violent incidents against civilians, ambiguity of the role of police forces, and concerns about both recovery efforts following the August 2020 port explosion in Beirut and extended powers under the state of emergency established by the Lebanese parliament have raised international concerns about the role of Lebanon’s security services, including the LAF. The LAF has a critical role to play in stabilizing Lebanon through a multi-faceted crisis, but will need to take concrete steps to bolster its professionalism.
Lebanon’s modern politics have long been defined by confessionalism, a reality that persists even as the country is engulfed in crisis. International assistance to the LAF over the last fourteen years had intended to support the LAF as a legitimate national institution transcending confessions and supporting a broader sense of Lebanese security and identity. In the midst of the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, political turmoil at the helm of the country, and the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, there is an important opportunity for the international community to support a new path for governance in the country—as shaped and envisioned by its populace. This opportunity hinges upon leveraging existing channels of support to the LAF and building in conditionality mechanisms that hold the LAF accountable for its actions, while continuing to promote a clear articulation of priorities for the LAF and a plan to improve military effectiveness through policy and doctrine; training and equipment, education, and exercises; operations; and institutional capacity building.
LEBANON’S MILITARY: PRIORITIES AND PERFORMANCE
Historically, the LAF has played a unique role in Lebanon as an apolitical entity buttressing a political goal of broader Lebanese unity and nationalism. In the midst of the current political turmoil, the LAF will have to reinforce its popular support while extending legitimacy, defending Lebanese sovereignty, and protecting domestic security interests.
EXTENDING LEGITIMACY IN THE POST–CIVIL WAR ERA
In light of Lebanon’s history of confessional conflict and fragmentation, the fact that the LAF is perhaps the only national institution that is broadly respected and supported across the country is nontrivial: Arab Barometer polls from 2019 showed 87 percent of the population trusted the LAF, compared to the 48 percent that trusted the police.1 Maintaining this legitimacy in the post–civil war era has been a high priority for the LAF, which it has sought to achieve through cross-confessional representation, balance, and neutrality.
The LAF’s attention to maintaining cross-confessional representation and balance has historic precedence dating back to the French mandate era of the early twentieth century, when the LAF’s predecessor, the Troupes Spéciales du Levant, focused on the “selective recruitment” of Muslim and Christian soldiers to particular military units as a “political balancing act.”2 In more recent memory, the LAF’s prioritization of cross-confessional balance is the direct consequence of its experience in the civil war of the 1970s and 1980s, when the LAF saw mass defections of its Sunni, Shia, and Druze officers and soldiers into militias organized by confession. The shell left behind was populated mostly by Maronite Christian officers and soldiers.3
The LAF’s efforts to prevent a repeat of such events, and the provisions of the 1989 Taif Accords and UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1559, 1680, and 1701 that called for the disarming of internal armed groups, have resulted in a more balanced and representative post–civil war force.4 This is particularly true across its rank and file: the military force is roughly 24 percent Christian, 35 percent Sunni, 27 percent Shia, and 6 percent Druze.5 The leadership of the LAF, however, tends to skew in favor of Maronite Christian generals, possibly partly as a legacy of the civil war defections of the other confessions and partly as a balancer to Lebanon’s other internal security forces—the Sunni-led policing authority known as the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Shia-led internal intelligence service known as the Directorate of General Security (DGS). The LAF has in the past been criticized for its alleged favoring of the Maronite community, not only because the position of LAF commander has historically been a pathway to the presidency in Lebanon, but also because of rumblings of favoritism for Maronites in special forces units.6 There are also concerns that, although to a much lesser extent than in the 1980s and 1990s, there may be divided loyalties within Lebanon’s officer corps.7 These fissures are particularly worrisome among those who have earned a place in the LAF officer corps through the country’s various sectarian and political patronage networks.
In order to tackle this criticism, the LAF’s keen focus on cross-confessional balance can lead to some impracticalities. For instance, U.S. officials were reportedly frustrated by how the LAF distributed U.S.-provided materiel—instead of sending the materiel to relevant, strategically placed units, the LAF opted instead to spread the weapons and equipment thinly across essentially the entirety of its force, so as not to be seen as favoring one unit or confession over another.8 These impracticalities also exist in the LAF’s efforts to abide by strict U.S. end-use monitoring requirements, resulting in LAF reticence to provide certain units in southern Lebanon or the Bekaa Valley with U.S. materiel for fear of being seen as risking the equipment falling into Hezbollah’s hands.
DEFENDING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
The LAF’s stated mission is to “defend the nation, preserve sovereignty and the state’s authority, protect the constitution, preserve security and stability, and contribute to providing social stability and development.”9 Lebanon’s sovereignty has historically been a sensitive issue, particularly because its occupation by external state forces from Syria and Israel is within very recent memory, and also because of the outsize influence that another external actor, Iran, has within Lebanese politics through its support for Hezbollah. This is especially complicated because Syria justified its occupation as one to counterbalance that of Israel, while Hezbollah fairly successfully represented itself as the resistance to Israeli occupation and the true defenders of Lebanese sovereignty—where the LAF fell short—against a state widely perceived as the enemy, not just in Lebanon but across the broader Middle East.
The aforementioned Taif Accords and UNSCR 1559, 1680, and 1701 assert the Lebanese government’s sovereignty over the country, prohibiting the existence of arms or authority outside of the state and of any foreign occupying entity within Lebanese territory.10 Despite these provisions, however, the LAF remains helpless in the face of powerful actors such as Hezbollah, regional influencers such as Iran and Syria, and—despite being disarmed and disbanded—the clout of former confessional militia leaders and warlords, many of whom continue to wield sizable influence in Lebanon’s politics and economy.
Political sensitivities and civil-military norms prevent the LAF from naming Hezbollah, Iran, or Syria as potential risks to Lebanese sovereignty. Indeed, some military leaders, such as former LAF commander General Jean Kahwaji, have publicly expressed a favorable attitude towards Hezbollah, while others have not been able to convert their criticisms of Hezbollah into concrete policies or posture against the group. The military has been able to more vociferously oppose threats posed by groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates.11 The LAF’s focus on defending Lebanon against these groups is reflected in its efforts to enhance professionalization and readiness in this context. The heightened focus on counterterrorism training with partners like the United States and the increase in materiel relevant to these sorts of missions is indicative of the LAF’s desire to defend the country from the threats these groups pose to its sovereignty.
PROTECTING DOMESTIC SECURITY INTERESTS
Lebanon has outsized domestic security concerns. The history of confessional conflict, the presence of powerful internal actors, both armed and unarmed, and the influence of external actors in the country’s domestic affairs have all resulted in a tinderbox of tensions within the country. With the tendency to flare up suddenly, domestic tensions are a significant source of instability in Lebanon. Although domestic security is an atypical responsibility for a national military, the LAF plays a unique role in Lebanese society, which necessitates its focus on the matter.12
Hypothetically, the ISF and DGS should lead the effort on maintaining the country’s domestic security, but a combination of a lack of capacity, deep-rooted politicization, and lack of public cross-confessional trust prevents the services from playing that role effectively.13 That is where the LAF comes into play. Lebanon’s military has historically been structured with the purpose of upholding domestic security within the country since the French mandate.14 Nearly a century later, domestic security remains a main military priority because, as discussed earlier, in a country perpetually mired in domestic sectarian tensions, it is seen as the only representative and politically balanced force in the country, one that would tackle arising issues without political motives.15
The downside of the LAF’s domestic security role, however, is that its reticence to risk its neutral image, coupled with its lack of a monopoly on violence in Lebanon, can translate to inaction. On the one hand, the LAF dealt with protesters in 2019 evenhandedly in comparison to its sister security services. It also has, on the other hand, been criticized for standing by and allowing counterprotesters from Shia-majority groups like Amal and Hezbollah to turn violent.16
The LAF’s inaction and strategy to “buy time and maintain civil peace long enough to allow for a suitable political settlement” in the 2019 protests is indicative of a larger problem in its domestic security mandate.17 When sectarian tensions have escalated in post–civil war Lebanon—for instance, during the escalation of Sunni-Shia violence in Beirut in 2007 and 2008—the LAF has hesitated to intervene for fear of being seen as violating its principles of and reputation for neutrality. Some analysts contend that the LAF has feared retaliation by Hezbollah.18 Others argue that different factors have shaped LAF choices, including that Lebanese government decisions are not always coordinated with the LAF, fears of confronting Hezbollah could lead to divisions with the LAF, and the LAF commander sometimes harbors political ambitions.19 The insistence on appearing neutral has also, in addition to other factors, provided breathing room for groups such as Hezbollah to operate within Lebanon almost entirely unchecked.20
Popular legitimacy is central to the LAF’s effectiveness. In the early days of the 2019 protests against bad governance and corruption, the LAF was praised for its neutrality and professionalism in dealing with protesters, taking great care to limit violence, avoid issuing any statements that could be construed as political, and work quickly to rectify any transgressions from within its ranks.21 Activists at first lauded the military, waving LAF flags alongside the national flag at protests, and posting positive messages and videos about the LAF that went viral on social media.22
These positive images were undermined with a much different treatment of protesters following the Beirut port explosion at the hands of the LAF. The LAF, in addition to the ISF and plainclothes police, reportedly responded with excessive force, injuring over 700—including several members of the press. Under the emergency measures implemented by parliament, the LAF had the ability to “impose curfews, ban assemblies and impose censorship on media organizations and publications... and also extend the ability of officials to try civilians in military courts.”23 While the LAF’s role is not to steer the political trajectory of Lebanon, it will continue to be under significant internal and international scrutiny in terms of its conduct in navigating the current political and economic turmoil.
For Lebanon and for the LAF, the trio of challenges—legitimacy, sovereignty, and domestic security—are interdependent. Gains in one area can improve the outlook in the others; conversely, backsliding in another area can negatively affect the other two. Ultimately, the LAF will need to make progress in all three areas in parallel in order to achieve enduring outcomes. This will not be possible without support from international donors and, more importantly, sustained leadership from key institutions in the Lebanese government—for instance, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, and the Higher Defense Council—that have the will and ability to overcome pressures from Hezbollah and others invested in Lebanon’s corruption and confessional model. With the ongoing political and governance crisis in the country, however, progress is unlikely in the near future.
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND LEVERAGING FOREIGN SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE
Over the last fourteen years, the LAF has relied on international donor support to increase its effectiveness, to the extent this is possible, while balancing its trio of challenges. The LAF’s military effectiveness can be assessed across four areas: policy and doctrine; training and equipment, exercises, and education; operations; and institutional capacity.
POLICY AND DOCTRINE
Lebanon lacks a comprehensive national security policy or strategy, and beyond the Ministry of Defense there is no civilian body that has oversight and planning authority over the country’s security apparatus.24 The civil-military dynamic in Lebanon contributes to the lack of a cohesive strategy: confessional political dynamics lead a lack of consensus over security priorities, and politicization within the LAF—particularly the perception of the LAF commander role serving as a pathway to the Lebanese presidency—adds to the lack of consensus.25 Additionally, the LAF is unable to focus on strategic planning when its capacity is stretched thin, performing internal missions within Lebanon that should really be in the purview of the ISF.26 This creates not only readiness issues within the LAF, detracting from core missions, but also prevents the military from having the capacity to contribute toward a national military or security policy. While the LAF represents one of the few truly national institutions in the country, the lack of strong civilian oversight and connection to national policy formulation inhibits the LAF’s ability to fully project its example of cross-confessional national identity.
The closest thing to a strategy that the LAF has is the Lebanese Armed Forces Capabilities Development Plan (CDP), a five-year plan “for strengthening security and consolidating the authority of the state.”27 The first CDP spanned the 2013 to 2017 time frame, while the second CDP spans the 2018 to 2022 time frame. The document is not released publicly and faces some criticism and lack of buy-in from the Lebanese political elite that do have access to it. Nevertheless, it is a significant bottom-up effort to inform the LAF’s strategic positioning, focusing on three main mission areas for the military as per the first CDP: “minimum force capabilities, targets in terms of professionalizing LAF standard operating procedures, and linking this overall effort to budgeting and future funding.”28
TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT, EDUCATION, AND EXERCISES
Training and Equipment
The vast majority of foreign security assistance to Lebanon comes in the form of training and equipment, with the United States as its primary partner, followed by the European Union.29 Although the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump temporarily withheld over $105 million in security assistance in 2019, the funding has resumed, and the LAF continues to benefit from the significant assistance provided by the United States.30 In FY 2019, the United States provided $218 million in military grant assistance, including $105 million in Foreign Military Financing, $3 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $110 million in Department of Defense-authorized funding.31 Moreover, more than 80 percent of the LAF’s equipment arsenal comes from the U.S. government—ranging from guns and grenade launchers to tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles—while a total of over 32,000 LAF soldiers have been trained by the United States.32
Historically, U.S. training of LAF personnel has largely focused on foundational professionalization and equipment maintenance. From 2008 onward, the United States significantly increased its training of the LAF’s special forces units, including the Lebanese Ranger Regiment, the Lebanese Air Assault Regiment, and the Lebanese Marine Commandos (also known as the Lebanese Navy SEALs).33 Although there are still shortfalls in their capacity and capabilities, the Lebanese special forces have shown significant gains, particularly as part of efforts to counter the Islamic State in 2017.34
U.S. security assistance has been critical to the LAF, which is why the government and military leadership in Beirut were deeply disturbed by the decision to block U.S. security assistance to the country.35 Although the decision was reversed recently, the lack of transparency around why assistance was withheld in the first place and the reason behind its resumption has left the LAF, the Lebanese government, and the country’s citizenry wary of U.S. intentions in Lebanon.36 It also feeds fears of abandonment of U.S. partners, particularly on the heels of the perceived U.S. betrayal of the Syrian Democratic Forces following Turkey’s intervention in northeastern Syria in October 2019.
The European Union has invested more than 85 million euros (nearly $100 million) worth of security assistance in Lebanon since 2006, including a 50 million euro ($58 million) package granted in 2018, with 46.6 million euros allocated through the European Neighborhood Instrument toward counterterrorism support until 2020 and the rest allocated through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace toward improving border security in Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.37 The United Kingdom, meanwhile, has contributed over 13.8 million pounds ($17 million) to Lebanon through its Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund (CSSF), aimed primarily at creating and training the LAF’s Land Border Regiments, in addition to improving ISF capabilities and facilitating ongoing efforts at countering violent extremism.38
Education
Locally, Lebanon has eight military schools within the country. The Military Academy and Fouad Chehab Academy train cadets and junior officers at the foundational professional and tactical levels, while two noncommissioned officer training centers provide similar schooling for enlisted soldiers.39 The Personnel Training Institute at the Araman Training Camp focuses on providing more advanced training on rule of law, human rights, and military discipline to longer-serving soldiers.40 There are also specialized academies like the Special Forces School, which trains units such as the Ranger Regiment, Airborne Regiment, and Marine Commandos; the Ski School, which trains soldiers for combat and rescue missions in snow conditions; and the High Center for Military Sport, which manages and trains military sports teams.41
The LAF receives a significant amount of U.S. support for the training and education of its soldiers, primarily by way of the IMET program. Although the United States has maintained some level of IMET support for Lebanon since the 1980s, it increased that support significantly after renewing closer security ties in 2005. Since then, the United States has provided nearly $30 million through IMET, funding the training of over a thousand LAF personnel.42
Exercises
The LAF participates in annual bilateral joint exercises with the United States and France, conducted in Lebanon. These exercises aim to buttress LAF capabilities against conventional as well as unconventional threats—the latter, in particular, dealing with Islamic State and al-Qaeda elements. They also seek to address the LAF’s professionalization, ranging from operational and tactical proficiency to the upholding of human rights norms in its operations.43
OPERATIONS
Although the LAF lacks the ability to post a serious defense against stronger external actors in its neighborhood, such as Israel, it has launched operations against internal actors—although its success has been mixed at best. One such example is Fatah al-Islam, an al-Qaeda–affiliated group birthed in a Palestinian refugee camp in Nahr al-Bared in northern Lebanon. During an escalation of violence in 2007, Fatah al-Islam launched a series of attacks and confronted the LAF. After a three-month-long battle, the militant group was finally defeated. The LAF’s performance had been less than stellar due to a combination of capacity and capability issues: it had incurred significant casualties—158 killed—and ultimately had razed the Nahr al-Bared camp to the ground after the evacuation of civilian refugees in order to defeat the militants. Nevertheless, the LAF emerged victorious in the end.44
The Nahr al-Bared experience prompted the LAF’s international partners to buttress its counterterrorism and urban warfare capabilities through training and materiel assistance. A decade later, the LAF’s capabilities were tested yet again in Operation Fajr al-Juroud, the 2017 operation against the Islamic State. With 5,000 troops deployed against 600 Islamic State fighters, the LAF launched what was praised as a sophisticated series of aerial attacks and ground maneuvers, cornering the surviving fighters into a valley adjacent to the Syrian border.45 The conclusion of the operation, however, was controversial—there was no final, conclusive LAF attack on the remaining fighters. Instead, Hezbollah and the Syrian government negotiated a cessation of hostilities, allowing some 400 fighters and family members to return across the border.46 As reports (and criticism) of close collaboration between the LAF and Hezbollah emerged prior to Operation Fajr al-Juroud, another layer of complexity was added to the LAF’s success in the operation. Furthermore, the LAF later attempted to distance itself from Hezbollah.47
In addition to its counterterrorism operations, the LAF operates alongside the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to reassert the government’s authority in south Lebanon following the withdrawal of Israeli forces formerly occupying the region.48 The LAF also partakes in efforts to clear landmines and unexploded ordnance across the country.49
During the 2019 protests in Lebanon, the LAF largely exercised restraint in the face of protesting by civilians and goading by Hezbollah and other spoilers. It took swift action to remove, detain, and prosecute through the civilian judicial system a soldier who shot a civilian protester in November. In contrast, the ISF and riot police have turned increasingly violent against protesters in Beirut, injuring dozens by firing tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons, and drawing criticism from the international community.50 Although the LAF has largely avoided the same level of criticism, it will be increasingly tested by Hezbollah and other spoilers as the economic and political crisis persists. Reinforcing civilian protection training and doctrine within U.S. programs for the LAF and ISF will be crucial to mitigating these challenges.
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Although the LAF has made significant strides to improve its operational and tactical performance and professionalism, its institutional capacity to conduct strategic planning and uphold human rights norms and principles as a professional military remains nascent.
Additionally, the LAF’s institutional capacity for strategic planning is fairly weak, due to a combination of lack of capacity within the military, lack of cohesion and technical expertise on defense matters within the civilian government, corruption across the Lebanese government, and influence from external actors.51 Despite foreign partners’ efforts to rectify capacity issues within the LAF, and despite the existence of the Lebanese government’s CDP, internal and external political dynamics hinder the LAF’s ability to conduct strategic planning in a meaningful way. The lack of political consensus in Lebanon, exacerbated by external pressure from actors such as Syria and Iran, as well as systematic corruption within Lebanon’s government, impacts the LAF’s strategic development, budgeting process, and future planning and readiness.52
The LAF’s institutional capacity to protect civilians and respect human rights within the country is limited, and its performance in this area is mixed. On the one hand, the military seems to be making a concerted effort to address human rights concerns as a priority area; on the other, there are still lapses and gaps in implementation that indicate the continued need for support in this area.
January 2019 marked the launch of the Code of Conduct for the LAF in Law Enforcement, a UN-supported initiative to raise standards of professionalism and adherence to human rights norms in security operations.53 Additionally, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor published a report that favorably assessed the LAF’s performance on human rights in 2018. It detailed the efforts of the LAF’s human rights unit to coordinate with international NGOs to conduct internal training for the military, as well as the participation of LAF officers in more intensive bureau-led human rights training.54
That same year, however, journalist Haneen Ghaddar was convicted for “defaming” the LAF, a decision that raised censorship concerns and was subsequently reversed.55 The LAF’s mixed performance has also become apparent during the protests, where the military has been both touted and criticized for its treatment of protesters.56
Even if the LAF succeeds in closing the gap within its own institutional capacity for upholding human rights norms, it has very little control over other internal security actors who may be responsible for human rights abuses. The ISF and DGS have a less favorable human rights record in Lebanon and are frequently criticized by civil society groups and the international community for their excesses, particularly in their limitations on free speech and recent handling of protesters and activists.57 Additionally, the LAF does not have any institutional or political ability to control or counter actions by Hezbollah and in fact has been accused of turning a blind eye or even being a lackey to Hezbollah as the group operates with near impunity in Lebanon. The United States has been reticent to extend security assistance to certain elements of Lebanon’s state security apparatus due to concerns that materiel assistance might be diverted to Hezbollah—mostly due to such occurrences in the past.58 Although the political dynamics remain murky, recent U.S. end-use monitoring has thus far seen compliance from the LAF, finding no evidence of weapons being diverted to Hezbollah.59
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The LAF is a pillar of credibility in the current Lebanese government’s corrupt system, far from perfect but far better than any other security institution. The United States and its allies should sustain support to the LAF while urging it to exercise restraint with the civilian population in the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion. It should build out its program to professionalize the ISF to focus on domestic issues, particularly protecting civilians in the current crisis, providing for inclusive and responsible security for local communities, and reducing the LAF’s domestic burden. The United States and its allies should better align their civil-military plans, analysis, and programming in Lebanon to buttress the LAF, as part of a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon. The explosion in the Beirut port on August 4, 2020, and the government’s subsequent resignation on August 11, provide a unique opportunity to implement such a strategy. In light of this new political reality, two sets of recommended steps for the LAF will be important to address the immediate crisis in Lebanon and to improve its performance and role over the long term.
Most immediately in response to the current crisis, the LAF, working with the ISF and other security forces, should prioritize reconstruction and civilian protection in their security missions, engaging with local civilian councils and civil society to understand civilian concerns in communities and urban neighborhoods. It should avoid the trap of justifying the subordination of civilian protection principles for the expediency or urgency of counterterrorism objectives. Building trust with local populations is central to an effective counterterrorism and reconstruction effort. Creating additional capacity and building professionalism within the ISF and the judicial sector would help free the LAF for defense and counterterrorism missions where they can provide a critical and comparative advantage and to expand its role in protecting Lebanese sovereignty.
In parallel, the Lebanese government should undertake a broader set of steps to improve the LAF’s military effectiveness over the long term, aided by the United States and other donors. The Lebanese government’s lack of a national security or defense strategy complicates the LAF’s ability to plan and budget. In the near term, creating such a strategy would require a narrow definition of interests, threats, and priorities to address Sunni terrorism and border security. Fully defining national interests and threats would necessarily include listing Israel as a threat—a non-starter to sustain U.S. support—and the role of Hezbollah and other Lebanese militias—a non-starter from a domestic Lebanese perspective. Because of this dilemma, there will be limits to the strategic plans the LAF can develop absent broader domestic reforms, reconciliation and disarmament, and regional peace.
It would be dangerous and misguided to expect the LAF to lead the charge on tackling these politically sensitive issues. The Lebanese people themselves need to decide the course of their political future through governance and economic reforms that address the roots of corruption, inequity, and insecurity. Putting the LAF out ahead of these reform efforts could prompt retaliation by Hezbollah and other actors invested in the status quo, reduce its legitimacy, and disrupt its efforts to extend Lebanese government sovereignty and protect domestic security. It would also undermine civil-military norms important for Lebanon’s democratic health. In short, the LAF can be a means for and contribute to furthering Lebanon’s national political identity and security.
But it cannot be expected to be the primary way to achieve these goals or to be an end in itself. The LAF can play a critical role in stabilizing and protecting communities, building competencies for strategic planning, countering extremist threats, and deepening its professionalism through training and scenario-based exercises. Like this, the LAF can prepare for the day when Lebanon’s governance and prospects for peace improve and a broader approach to strategic planning and national integration is possible.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Hijab Shah is an associate fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Melissa Dalton directs the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
NOTES
1 “Arab Barometer V: Lebanon Country Report” (Arab Barometer 2019), accessed March 27, 2020, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/lebanon-report-Public-Opinion-2019.pdf.
2 Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 10, 2009, https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanese-armed-forces.
3 Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 108‒115.
4 “Document Retrieval: Taif Accords,” United Nations Peacemaker, October 22, 1989, https://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89; “UN Security Council Resolution 1559,” United Nations, September 2, 2004, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1559; “UN Security Council Resolution 1680,” United Nations, May 17, 2006, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1680; and “UN Security Council Resolution 1701,” United Nations, August 11, 2006, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1701.
5 Aram Nerguizian, "Between Sectarianism and Military Development: The Paradox of the Lebanese Armed Forces," in Bassel F. Salloukh et al, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 120-122.
6 Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces”; and Nerguizian, “Between Sectarianism and Military Development.”
7 Nayla Moussa, “Loyalties and Group Formation in the Lebanese Officer Corps,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 3, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org /2016/02/03/loyalties-and-group-formation-in-lebanese-officer-corps-pub-62560.
8 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 177-178.
9 “The Mission of the Lebanese Army,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/mission-lebanese-army.
10 “Taif Accords”; “UN Security Council Resolution 1559”; “UN Security Council Resolution 1680”; and “UN Security Council Resolution 1701.”
11 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 188; “LAF Officers to Visit Pentagon for Talks on Aid,” Daily Star, October 9, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Oct-09/50652-laf-officers-to-visit-pentagon-for-talks-on-aid-newspaper.ashx; and Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah: Military Dualism in Post-War Lebanon,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, October 30, 2018, https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/10/30/lebanese-armed-forces-and-hezbollah-military-dualism-in-post-war-lebanon-pub-77598.
12 Nicholas Blanford, “The United States-Lebanese Armed Forces Partnership: Challenges, Risks, and Rewards,” Atlantic Council, May 7, 2018, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-united-states-lebanese-armed-forces-partnership-challenges-risks-and-rewards/.
13 Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah, “Playing the Long Game,” Center for American Progress, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/08/30/437853/playing-long-game/.
14 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 109.
15 Blanford, “The United States-Lebanese Armed Forces Partnership.”
16 “Lebanon: Protect Protesters From Attacks,” Human Rights Watch, November 8, 2019, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/lebanon-protect-protesters-attacks; and Nerguizian, “Moral Leadership and the Lebanese Military.”
17 Nerguizian, “Moral Leadership and the Lebanese Military.”
18 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 166; Allegra Statton, Elizabeth Stewart, and agencies, “Violence Escalates between Sunni and Shia in Beirut,” Guardian, May 8, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/08/lebanon.
19 Nerguizian, "Between Sectarianism and Military Development,” 128-129.
20 Zachary Karabatak, “Here’s What U.S. Military Aid to Lebanon Will and Won’t Achieve,” Washington Post, December 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/09/us-finally-released-military-aid-lebanon-heres-what-it-will-wont-achieve/.
21 Aram Nerguizian, “Moral Leadership and the Lebanese Military,” Carnegie Middle East Center, November 26, 2019, accessed February 12, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80433.
22 Florence Dixon, “‘We Are All Lebanese’: Emotional Soldiers Break into Tears After Being Told to Confront Protesters,” New Arab, October 23, 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2019/10/23/Demonstrators-comfort-crying-soldiers-on-Lebanon-protest-frontlines.
23 Kareem Chehayeb and Megan Specia, The New York Times, August 13, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-parliament-emergency.html
24 Aram Nerguizian, “Addressing the Civil-Military Relations Crisis in Lebanon,” Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, March 2017, http://lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=107.
25 Nerguizian, “Addressing the Civil-Military Relations Crisis in Lebanon”; Aram Nerguizian, “Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics: Weathering the Regional Storm?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2011, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/46038; and Blanford, “The United States–Lebanese Armed Forces Partnership.”
26 Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 4, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanese-armed-forces-hezbollah-and-military-legitimacy.
27 “Joint Statement: Ministerial Meeting in Support of Lebanon’s Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces,” United Nations, March 15, 2018, https://unscol.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/isg-joint_ministerial_statement-rome_15_03_18.pdf.
28 Nerguizian, “Addressing the Civil-Military Relations Crisis in Lebanon.”
29 “Lebanon,” European Neighborhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations at the European Commission, December 6, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/lebanon_en.
30 Patricia Zengerle, “Trump Administration Lifts Hold on Lebanon Security Aid,” Reuters, December 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon-defense-idUSKBN1Y629N.
31 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation With Lebanon,” U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, May 1, 2020, https://lb.usembassy.gov/us-security-cooperation-with-lebanon/.
32 Ibid; and Zachary Karabatak, “The U.S. Finally Released Military Aid to Lebanon. Here’s What It Will—and Won’t—Achieve,” Monkey Cage, Washington Post, December 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/09/us-finally-released-military-aid-lebanon-heres-what-it-will-wont-achieve/.
33 Michael Foote, “Operationalizing Strategic Policy in Lebanon,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, June 2012, https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2502/SW2502OperationalizingStrategicPolicyInLebanon.html.
34 Jean-Loup Samaan, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Operationally Effective, Strategically Weak?” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 6, 2017, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lebanese-armed-forces-operationally-effective-strategically-weak-19128.
35 What’s Next for Lebanon? Examining the Implications of Current Protests, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Carla E. Humud, analyst in Middle Eastern affairs, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, November 19, 2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20191119/110254/HHRG-116-FA13-Wstate-HumudC-20191119.pdf; and Patricia Zenergle and Mike Stone, “Exclusive: U.S. Withholding $105 Million in Security Aid for Lebanon—Sources,” Reuters, October 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon-defense-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-withholding-105-million-in-security-aid-for-lebanon-sources-idUSKBN1XA2QX.
36 Catie Edmondson and Edward Wong, “White House Lifts Mysterious Hold on Military Aid to Lebanon,” New York Times, December 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/us/politics/trump-lebanon-aid.html; and Patricia Zenergle, “Trump Administration Lifts Hold on Lebanon Security Aid,” Reuters, December 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon-defense/trump-administration-lifts-hold-on-lebanon-security-aid-source-idUSKBN1Y629N.
37 “EU Supports Lebanese Security Sector with €50 Million,” ReliefWeb, March 15, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/eu-supports-lebanese-security-sector-50-million; and “Lebanon,” European Commission.
38 “Lebanon Security Program: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office,” Development Tracker, Department for International Development, accessed June 23, 2020, https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-3-CSSF-06-000005.
39 “The Military Academy,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/military-academy; “Fouad Chehab Academy for Command and General Staff,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/fouad-chehab-academy-command-and-general-staff; “NCO Institute,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/nco-institute-0; and “NCO School,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/nco-school.
40 “Personnel Training Institute,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/personnel-training-institute.
41 “Ski School,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/ski-school-0; “Special Forces School,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/special-forces-school-0; and “High Center for Military Sport,” Official Website of the Lebanese Army, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/high-center-military-sport.
42 “U.S. Security Cooperation With Lebanon: Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, May 21, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-lebanon/.
43 “US, Lebanese Armed Forces Participate in Resolute Response 19,” U.S. Central Command, July 23, 2019, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1913428/us-lebanese-armed-forces-participate-in-resolute-response-19/; and “French, Lebanese Armies Hold Joint Exercise in Jounieh,” Daily Star, June 19, 2019, https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Jun-19/485649-french-lebanese-armies-hold-joint-exercise-in-jounieh.ashx.
44 Hussein Dakroub and Associated Press, “Three-Month Battle Ends as Army Takes over Refugee Camp,” Guardian, September 3, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/03/syria.lebanon; and Jean Dagher, “The Lebanese Armed Forces Engaging Nahr al-Bared Palestinian Refugee Camp Using the Instruments of National Power,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: 2017), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038628.pdf.
45 Nicholas Blanford, “The Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah’s Competing Summer Offensives Against Sunni Militants,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 8 (September 21, 2017): 27–32.
46 Blanford, “The Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah’s Competing Summer Offensives Against Sunni Militants”; and Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy.”
47 Blanford, “The Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah’s Competing Summer Offensives Against Sunni Militants”; Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy”; and Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States.
48 “UNIFIL Mandate,” United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, March 9, 2016, https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate.
49 “Joint Statement of the Ministerial Meeting in Support of Lebanon’s Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces,” Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, March 15, 2018, https://unscol.unmissions.org/joint-statement-ministerial-meeting-support-lebanon%E2%80%99s-armed-forces-and-internal-security-forces.
50 “Lebanon Crisis: Dozens Wounded in Second Night of Clashes in Beirut,” British Broadcasting Corporation, December 16, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50804392
51 Nerguizian, “Addressing the Civil-Military Relations Crisis in Lebanon.”
52 Nerguizian, “Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics.”
53 “Lebanese Army Launches Code of Conduct on Human Rights,” United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, January 29, 2019, https://unscol.unmissions.org/lebanese-army-launches-code-conduct-human-rights.
54 “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018: Lebanon 2018 Human Rights Report,” U.S. Department of State, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/LEBANON-2018.pdf.
55 “Lebanese Military Court Reverses Conviction of Institute Friedmann Visiting Fellow Hanin Ghaddar,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 11, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/press-room/view/lebanese-military-court-reverses-conviction-of-institute-friedmann-visiting.
56 “Lebanon: Military Forces Must End Arbitrary Arrests and Torture of Protesters,” Amnesty International, November 29, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-military-forces-must-end-arbitrary-arrests-and-torture-of-protesters/; Kareem Chehayeb, “Impartial or Ambivalent? Lebanon’s Protests Put Security Forces in the Spotlight,” Middle East Eye, December 5, 2019, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-protests-security-forces-spotlight; and Nerguizian, “Moral Leadership and the Lebanese Military.”
57 “Lebanon,” Amnesty International; “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018: Lebanon 2018 Human Rights Report”; “Lebanon Protests: Spate of Free Speech Prosecutions,” Human Rights Watch, March 16, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/blog-feed/lebanon-protests; and “Journalists Assaulted, Detained While Covering Protests in Beirut,” Committee for the Protection of Journalists, January 16, 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/01/journalists-assaulted-detained-while-covering-prot-1.php.
58 What’s Next for Lebanon? Examining the Implications of Current Protests.
59 Blanford, “The United States-Lebanese Armed Forces Partnership.”
End of document

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on September 17-18/2020

First of its kind: UAE, Bahrain channels share live broadcast with Israeli channel
Al Arabiya English/Wednesday 16 September 2020
News channels from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel shared a live broadcast for the first time in history after the two Arab Gulf states signed treaties normalizing ties with Israel on Tuesday. “After the signing of the peace deal between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, we witness the first TV broadcast of its kind between an Emirati channel, Dubai TV, an Israeli channel, Channel 12, and a Bahraini channel, Bahrain TV,” Dubai TV presenter Mohammed al-Kaabi said at the start of the broadcast. A signing ceremony for the US-brokered peace deals was held in Washington, DC on Tuesday at the White House. “Welcome. From the White House garden to the Middle East, the wind of peace is blowing in this important day in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in history, a live broadcast from Israeli Channel 12 and the official channels of the UAE, Dubai TV, and Bahrain TV. We send you peace from Jerusalem,” Israeli news anchor Yonit Levi said. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed agreements with Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif Al Zayani.

UAE ‘will never abandon’ Palestinians, senior official says after Israel deal
Emily Judd, Al Arabiya English/Thursday 17 September 2020
After normalizing relations with Israel, the UAE wants Palestinians to know it will never abandon them, a senior UAE official told Al Arabiya English on Thursday. “We continue to emphasize on all levels, from our leadership to our citizens, that we will never abandon the Palestinians, we will always be there for them,” said Jamal Al Musharakh, director of policy planning at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Our message is that we stand by Palestine, we stand for the two-state solution, and we will never abandon our Palestinian brothers and sisters,” said Al Musharakh, adding that Palestinians are a core segment of UAE society. The remarks come two days after the UAE and Israel signed an agreement at the White House to officially normalize relations – a move condemned by Palestinian leaders including President Mahmoud Abbas.
But criticism of the agreement fails to acknowledge that “one of the prerequisites of going forward with this accord was halting annexation of Palestinian land,” according to Al Musharakh. Israel halted its plans to annex Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory in August, in exchange for the normalization of diplomatic ties with the UAE.
“What we have done is provide hope for the future of the two-state solution, for the Palestinians to have their own state with East Jerusalem as its capital,” said Al Musharakh. East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. The UAE still supports, and will always support, East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, according to Al Musharakh. “The UAE is within the Arab consensus, which very clearly mentions that East Jerusalem is the capital of a future Palestinian state, and we still stand by that,” said Al Musharakh. “We have not backtracked on this and we never will,” he added. The Trump administration told Al Arabiya English last month that it continues to back an undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, despite Arab allies like the UAE maintaining their stance of East Jerusalem being designated the capital for a Palestinian state. Trump’s Middle East peace plan, which supports a two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calls for an “united” Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and assigns a future Palestinian capital to be in a suburb area to the east of the city of Jerusalem. Palestinian, Arab, and other world leaders have long contended that any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement must return territory Israel annexed in the 1967 war, as stated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This annexed territory includes the part of the city known as East Jerusalem - where 360,000 Palestinians currently live under Israeli occupation. Seventy-two percent of Palestinian families in Jerusalem are living below the poverty line, according to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. The UAE has been one of the top financial donors to the Palestinians throughout the years, and will continue to provide this support, according to Al Musharakh. The UAE ranked fifth in countries that donated the most to the UN’s special agency for Palestinians last year, contributing over $51.8 million. “The end goal is the prosperity for the region, for the Palestinians and for the youth of Palestine,” said Al Musharakh.
 

U.S. Charges Two Iranians Over 'Cyberintrusion Campaign'
Radio Free Europe/September 17, 2020
U.S. prosecutors say they have indicted two Iranians on allegations they were hackers connected with a “coordinated cyberintrusion campaign” that targeted American and foreign universities, a Washington-based think tank, and other organizations in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Hooman Heidarian, 30, and Mehdi Farhadi, 34, stole hundreds of terabytes of data, including national security intelligence, aerospace data, unpublished scientific research, and "nonmilitary nuclear information," the Department of Justice alleged in a statement on September 16. It said the defendants, both from the western Iranian city of Hamedan, conducted “many of these intrusions on behalf of the Iranian government.” They also “often vandalized websites…and posted messages that appeared to signal the demise of Iran’s internal opposition, foreign adversaries, and countries identified as rivals to Iran, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.”In some cases, the hackers privately sold the stolen data on the digital black market, the department said. “These Iranian nationals allegedly conducted a wide-ranging campaign on computers here in New Jersey and around the world,” said Craig Carpenito, the U.S. attorney for the district of New Jersey. “They brazenly infiltrated computer systems and targeted intellectual property and often sought to intimidate perceived enemies of Iran, including dissidents fighting for human rights in Iran and around the world,” he said. Carpenito added that their conduct “threatens our national security, and as a result, these defendants are wanted by the FBI and are considered fugitives from justice.”Both suspects were charged in a 10-count indictment that included computer hacking, fraud, and aggravated identity theft. None of their alleged targets were identified by name, but the statement said they included “several American and foreign universities, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, a defense contractor, an aerospace company, a foreign policy organization, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofits, and foreign government and other entities identified as rivals or adversaries to Iran around the world.”U.S. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers said that recent cases "demonstrate that at least four nations -- Iran, China, Russia and North Korea -- will allow criminal hackers to victimize individuals and companies from around the world, as long as these hackers will also work for that country's government -- gathering information on human rights activists, dissidents, and others of intelligence interest."

US President Trump plans executive order to punish arms trade with Iran: Report
Reuters/Thursday 17 September 2020
US President Donald Trump plans to issue an executive order allowing him to impose US sanctions on anyone who violates a conventional arms embargo against Iran, three sources familiar with the matter said on Thursday. The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the executive order was expected to be issued in the coming days and would allow the president to punish violators with secondary sanctions, depriving them of access to the US market. Neither the White House nor the Iranian mission to the United Nations immediately responded to requests for comment.
The proximate cause for the US action is the impending expiry of a UN arms embargo on Iran and to warn foreign actors - US entities are already barred from such trade - that if they buy or sell arms to Iran they will face US sanctions. Under the 2015 nuclear deal that Iran struck with six major powers - Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States - the UN conventional arms embargo is to set to expire on October 18, shortly before the November 3 US election. The United States, which abandoned the nuclear deal in May 2018, says it has triggered a "snap back," or resumption, of all UN sanctions on Iran, including the arms embargo, which would take effect at 8 pm on Saturday night or 0000 GMT on Sunday. Other parties to the nuclear deal and most of the UN Security Council have said they do not believe the United States has the right to reimpose the UN sanctions and that the US move at the United Nations has no legal effect. One of the three sources, a European diplomat, said the new executive order would put teeth behind Washington's assertion that the UN arms embargo would remain in place beyond October by giving the president secondary sanctions authority to punish arms transfers to or from Iran with US sanctions. Secondary sanctions are those where one country seeks to punish a second country for trading with a third by barring access to its own market, a particularly powerful tool for the United States because of the size of its economy.
Most foreign companies do not wish to risk being excluded from the vast US market in order to trade with smaller countries such as Iran. Speaking on Wednesday, US Special Representative for Venezuela and Iran, Elliott Abrams, said Washington planned to impose sanctions on those who violated the UN arms embargo, though he did not say it would do so with an executive order. Also on Wednesday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo obliquely hinted at the upcoming US action by stressing the power of US sanctions restored since it abandoned the Iran nuclear deal two years ago to deter foreign trade with Iran.
"We'll do all the things we need to do to ensure that those sanctions are enforced," Pompeo said of the UN arms embargo, recalling many experts argued US unilateral sanctions imposed after it abandoned the nuclear deal would fail. "We've been very successful in spite of what the world said would happen," he added, saying US sanctions had drastically reduced Iran's financial resources.

Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, Bahrain’s FM

Joseph Haboush, Al Arabiya English/Thursday 17 September 2020
The United States did not pressure the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain to sign a normalization deal with Israel, but doing so will brighten the future for young people in the region and increase national security and economic prosperity, a senior US official said Thursday. “They are doing this on their own, recognizing their national security interests,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Timothy Lenderking told reporters during a phone briefing. The UAE, Bahrain and Israel signed the Abraham Accords on Tuesday, which increased the number of Arab countries signing peace deals with Israel to four. Egypt and Jordan were the first two. Lenderking spoke of US optimism for more countries to come forward and do the same soon. “We are very optimistic about the possibilities ahead [with the Abraham Accords], which open up … opportunities for the young people of the Middle East region,” he said. Asked about Qatar’s response to the Abraham Accords, Lenderking noted Doha’s yearslong relationship with Israel. “Qatari officials are very open about their relationship with Israel,” the US diplomat said, adding that each other would move at its own pace to normalize ties with Tel Aviv. When Al Arabiya English asked if Turkey was pressuring Qatar not to push ahead with a deal with Israel, Lenderking said Ankara was “not only wrong but against the trend” in its condemnation of the Abraham Accords.

Trump: Other countries want to make peace with Israel
Arutz Sheva/September 17/2020
US President meets PM Netanyahu at the White House shortly before signing of historic peace agreement with UAE, Bahrain. US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met at the White House Tuesday ahead of the signing of the normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The foreign ministers of the UAE and Bahrain arrived shortly before Netanyahu to meet with President Trump. At the start of the meeting, Trump presented Netanyahu with a golden "key to the White House."
"You've been an amazing leader for a long period of time, and this is in many respects the big day because this is something very special," Trump said. Netanyahu responded: "You have the key to the hearts of the people of Israel because of all the great things you've done for the Jewish State and the Jewish people." Trump said that other Arab and Muslim nations are currently in discussions about signing a peace deal with Israel. "We are in talks with 5-6 countries about signing peace accords with Israel, you will see more announcement soon." “You’re going to see a lot of great activity. There’s going to be peace in the Middle East,” he added. "I think Israel is not isolated [in the region] anymore," he declared. "Now you have a situation where many of the countries .. want to sign this deal." Netanyahu agreed, saying that "we have strong relations throughout the Middle East. Israel doesn't feel isolated at all. Its enjoying its greatest diplomatic triumph ever." The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are the third anf fourth Arab nations to sign a peace treaty with Israel, following Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

U.S. plans to enforce U.N. sanctions on Iran with its own action
Arshad Mohammed, Michelle Nichols/Reuters/September 17/2020
The United States said on Wednesday it plans to impose sanctions on those who violate a U.N. arms embargo on Iran, which Washington says will now stay in place instead of expiring in October as agreed under a 2015 nuclear deal.
U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela and Iran Elliott Abrams said Washington could deny access to the U.S. market to anyone who trades in weapons with Iran, which President Donald Trump’s administration accuses of seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has denied it is developing nuclear weapons.
In 2018 Trump quit the Iran nuclear deal - under which Tehran limited its nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief - and reimposed U.S. sanctions. Washington also says it has triggered a return of all U.N. sanctions on Iran, which would take effect this weekend. But the other parties to the nuclear deal - Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia - and most of the U.N. Security Council have said they do not believe the United States can reimpose the U.N. sanctions. “It’s like pulling a trigger and no bullet comes out,” a senior U.N. Security Council diplomat said on condition of anonymity. “There will be no snapback, the sanctions will remain suspended, the JCPOA (nuclear deal) will remain in place.”Asked if Washington is “making concrete plans now for secondary sanctions” to enforce the arms embargo, Abrams told reporters: “We are, in many ways, and we will have some announcements over the weekend and more announcements on Monday and then subsequent days next week.”Diplomats say few nations are likely to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran. Earlier on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters, “We’ll do all the things we need to do to ensure that those sanctions are enforced.”
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Wednesday described the opposition to Washington as a “victory of the Iranian nation and the disgraceful defeat of the United States in activation of the snapback mechanism.”Reporting by Arshad Mohammed, Doina Chiacu and David Brunnstrom in Washington, Michelle Nichols at United Nations and Parisa Hafezi in Dubai; Writing by Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Matthew Lewis

Canada congratulates Israel, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on bilateral deals
September 16, 2020 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:
“Canada welcomes the historic signing of the Abraham Accords at the White House, establishing full diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and Israel and Bahrain.
“These accords will contribute to enhancing stability, security, and prosperity across the region.
“As a longstanding friend of Israel and a steadfast partner of both Bahrain and the UAE, Canada looks forward to the opportunities these agreements will create for peace in the region. Canada stands ready to support these efforts.”

Syria Blames U.S. for Harsh Fuel Crisis Paralyzing the Country
Associated Press/Naharnet/September 17/2020
Syria's oil minister claimed the severe fuel crisis that has hit his country is the result of Western sanctions, and also allegedly because oil fields in eastern regions have fallen under control of American troops and U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters.
The minister, Bassam Tomeh told state TV in an interview aired late Wednesday that oil supplies have been delayed because of the situation. "We have stocks that we are trying to manage in a rational way," he said, without elaborating.
U.S. sanctions on Iran have compounded the fuel crisis faced by the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Tehran is a key Damascus ally that has supplied it with crude oil throughout Syria's nine-year civil war.
Separately, oil smuggling into Syria from neighboring Lebanon has dropped recently amid tight measures by Beirut authorities as Lebanon has been gripped by its worst economic and financial crisis in decades.
The U.S. sanctions on Syria were tightened in June targeting anyone doing business with Assad's government regardless of where in the world they are. The U.S. says those doing business with Damascus will be exposed to travel restrictions and financial sanctions. "American sanctions are depriving us of importing (enough for) our oil needs," Tomeh said. In government-controlled regions of Syria, people spend hours waiting in line to fill up their tanks. The cost of 20 liters (5.2 gallons) of gasoline is now 25,000 Syrian pounds ($11) on the black market while the subsidized price at gas stations is 5,000 Syrian pounds ($2.3).
Most Syrians make less than $100 a month, which leaves them unable to afford black market prices. The government is also struggling to fight fraud and corruption in fuel distribution, according to Tomeh. Assad's government controls Syria's two oil refineries but one of them is currently undergoing renovation work. Tomeh said the Banias Refinery needs 10 more days to become more operational, which would raise fuel supplies about 25%. "Everyone knows that our oil fields that used to supply our fuel needs are under American occupation," Tomeh said.
Tomeh promised the "crisis is about to end" and urged Syrians to be patient. "The war is not over and the economic war is at its most intense now," he said.

Russia Says No Mideast Peace without Solving 'Palestinian Problem'
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
Russia said on Thursday it would be a "mistake" to think lasting peace in the Middle East could be secured without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The foreign ministry statement came after Israel normalized relations with long-time foes Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates at the White House on Tuesday. Russia said it noted "progress" in the normalization of ties between Israel and several Arab countries but said that "the Palestinian problem remains acute." "It would be a mistake to think that without finding a solution to it that it will be possible to secure lasting stabilization in the Middle East." Moscow urged regional and global players to "ramp up coordinated efforts" to solve the issue. "Russia is ready for such joint work," including in the framework of the diplomatic Quartet of Middle East peace negotiators and in close coordination with the Arab League, the foreign ministry said.
US President Donald Trump has said similar U.S.-brokered deals are close between the Jewish state and several other nations, including Saudi Arabia. Bahrain and the UAE are the first Arab nations to establish relations with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas said Tuesday that only an Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories could bring peace to the Middle East.

Libyan Unity Government Chief Says Ready to Step Down
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
The head of Libya's UN-recognised Government of National Accord said Wednesday he planned to step down within six weeks as part of efforts to broker a peace agreement. Libya has endured almost a decade of violent chaos since the 2011 NATO-backed uprising that toppled and killed veteran dictator Moamer Kadhafi. Fayez al-Sarraj's GNA has battled against a rival administration in eastern Libya led by strongman Khalifa Haftar, whose offensive against the regime in Tripoli recently ground to a halt after more than a year of deadly conflict. Both sides have since met for peace talks in Morocco after last month announcing a surprise ceasefire and pledging national elections. Sarraj said during a brief televised address on Wednesday evening that he was willing to leave his post in favour of a new executive determined by the talks. "I announce to all my sincere wish to cede my functions to the next administration before the end of October at the latest," he said. The talks had outlined the process for determining a new Presidential Council and the appointment of a new head of government who would take office "peacefully", Sarraj added. He welcomed the "preliminary and promising recommendations" agreed to during the Morocco dialogue. The Morocco summit, dubbed the "Libyan Dialogue", has brought together five members of the Tripoli-based GNA and five from the rival parliament headquartered in the eastern city of Tobruk. Talks have focused on appointments to the top of the country's key institutions, with the naming of the heads of Libya's central bank, its National Oil Corporation and the armed forces the main points of dispute.
Morocco also hosted talks in 2015 that led to the creation of the GNA.

Mexican President Seeks to Avoid Row after Trump Drug Warning
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador said Thursday that he wanted to avoid a "confrontation" with the United States after President Donald Trump issued a new warning over drug trafficking. In a memorandum published Wednesday, Trump welcomed "signs of progress" by Mexico such as extraditions of traffickers, but said that "more must be done" to tackle the drug cartels. "Unless the Mexican government demonstrates substantial progress in the coming year backed by verifiable data, Mexico will be at serious risk of being found to have failed demonstrably to uphold its international drug control commitments," he warned. Trump made a similar threat last year to designate Mexico as having failed to uphold those commitments, which could have repercussions in areas such as financial aid. Lopez Obrador said while there were certain things in the annual assessment that his government did not accept, he had asked Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard to respond with "love and peace."Noting that Trump was in campaign mode ahead of the November 3 election, he said: "We have a very good relationship with the government of the United States and we are not going to fall into any confrontation." According to the White House memorandum, Mexico is the source of almost all heroin and methamphetamine seized in the United States, and a transit route for most of the cocaine. Lopez Obrador has sought to maintain good relations with Trump despite the US leader's anti-Mexico rhetoric, and chose the United States for his first foreign visit after taking office.

FBI Worried about Clashes between Violent Groups before U.S. Vote
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/September 17/2020
The FBI is increasingly worried about possible violent clashes between ideologically-motivated extremist groups before the November election, Director Chris Wray said Thursday. Wray said the Federal Bureau of Investigation is keeping a close eye on groups who have faced off in protests in various cities such as Portland, Oregon, and Kenosha, Wisconsin. In those places, anti-racism and anti-police groups have squared off with right-wing and white nationalist activists who are often armed. Wray told a Congressional hearing that the FBI was deeply concerned about the growing tension on US streets, and groups that are "hijacking" protests to incite violence. "Now you've got an additional level of combustible violence," he said, citing "violent extremist groups or individuals committing violence." "Now you have both groups from the opposite sides adding to the combustibility and danger of the situation," Wray told the House Homeland Security Committee. "We have certainly seen that in a number of cities. That's a force multiplier, in a bad way, that I'm concerned about."Several people have been killed in those situations.  In August, a 17-year-old with ties to arch-conservative groups was charged with shooting dead two people protesting against police mistreatment of blacks in Kenosha. And at the end of August in Portland, an activist aligned with the leftist Antifa movement shot dead a supporter of a far-right Patriot Prayer group during a protest. The Antifa shooter, Michael Reinoehl, was killed by police days later.
Wray told lawmakers that, aside from "lone wolf" attackers inspired by foreign jihadist groups like Islamic State, white supremacists remain the biggest domestic terror threat. "Within the domestic terrorism bucket as a whole, racially motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within that larger group," he told the committee. "Within the racially motivated violent extremist bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist ideology is certainly the biggest chunk." Wray did point out that while white supremacists have been responsible for most of the lethal terror attacks inside the United States in recent years, there has been a noteworthy shift this year, with attacks by "anti-government, anti-authority" actors. That includes the May murder of two policemen in California by a follower of the extreme-right, often heavily armed "Boogaloo Bois" movement.

Turks want peace on Turkey, Greece dispute despite politicians’ heated rhetoric

Nicholas Frakes, Al Arabiya EnglishThursday 17 September 2020
Amid rising tensions between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish people in Istanbul told Al Arabiya English that they would prefer to see a peaceful solution to the conflict despite the fiery rhetoric being used by politicians. After Turkey announced in July that it was going to send a survey team into waters close to the Greek island of Kastellorizo, tensions between the two countries began to rise amid a dispute over who exactly has the right to drill for oil and gas in contested waters. Since then, both sides have used heated language with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saying earlier this month that “They’re [Greece] either going to understand the language of politics and diplomacy, or in the field with painful experiences.”However, despite this rhetoric, many Turks would rather see a peaceful solution to the growing conflict, according to a poll and individuals who spoke to Al Arabiya English. A poll conducted in Greece and Turkey by the Greek Kapa Research company before the two sides were set to discuss a solution in August found that over half of the Turks surveyed would like a political solution, with only just over a third being in favor of a military one.
“Any military conflict that is an all around war is the most unacceptable thing that will happen,” Yusuf, a former automotive salesman who spoke with Al Arabiya English over the phone on the condition of anonymity, arguing that the countries leaders are just trying to get votes from the nationalists in their countries.
“Both countries leaders won’t move past actions like sinking a coast guard boat or shooting down an airplane, which are just for taking the votes from nationalist public in their countries that won’t trigger an all-out war,” he said.
Yusuf also argued that both sides are “talking about other one in a bully way of speech” rather than actually working to find a solution to the issue at hand.
Politicians out of touch
Zeynap, a high-school student who asked to remain anonymous, criticized the ruling class and said they were out of touch with everyday people’s lives. “They [the politicians] don’t really do much for us. They just talk about their lives. They eat meat cheaper than us and they live that life better than us. They have too much money while we don’t have [any],” she said. Yusuf also argued that there are bigger problems at hand for Turkey and added that a “political or military conflict will have serious economic impacts on both these countries [Greece and Turkey].”“In a normal time both countries can sustain this conflict,” he said, “but in these current conditions, which are Greece’s decrease in tourism revenues and decrease in United Nations support and Turkey’s current economic situation, it will be catastrophic for both of them.”
Erdogan supporters blame Greece
Many supporters of Erdogan and his government have echoed his rhetoric, arguing that Greece is to blame for the current tensions.
“If Greece finds gas in its seas, then we would not say anything,” Hamza, a supporter of Erdogan’s government who asked to have his last name omitted, told Al Arabiya English. “But when we find something it is ours. What is the matter?”Hamza’s friend, Kadar, who also requested his last name be removed, said he too supports Erdogan’s government and was prepared to fight for it if asked. “If Erdogan says ‘Let’s fight,’ then we will go,” he told to Al Arabiya English. “Right now, we will go. Anywhere. Any country.”However, despite his willingness to fight, he said that a peaceful solution was best for both Greece and Turkey, pointing to Islamic principles that forbid killing. “Of course, we don’t want war,” Kadar stated. “We don’t want to fight with any country. Killing is forbidden in Islam. You cannot kill. You cannot want to kill. We are Muslims. We always want to solve our problems through talking.”Some hope amid tensions Relations between Greece and Turkey, while tense at times, have not always been bad. In 1999, both countries were hit by powerful earthquakes. When Turkey was hit first, Greece immediately contacted Turkey to deliver aid to the affected areas. When Greece was hit by earthquakes a month later, Turkey reciprocated Greece’s help by sending aid to their neighbor. This handout photograph released by the Turkish Defence Ministry on August 12, 2020, shows Turkish seismic research vessel 'Oruc Reis' heading in the west of Antalya on the Mediterranean Sea.
This handout photograph released by the Turkish Defence Ministry on August 12, 2020, shows Turkish seismic research vessel 'Oruc Reis' heading in the west of Antalya on the Mediterranean Sea. This reciprocal aid helped to improve the relations between Greece and Turkey in the short-term but did not last. Nevertheless, examples such as the 1999 earthquakes give some Turks hope. Yusuf pointed to a moment where the Turkish and Greek foreign minister danced together following a dinner as a model for better relations. “These events show that any foreign relation can get to a friendly point. Both countries have foreign affairs minister that day and today,” he explained. “But it all comes to the experience of those minister that are in decision. For Yusuf, there should not be any conflict between the two nations since there are people from both countries have and continue to live together in peace, even as politicians beat the drums of war. To Yusuf, they are all one in the same.
“Turkish people that live in Greece and Armenian and Greek people that live in Turkey haven’t had any problems,” he stated. “Their relations with their friends, families and neighbors continue in the same way from beginning. Because we’re the children and people of the same seas.”

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on September 17-18/2020

Was God really the peace broker on the White House lawn?
Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
The idea of using Abraham - as opposed to any other biblical character - is that he is mutually respected by all faiths.
The word “God” was uttered a collective six times in the speeches given by US President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani on the White House lawn on Tuesday.
That’s because the seeds for these agreements were planted and watered and ultimately flowered through faith-based diplomacy by Evangelical Christians – the same people who have been a driving force behind the White House’s pro-Israel policy for generations. The signing of the peace treaties will certainly bolster support for Trump in the November election – and that may have been the president’s intention. But the driving force behind the accords is a belief that the children of Abraham can and should live side by side.
The Abraham Accords peace treaty signed by Israel and the UAE says that it was written “recognizing that the Arab and Jewish peoples are descendants of a common ancestor, Abraham, and inspired in that spirit, to foster in the Middle East a reality in which Muslims, Jews, Christians and people of all faiths, denominations, beliefs [and] nationalities live in, and are committed to, a spirit of coexistence, mutual understanding and mutual respect.”
The idea of using Abraham – as opposed to any other biblical character – is that he is mutually respected by all faiths. In Hebrew, he is Avraham; in Islam, Ibrahim; and in Christianity, Abraham. Beyond his being the forefather of the Jewish people, Muslims consider him a prophet, and Christians revere him as representing God, as described in one of Jesus’s parables.
In Luke 16:19-24, Jesus reveals that Abraham represents God the Father. And, in Galatians 3:7, it is written that Abraham’s children represent God’s children.
“The real children of Abraham, then, are those who put their faith in God,” it says in Galatians. THE THEOLOGY of it all does not bother the president, who has made no secret of his courting the Evangelical and Christian Zionist vote. He has blatantly expressed that he would not be president of the United States if the Evangelical Christian community had not supported him.
In speaking about the peace agreements in a recent interview with Fox, Trump said, “It’s an incredible thing for Israel.... It’s incredible for the Evangelicals, by the way.”
At a recent rally in Wisconsin, at which he mentioned his decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, he even said that “the Evangelicals are more excited about that than the Jewish people. It is incredible.”
He has surrounded himself with Evangelical advisers, including Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, both of whom were instrumental in orchestrating the Abraham Accords.
But why would the Christians care so much about peace for Israel?
Evangelical leaders told The Jerusalem Post that this is because nearly all Evangelicals hold dear the biblical maxim: Pray for the peace of Jerusalem.
“Blessed are the peacemakers,” Jesus told the Christians. The Apostle Paul said that, “if possible, so far as it depends on you, be at peace with all men.”
So every day, Evangelical Christians around the world pray for the peace of Jerusalem.
EVANGELICAL LEADER Joel Rosenberg said that while most Evangelicals believe biblical prophecy indicates that one day Israel will have all the land that was promised to Abraham in the Bible, what they want is what is best for Israel – and their faith dictates that peace is what Israel needs most.
“We want to engage in advancing religious freedom, advancing peace between Israel and her neighbors, and making sure to strengthen our brothers and sisters who are followers of Jesus all throughout the Arab and Muslim world,” Rosenberg said, adding that, “Above all, Evangelicals want Israel to be safer, stronger and more peaceful.”
He said in a separate interview that while Israel should not be carved up like a turkey or full of holes like Swiss cheese, “Abraham, who was given the original grant to the land, divided it with Lot to separate and achieve peace,” which shows that “making compromises for peace is a biblical approach.”
Only five paragraphs into Trump’s speech, he reminded the Muslims of the religious benefit that they will garner from peace with Israel: “The Abraham Accords also opens the door for Muslims around the world to visit the historic sites in Israel and peacefully pray at al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third-holiest site in Islam.”
The Evangelicals, too, are ensuring that their Christian brethren, who have been fiercely persecuted in various parts of the Muslim world, can have greater freedom of religion.
“We, the undersigned, recognize the importance of maintaining peace in the Middle East... based on... respect for human dignity and freedom, including religious freedom,” it states in the first paragraph of the Abraham Accords declaration.
Days before the accord was signed, the UAE foreign minister wrote an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal where he said that his country is “committed to the true tenets of Islam: moderation, inclusion and peace,” and that “We are building an interfaith Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi with a mosque, church and synagogue in the same complex.”
REV. JOHNNY Moore, who helped organize the Trump campaign’s Evangelical advisory board in 2016, was, with Rosenberg, part of the first delegation of Evangelical leaders to the United Arab Emirates in October 2018, during which talk about normalization of ties first took place. They took part in many subsequent meetings throughout the region.
Moore has spent years cultivating a multi-tiered relationship between the US and Bahrain, with the goal of not only increasing economic, political and security cooperation, but also combating extremism and terrorism in all its forms, as well as spreading coexistence and tolerance.
As Evangelicals, Moore and Rosenberg said, those meetings always included an additional subtext, sometimes overt and sometimes inferred, because Evangelicals – nearly 800 million of them – are known to be devoted and loyal friends of the State of Israel.
“Our vibrant, global and influential Christian movement not only represents one of the most important constituencies to the presidents of many countries, including the United States, but we are also a type of global firewall against antisemitism and its latest iteration in anti-Zionism,” Moore said.
But they are not only a firewall against antisemitism. The reverend added that the commitment of Evangelicals to peacemaking has successfully made them allies with Arab governments combating extremism as well, and has served as an effective bridge builder between Arab communities and their Jewish neighbors.
Rosenberg said that Evangelicals want to see Israel treated well, because “we love Israel, because that is where the prophets are from and where Jesus was born and raised, and where the Bible was written.”
The president has sided with these Christians, believing that if he put his faith in them, he would ultimately triumph. He moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem. He stopped US funding to Palestinian aid programs. He recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.
Now, he has managed to broker deals between Israel and two of its Arab neighbors, without requiring it to make any real or immediately apparent concessions. Although the documents signed mention a “just, comprehensive, realistic and enduring solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” they do not mention annexation or a two-state solution.
Moore said that under Trump, politics has been reoriented.
“Rather than allowing religion to be a barrier to peace, for Trump, religion and politics are intertwined,” Moore continued. “This is a religious peace – that was the plan from the very beginning.”

The Abraham Accord: No details, no devil - analysis
Herb Keinon/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
Unlike the treaties with Egypt and Jordan that had to devolve into minute details about boundaries and timetables, these documents were much more general.
The Israel-Egypt peace deal signed at the White House on March 26, 1979, spanned dozens of pages and included letters, annexes, detailed maps and agreed minutes.
So it goes when two sides that fought four bloody wars decide to terminate their state of war and disentangle. There were no-go zones in the Sinai to delineate, timelines of withdrawal from oil fields to spell out, and an international boundary to set.
That takes a lot of ink.The same is true of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, signed on October 26, 1994, in the Arava. That document, which put to end the state of war that existed between two countries that had fought each other three times, included a preamble, 30 articles, five annexes and agreed minutes.
Contrast that with the relatively brief documents signed Tuesday on the White House lawn.
There were three documents in all: the Abraham Accords declaration; the Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations Between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the State of Israel; and the Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel. The first document was 210 words, the second about 460, and the peace treaty with the UAE spread over nine pages.
Why so short? Because unlike the treaties with Egypt and Jordan that had to devolve into minute details about boundaries and timetables, these documents were much more general.
Much ado was made in the run-up to Tuesday’s signing that no one in Israel – outside of the prime minister, his advisers, and officials involved in drawing up the documents – had any idea what was in them.
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Would they spell out an Israeli promise not to extend sovereignty to parts of the West Bank? Would they explicitly refer to a future Palestinian state? Would there be any mention of a US commitment to sell F-35s to the UAE?
That the Prime Minister’s Office was so tight-lipped about the contents of the documents fueled speculation that they contained something explosive.
They didn’t.
The Abraham Accords declaration reads like a John Lennon song and declares that the signatories – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani – “recognize the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace in the Middle East and around the world based on mutual understanding and coexistence, as well as respect for human dignity and freedom, including religious freedom.”
This declaration seems like a public service announcement declaring that those who signed it had boarded a “peace train,” in the hopes that this announcement in itself will entice others to do the same.
The peace treaty with the UAE, however, is written in standard diplomatic style – dry and legalistic, not declaratory.
Whereas the Egyptian-Israeli accords included a letter from Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat to president Jimmy Carter committing themselves to negotiations toward Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza – negotiations that ultimately went nowhere – the Palestinian issue merited no more than 100 words in the Israel-UAE agreement. The two sides referred to their commitment to “continuing their efforts to achieve a just, comprehensive, realistic and enduring solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” And to “working together to realize a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples, and to advance comprehensive middle east peace, stability and prosperity.”
That’s it, and that is about as vague as one could ask for. There is no mention there of a Palestinian state or Jerusalem or possible Israeli annexation.
But, then again, why should there be?
This is a treaty between Israel and the UAE, not between Israel and the Palestinians. The rather perfunctory manner in which the Palestinian issue appears here, as it similarly appears in the peace declaration between Israel and Bahrain, leaves the impression that it was raised so that the UAE and Bahrain could say they did not abandon the Palestinian cause.
That the drafters of the documents decided not to mention any of the contentious issues on the Palestinian track – two states, Jerusalem, refugees, annexation, settlements – underlines the degree to which the UAE, Bahrain and Israel do not want the Palestinian issue to derail their agreements.
This language makes it clear that the sides are not giving the Palestinians any leverage at all over their relationship. For if the agreements had said that the hope was for a two-state solution, then if a Palestinian state would not come into being in the foreseeable future, could that be grounds upon which to annul the documents?
Better not go there at all. The less detail on this issue for both sides, the better, because that way neither side can say down the road that the other is not living up to the deal.
If the devil is in the details, then one way to keep the devil at bay is simply not to get into details, and that seems to have been the philosophy that guided the drafters of these accords. There is nothing in the documents regarding the Palestinians that could be used to break up the new relationships.
The document with Bahrain ends with a paragraph thanking Trump for, among other things, his “pragmatic” approach to furthering the cause of peace. That the Palestinian issue was barely mentioned demonstrates that pragmatism, because if one wants these agreements to last and bear fruit, it is common sense to leave out as many bones of contention as possible.

No, Israel Doesn't Prefer Undemocratic Mideast Regimes
Seth Frantzman/ Middle East Forum/September 17/2020
Israel "prefers that its Arab neighbors not be democratic," claims Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute.
There is a talking point going around that claims Israel not only prefers peace with dictatorships but that Israel's peace with the UAE and Bahrain actually encourages authoritarianism and is some kind of plot to push for more dictatorships in the Middle East.
The argument stresses that if "the people" could choose in these countries they would vote against normalization.
This nonsensical, but seemingly inviting, argument is deeply flawed. It was the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in the 1950s that led the drive against relations with Israel. Based variously on theocratic extremist views and also anti-Semitism, these countries sought to pretend Israel didn't exist, a classic irredentist nationalist drive. These dictatorships enflamed a generation and brainwashed people against Israel, even as these countries tended to normalize with other states that they didn't agree with (i.e despite the India-Pakistan conflict, no one suggested not recognizing India forever).
So, first of all it is primarily dictatorships that don't recognize Israel. Israel always had relations with democracies.
The argument that average citizens in the Middle East oppose Israel is flawed.
Second the argument that average citizens in the Middle East oppose Israel, and therefore Israel "needs" dictatorships is flawed. The public that was propagandized against Israel is sometimes hostile. However this is mostly a historical aberration. Israel had relationships with democracies like Turkey and Iranians would make peace with Israel if not for the regime. Kurds would also be open to Israel if not for Saddam and then Iran occupying Baghdad. Today the MAIN reason that Israel wasn't able to come to terms with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon is Iran.
Why is Israel singled out for relations with authoritarian regimes?
Next, we need to ask about why Israel is singled out for being responsible for "authoritarianism" in the Middle East when every single other country in the world has relations with countries like Saudi Arabia. Only Israel is made to seem like it is a problem to have relations with the UAE. But when the US or France has relations with the UAE or when Switzerland embraces Iran, it's fine? This makes no sense. Israel shouldn't have to eschew relations with Bahrain while all of Europe has relations, as if only when Israel has relations it is due to "authoritarianism."
Lastly, most of the voices who condemn these deals all embrace authoritarian regimes in places like Gaza, Qatar, Ankara or Tehran. They just don't want Israel having relations with countries they don't like.
They need to explain who is really holding back relations between Israel and Lebanon and Syria and Iran and Iraq. It isn't Israel, it is the intolerance of the regime. Consider Malaysia. Why doesn't Malaysia have relations? Not because of Israel, but because of the intolerance and antisemitism of the regime.
Authoritarian regimes have led the drive against relations with Israel.
Make a map of the world. Israel has relations with the democracies, it is the dictatorships that for years disliked Israel. To twist it around and make Israel responsible for the authoritarians reverses reality.
And Israel is not at fault just because some of the public in far away places like Pakistan or even in nearby Egypt dislike Israel. Often that dislike is irrational, not because of weighing the merits.
*Seth Frantzman is a Ginsburg-Milstein Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum and senior Middle East correspondent at The Jerusalem Post.

MEF Plays Key Role in Designation of Al Jazeera Subsidiary as Qatari Agent
News from the Middle East Forum/September 17/2020
PHILADELPHIA – September 16, 2020 – The U.S. Department of Justice has ordered AJ+, a US-based subsidiary of Al Jazeera Media Network, to register as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), because it is "engaged in political activities within the United States ... on behalf of the Government of Qatar."This culminates a multi-year effort by the Middle East Forum to counter Qatar's toxic influence campaign in the U.S. through its media arm. For example, Al Jazeera had 175 staffers in the U.S. Capitol in 2016, according to the Congressional Directory; in contrast, the New York Times had only 43.
Qatar is a malign Islamist influence across the globe. In the Middle East, it is at odds with moderate Sunni states and finances Palestinian rejectionism. In the United States, the Qatar Foundation invests millions in schools and universities, using curricula that encourag anti-Americanism and hatred of Jews. In response, MEF's Counter-Qatar Team launched a Counter-Qatar Campaign.
In 2018, President Trump signed the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that includes Forum-supported language requiring foreign-owned media outlets to report on their funding by "foreign principals."
In 2019, we hosted a first-of-its-kind conference in Washington, D.C. to examine whether Qatar is a "U.S. ally or global menace." (Click here for conference videos.) Al-Jazeera snickered about "a largely empty conference room," but photos of the event show otherwise.
Later in 2019, the Forum filed a Freedom of Information Act request to determine why Al Jazeera failed to meet the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) filing deadlines, as mandated by the NDAA. The FCC's lack of enforcement piqued the interest of members of Congress.
MEF worked closely with congressional offices on this issue. Just last month, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), Rep. Lee Zeldin (R-NY), and eight others sent a congressional letter to Attorney General William Barr requesting the Justice Department require Al Jazeera to register under FARA. The letter cites many facts unearthed by Forum researchers, subsequently published in the Washington Examiner.
"AJ+ has been un-masked," said Forum Director Gregg Roman. "Americans now know: These are not journalists but foreign agents doing the bidding of a hostile regime."
"We worked hard to hold Al Jazeera accountable for violating the law," noted Counter-Qatar Team member Benjamin Baird. "This is a great day for those who believe in transparency."
"With this Justice Department action, the game changed," said Counter-Qatar Team member Cliff Smith. "Now, the rest of Al Jazeera needs to be exposed as the media mouthpiece of Iran's and Turkey's close ally."
The Middle East Forum promotes American interests in the region and protects Western civilization from Islamism. It does so through a combination of original ideas, focused activism, and the funding of allies.
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Goal of Natanz explosion was to send ‘clear’ message to Iran
Yonah Jeremy Bob/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
Foreign claims of Israeli role validated; Physical sabotage, not cyber
An explosion two months ago at a key Iranian uranium enrichment facility in Natanz was meant to send a message of determination to stop the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, The Jerusalem Post has learned. The purpose of the attack was to send an unambiguous deterrent message that progress toward a nuclear weapon beyond certain redlines would not be tolerated.
In addition, the Post has confirmed foreign reports that the explosion was caused by physical sabotage as opposed to exclusively cyberwarfare. To date, Iran has made multiple announcements but has not accused Israel at an official level, and Jerusalem has never officially taken responsibility, although multiple ministers have dropped hints.
At the time, a previously unknown group called the Homeland Cheetahs claimed that it was a group of Iranian dissidents that had undertaken the attack.
However, that group has not been heard from since. Experts speculated that the group was a cover for the true attacker or at most a mixed operation of Iranian dissidents with a powerful foreign backer like Israel, the United States or Saudi Arabia.
Apparently, though, one of the goals of the attack was that it be carried out in a public and loud way to send a message to the Iranian leadership, even if only unofficially.
Though Tehran initially played down the Natanz and other explosions, within days satellite footage revealed that the impact was far more serious than the regime was claiming. By July 9, Institute for Science and International Security president David Albright had told the Post that around three-quarters of the advanced centrifuge assembly facility had been destroyed, setting back advanced centrifuge development by one to two years.
Furthermore, the Post has confirmed that official levels of the Israeli government agree with this assessment and believe that the attack has dealt a major setback to Iran’s development of advanced centrifuges.
Shortly after the explosion, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi hinted at Israeli involvement. Further, last month Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen responded to the Post’s questions about the attack, saying, “We know what is happening everywhere” in the Islamic Republic, and “Whoever wants to threaten Israel’s existence will have no immunity anywhere.... I say to Iran, don’t put Israel’s determination to the test.”
According to a report by the Albright think tank, “High-resolution commercial satellite imagery... shows that the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center at the Natanz Enrichment Site has suffered significant, extensive and likely irreparable damage to its main assembly hall section.”
Further, the report says, “This new facility, inaugurated in 2018, was critical to the mass production of advanced centrifuges, in particular the assembly of rotor assemblies, the rapidly spinning part of the centrifuge and its most crucial component.”
In terms of rolling back Tehran’s future nuclear program plans, the report adds, “An annex to the building was intended to assemble electrical components of centrifuges, including motors – another important component of centrifuges.”
The report said that “the visible damage is such that the entire building will likely have to be razed and rebuilt from scratch.”
It added that “advanced centrifuge rotor assemblies are typically assembled in ‘clean rooms,’ an expensive-to-build environment free from dust and other contaminants,” and a 2018 video showed what appear to be clean rooms at the facility in question.
Other destroyed items that could be hard to replace could include: “balancing machines, specialized rotor assembly equipment, measuring equipment, and centrifuge test stands.”
Albright estimated that the facility would take at least a year to rebuild, but likely longer since it took six years, from 2012-2018, to build it and become operational the first time.
Although the explosion will not prevent Iran from performing advanced centrifuge research at other locations, Albright said that only the Natanz facility had the potential capability to mass-produce advanced centrifuges in the thousands.
Most importantly, it is a major setback for moving forward with the IR-4, the only advanced centrifuge that has been expected to show more immediate promise.
Iran has a variety of other advanced centrifuges, which it shows off for public relations, but which have failed completely or are still far from fully operational.
The Natanz explosion and about one dozen other explosions between June and August came 14 months after Iran started to violate the 2015 nuclear deal’s limits, with estimates that it is four to six months from being able to produce a nuclear bomb.

Iran’s axis worried about Israel-Saudi ties
Seth J. Frantzman/Jerusalem/September 17/2020
Five years of Iranian aggression in Syria and Yemen have backfired for Tehran as Israel and the Gulf have become closer.
Iran is concerned about the next steps Israel and its new Gulf partners will take in the wake of the Abraham Accords signed in Washington on Tuesday.
Tehran’s displeasure is difficult to measure, but the overall context and hints in pro-Iranian media give away the sense that the regime and its allies and proxies in the Middle East view the potential Saudi-Israel relationship with concern.
Iran has been zigzagging between hyperbolic condemnation of the UAE and Bahrain for working with Israel, and trying to ignore the setback that its threats have caused. Iran’s threats and its attempt to leverage the Iran Deal of 2015 (JCPOA) so it can act with impunity throughout the region have fueled the Israel-Gulf relationship.
Iran believed incorrectly that it had a blank check after the JCPOA signing to basically take over the Middle East. It sent drones and missiles in increasing numbers to Yemen in 2015, forcing Riyadh’s hand and bringing Saudi Arabia and the UAE into Yemen’s civil war. The kingdom didn’t want an Iranian-backed proxy on its doorstep.
Once Saudi Arabia was in Yemen, the Iranians rapidly increased production of technical assistance for the Houthis. Soon, ballistic missiles and drones were raining down on southern Saudi Arabia and even targeting Riyadh.
But Iran wasn’t satisfied even with this apparent accomplishment. It targeted Saudi Arabia’s oil pumping station at al-Dawadmi in mid-May 2019, using drones allegedly sent to Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.
Then Iran ordered the Houthis to strike at Shaybah oil field near the UAE border. The attack was a message and it was sent in August 2019.In September 2019, Iran went one step further, using 25 drones and cruise missiles to attack Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility. Iran, for some reason, has believed that the more it attacks Saudi Arabia, the more it will pressure Riyadh, but then was surprised that the kingdom and its Gulf allies would become more willing to look to potential talks with Israel.
SIMILARLY, Iran began to increase its role in Syria after the nuclear deal. This included construction of facilities and support for missile factories in Syria. By the fall of 2017, Iran had agents at Masyaf and other sites, such as Kiswa, south of Damascus.
Those sites were targeted by airstrikes in 2018 and 2019. Iran began to pour resources into the T-4 base and also the Albu Kamal border crossing area in 2018.
Airstrikes hit Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, in Syria’s Albu Kamal in June 2018. By 2019, Iran had built a whole base called Imam Ali near Albu Kamal. In April 2018, Iran even tried to unload a third Khordad air defense system at T-4, according to a Ynet report.
These Iranian projects – trafficking weapons to Hezbollah and building up a footprint in Syria to threaten Israel, while threatening Saudi Arabia from Yemen – have been Tehran’s main strategies. Iran also funds Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Riyadh is concerned about Iran’s role in Lebanon, having summoned Lebanese Sunni leader Saad Hariri for consultations in 2017.
Now pro-Iranian media, such as Al Mayadeen, are reporting about potential Saudi-Israel relations.
“In the time of normalization, there is no place for neutrality, with or against Palestine,” shouts a headline at Al Mayadeen on September 16. “The day is recorded for those who would compromise,” say the Houthis, according to Fars News reports.
The headlines are all basically the same. The Houthis, Hezbollah, Iran, Kataib Hezbollah and all the proxies, pieces and tentacles of the Tehran octopus across the region, are being told to repeat the same mantra.
That is why Kataib Hezbollah is mobilizing a protest in Basra, not far from Kuwait and the Saudi border, to show off its strength, according to reports. Basra was the center of Iraq protests for a year that were demanding more employment and investment. Now the only investment they get is anti-Israel and anti-Saudi propaganda.
IRAN’S TASNIM news also reports that while Saudi Arabia supports the Palestinians, it could work with Israel in the future. This leaves little doubt that after five years of Iranian attacks, threats and pressure against Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main concern is the next moves in Riyadh.
Iran’s Press TV on September 16 said that Saudi Arabia is part of the “plots against Muslims,” highlighting Saudi air raids on Yemen as well as alleged Saudi nuclear facilities and a Saudi challenge to Qatar.
You don’t put five headlines against Saudi Arabia on your site the day after the UAE-Bahrain deal unless that is your main concern.
While Iran wants to downplay the UAE-Bahrain deal in its media and highlight Saudi Arabia, it quietly knows that it has suffered a setback. Five years of trying to dominate Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen have encouraged Israel and the Gulf to work more closely together and have brought a string of successes to the Trump administration’s transactional deal-making foreign policy.
Last year, it used drone strikes and pushed rocket attacks on US forces in Iraq, as well as mining ships in the Gulf of Oman. It still has an expanding drone and missile arm and clandestine networks to move its weapons all across the region.
Even though Iran has operationalized its lobby in the West to talk about how it is “surrounded,” Tehran knows that its aggression has had blowback and has potentially backfired. It must now weigh the next step.

Arabs: Israel Is Not Our Enemy
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/September 17/ 2020
"Times change, everything has changed, except for the Palestinian mood that rejects anything and everything." — Saudi writer Amal Abdel Aziz al-Hazany, Asharq al-Awsat, September 15, 2020.
"Palestinian leaders are the main cause for the suffering of their people. They have achieved nothing for the Palestinians. They only care about power and achieving personal and partisan gains at the expense of the Palestinian issue." — Emirati political analyst Issa bin Arabi Albuflasah, Al Bayan, September 12, 2020.
"We were told that Israel's slogan was [to expand] 'From the Euphrates to the Nile.' Iran, however, does not hide its expansionist ideological trend, which it is already practicing through its militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Turkey, on the other hand, is seeking to seize new sources of energy in Libya and has sights on Africa along the Red Sea. These developments prompted the moderate Arabs to start reconsidering previous their political positions." — Saudi writer Fahd al Degaither, Okaz, September 14, 2020.
"The Palestinian issue concerns the Arab peoples who want a solution, but the leaders benefit from the status quo. These leaders benefit from the problems and suffering of their people. There is no solution under corrupt leaderships." — Saudi writer Osama Yamani, Okaz, September 11, 2020.
Al-Shkiran also advised the Palestinians to hold their leaders accountable on two levels: "The first is political accountability: The reasons and causes of the continued rejection of all realistic deals that were offered to them since the beginning of the problem until today. Second: Opening the files of corruption. The Palestinian has the right to ask about the billions of dollars paid by the Gulf states for the Palestinian cause. All that money has disappeared." — Saudi writer and researcher Fahd al-Shkiran, Asharq Al-Awsat, September 16, 2020.
A growing number of Arabs, particularly those living in the Gulf, say they finally understand that Israel is not the enemy of the Muslims and Arabs. This change of heart manifested even before the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed peace agreements with Israel during a ceremony at the White House on September 15.
A growing number of Arabs, particularly those living in the Gulf, say they finally understand that Israel is not the enemy of the Muslims and Arabs. This change of heart manifested even before the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed peace agreements with Israel during a ceremony at the White House on September 15. It is the direct result of the expansionist ambitions of Iran and Turkey in the Arab world and the feeling among Arabs that those two states pose the real threat to their national security.
Until recently, it was unimaginable to see Arabs openly admitting that they had been mistaken in their belief that Israel was the enemy of the Muslims and Arabs. Now, Arabs seem to have no problem saying that they were wrong all these years about their attitude toward Israel. These Arabs now are saying out loud that Iran and its proxies in the Arab world, and not Israel, are the real enemies of Arabs and Muslims.
Until recently, most Arab writers, journalists and political activists avoided any form of criticism of the Palestinians. Such criticism was considered taboo in the Arab world: the Palestinians were considered the poor spoiled babies who were suffering as a result of the conflict with Israel. Now, however, one can find in Arab media outlets more criticism of the Palestinians and their leadership than in Western media, or even in Israeli media.
Until recently, for most Arabs, the terms peace and normalization (with Israel) were associated with extremely negative connotations: humiliation, submission, defeat and shame. No longer. Many Arabs are openly talking about their desire for peace with Israel. These Arabs are saying that they are looking forward to reaping the fruits of peace with Israel and that it is time that Arab countries prioritize their own interests.
Of course, none of this means that the entire Arab world has changed course and is ready to recognize Israel and establish relations with it. The voices of the Arabs and Muslims who reject any peace treaty with Israel remain vocal and representative of the sentiments of the majority of the people in the Arab and Islamic countries, especially those that have not educated their public for peace.
Yet, it is remarkable to see how an increasing number of Arabs are airing their views regarding Israel and the Palestinians in the public sphere. The message coming from these Arabs: "We helped the Palestinians for many years; we gave them money; we gave them weapons, and some of us even fought wars with Israel because of them. In the end, we discovered that our Palestinian brothers are ungrateful, obstinate, lack good leadership and are refusing to move on with their lives." The Arabs are telling the Palestinians: "You no longer have a veto on peace with Israel."
Most importantly, the Arabs of the Gulf are openly admitting that it is Iran, and not Israel, that poses a major threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. The Gulf Arabs are saying that Iran and its Palestinian and Lebanese proxies -- such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah -- are destroying Arab countries and dragging them toward more bloodshed, violence and chaos.
As Saudi writer Mohammed al-Sheikh recently noted:
"For us in the Gulf, Israel is no longer the No. 1 enemy, as it was before the Persian mullahs seized control of Iran in 1979 and began exporting their revolution, or before Erdogan assumed the presidency in Turkey and worked to restore the Ottoman occupation of the Arab world."
Al-Sheikh said that the Gulf Arabs are the only ones entitled to assess the dangers and threats surrounding them:
"It is we, not other Arabs, who assess the dangers surrounding us and arrange our priorities. The problem is that most Arabs, including the Palestinians, insist on playing the role of guardians over us and on defining for us our priorities. They continue to argue that the mullahs of Iran and Erdogan's Turkey do not pose a threat to us as much as Israel does."
Praising the prospect of peace and normalization with Israel, the Saudi writer pointed out that:
"Israel is an advanced and superior country in all fields, and by creating a space for peaceful cooperation with it, we believe that we will benefit from its progress and superiority."
Arabs who are opposed to peace with Israel, al-Sheikh added, "do not care about development and modernization, and that is why they are at the bottom of countries in terms of modernity and development."
Echoing a common theme in the Gulf states nowadays, al-Sheikh said that peace with Israel would benefit the Arabs as much as Israel. He is saying, in other words, that the Arabs stand to gain a lot from making peace with Israel.
"We are certain that our cooperation with the superior Israel and the US will definitely affect our national interests, and it will have the best impact on our national security, specifically toward our enemies, and it will positively reflect on our development."
Ahmad al Garni, editor of the Saudi newspaper Sada al Hijaz, said that the days when Arabs used Israel to scare other Arabs are finally gone. "Scaring us with Israel has become a thing of the past," al-Garni wrote.
"We are not afraid of Israel. We are not cowards. Dealing with Israel does not mean that we love it. It's one thing to love Israel, and another thing to have commercial, economic and political relations with it."
Expressing growing disillusionment with the Palestinians in the Arab countries, Saudi writer Amal Abdel Aziz al-Hazany said that the Palestinians who are now condemning the UAE and Bahrain for making peace with Israel were among the first Arabs to normalize their relations with Israel when they signed the 1993 Oslo Accord.
Al-Hazany pointed out that Iranian meddling in the internal affairs of the Palestinians has resulted in the separation of the West Bank from the Gaza Strip and triggered a power struggle between the two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, that continues to this day.
She said that despite Iran's endorsement of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Arabs continue to support the Palestinian cause in international forums and remind the international community on every occasion that the Palestinian issue is the Arabs' first concern. Al-Hazany also noted that funds nevertheless continued to flow to the Palestinians, especially from the Gulf states:
"The Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, have provided everything possible in favor of the Palestinian issue, and millions of dollars have not stopped flowing to the PLO, without accountability, but with the hope that they would spend this money to provide a decent life for the Palestinians... Can the Arab countries be blamed today for looking after their interests by establishing open relations with Israel? Times change, everything has changed, except for the Palestinian mood that rejects anything and everything. It is not in the Palestinians' interest to adopt a negative attitude towards the countries that decide to normalize the relationship with Israel, which is increasing and will increase with time."
Emirati political analyst Issa bin Arabi Albuflasah expressed outrage and disgust over the Palestinian leadership's recurring insults and attacks on the Gulf states for daring to seek peace with Israel. "Palestinian leaders are the main cause for the suffering of their people," Albuflasah remarked. "They have achieved nothing for the Palestinians. They only care about power and achieving personal and partisan gains at the expense of the Palestinian issue."
Accusing the Palestinians of being ungrateful, the Emirati analyst said:
"The UAE and the rest of the Gulf states opened their doors and institutions to the Palestinians, where they lived as brothers, enjoying everything that the citizen enjoys, and receiving care and attention. The Palestinians are now responding by insulting us and aligning themselves with Iran, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood."
Saudi writer Mohammed al-Saed also lashed out at the Palestinians and accused them of living in "a miserable film."
"Human history will not see the birth of a Palestinian politician. I wish to remind everyone of the weakness and confusion that dominates the Palestinian issue and of the guns and explosives that were directed mostly at Arab and Western civilians to cover up the [Palestinian] state of bankruptcy."
Noting that Palestinians have a long history of rejecting peace offers with Israel, he said that the Palestinians did not bother to inform their Arab brothers of their intention to sign the Oslo Accords:
"It was excessive selfishness from [former PLO leader Yasser] Arafat and his unfortunate negotiating delegation who participated in Oslo. Within 50 years, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and many Arab countries paid a heavy price and fought several wars on behalf of the Palestinians. Yet Arafat did not let them know about the negotiations that led to the signing of the Oslo Accords."
Explaining why Arabs are now moving closer to Israel, Saudi writer Fahd al Degaither commented:
"Geopolitically speaking, new enemies of the Arabs have appeared in the region, with new and very dangerous ambitions that are declared and different from those of Israel. We were told that Israel's slogan was [to expand] 'From the Euphrates to the Nile.' Iran, however, does not hide its expansionist ideological trend, which it is already practicing through its militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Turkey, on the other hand, is seeking to seize new sources of energy in Libya and has sights on Africa along the Red Sea. These developments prompted the moderate Arabs to start reconsidering previous their political positions."
Saudi writer Osama Yamani concurred:
"Our enemy today is Iran and Turkey, who occupy Arab lands in the name of the Palestinian issue. As for the enemy of the Palestinians at home, they are the corrupt leaders and traitors who rest in the bosom of Iran. For us, the real issue now is development, peace and justice that were stolen from the Arab world and forgotten by the Arab peoples. The Palestinian issue concerns the Arab peoples who want a solution, but the leaders benefit from the status quo. These leaders benefit from the problems and suffering of their people. There is no solution under corrupt leaderships. The Palestinian leadership is in the hands of traitors and beneficiaries."
Saudi writer Saeed al-Farha al-Ghamdi, in an article published in the Saudi newspaper al-Madina on September 4, says he can't understand why the Palestinians fail to read reality. "The Palestinian issue is in retreat and Palestinian leaders are moving in the opposite direction, as if their minds have been frozen. The Palestinians have become lost and without a leadership that looks after their interests," al-Ghamdi said, urging the Palestinians to keep a distance from Iran, Turkey and Qatar, "which have agendas that seek to exploit the [Palestinian] issue."
Saudi writer and researcher Fahd al-Shkiran advised the Palestinians to "catch up" with the normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. "The historic agreement will change the face of the region," al-Shkiran wrote.
"It is tantamount to turning the tables on the axis of resistance and its terrorist militias. It is not reasonable for the Palestinian Authority to remain in its negative attitude regarding the changes that are sweeping the world."
Al-Shkiran also advised the Palestinians to hold their leaders accountable on two levels:
"The first is political accountability: The reasons and causes of the continued rejection of all realistic deals that were offered to them since the beginning of the problem until today. Second: Opening the files of corruption. The Palestinian has the right to ask about the billions of dollars paid by the Gulf states for the Palestinian cause. All that money has disappeared."
Judging from the comments of many Gulf Arabs, it is evident that a growing number of Arabs realize that they have been misled about Israel for decades. They were brainwashed to believe that Israel was the true enemy of all Arabs. It is refreshing to see that many Arabs have become aware of the misconceptions and lies they were fed all that time. The Palestinians, however, are unlikely to see similar changes as long as their leaders continue to inform them, in no uncertain terms, that normalization and peace with Israel constitute the high crime of treason.
*Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem, is a Shillman Journalism Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

The Possible Limits of China-Russia Cooperation
Lawrence A. Franklin/Gatestone Institute/September 17/2020
China even recently claimed that Vladivostok, the most prominent city in Russia's Far East, is historically Chinese territory.
China seems to see Russia less as an economic partner than as a source for extraction of energy and raw materials.
While disapproving Russia's assaults on sovereign states, China seems to have no problem asserting its own will in and around other states, for instance, in the South and East China Seas, India, and the Galapagos Islands.
China is already successfully challenging Russia for influence among the post-Soviet states in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan.
Mainly, this bilateral condominium might be doomed to collapse because there is no trust in the relationship.
China and Russia's coordinated policies in foreign affairs and economic endeavors belie deep-seated fissures that might well prevent their current period of cooperation from evolving into a sustained alliance. Pictured: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 26, 2019 in Beijing, China.
China and Russia's coordinated policies in foreign affairs and economic endeavors belie deep-seated fissures that might well prevent their current period of cooperation from evolving into a sustained alliance.
Despite China's planned participation in Russia's annual Caucus 2020 exercises on September 21-26, Sino-Russian history is so replete with war, unequal treaties and racism, there seems little probability that their present military cooperation will succeed in developing into a military alliance.
The current Russo-Chinese cooperation seems loosely rooted in the notion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Both countries apparently believe that checking U.S. power is in their national interests. China wants the U.S. to withdraw from its military and diplomatic commitments in the Western Pacific, thereby allowing Beijing to assert primacy in Asia, at least for a start. Russia seems to want the U.S. to decouple itself from the decades-old NATO alliance, thereby enabling Moscow to re-assert its dominance in the Baltic region and Eastern Europe.
Russia's drive eastward in the late 17th century already brought Russians into conflict with China's Qing Dynasty. After a series of clashes in the 1680s, the two empires temporarily settled on a boundary along the banks of the Amur River, separating Manchurian China from the Russian Far East. The Chinese, however, apparently resented Russia's intrusion into a region Beijing considered its backyard. The Chinese also seem to have felt humiliated by defeats in subsequent wars with Russia and by having been coerced into signing what Beijing still refers to as "unequal treaties." The ill will generated between China and Russia over several military conflicts in the 18th and 19th centuries, and a fierce ideological rivalry in the late 20th century, might also be an obstacle to an enduring bilateral alliance. Some Chinese commentators allege that Russia still occupies hundreds of thousands of square miles of Chinese territory seized in Tsarist times. China even recently claimed that Vladivostok, the most prominent city in Russia's Far East, is historically Chinese territory.
China and Russia's profoundly different cultures might also help to limit a bilateral honeymoon. A portion of Russia's self-image is that of protector of the Slavic World, guardian of the Orthodox Christian faith, and the lead society in the Eurasian landmass from the Urals to the Pacific. Moscow's historical view of China further seems conflated with a contempt for the Mongols, who cruelly subjugated Russian Slavdom for centuries. Ethnic tensions took a dark turn in July 1900, when Russian soldiers in the Amur River territory of Blagoveshchensk executed a racist rampage with forced deportation, and killing roughly 5,000 Chinese in the operation.
China sees itself as synonymous with civilization and calls itself "Jungwo" or center country. The Great Wall was continuously maintained by Chinese dynasties to keep out what China viewed as the "northern barbarians": the Russians and earlier marauders. Chinese racism seems to extend to everyone outside its civilization's values, such as China's current concentration camps holding more than a million Uighurs, who are Turkic, as well as against Africans doing business in China.
Today, most Russians who live in Siberia reside less than 150 miles from the Chinese border, and the Russian population in these border provinces is in decline. Siberia, larger than the continental United States and India combined, is home fewer than 35 million people, with hundreds of millions of Chinese just over the border. At some point, China may start eyeing this energy- and mineral-rich region of Russia. Chinese investors have already leased large swathes of land in Russia's Far Eastern realms.
The only major link that connects European and Asian Russia is the Trans-Siberian Railroad. China is now building more roads and more rail connectivity.
President Vladimir Putin's Russia is clearly the junior partner in the Sino-Russian anti-American "alliance of convenience": China's growth is nearly five times that of Russia. Bilateral trade is increasing with the hoped-for goal of reaching $200 billion by 2024. Most of their joint projects are being carried out in agriculture, light industry, and energy. Last month, the two countries agreed to initiate two new joint projects: a gas processing plant and a bilateral insurance company. China's investments in Russia are largely in energy, agriculture, forestry, construction materials, textiles, and household electric goods.
China seems to see Russia less as an economic partner than as a source for extraction of energy and raw materials. In 2019, Russian exports to China consisted almost entirely of oil, mineral ores, and wood. China appears to favor procurement of technically advanced products from the West rather than from its Eurasian ally. China, for instance, awarded contracts for hydroelectric products for its massive Three Gorges Dam to two European consortia, one headed by Germany's Siemens Corporation, the other by the British/French GEC-Alstom, evidently preferring western designs to bids by Russia's "Energomashexport." Additionally, the trading branch of a major Chinese oil refining enterprise has been turning down Russian crude oil exports since Moscow's state petroleum institution, Rosneft, was sanctioned by the United States.
There seem to be problems even in the most vibrant dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation: arms sales. While China in the past purchased billions of dollars of fighter and bomber aircraft from Russia, Beijing has quickly been developing its own arms industry, sometimes reverse engineering Russian weapons systems. Russia, perhaps annoyed at China's aggressive pattern of copying its weapons systems -- such as the SU-27 fighter and the S-300 surface to air missile system -- has delayed a planned shipment of its premier S-400 air defense system. Moscow, it seems, decided to deliver the system to China's regional arch-rival India instead. China's development of its most modern stealth fighter aircraft, the Chengdu J-20, resembles a cancelled variant of a Russian fighter aircraft.
China is already successfully challenging Russia for influence among the post-Soviet states in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan. China's establishment of a military base inside Tajikistan near its border with Afghanistan appears to have bested Russia's effort to provide the Tajik government with security against Afghanistan-based jihadists just across the border.
Another area of disagreement is China's opposition to Russia's seizure of Crimea and its subsequent invasion of Ukraine.
A major plank of disingenuously articulated Chinese foreign policy is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. While disapproving of Russia's assaults on sovereign states, China seems to have no problem asserting its own will in and around other states, for instance, in the South and East China Seas, India and the Galapagos Islands.
Russia, in turn, has not supported China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea, in an attempt not to alienate Vietnam, the Philippines or Malaysia.
Mainly, this bilateral condominium might be doomed to collapse because there is no trust in the relationship. Russian security officers recently arrested a Russian scientist accused of spying for China. Russia and China act far more like competitors than allies. Their common antipathy for the United States most likely presents a distorted image of a coordinated policy agreement. These two authoritarian rivals could eventually assume their normal historical role as adversaries, even enemies. Consequently, Western intelligence agencies and policymakers might want to be wary of not overestimating the solidity and longevity of the Chinese-Russian friendship.
*Dr. Lawrence A. Franklin was the Iran Desk Officer for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. He also served on active duty with the U.S. Army and as a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Pioneer Kitten: A New Iranian Cyber Threat Group Emerges
Annie Fixler and Trevor Logan/FDD/September 17/2020
U.S. Cyber Command is warning the private sector about the “reckless” activities of a new Iranian hacker group. According to both the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike and the FBI, Pioneer Kitten, as the group is known, poses a particularly significant national security threat not only because its targets possess sensitive information sought by the regime in Iran, but also because it sells access to compromised systems.
Active since at least 2017, Pioneer Kitten, also known as Fox Kitten or Parisite, targets primarily Israeli and U.S. entities using known but only recently disclosed vulnerabilities in remote external services and virtual private networks. The group accomplishes this task through a tactic called secure shell tunneling, which allows the attacker to use stolen credentials to bypass a company’s firewall, remotely connect to a secure computer network, and export sensitive data.
Pioneer Kitten uses open-source tools, not zero-day exploits, thus leveraging the delay between vulnerability disclosures and when large companies patch their systems. While Pioneer Kitten is opportunistic and has targeted companies in diverse sectors ranging from healthcare to manufacturing, technology, and defense, Crowdstrike assesses that all of the targets have one thing in common: They possess the type of sensitive information that Iranian intelligence seeks.
One former U.S. government cyber analyst explained that this group acts as the tip of the spear, providing a beachhead for other Iranian cyber threat actors to exploit. Industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos assesses that the group “serves as the initial access group and enables further operations” for other Iranian threat actors. In other words, Pioneer Kitten digs the tunnel and then lets other Iranian hacker groups come in to gather data or plant malware.
At the same time, however, the group appears to be engaged in activities that would undermine its utility to the Iranian government. U.S. Cyber Command confirmed that the group has tried to sell access “despite likely negative impacts to potential intelligence collection.” Hackers looking to make a quick sale will often advertise their access controls to other hackers on hacker forums.
Astute network defenders patrol these forums looking for advertised credentials to their networks so that they can suspend that access point and patch the computer network, which will kick anyone using that access point off of the network. Concomitantly, if Pioneer Kitten sells access to clumsier criminal hackers, network defenders will be more likely to discover not only the criminals but also the Iranian intelligence assets and kick them both out of the network.
Pioneer Kitten’s conduct leads Crowdstrike and CYBERCOM to conclude that while the group is aligned with and working on behalf of the regime in Iran, it is not a government entity. This view is consistent with prior assessments that Tehran depends on contractors and domestic hacking groups to conduct cyber operations on behalf of the state.
This structure forces the United States to continually reassess the tools it uses to combat malign cyber activity. To date, Washington has relied heavily on indictments and sanctions to punish and deter Iranian cyberattacks. Indictments, however, may have limited value against individual actors whom their government will not extradite. Likewise, while sanctions against individual hackers and regime decisionmakers are important tools for persuading actors to adhere to cyber “norms and punish[ing] those who violate them,” according to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, it is not clear that they have changed Iran’s – or any other nation state’s – cost-benefit analysis.
Therefore, U.S. and allied national security may be better served if Washington also focuses on coordinating with the tech industry and the broader private sector to minimize the delay between vulnerability disclosure and system patching. In so doing, the United States can ensure that actors such as Pioneer Kitten find that their tunnels lead to nowhere.
*Annie Fixler is deputy director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Trevor Logan is a cyber research analyst. For more analysis from Annie, Trevor, and CCTI, please subscribe HERE. Follow Annie and Trevor on Twitter @afixler and @TrevorLoganFDD. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Iran Must Be Banned From International Sports
Benjamin Weinthal and Alireza Nader/FDD/September 17/2020
The Islamic Republic in Iran has executed Navid Afkari, a young wrestler with a potentially bright future ahead of him.
Navid’s execution has led to a major outcry among Iranians in Iran and among the diaspora, especially on social media.
The regime executed Navid as a message to the rest of the population- obey us at all costs or face death. But his unjust death must not go answered by the international community.
All sports associations must ban the Islamic Republic from competition in international events, especially the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the United World Wrestling (UWW). Moreover, European countries that still maintain diplomatic ties to the regime must punish its behavior. Navid’s death must not be in vain.
Navid was executed for his participation in the 2018 nationwide protests against the Islamic Republic’s rule over Iran. In reaction to the people’s legitimate demands, the regime unleashed violence against the protestors, killing, injuring, arresting, and torturing thousands of Iranians.
Hoping to make an example of them to prevent future unrest, the authorities accused Navid and his two brothers of participating in protests in Shiraz, one of the largest cities in Iran and a center of the uprising. Tehran has also accused Navid of killing a security guard during the protests.
However, the regime did not provide any proof of its charges, and according to the Voice of America, the brothers’ convictions were based on confessions extracted under torture. In a recording from his incarceration, Navid stated that he was brutally tortured into confessing to a crime he did not commit.
“The evidence is there if the court wants to investigate [the acts of torture] … There is not one shred of evidence in this damned case that shows I’m guilty. But they don’t want to listen to us. I realized they are looking for a neck for their rope,” said Navid in the recording.
Navid’s death sentence is part of the regime’s strategy of creating societal-wide terror. A recent report by Amnesty International describes the regime’s brutal treatment of peaceful demonstrators, which include “waterboarding, beating, flogging, electric shocks, pepper-spraying genitals, sexual violence, mock executions, pulling out nails and solitary confinement, sometimes for weeks or even months.”
The Islamic Republic, beset by popular rebellion and U.S. maximum pressure, views terror and torture as the best method to ensure its survival.
Navid’s profession as a wrestler (he was also a plasterer) proved to be an advantage in his campaign for justice.
The ancient sport of wrestling is a deeply popular sport in Iran that transcends politics.
The killing of one of Iran’s finest youths is bound to trigger more anger from an already rebellious public. But the regime wanted to make an example of him and is likely to execute more young Iranians already on death row.
The IOC and UWW, which initially expressed outrage over Navid’s death, must follow up their statements by banning the Islamic Republic from all sports competitions. The regime must also be expelled from all international athletic associations.
Pressure from global sporting associations can lead to behavior changes from the regime. For example, in May 2020, Iran’s parliament – in response to the International Judo Federation’s (IJF) suspension last year of Iran’s team for refusing to play against Israel – removed a parliamentary motion that would have prohibited Iranian athletes from competing against Israelis.
Iranian judo athletes, like their national counterparts in wrestling, excel in Judo. Iranians still cannot play against Israelis, but both the public and the Iranian athletic community are increasingly resentful of ideological restrictions that constrain their ability to excel in competitions.
Public criticism from these organizations and threats to expel Iran from sports and wrestling associations and competitions are bound to influence the regime. Even the most die-hard supporters of the Islamic Republic will be upset by Iran’s international isolation from a cherished aspect of Iranian life.
Europe’s punishment of the regime will also complete its global isolation and erase any remaining hope by a cash strapped regime that it will be rescued by European trade and investments. European countries must sanction regime officials responsible for Navid’s execution and refuse to meet with Iranian foreign minister Muhammad Javad Zarif as he begins his European diplomatic tour.
Navid Afkari deserved justice. He was only exercising his natural rights to protest an unjust and cruel regime. But the regime will not stop the execution of Iranians like him unless pressured into doing so. Navid’s life, and the lives of thousands of imprisoned Iranians, depends on censure from the international community.
*Benjamin Weinthal is a research fellow at FDD. A widely published journalist based in Berlin, he serves as FDD’s eyes and ears in Europe. Benjamin’s investigative reporting has uncovered valuable information on Iran’s energy links to European firms and on Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s terror-finance operations. Alireza Nader is a senior fellow at FDD focusing on Iran and U.S. policy in the Middle East. He also researches the Islamic Republic’s systematic repression of religious freedom and currently serves on ADL’s Task Force on Middle East Minorities. Follow Benjamin and Alireza on Twitter @BenWeinthal and @AlirezaNader.

How the Israel-Bahrain Peace Deal Will Reshape the Middle East
James Phillips/The National Interest/September 17/202020
The U.S.-brokered agreements between Israel and the two Gulf States are important milestones in the long diplomatic march toward a broader Arab-Israeli peace.
Bahrain has stepped forward to join the United Arab Emirates, another longtime Arab ally of the United States, in normalizing relations with Israel.
President Donald Trump presided over a signing ceremony at the White House on Tuesday that included Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif al-Zayani, and the UAE’s Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The officials signed two separate documents: the Israel-UAE peace treaty and a declaration of intent by Israel and Bahrain to make peace. There was not enough time to negotiate a final agreement on the second accord since the announcement of the second diplomatic breakthrough on Sept. 11.
The U.S.-brokered agreements between Israel and the two Gulf States are important milestones in the long diplomatic march toward a broader Arab-Israeli peace. These are the first two Arab states to sign peace agreements with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. The two peace accords are twin achievements of the Trump administration’s “outside-in” negotiating strategy, as well as a vindication of Netanyahu’s longstanding strategy of engaging moderate Arab states that increasingly share some of the same interests and concerns as Israel.  Diplomatic Breakthroughs Motivated by Common Enemies
Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all face threats from Shiite Iran as well as from Sunni Islamist extremist groups. All three also are concerned about Turkey’s increasingly destabilizing role in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in conflicts in Syria, Gaza, and Libya.
The two agreements clear the way for Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE to ramp up trade, investment, technological cooperation, tourism, and most importantly, strategic cooperation against Iran, regarded by all three and the U.S. as the chief threat to regional stability.  Iran’s hostility brought Israel, Bahrain and the UAE closer together, and Iran stands to be the biggest loser due to enhanced Arab-Israeli ties.
The UAE peace accord specifies that “Israel and the United Arab Emirates will join with the United States to launch a Strategic Agenda for the Middle East to deepen diplomatic, commercial and security cooperation together and with other countries committed to peace and non-interference.” This language suggests a broadening of the Trump administration’s previous proposal for a Middle East Strategic Alliance, which Heritage Foundation analysts called for in an April report.
Not only does Iran need to beware of close military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and the two Arab kingdoms, but the accord also is expected to clear the way for the export of more sophisticated U.S. weapons to the two countries, possibly including F-35 stealth jets and armed drones that were denied in the past.
Arab Nationalists Break with Palestinian Maximalists
By facilitating negotiations between Israel and the outer ring of Arab states, the Trump administration sought to jump-start a regional peace process while encouraging greater Palestinian flexibility by depriving the Palestinian Authority of its longstanding veto power over the policies of other Arab leaders towards Israel. Jared Kushner, who played a leading role in the diplomatic breakthroughs, assessed that the agreements demonstrate that “a lot of the leaders in the region are tired of waiting for the Palestinians” before recognizing Israel to advance their own national interests. The leaders of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have put the interests of their own people ahead of those of the Palestinians, who are resented by many Gulf Arabs for their support of Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Many Gulf Arabs also are critical of Hamas and other Palestinian Islamist extremists for close cooperation with Iran, their archenemy. The relatively young and dynamic leaders of Bahrain and the UAE also have been exasperated by the ingratitude of aging and corrupt Palestinian leaders who presumed that they deserved the automatic support of other Arabs to sustain their dysfunctional rule.Impatient with the diplomatic foot-dragging of Palestinian leaders wedded to unrealistic demands, Bahrain and the UAE are nudging the peace process along. Both played key roles in supporting the U.S. diplomatic push for Arab-Israeli peace. Bahrain hosted a June 2019 workshop that explored the economic benefits to the Palestinians of the Trump administration’s Peace to Prosperity initiative.  Both countries also have tacit Saudi support for their peace efforts. Although the Saudis cautiously have refrained from publicly joining peace negotiations, they signaled their support by opening their air space to commercial flights between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and to eastward travel from Israel to other destinations.  Morocco, Oman, and Sudan also are likely prospects to enter peace negotiations with Israel in the near future. If the momentum can be maintained, then the UAE and Bahrain agreements could breathe new life into the administration’s peace initiative, which was rejected in January by Palestinian leaders clinging to maximalist demands for statehood and the return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees to Israel.
Eventually, the Bahrain and UAE diplomatic pacts could lead Palestinians to adopt a more realistic negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel and join the other Arab states on the peace train. But regardless of how the Palestinians react, those two agreements represent a quadrilateral diplomatic achievement that will pave the way for closer strategic cooperation against Iran.
*James Phillips is The Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs.

A New Look At Iran's Complicated Relationship With The Taliban/
Barnett Rubin/War On The Rocks/September 17/202020
Eight years ago, I took part in a meeting among people from several different countries — Iran, various European countries, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the United States. I was a part-time consultant to the U.S. government at the time, and most of the group had been or — at least — were close to government officials. These are known as “track-two meetings.” During one of the sessions, a European participant charged Iran with supplying military aid to the Taliban. A retired Iranian diplomat responded indignantly. “How could Iran supply aid to its sworn enemies?” he asked. I responded that Iranians were not such simple-minded people that they could have only one enemy or one policy at a time.
Iran’s position on the agreement between the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed in Qatar earlier this year may likewise appear confusing. In 1998, Iran nearly went to war with Afghanistan, then mostly under Taliban rule, when Pakistani fighters allied with the Taliban killed 11 Iranian civilians in Mazar-i Sharif, including nine diplomats. In 2001, Iran helped the United States remove and replace Taliban rule in Afghanistan with both military and intelligence support on the ground in Afghanistan and diplomatic support at the U.N. talks on Afghanistan in Bonn. For years, Iran opposed political outreach to the Taliban and rejected any distinction between them and al-Qaeda. As the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan approached its 20th anniversary and the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic and imposed additional sanctions, Iran echoed the Taliban in calling for the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, the main Taliban demand that the United States met in the Doha agreement. Iran also began supplying Taliban commanders in western Afghanistan with weapons both to send a message to the United States and to deal with threats on or close to the Afghan-Iranian border. Yet Iran has also been the most outspoken country in the world in denouncing the agreement, claiming that it amounted to recognition by the United States of the Taliban’s “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” which Tehran says constitutes a threat to the national security of Iran. Iranian officials who welcomed Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar to Tehran, something Donald Trump could only dream of doing at Camp David, claim they told the Taliban that the re-establishment of the Emirate would cross a red line for Iran. Russia, which has taken the same position on the Emirate, has nonetheless endorsed the agreement as the best way to achieve its top goal in Afghanistan: ousting U.S. military forces from their bases on the former southern border of the Soviet Union. According to an Iranian official who requested anonymity to speak with me freely, Russian officials have asked their Iranian counterparts if they really want the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan or not.
Ralph Waldo Emerson famously wrote that “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” For Iranians, there is nothing “little” about Iran, its statesmen, philosophers, and divines, as they are heirs to thousands of years of unbroken history and civilization. Though Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan may lack a foolish consistency, it has placed Iran in what may be its best attainable position in Afghanistan: No one trusts it, but no one wants to antagonize it either.
Iran’s view of the Taliban has largely been derivative of its analysis of the relationship of the Taliban to the top threat to the Iranian state, the United States. In this respect, Iranian policy toward the Taliban resembles U.S. Cold War policies that evaluated groups in other countries as a function of their relationship to the Soviet Union.
Iran was involved in the establishment of the “Northern Alliance” (Ittilaf-i Shamali) that overthrew Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah in 1992, and constituents of that alliance predominated in President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Islamic State. Iran had excellent relations with Ismail Khan in Herat and with Ahmad Shah Massoud in the northeast. Until 1996, it used northern Afghanistan as a staging ground for aid to the Islamic movement in Tajikistan.
While Rabbani was a Sunni of the Hanafi school, the fact that he was Persian speaking was a source of solidarity. The opposition to Rabbani’s government led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, with the support of Arab Islamist volunteers and with backing from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, looked to Iran like another case of Wahabi “mullahs made in Britain” or the United States to oppose Iran. Iranian leaders at that time openly spoke of the Taliban as being supported by the United States. Such suspicions are resurfacing today as a result of the U.S.-Taliban deal in Doha.
As early as Pakistan’s first support to the Taliban in 1994, the latter’s potential contribution to the security of a projected gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would have evaded the “natural” pipeline route through Iran to the Persian Gulf, reinforced the idea that the Taliban were part of the U.S. strategic plan to encircle and marginalize Iran. U.S. statements of interest in the pipeline project and speculating that the Taliban takeover of Kabul might bring stability to Afghanistan reinforced this suspicion.
The high point of hostility between the Taliban and Iran took place in August 1998, when the Taliban captured most of northern Afghanistan with massive Pakistani assistance. They had already overthrown Ismail Khan and taken him prisoner. They then captured Kunduz and Mazar-i Sharif. This offensive cut off Iran’s corridor through northern Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. During the capture of Mazar-i Sharif, Pakistani fighters belonging to the Sunni sectarian organization Sipah-i Sahaba, who participated in the Taliban offensive, massacred eleven Iranians in Mazar, including nine consular officials and a journalist. The Taliban also captured over 100 Iranians assisting the Rabbani government.
These events led to a military mobilization on the Iranian side, and war appeared imminent. There was widespread support in Iran for war against the Taliban. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi intervened to prevent the war. He met with Mullah Omar in Kandahar and President Mohammad Khatami in Tehran and arranged the return of prisoners to Iran. Brahimi attributes his success to Mullah Omar’s interpreter, whom he later learned had toned down both his statements and Mullah Omar’s replies to prevent the meeting from blowing up. In Tehran, Brahimi tried without much success to convince Iranian officials that the Taliban were not a U.S. proxy, but the offer of the return of prisoners managed to deescalate the crisis.
The start of U.S.-Iranian détente during the reformist presidency of Khatami (elected 1997 and 2001) facilitated a reorientation of Iran’s policy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, though from the Iranian point of view it was the United States, rather than Iran, that changed. The U.S. decision to respond to 9/11 by trying to destroy al-Qaeda and overthrowing the Taliban government appeared to Iran as if the United States had come to its senses and realized where the real terrorist threat came from. In effect, the United States moved from its historic alignment with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to active cooperation with Iran and Russia. The CIA made the initial contacts in Dushanbe where the United States already had de facto cooperation with Iran on the peace process in Tajikistan. The United States made use of the infrastructure already established in Tajikistan by Iran and Russia to provide assistance to anti-Taliban fighters in northern Afghanistan. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani personally helped the CIA to establish bases in Panjshir and Bagram. U.S. presidential envoy James Dobbins met with Iran’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Ebrahim Taherian, in Charikar, north of Kabul, together with members of the Qods Force whom the United States designated as terrorists in 2014.
Iran also provided essential diplomatic assistance to the United States at the U.N. talks on Afghanistan in Bonn, where Dobbins worked closely with Iran Deputy Foreign Minister for International Organizations Javad Zarif, who later twice became the foreign minister. At Bonn — where I was senior advisor to Brahimi — Dobbins and Zarif jointly demarched me at breakfast one morning to ask why the United Nations had not included guarantees of elections and counter-terrorist cooperation in the draft agreement. The final agreement included both. Zarif’s private intervention with Yunus Qanooni, head of the United Front (“Northern Alliance”) delegation, resolved the final stalemate over the composition of the interim government.
The Khatami administration expected continued relaxation of tension with the United States, but on Jan. 22, 2002, The New York Times ran an article reporting with alarm that Iran “was working to consolidate its influence in Herat,” a finding similar to an Iranian reporting that the United States was consolidating its influence in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Within a week after that article, in his 2002 State of the Union message, President George W. Bush labeled Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil” along with Iraq and North Korea. During the Bonn talks, representatives of Donald Rumsfeld’s Defense Department had tried to block Dobbins’ cooperation with Zarif, but the support of Secretary of State Colin Powell enabled Dobbins to continue. Back in Washington, however, the Rumsfeld-Vice President Dick Cheney-led advocates of regime change — first in Iraq and then Iran — won the battle for the president’s teleprompter.
The speech sent shock waves through Tehran that still reverberate today. Equating Iran to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had fought a bloody war of aggression against Iran with U.S. and Saudi help that cost the country an estimated one million lives deeply insulted Iranians, and not just regime sympathizers. There had been resistance in Tehran, as well as Washington, to cooperation on Afghanistan, and Bush’s speech discredited those who had backed that cooperation. Many of them ultimately lost their positions and were sidelined, or worse. The same individuals, who once again gained leadership of Iran’s Afghanistan policy after the election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013, still refer to it bitterly. At a meeting in Oslo in 2014, one of them commented to me, “If this doesn’t work out, nothing will happen to you.”
After several years, Iran’s position on the U.S. presence in Afghanistan turned more hostile, though it was still counterbalanced by common opposition to Sunni jihadist terrorism (though with differences on who qualified as a Sunni jihadist terrorist, notably Hamas) and Iran’s need for stability along its 540-mile border with Afghanistan. Then the United States invaded Iraq, from which there was no terrorist threat to the United States, and it showed no sign of withdrawing from Afghanistan, but instead turned it into a NATO mission, stationing forces from the entire Western alliance there. Not only Iran but other states in the region questioned whether U.S. objectives were limited to the common goal of opposing Sunni jihadist terrorism. These suspicions were confirmed on May 23, 2005, when Bush and President Hamid Karzai signed a “Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership.” While the declaration stated that it was “not directed against any third country,” it also stated that U.S. military forces would continue to have access to bases in Afghanistan, where they would “continue to have the freedom of action required to conduct appropriate military operations based on consultations and pre-agreed procedures.” The first phrase was a profession of intentions, while the second guaranteed capabilities. Security planners in all countries plan against capabilities, which are concrete and observable, not intentions, which are unverifiable and mutable.
The United States had already rejected Khatami’s 2003 offer of a grand bargain and was pressing toward consolidating regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran, which seemed to be next on the list, was in the midst of the run-up to a presidential election when the strategic partnership declaration was signed. The victory in August 2005 by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led to the formalization of a new attitude toward the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, though not yet the Taliban. Ahmadinejad asked Karzai for a strategic partnership declaration with Iran similar to the one he had signed with the United States. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squelched that idea. As the situation in Iraq stabilized from catastrophe to disaster, the rumblings for regime change grew louder in Washington. On May 11, 2007, Cheney warned Iran — while standing on the U.S. aircraft carrier John Stennis (named after a staunch white supremacist senator from Mississippi) — that the United States was prepared to use its naval power against Iranian threats. In September 2007, Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the newly appointed commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, announced that henceforward, if the United States attacked Iran, Iran would respond against U.S. forces and assets wherever it could reach them. Iranian officials confirmed that included in Afghanistan.
A few weeks after Cheney’s performance, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking in Kabul with Karzai, told the press that the United States was observing “insurgents in Afghanistan” receiving shipments of arms from Iran, but that he could not say with certainty if the government was involved, given the volume of smuggling across the border. On his way home while in Germany on June 14, no longer constrained by Karzai’s sensitivities, Gates said that the volume of the arms flow was such as to suggest that the Iranian government knew of them. U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns made more specific accusations on CNN, that there was “irrefutable evidence” that the arms were being supplied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In September, after Gen. Jafari had announced the new policy, Central Command’s Adm. William Fallon told the press in Kabul that Iran was “clearly” supplying insurgents in Afghanistan with parts needed to manufacture the same explosively formed projectiles that had done so much damage to U.S. troops in Iraq.
The perception that both the presence in and withdrawal from Afghanistan by U.S. forces posed threats to Iran continued to shape Iranian views of the Taliban. Previously, Iran had viewed the Taliban as part of network of Saudi-sponsored Sunni jihadist groups targeted against Iran with U.S. backing. It opposed attempts at political outreach to the Taliban and denied that the Taliban differed substantially from al-Qaeda. As Iran became more concerned by the threat that a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan could pose, it gradually developed a two-track policy.
The Taliban had begun a diplomatic offensive in 2007 aimed at convincing the United States and the neighbors of Afghanistan that their goals were confined to Afghanistan. They wanted to convince the United States that they could cease providing refuge to al-Qaeda if the United States withdrew its troops. To Iran and Russia, who had similarly hostile views of the Taliban, they emphasized a common interest in opposing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, while assuring them that they harbored no plans against any of Afghanistan’s neighbors. At that time, the Taliban were still on speaking terms with Saudi Arabia, where King Abdullah hosted a reconciliation iftar among Afghans during Ramadan in September 2008. According to one organizer of the meeting, in which some senior government-affiliated Afghans participated, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki then asked his Afghan counterpart, Dr. Abdullah, why the Saudis were trying to bring back the Taliban. As long as the Taliban appeared to be close to Saudi Arabia, there was a limit to the relations Iran would have with them.
In 2009, however, Saudi-Taliban relations broke down. When Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, met Taliban political envoy Tayyib Agha in Jeddah, the two got into a heated argument over Taliban resistance to Saudi preconditions for acting as a mediator with the U.S. and Afghan governments. King Abdullah insisted that the Taliban publicly denounce al-Qaeda before the Kingdom would act. The Taliban insisted such an action could come only at the end of a process, not before. Muqrin expelled Tayyib Agha from Saudi Arabia. Soon after, Muqrin received a visit in Riyadh from Pakistani intelligence chief, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who admonished his Saudi brothers for acting without consulting Pakistan. Two things happened after that meeting: Saudi Arabia became irrelevant to the peace process in Afghanistan, and Muqrin and his associates started telling their U.S. counterparts that Tayyib Agha was an Iranian agent being paid $10,000 per month by Soleimani. U.S. intelligence was unable to verify the latter claim.
After that, the Taliban shifted to working with Germany and Qatar as intermediaries, and direct talks with the United States began in Germany on Nov. 29, 2010. Tayyib Agha told his American interlocutors that Iran was Afghanistan’s “most dangerous neighbor.” Iran tried to capitalize on U.S. contacts with the Taliban to sow suspicion between the Afghan government and the United States. In one small example, during 2011, when I was an advisor to the U.S. State Department Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, a senior Afghan official told me that an Iranian official he met in Turkmenistan had told him that I had met with Mullah Omar in Quetta, Pakistan. I am not sure he completely believed my denial.
The outreach to the United States and others was part of a Taliban strategy to capitalize on their demonstrated military and political staying power by seeking international recognition as a legitimate political movement rather than a terrorist group. As a domestic counterpart of this policy, the Taliban also tried to downplay their Sunni sectarian allegiances. During their rule they had engaged in several massacres of Hazaras, a predominantly Shi’a ethnic group, and Shi’a in Afghanistan still largely regard the Taliban as the sectarian equivalents of ISIL. In their public statements and media releases, however, while the Taliban did not compromise their allegiance to Hanafi jurisprudence, they began to publicize their alleged good relations with some Hazara populations and state that they regarded them as fellow Muslims and “Afghans” (citizens of Afghanistan). This did not persuade many Shi’a in Afghanistan, but it made it easier for Iran to engage with the Taliban and capitalize on their common opposition to the U.S. military presence.
Periodically, intelligence reports surfaced claiming that Iran had started providing not only projectile components but also anti-aircraft weapons to the Taliban. As recently as January 2020, I was shown a video of Soviet-manufactured ground to air missiles that Taliban in Helmand had allegedly obtained from Iran. There is no evidence of the use by the Taliban of such anti-aircraft weapons thus far.
During the Obama administration, as the United States opened negotiations with both Iran and the Taliban, Iran seemed to conclude that it would need to deal with the Taliban as a future component of Afghanistan’s political scene. Throughout this time Iran continued to enjoy warm relations with the Afghan government, aside from long-term interstate disputes over water, migrants, and drug trafficking. Iran also continued to fund and support important opposition leaders who supported the constitutional system.
The combination of leadership struggles and pressure from Pakistan pushed the Taliban leadership closer to Iran after 2014. After the Taliban’s expulsion from Afghanistan by the U.S. 2001 military offensive, Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar took over reconstitution of the Taliban leadership in Balochistan and Karachi, while Mullah Omar remained out of sight. Baradar’s leadership was undisputed. The arrest of Baradar in a joint CIA-Inter-Services Intelligence operation in Karachi in January 2010 led to a leadership dispute. Akhtar Muhammad Mansour became the first deputy leader, while Abdul Qayyum Zakir became the second deputy leader. Mansour claimed to have the same authorities as Baradar, reporting directly to Mullah Omar and supervising the entire Taliban organization, with Zakir reporting to him as deputy leader for military affairs. Zakir claimed that he and Mansour were peers, both reporting to Mullah Omar, with Zakir responsible for military affairs and Mansour for political and civilian affairs.
Both Mansour and Zakir were from Helmand province, from the Ishaqzai and Alizai Pashtun tribes respectively. Both of these tribes are deeply involved in the production, refining, and trafficking of opium. The town of Zaranj on the Afghan-Iranian border is only 136 miles by road from Delaram, where the sole bridge across the Helmand river is the major transit point for heroin from Helmand headed for Iran. At Delaram (where I stopped in a tea house in June 1998, while traveling from Kandahar to Farah as a U.N. consultant) the road to Zaranj and the Iranian border branches southwest from the Kandahar-Herat segment of the Afghan ring road. That route traverses Nimruz, the only Baloch-majority province of Afghanistan, which borders the Pakistani province of Balochistan and the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan. The Baloch, who live in the region where the three countries meet, easily cross the borders, dominating the region’s licit and illicit cross-border trade.
While the Baloch in Afghanistan have no quarrel with a weak state that largely leaves them alone, their co-ethnics in Pakistan and Iran have each struggled for independence or autonomy. In Pakistan, the Baloch National Front espouses a secular nationalism, and over decades past benefited from support from India, the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Iranian organizations such as Jundullah have adopted Sunni or even Salafi Islamism and received aid from Saudi Arabia operating through Pakistani territory. Both Pakistan and Iran believed (with some factual basis) that their respective Baloch movements receive support from their inveterate enemies, India for Pakistan and, in addition to Saudi Arabia, the United States for Iran. Israeli agents pretending to be Americans provided covert aid to Jundullah in 2007 and 2008 until the United States found out and asked them to stop.
The narcotics threat became intertwined with Iran’s concerns over Baloch separatism and Salafi terrorism. In early 2009, before I joined the Obama administration, an Iranian official told me that the counter-narcotics directorate in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was increasingly concerned over links of Jundullah not only to the drug trade, but also to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. A similar message came through other channels, which along with terrorist acts by Jundullah that killed civilians, led the Obama administration to designate Jundullah as a foreign terrorist organization in November 2010, though not without lengthy internal resistance and delays, which rendered the designation almost useless as a confidence-building measure.
Starting around 2014, the rise of the ISIL, plus the establishment of ISIL’s Khorasan province in Afghanistan, confronted Iran with a new threat on both its western and eastern borders. ISIL controlled an area of Jawzjan province in northwest Afghanistan, on the border with Turkmenistan (which Russia considered a direct threat) and astride the road linking Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Mazar-i Sharif to Mashhad, the capital of Iran’s Razavi Khorasan province. The Afghan monarchy had settled Ishaqzais and Alizais from Helmand in Jawzjan for support in dealing with the largely Uzbek population, and these tribes maintained their family and clan links to Helmand. Ishaqzais and Alizais expelled from Jawzjan by the U.S.-supported forces of Uzbek, formerly Soviet-aligned militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum in 2001 took refuge with their fellow tribes in Helmand. There they learned the skills of opium poppy cultivation, which some of them eventually took back to Jawzjan.
The changing dynamics among Pakistan, the Taliban leadership, and the United States presented Iran with new opportunities for dealing with the interlinked problems of drugs, terrorism, external subversion, and separatism in the Iranian-Pakistani-Afghan Baloch zone. With the apparent authorization of Mullah Omar, Mansour had taken over the supervision of Tayyib Agha’s outreach from Mullah Baradar after the latter’s detention. He did not, however inform Mullah Zakir, or Mullah Hasan Akhund, the chair of the leadership shura. When the news leaked in 2011, this intensified the dispute with Zakir, which culminated in the April 2014 dismissal of Zakir as deputy leader and head of the military commission.
Subsequently, both Zakir and Mansour were reported to have spent time in Iran as guests of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Zakir seems to have been looking for a base from which he could operate with more independence. He also began spending more time in Helmand rather than Pakistan. In 2015, Mansour came under increased pressure from Pakistan to participate in Pakistan-based talks with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council. When under pressure, he authorized some Taliban individuals with particularly close relations to Pakistani intelligence to participate in a meeting in Murree in July, the demand by others in the leadership to know whether Mullah Omar had authorized this deviation from longstanding policy led to the revelation that the leader had died two years earlier.
Mansour, who had already been acting as Mullah Omar’s successor, managed to make it official, but only after a leadership struggle that took several months and involved overcoming resistance from Mullah Omar’s family. Pakistan exploited the rift to get its favorite, Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of the late commander Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, appointed as deputy leader in charge of military affairs. One of the means Mansour used to resist the increasing pressure was by reaching out to Iran, where he stayed for weeks at a time in February, March, and April to May 2016. On May 21, he was killed by a U.S. military drone launched from Afghanistan, while driving across Balochistan from the Iranian border to his home in Kuchlak, a town just outside of Quetta. Someone posted an image of his pseudonymous passport on the Internet, which was in a surprisingly pristine condition considering that it was supposedly salvaged from a taxi of which only charred embers remained (see photograph). This has led to speculation that the passport was actually photographed at the border crossing by Pakistani officials who alerted the United States to Mansour’s whereabouts.
I have no direct knowledge of what Mansour discussed with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for several months, but it does not appear to have been a courtesy call. Since then, Iran has established open political relations with the Taliban. It has invited delegations, including one led by the deputy leader and head of the political office, Mullah Ghani Baradar, whom Pakistan released from eight years of detention in 2018 at the request of the United States to lead the negotiating team in Doha.
According to a variety of reports, the talks dealt with the linkages among all the topics discussed above: the common struggle against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, managing the heroin trade from Helmand in such a way as to keep its profits out of the hands of Saudi-supported Baloch groups, securing the Iranian-Afghan border from groups such as Jundullah, cooperation in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and intelligence cooperation regarding U.S. military and intelligence operations in Helmand and along the border. Those visits were managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps without the participation of the ministry of foreign affairs, which may have learned about them at the same time as the rest of us, when Mansour was killed, but since then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has opened political talks with the Taliban, including at least one meeting in Tehran between Iran foreign minister Javad Zarif and Mullah Baradar.
Iranian officials have since that time informed the Afghan government of their relations with the Taliban. In December 2018, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council for National Defense, visited Kabul to brief the Afghan government. Iran told the government that it was supplying the Taliban with light weapons in order to deal with security concerns on the Afghan side of the border, but that it did not supply weapons capable of changing the political situation in the Taliban’s favor — in other words, no man-portable air-defense systems. The concerns include all the topics mentioned above, though it is unclear what agreement they reached about narcotics trafficking. Iran’s relations with Taliban on the border seem to be mainly channeled through commanders belonging to Mansour’s Ishaqzai tribe, who are deeply involved in the drug trade. There are reports that elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are complicit in the trade, and perhaps one should not credit even the piety of the defenders of the Islamic Republic with the capacity to make that country the only one between Karachi and Moscow where the security forces have not been corrupted by contraband billions. More fundamentally, though Iran, like the United States, claims to be totally opposed to the drug trade and touts its efforts against it, in neither case has counter-narcotics policy prevented intelligence and military cooperation with traffickers when deemed necessary for national security.
Shamkhani addressed one particular incident that had strained Iranian-Afghan official relations. In May 2018, the Taliban mounted an attack on and nearly captured the city of Farah, center of the province of the same name on the Iranian border with a population of about 500,000. Afghan officials charged Iran with “directly funding and equipping the Taliban in Farah.” The head of the Afghan border police in the province said that “Revolutionary Guard commanders are leading the firefight” there. During a visit to Kabul in January 2019, I was told by Afghan officials that Shamkhani did not deny the Iranian role, but rather expressed Iran’s serious concern about what he claimed was a significant presence in Farah of U.S. intelligence agencies carrying out surveillance and operations in Iran. That, he implied, was the target. The Afghan government just happened to be in the way.
This lugubrious morass of countervailing intrigues provided the context for Tehran’s statements, carefully straddling the invisible line between nuance and incoherence, on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations in Doha. With channels to all camps, and the direct threat to Iran from the United States largely neutralized for now, Tehran has retained freedom of action to confront whatever further vicissitudes may agitate its relations with its eastern neighbor.
*Barnett R. Rubin is director of the Afghanistan Regional Program, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, and former senior advisor to the U.N. special representative of the secretary-general for Afghanistan and the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Oil and OPEC: Step aside Seven Sisters, it’s time for the Seven Brothers
Cyril Widdershoven/Thursday 17 September 2020
OPEC producers stand at the precipice of unprecedented opportunity while international oil companies stagger from the fallout of COVID-19.
The current discussion in energy markets, exaggerated by ongoing media reports about peak oil (BP Energy Outlook 2020), fledgling demand from the International Energy Agency, and lower demand forecasts for 2020-2021 from OPEC, should not be seen as threatening members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but maybe as an opportunity.
Most of the negative news is coming from the former Seven Sisters and their offspring, not from the likes of Aramco, ADNOC, Gazprom or KOC. There seems to be a media frenzy hitting oil, claiming the Era of Oil is over, or that we have reached peak oil demand. The reality, however, is a very different picture.
While the world’s most famous energy organization, OPEC, celebrates its 60th anniversary, the organization needs a new strategy. The old guard in OPEC’s Vienna headquarters, or those at the helm of the different national oil companies (NOCs) around the world, should re-assess the viability of its current crude oil export market strategies, and see if there is the option for an integrated oil market approach.
OPEC, the new kid on the block in 1960, after its establishment in Baghdad, has become the conservative factor in the market. The world has gotten used to it, which means market assessments are becoming stale, not vibrant. Looking at the real potential of NOCs, and the current market situation, a new opportunity is there to establish a new “Seven Brothers,” made up of Aramco, ADNOC, KOC, NNPC, Sonatrach, Gazprom and INOC (Iraq National Oil).
Generally speaking, OPEC has been a success story, being a major market regulating factor, stabilizing oil prices and supporting global economic growth. Set up not only to increase the producer’s share in oil revenues, but also to counter the market control of the so-called Seven Sisters of the time (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Shell, Total, BP and ENI), OPEC can look back with a smile. This strategy has worked for decades, but it is now under extreme pressure.
Since the start of the 21st century, its overall market share has decreased substantially, while new non-OPEC producers have taken over. The re-emergence of the United States as the world’s largest producer, and the proactive market strategy of Russia, and its former Soviet Union compatriots, has confronted the old OPEC guard with threats to its very existence. Still, OPEC’s leaders, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, have been preventing its demise by setting up an unforeseen, active, and successful partnership with Russia.
The Saudi-Russia-UAE triangle has been behind a reemergence of the market power of the group. Taking in a former political and energy adversary has been a masterstroke of statesmanship for Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
A successful OPEC 2.0, otherwise known as OPEC+, was set up, and was able to counter the immense demand-supply crisis of the last years. COVID-19, however, has been a black swan, not foreseen by anybody, reshaping markets, demand and supply and the future.
Until now, OPEC’s producers have been reactive in the market, leaving traders, hedge funds and the former Seven Sisters to influence prices. The current high-noon scenario for international oil companies (IOCs), such as Shell, BP and others, is creating an opportunity that OPEC’s producers can seize. Total media focus at present is on the fledgling role and future power IOCs.
Scenarios painted by BP, Shell and financial markets are bleak, as the financials are not favorable anymore. We could already be past peak IOC oil (and gas) production, with activist shareholders and media and government pressure continuing to force them to become green, and further dampen future production estimates. Lower investments combined with lower revenues, margins and dividends, will be the major threat to the position and power of the Seven Sisters.
The potential market vacuum, however, can and should be filled by NOCs and possibly independents, such as Petrofac. Even if demand for oil and gas will someday peak, the call on NOC oil will increase. Lower production by IOCs will shift demand to NOCs and new incumbents.
At present, IOCs are bleeding on all sides. Their market value is diminishing, while investors are leaving. The lack of pro-active strategies and possible overestimating their own power positions has become clear, but seems not yet to be recognized in London, The Hague and some other places. The integrated oil companies of the past will be removed or substituted by the new Seven Brothers of the Future. Their margins and financial powers are different, making a full-scale Seven Brothers scenario likely in the next 10-15 years.
OPEC strategists should be focusing not on demand-supply traditional issues, but setting up a strategy to make OPEC+ an integrated upstream-downstream powerhouse, controlling or mitigating market risks.
Keeping in mind the outflow of hydrocarbon financing at IOCs and independents, NOCs could be looking at a win-win situation, without changing dramatically its operations, just OPEC strategies. Let us not forget that NOCs are the lowest-cost producers in the world, with many supported by some of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world. A growing market power of the NOCs (or Seven Brothers) will also directly propone a reemergence of OPEC(+). If Vienna strategists and powers in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or Moscow, are able to combine all, a new era is on the horizon. The Aramco’s of the world have become integrated operators and market shapers.Now is the time to integrate market power and political strategies, and integrate oil and gas upstream and downstream sectors in a new OPEC strategy, to shake and move markets.
New leaders are emerging already, such as Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman al-Saud and the CEO of ADNOC, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, who have the potential to take the world’s biggest oil organization forward, into a new era for black gold.