LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
February 29.2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
All who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who
humble themselves will be exalted
Luke 18/09-14: “Jesus also told this parable to some who trusted in
themselves that they were righteous and regarded others with contempt: ‘Two men
went up to the temple to pray, one a Pharisee and the other a tax-collector. The
Pharisee, standing by himself, was praying thus, “God, I thank you that I am not
like other people: thieves, rogues, adulterers, or even like this tax-collector.
I fast twice a week; I give a tenth of all my income.”But the tax-collector,
standing far off, would not even look up to heaven, but was beating his breast
and saying, “God, be merciful to me, a sinner!” I tell you, this man went down
to his home justified rather than the other; for all who exalt themselves will
be humbled, but all who humble themselves will be exalted.’”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese
Related News & Editorials published on February 28-29/2020
Lebanon bans entry to travelers from Iran, coronavirus-hit countries
Lebanon Closes Educational Institutions as Precaution against Coronavirus
Report: Hitti in Paris to Discuss Crisis
Lebanon Suspends Travel from Virus Infected Countries, Exempts Residents
Report: Foucher Requests an ‘Urgent’ Meeting with Diab
Lebanese in Nabatieh Demand Closing of Schools over Virus Threat
Beirut's Parking Meters: Where Does the Money Go?
Bassil Calls for Protecting Oil from Domestic Corruption, Foreign Greed
Japan Sends Minister to Lebanon on Ghosn Case
Geagea after Strong Republic bloc meeting urges government to adopt
comprehensive reform plan
Minister of Information: Decision to close schools to be made within 48 hours
Ministers of Telecom and Health discuss health situation, importance of
awareness
Abdel Samad chairs National Audiovisual Council meeting over electronic press
situation
Lebanon's Ambassador to Italy tells NNA number of Coronavirus patients is high
'due to comprehensive survey of population'
Lebanon to close all schools in effort to thwart spread of coronavirus/Paula
Naoufal/Anahar/February 28/2020
Lebanese loyalty should be to state, not Hezbollah/Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab
news/February 28/2020
The Rampant Corruption that Sparked Lebanon’s Protests/Mohamed Azakir/Asharq Al-Awsat/February
28/2020
Lebanon About to Legalize Cannabis Cultivation/Caroline Akoum/Asharq Al-Awsat/February
28/2020 -
Lebanon needs early elections to regain legitimacy/Ryan Bohl/Al Arabiya/February
28/2020
Lebanon must manage expectations as offshore drilling begins/Diana Kaissy/Al
Arabiya/February 28/2020
October's Meeting': Together to Get Back The Abducted State/Hanna Saleh/Asharq
Al Awsat/February 28/2020
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
February 28-29/2020
Canada strongly condemns targeting of civilians in northwestern Syria
Four Iranian MPs test positive for coronavirus
Iran’s former envoy to Vatican Hadi Khosroshahi dies of coronavirus
US watching ‘closely’ to see if Iran tries to undermine peace in Afghanistan
Iran death toll from coronavirus reaches 210: BBC Persian
Coronavirus death toll in Iran ‘much higher’ than what govt says: MP
16 Syrian troops, militiamen killed in Turkish retaliation: Monitor
NATO Holds Urgent Talks as World Condemns Idlib Violence
Death toll of Turkish soldiers killed in Syria in February alone reaches 53
Top Russian, US generals discuss Syria amid tensions: Report
US offered to help Iran with responding to coronavirus: Pompeo
Moscow urges Ankara to protect Russian citizens in Turkey: Report
EU fears all-out war over Syria conflict
Greece blocks migrants at border after Turkey says it will let refugees into
Europe
Fears over Constitutional Vacuum after Iraq Parliament Postpones Confidence Vote
Arab Health Ministers to Hold Urgent Meeting On Covid-19
UNRWA Warns of Reduction in Services over Lack of Funds
Three Syrian Soldiers Wounded by Israeli Fire near Golan
Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on February 28-29/2020
Saudi journalist Tareq Al-Homayed: The Iranian Regime Is 'The Deadliest
Virus' – And The West's Lenience Towards It Endangers The Region/MEMRI/February
28/2020
Israel's Iran Confrontation Is Pointing the Way to the Future of War/Seth
Frantzman/The Hill/February 28/2020
A Corona-free Umrah/Salman Al-Dossary/Asharq Al Awsat/February 28/2020
Iran Elections: The Least Bad Outcome/Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/February
28/2020
In the Middle East, coronavirus spreads along routes of trade, faith, and
war/Faisal al-Yafai/Al Arabiya/February 28/2020
How Iran's Regime Spread Coronavirus to the Middle East/Seth Frantzman/The
Jerusalem Post/February 28/2020
Greece's Migrant Crisis: "A Powder Keg Ready to Explode"/Soeren Kern/ Gatestone
Institute/February 28/2020
Coronavirus could push major economies into the abyss/Dr. John C. Hulsman/Arab
news/February 28/2020
Polish actions threaten future of EU’s judicial integration/Ranvir S. Nayar/Arab
news/February 28/2020
Syria strike leaves Turkish-Russian ties in tatters/Sinem Cengiz/Arab
news/February 28/2020
Fighters Without Borders”—Forecasting New Trends in Iran Threat Network Foreign
Operations Tradecraft/Matthew Levitt/ctc.usma.edu/Combating Terrorism
Centre/February 28/ 2020
Why Russia Wants Lebanon/Grigory Melamedov/Middle East Forum/February 28/2020
The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on February 28-29/2020
Lebanon bans entry to travelers from Iran,
coronavirus-hit countries
Tamara Abueish, Al Arabiya English/Friday, 28 February 2020
Lebanon has banned all entry to travelers from Iran and coronavirus-hit
countries as a precautionary measure to contain the spread of the lethal virus,
the National News Agency (NNA) reported on Friday. The country restricted
entries via land, air, and sea to travelers from Iran, South Korea, Italy, and
China. However, citzens and foreigners who live in Lebanon will be excluded from
the ban, according to the NNA.The decision comes a day after the country
confirmed its third case of the coronavirus in a man who arrived from Iran on
February 24.
Lebanon Closes Educational Institutions as Precaution
against Coronavirus
Naharnet/February 28/2020
Education Minister Tarek al-Majzoub on Friday ordered the closure of all
educational institutions in the country for a week as a precaution against the
spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus. The minister said the decision was taken
"out of keenness on the health of students and their families, after
consultations this evening with Health Minister Dr. Hamad Hasan and as a
precautionary measure." Majzoub said the decision applies to all private and
public kindergartens, schools, secondary schools, vocational institutes and
universities, adding that the closure begins Saturday, Feb. 29 and ends on the
evening of Sunday, March 8. "The health developments would then be assessed to
take the appropriate decision. Through awareness and cooperation we can overcome
all crises," Mjazoub added. Lebanon had earlier on
Friday confirmed its fourth coronavirus case, identifying the person infected as
a Syrian woman. The woman along with two Lebanese women and an elderly Iranian
man are being quarantined at the Rafik Hariri state-run hospital. The first
three patients had arrived on two planes from Iran earlier this month.
Report: Hitti in Paris to Discuss Crisis
Naharnet/February 28/2020
Foreign Minister Nasif Hitti shall hold talks with his French counterpart Jean-Yve
Le Drian in Paris to discuss bilateral relations between Lebanon and France and
the much-needed support for the country’s ailing economy, media reports said on
Friday.
Hitti, on an official three-day visit to the French capital, will discuss the
monetary crisis in Lebanon and the country’s ailing economy in addition to the
daily sufferings of Lebanese with banks that imposed restrictions on cash
withdrawals and overseas transfers. A diplomatic source told Asharq al-Awsat
daily that “Hitti will expand his meetings to also include the Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Parliament and the Senate, and perhaps
create a lobby for members of both chambers to provide more support for Lebanon
at the level of public opinion.”
The source added that Hitti “will affirm the commitment of Diab’s government to
implement “structural reforms, strengthen the agriculture and productive sectors
and preserve the services sector.”
“Paris will not be the sole European capital that Hitti plans to visit,” said
the source.
Lebanon Suspends Travel from Virus Infected Countries, Exempts Residents
Naharnet/February 28/2020
Minister of Public Works and Transport Michel Najjar issued a statement on
Friday suspending travel to Lebanon from countries infected with the coronavirus
disease, the Minister’s media office said in a statement.
The statement said that Najjar decided to “suspend air, land, and sea travel for
individuals coming from China, South Korea, Iran, Italy and other,” and that
“Lebanese nationals and foreigners residing in Lebanon will be exempted” from
the decision. Lebanon could ban travel from other countries infected with the
virus when seen necessary by the ministerial committee tasked with following up
on precautionary measures against coronavirus, according to the statement.The
statement came in accordance with the Cabinet decision on Tuesday to restrict
travel to countries witnessing major coronavirus outbreaks and to order a halt
to pilgrimage trips.
Report: Foucher Requests an ‘Urgent’ Meeting with Diab
Naharnet/February 28/2020
French Ambassador to Lebanon Bruno Foucher reportedly asked for an “urgent”
meeting with Lebanon’s Prime Minister Hassan Diab to discuss “pressing” matters,
al-Joumhouria daily reported on Friday. The two are
set to meet today before noon, said the daily.
According to diplomatic sources, the French diplomat’s request to meet Diab
comes hours before Foreign Minister Nasif Hitti meets his French counterpart
Jean-Yves Le Drian in Paris, to discuss several issues including the ailing
monetary situation in Lebanon and its repercussions at various levels.
Lebanese in Nabatieh Demand Closing of Schools over Virus
Threat
Naharnet/February 28/2020
Lebanese in the southern town of Nabatieh rallied on Friday near the educational
directorate in their town demanding that schools be closed for a time period of
month over the deadly Coronavirus threat. Parents
fearing for their children’s health asked the authorities to suspend classes at
schools for one month. Lebanon has recorded three cases of the virus, two of
which are Lebanese women who had traveled aboard an Iranian plane earlier this
month from Qom in Iran. The third case is an Iranian man. Thousands of Lebanese,
mainly from the South, travel to Iran every year to visit Shiite holy sites in
Qom and other cities. The Rafik Hariri University
Hospital, a state-run hospital in Beirut, meanwhile announced Thursday that it
examined 40 people for the virus over the past 24 hours, keeping nine of them in
the coronavirus ward and asking the others to isolate themselves at home.
Beirut's Parking Meters: Where Does the Money Go?
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/February 28/2020
Every year the Lebanese capital's parking meters generate the equivalent of six
million dollars, but the municipality on whose soil most operate says it has yet
to see a penny. The case is just one to have sparked public anger in a country
rocked since October 17 by unprecedented anti-government protests. A source with
the borough claims that, under a 2004 deal with the Traffic Authority, a share
of the coins slipped into Beirut's parking meters are supposed to land in the
municipality's coffers. But "until now, the
municipality has not received anything," the source told AFP. During the mass
protests of recent months, the municipality filed a complaint with the Council
of State and obtained permission to choose an auditor to investigate the case.
"We want to know how much they earned each day, we want to know everything on
each and every pound," the source said. The municipality has also requested to
be put back in charge of the parking metres on its turf. Lebanese-American
consortium Duncan-Nead, operates some 900 meters in Greater Beirut under a
contract with the Traffic Authority. An employee at the company, who requested
to remain anonymous, said they generate an annual income of 10 billion Lebanese
pounds, or a little more than six million dollars.They were set up under a wider
transport plan for Greater Beirut, with funds from donors including the World
Bank.
Traffic light maintenance
Some have asked why the municipality is only now complaining, more than a decade
into the project under which the Traffic Authority was supposed to pay a
concession fee to the municipalities. But the source at the borough blamed
previous municipality officials who did not look into the matter, as well as
grinding bureaucracy. Until 2012, he said, the municipality didn't even have a
copy of the contract with the Traffic Authority and seemed to know little about
the deal. The Traffic Authority in November said money it collected from parking
meters was used to maintain the meters themselves as well as traffic lights,
surveillance cameras and electric road signs. Lebanese firm Nead is also in
charge of the upkeep of that equipment. But the Nead employee insists they won
the contract fair and square with a better tender than the competition. "Why
would our prices be 30 percent cheaper if there had been a political
intervention?" the employee asked. Lebanese broadcaster Al-Jadeed accused
shareholders at Duncan-Mead of having ties to political heavyweights in Lebanon.
The company employee inisted they were merely "a group of investors who
want to place their money to make a profit". He said the Traffic Authority is
using the parking meter income to finance its projects, including new parking
meters that have benefited Beirut municipality. To
support his claim, he produced a request from the Beirut municipality in 2015
for more parking meters, which he said the Traffic Authority financed. "With
what money? The parking meter money," he said.
Bassil Calls for Protecting Oil from Domestic Corruption,
Foreign Greed
Naharnet/February 28/2020
Free Patriotic Movement chief MP Jebran Bassil on Thursday called for protecting
Lebanon’s oil and gas resources from “domestic corruption and foreign
greed.”Reminiscing the efforts of ten years that eventually led to the launch of
offshore oil and gas drilling, Bassil said some parties “ridiculed” the endeavor
and voiced skepticism “but the dream has become reality.”
Noting that some had sought to “obstruct” the exploration efforts, Bassil
stressed in a tweet that “entire Lebanon will benefit” from the development.
Earlier in the day, President Michel Aoun inaugurated the country's first
offshore exploratory drilling for oil and gas, calling it a "historic day" for
cash-strapped Lebanon. Experts say it would be years
before the country could start extracting and reaping the benefits of any oil
found in its waters, should any be found.
Japan Sends Minister to Lebanon on Ghosn Case
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 28 February, 2020
A Japanese vice minister for justice is heading to Lebanon for talks on the case
of former Nissan Motor Co. executive Carlos Ghosn, who fled for his home country
late last year while out on bail awaiting trial. Justice Minister Masako Mori
said Friday that she was dispatching the official to Beirut to explain the
Japanese criminal justice system and improve cooperation. Hiroyuki Yoshiie will
leave Tokyo on Saturday and meet with Lebanese justice minister Albert Serhan on
Monday, Japan’s justice ministry said. "Regarding Lebanon, where Ghosn escaped
to, we believe that it is important that a proper understanding of the Japanese
criminal justice system is understood and to prevent international crime by
strengthening cooperation in the legal and judicial fields," Mori said.
Japan and Lebanon do not have an extradition treaty and it is thought unlikely
that Lebanon would agree to send Ghosn back to Japan to face trial. Mori
acknowledged that there were "various environments" and laws that underpin
different positions on the issue in each country.
Ghosn was arrested in late 2018 and is facing charges of underreporting income
and breach of trust. He says he is innocent. He led Nissan for nearly 20 years.\
Having spent months in detention and struggled to gain his release on bail under
stringent conditions, Ghosn said he fled in the belief he could not get a fair
trial in Japan. Ghosn said he fled to his childhood home of Lebanon to clear his
name. Lebanon does not have an extradition treaty with Japan. Ghosn returned to
Twitter late on Thursday for the first time in more than a month, soliciting
signatures for a petition for the release of fellow former-Nissan executive Greg
Kelly, who was arrested at the same time.
Geagea after Strong Republic bloc meeting urges government
to adopt comprehensive reform plan
NNA/Friday, 28 February, 2020
The Strong Republic parliamentary bloc held its periodic meeting under the
chairmanship of Lebanese Forces party leader, Samir Geagea, at the party's
headquarters in Maarab. Speaking at a press conference following the meeting,
Geagea called on the government to move towards a comprehensive reform plan
"because the people and the international and Arab communities must restore the
minimum level of confidence in the state."On the other hand, Geagea stressed
that Lebanon has the immunity to help itself out of its crisis if a good
management exists.
Geagea also stressed that the electricity dossier hugely impacts our country's
finances, pointing out that international companies have expressed readiness to
build power plants and provide alternatives at a price close to what the state
offers today. "However, some sides still insist on the existing policy in the
electricity dossier and temporary solutions, specifically the Turkish
power-generating ships," he noted.
The LF leader also indicated that the whole problem lies in managing the
country's public affairs.
Minister of Information: Decision to close schools to be
made within 48 hours
NNA/Friday, 28 February, 2020
Minister of Information Manal Abdel Samad said after the Baabda Cabinet session:
"President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, has informed the ministers of
the start of oil exploration, reiterating that yesterday was a historic day for
Lebanon."
On the issue of Eurobonds, she said: "We are studying all available options, and
we have not yet reached a decision in this regard. Anything contrary to that is
incorrect." "It is necessary to adopt a clear and transparent mechanism in the
appointment file, independently of all parties. Efficiency should be the only
criterion," she went on to say. "In the next 48 hours, a decision will be issued
by the Minister of Education on whether to close schools for a week, subject to
renewal, due to the coronavirus [spread]," Abdel Samad affirmed.
Ministers of Telecom and Health discuss health situation,
importance of awareness
NNA/Friday, 28 February, 2020
Minister of Telecommunications, Talal Hawat, met this Friday with Minister of
Health, Hamad Hassan, and tackled with him the current health situation in
Lebanon and the importance of spreading health awareness and enhancing
individual awareness during this phase.
Abdel Samad chairs National Audiovisual Council meeting
over electronic press situation
NNA/Friday, 28 February, 2020
Minister of Information Dr. Manal Abdel Samad Najed, on Friday chaired a meeting
of the National Audiovisual Council attended by electronic websites'
representatives, to discuss the situation of electronic press in Lebanon. The
meeting took place in the presence of the Council's Chairman Abdel Hadi Mahfouz,
Ministry Director General Dr. Hassan Falha, and Minister Abdel Samad's Advisor
Nourma Abu Zeid. Speaking during the meeting, Minister Abdel Samad highlighted
the crucial role played by social media in transmitting information, shedding
light on the importance of the quality of information and its impact on public
opinion. Given the weighty influence played by social media, the Minister urged
everyone to pass on accurate, truthful and objective information, stressing the
need for the transmission of info in a responsible manner. Dwelling on the role
of the Information Ministry, in particular, and media, in general, Abdel Samad
said: "We are reviewing the Ministry's structure and role, and based on this, we
will develop a strategic plan for the future."
"We also plan to work on a new modern media law to keep up with media
development," the Minister corroborated.
Lebanon's Ambassador to Italy tells NNA number of Coronavirus patients is high
'due to comprehensive survey of population'
NNA/Friday, 28 February, 2020
Lebanese Ambassador to Rome, Mira Daher, confirmed to the "National News Agency"
that she was holding continuous meetings with the Italian ministries of foreign
affairs and health, as well as with Rome airport authorities, over the novel
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the best means to protect the community
from it.She explained that the number of Coronavirus cases in Italy was very
high due to the fact that the authorities were conducting "a comprehensive
laboratory survey of the population", explaining that the virus kills the
elderly. "Coronavirus precautionary measures have prevented the death of a large
number of Italians with regular flu, which every year leads to the death of more
than 150 people, according to official statistics," the diplomat said, insisting
that travel to Italy should not be banned.
Ambassador Daher finally expressed readiness "to provide any service to the
Lebanese community in Italy."
Lebanon to close all schools in effort to thwart spread of
coronavirus
Paula Naoufal/Anahar/February 28/2020
Some officials also showed concern for a future rise in cases.
BEIRUT: The Ministry of Education has announced the closure of schools and
universities starting 29th of February till the 8th of March.
The decision to close educational establishments came after multiple
coronavirus cases were recorded in Lebanon. Some officials also showed concern
for a future rise in cases.
The media office of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education has issued
the following statement: "In the interest of the
health of students and their families, and after consulting this evening with
the Minister of Public Health Hamad Hassan, the Minister of Education Dr. Tarek
Al Majzoub, requests all educational institutions from kindergartens, schools,
high schools, vocational institutes, and universities to close starting from the
morning of Saturday, February 29, 2020 until Sunday, March 8, 2020."
“Further measures are to be taken in response to how the situation
develops,” the minister added. “With awareness and cooperation, we can overcome
the crises." Hassan Shamseddine, an interior design
student at AUL believes that this is a smart move from the government to prevent
a further possible outbreak of the coronavirus. Yet at the same time, he
believes the Ministry of Education should increase awareness campaigns and
further highlight the important of social responsibility.
Rawad Taha, a journalism student at LAU, said that the most important
aspect right now is for people to have social responsibility.
“We also need stricter measures at all ports of entry and the Ministry of
Health should prepare more than just one center for the treatment of the virus,”
he said. Hiba Orabi, a biology graduate from LAU, a
current pharmacy student at BAU and an intern at the military hospital in
Beirut, said school closings might prove belated in stopping a virus noting that
the “the damage has been done. ““This step should have been taken when the first
case was recorded and they should’ve started with these restrictions from the
airport ... and although this step might decrease the number of suspected corona
cases," she told Annahar.
Lebanese loyalty should be to state, not Hezbollah
خالد أبو ظهر: الولاء يجب
أن يكون للدولة اللبنانية وليس لحزب الله
Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab news/February 28/2020
As the entire world looks for ways to cope with the coronavirus outbreak, in
what seems destined to be a pandemic that threatens not only the health and
well-being of millions but also the entire global economy, Hezbollah-affiliated
Lebanese pilgrims returning from Iran have reportedly refused state quarantine
instructions, insisting they are part of a conspiracy against Tehran.
Meanwhile, as an International Monetary Fund (IMF) technical team visited
Lebanon to give advice about debt restructuring and the necessary reforms, Naim
Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy leader who has no official state position, stated in
the name of Lebanon that “we will not accept submitting to (imperialist)
tools.”These two seemingly unrelated events are in fact very revealing of how
Hezbollah sees the world. They underline that the militia is not willing to make
any concessions to try and get Lebanon out of difficult situations, whether
economic or even threatening to the well-being of the citizens of the country.
They will only do what is in Iran’s interest.
These events also clearly show that Hezbollah not only undermines the state, but
it encourages the Shiite community to disrespect state institutions too. This
constant parallel stance, with Hezbollah and its supporters rebelling against
state positions, makes the nation-building process difficult — if not impossible
— for Lebanon. To make things worse, Hezbollah also encourages, even forces, its
community to have total blind loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
I cannot help but wonder what is needed to bring those that support Hezbollah
out of their rebellious stance against everything the state represents. How can
we work together to bring them within the state’s confines and ensure they
respect the state and its institutions and abide by its laws? How can their
loyalty be first and only to the Lebanese state, not an armed militia and its
foreign leader?
Every sectarian community in Lebanon seems to have gone through this phase of
supporting an external ideology, belief or leader above their own country. Yet
the majority of citizens have ended up renouncing this and committing to the
Lebanese flag. It is time for those who support Hezbollah to do the same. If
this country is to survive, every citizen — regardless of their religious or
social background — needs to respect the state and its institutions. More
importantly, the Lebanese state should have a monopoly on its leaders and
citizens’ loyalty. There should be an exclusive and unbreakable loyalty to the
state.
This is difficult to achieve when Hezbollah is disseminating false information,
creating what can best be described as an alternate reality. It is doing what
Tehran requires, which is exporting the regime’s Islamist revolution. This
requires an exclusive and unique loyalty to the supreme leader.
This alternate reality applies to everything and resembles the propaganda
messages of the ruthless regimes of the last century. Iran is depicted as
invincible — no army or virus can bring it down. The whole world might crumble,
but Iran will prosper. Obviously, Iran is in complete denial and has alternate
“imaginary” views about everything — the coronavirus, its economic situation,
its military capacity, etc. The only reality is the violent repression it is
willing to inflict to crush any dissent, including on the community it falsely
claims to protect. Therefore, in Lebanon, the army also needs to break free and
shield all communities from oppression.
If this country is to survive, every citizen — regardless of their religious or
social background — needs to respect the state and its institutions.
Today, all Lebanese citizens need to participate in a true nation-building
effort, regardless of their religion. There is, among all sectarian groups, a
tendency to hide behind their “own” whenever there is a need for a favor or an
exemption. This has been too easily exploited by sectarian leaders, who portray
themselves as the only and last resort for their community. Hezbollah, through
its social and health services and, above all, its military, has exacerbated
this situation; making it easy for its supporters to reject the state and what
it represents.
In the face of the pilgrims refusing state-imposed quarantine and Hezbollah’s
stance toward the IMF, the Lebanese institutions cannot do anything or use their
legitimate and constitutional role; they can only look the other way for fear of
Hezbollah’s violent reaction. Once again, the state comes out weakened and
humiliated, on the brink of disappearance and putting all its citizens in
danger. This needs to stop.
*Khaled Abou Zahr is CEO of Eurabia, a media and tech company. He is also the
editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.
The Rampant Corruption that Sparked Lebanon’s Protests
Mohamed Azakir/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 28/2020
The Lebanese government had frozen recruitment but then, around the time of a
key election, thousands of people suddenly landed civil servant jobs. The
alleged corruption case is just one of many stirring public anger in Lebanon,
where protesters are calling out rampant graft they say has brought the economy
to its knees, Agence France Presse reported Friday.
Cronyism in the public sector, bribes, conflicts of interest and dodgy
procurement deals -- Lebanese have been angrily detailing their complaints in
waves of mass protests since October, crying out that enough is enough.
The authorities have said they are determined to root out corruption, and state
prosecutors frequently say they have launched a probe or questioned an official.
But experts and protesters are skeptical. How, they ask, are they expected to
believe in change from leaders who benefit from the system and whose interest is
to preserve it? In August 2017, Lebanon passed a law to halt all recruitment in
the public sector.
But after that decision and through 2018, more than 5,000 people were taken on
in murky circumstances, a source at the oversight body for public
administrations said.
That period coincided with the country's first parliamentary election in nine
years. "It's buying votes," says Assaad Thebian, who heads the anti-graft
non-governmental organization Gherbal Initiative. "When you give someone a job,
you're buying their loyalty and that of their relatives," he said.
Lebanese media have also accused key political parties of arranging hundreds of
illegal employments at state-owned telecommunications firm Ogero in 2017 and
2018. Anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International said in December that
almost one in two Lebanese had been offered a bribe for a vote.
Parliament's finance committee investigated 5,000 hirings, and the file has been
transmitted to the Court of Audit. Committee chairman MP Ibrahim Kenaan said it
was not his place to analyze what had happened.
"But logically, it's a political issue," he said. "It was a period of elections.
Maybe it was easy to just provide someone with a job. "Maybe it's to do with...
people being used to no one being held accountable."But the lawmaker, who
represents the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun, now under fire
for its record in power, said things would change. "Now there's accountability
-- at least we're trying," he said. Laws are being drafted to prevent illicit
enrichment and retrieve stolen public funds, Kenaan said.
But anti-graft activist Thebian warns political will is lacking. "It's strange
that a state that wants to battle corruption has not yet fired a single civil
servant, tried a single minister or official," he said. Protesters say they are
fed up with a political class dominated for decades by the same powerful
families who also pull strings in business.
As they are hit by an acute liquidity crisis and price hikes, they ask how they
can trust a political elite with ties to the banking sector.
Lebanon is weighed down by a huge public debt, most owed to local banks
benefiting from high interest rates. "The major problem is conflict of interest
-- perceived or actual," said Jad Chaaban, an economics professor at the
American University of Beirut.
"There is no way that you, as a minister or prime minister or member of
parliament, can act against the interest of the institution that you have
shareholding in."
Critics say corruption extends to public procurement.
Another source at the oversight commission claims the government "meddles" by
drawing up invitations to tender with "conditions only met by a single company".
Similar complaints have been made about the Council for Development and
Reconstruction and the Southern Council.
Engineers' syndicate head Jad Tabet said the political class was "sharing the
cake" through opaque construction deals. It is done "through attributing big
construction projects to entrepreneurs linked to these political forces", he
said. In its Corruption Perceptions Index for 2019, Transparency International
ranks Lebanon 137 out of 180 countries.
Even in the private sector, activists say businessmen use their political
connections to skirt legislation for their benefit. On a beach in Beirut, for
example, the Eden Bay resort has drawn crowds in recent months to protest
against illegal encroachment on the public waterfront.
Tabet says he filed a report denouncing eight infractions by the developers,
Achour Holding, at the request of the president in 2017. They included building
on the public shoreline, and falsifying a topographic study to maximize
buildable area when requesting a building permit, he said. But Achour Holding's
lawyer, Bahij Abou Mjahed, insists construction was legal. "There isn't a single
executive, judicial, oversight or security body that hasn't examined the Eden
Bay case," he said. "If we have committed a violation, take us to
court."Environmental activists complained to the State Council, who briefly
suspended construction in 2017. But then it backed down, and the resort opened
the following year. "Despite the pressure, this man was able to get away with
it," Tabet says, referring to the businessman behind Ashour Holding.
"He seems to have connections almost everywhere."
Lebanon About to Legalize Cannabis Cultivation
Caroline Akoum/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 28/2020 -
Cannabis cultivation for medical and industrial use is about to be legalized
based on a draft law approved by the parliamentary committees on Wednesday and
referred to Parliament for adoption.
While the proposal specified that the cultivation of cannabis would be solely
targeted for medical and industrial purposes and would be governed by relevant
regulations and laws, some parties warned against the negative repercussions
that such a decision might entail, due to the lack of law enforcement and the
political reality in Lebanon.
In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Agriculture Minister Abbas Mortada stressed that
there was a detailed study on the returns of cannabis legislation, which was
recommended by the US McKinsey plan on developing the Lebanese economy. The
study estimates that this industry could generate one billion USD annually to
the state treasury.
“The Bekaa Valley is considered one of the best lands for cultivating cannabis,
which is classified among the finest species in the world, and it does not
contain more than 1 percent of narcotic substance,” he said.
Every thousand meters produces 250 kilograms of cannabis flower, according to
estimates provided by the minister. “If we sell a kilo for fifty dollars, we
would support the Lebanese farmers and secure a great return for the state; but
if we go towards establishing factories and pharmaceutical plants, then the
profits will double, in addition to the possibility that this law would push
foreign companies to invest in Lebanon with the aim of manufacturing drugs,”
Mortada explained.
Researcher Mohammed Shamseddine, for his part, said that the area of cultivated
land in the Bekaa was estimated at about three or four thousand hectares, which
is likely to increase significantly with the cannabis legalization. “Every
thousand square meters of cannabis is estimated at about USD 20,000, i.e. times
the return of any other agriculture,” he remarked.
Shamseddine, however, stressed that the legalization “does not mean controlling
this trade, which may be exacerbated if it is not accompanied by close
monitoring and enforcement of laws.”
He went on to say that based on the areas currently cultivated with “hashish”
(cannabis), the income of farmers is estimated at about USD 600 million, while
for merchants it may reach two billion or more. He also noted that the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime had ranked Lebanon as the third major source
of hashish in the world for 2018 after Afghanistan and Morocco. On the other
hand, the president of the National Health Authority, former deputy Ismail
Sukariyeh, questions the financial returns of cannabis legislation, warning at
the same time against exploiting it in the absence of the state and the
prevailing political and sectarian quotas. “Based on my experience in the
medical field, in a worn-out country that does not apply laws, the cannabis
cultivation legislation will lead to transgressions from some hospitals and
medical agencies, in addition to a monopoly on their export,” he warned.
Lebanese cannabis has long been a thriving industry during the civil war, and
its returns were estimated at millions of dollars before the state decided to
prohibit it and prevent its cultivation. Since then, around 30,000 people were
arrested for their involvement in its production, smuggling, and trade, amid
broken promises to secure alternative crops that would secure returns for the
residents of the Bekaa.
Lebanon needs early elections to regain legitimacy
Ryan Bohl/Al Arabiya/February 28/2020
Recent US sanctions on Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the prospect of more to come –
are only piling on problems for Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s Hezbollah-backed
government. It has becoming increasingly clear early elections are needed for
Lebanon to start down a legitimate path to reform.
The March 8 electoral alliance that backs Diab, which includes Hezbollah and its
fellow Shia party Amal, has so far done little to tick the boxes that would lead
Lebanon to stability. They have insufficient support from the protest movement.
Being Iran-affiliated, they have no foreign allies willing or able to provide
new economic lifelines – and they are now incurring the increasing sanctions
wrath of the United States in its anti-Iran regional campaign, with the most
recent sanctions coming on February 26. And Hezbollah has proved an obstacle to
much-needed International Monetary Fund management of the economic crisis. The
Shia group said it does not oppose Lebanon seeking the IMF’s advice, but it is
against the fund managing Lebanon’s financial crisis.
In addition to mismanagement, Diab’s government no longer represents the
opinions of the Lebanese people, who last cast their vote under very different
circumstances on May 6, 2018. Then, the Lebanese sectarian system seemed
unassailable, even tilting toward Hezbollah and the Shia parties. Now, thanks to
a long-coming economic crisis, a months-long protest movement nationwide has
demonstrated that the Lebanese are interested in new approaches, new faces, and
new politics. Established parties, from former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s
Sunni Future Movement to the once-untouchable Hezbollah and Amal parties, have
come under sustained criticism from within their own sects. The Future
Movement’s implosion was already cemented by the May 6 election results, where
they did poorly. But Hezbollah and Amal had to wait until the current economic
crisis began in earnest and the protest movement evolved before they too became
the target of anti-establishment sentiment. This intra-sectarian criticism is
new and reflects an evolution of Lebanese public opinion that no government of
the March 8 or March 14 blocs, or the combination thereof, can truly represent.
These alliances and their leaders have largely served their purpose – they came
about in the aftermath of Rafic Hariri’s assassination, an event that nearly
drove Lebanon back to civil war. March 14 and March 8 managed to work out a
political compromise that prevented that slide, but they have achieved little
else. Instead, they have engendered corruption and enabled foreign interference.
Moreover, deep austerity is coming to Lebanon, regardless of the government. It
can be managed austerity, supported by international organizations and allies to
ensure that, while painful, it at least is driven by a plan. Or it can be
uncontrolled austerity, imposed by economic conditions upon Lebanon, with
nothing but the most difficult path forward. In the latter case, Lebanon’s
security situation will become increasingly precarious, as protestors target
banks and the parties they blame for their misery. Meanwhile, militias and
politicians scheme to prevent a chaotic austerity from undercutting their own
influence and wealth.
Austerity will be painful, but new elections will at least force politicians to
campaign on how they will manage its inevitability. That will both beholden them
to their voters, and allow voters a stake of responsibility in the final outcome
as the difficult times begin to unfold. New elections could also produce new
leaders able to offset the increasing US sanctions campaign against Hezbollah,
preventing the US from causing further harm to an already difficult situation,
especially if new elections could produce a government that isn’t so clearly
beholden to Hezbollah.
Lebanon is rapidly running out of time before the economic and security
situations begin to deteriorate beyond Beirut’s ability to manage them. To help
start the path upward, Lebanese need a chance to break out of the pre-crisis
sectarian system and put the country toward a more sustainable path.
Lebanon must manage expectations as offshore drilling
begins
Diana Kaissy/Al Arabiya/February 28/2020
February 27, 2020, marked the first day for drilling for oil and gas in
Lebanon’s offshore block number 4. And all hopes are hanging on the results from
Byblos – the name given to the well. This is the first well to be drilled, ever,
in Lebanon’s offshore exclusive economic zone.
While I have to confess that excitement and anticipation are running through my
veins, I also have to be candid and say that feelings of apprehension and
caution are also present.
Yes, Lebanon will be drilling its first offshore exploratory well, but this is
the first step taken on a long and unpredictable road. Exploitation of natural
resources, as experienced by so many other countries is a lengthy process often
etched with a high number of uncertainties, bad luck, volatilities, and fickle
geopolitical games. But it is also ordained by some rare, yet great beautiful
journeys.
Since 2010, the Lebanese state has been pushing forward on the development of
this nascent oil and gas sector. With substantial support from the Norwegian
government, Lebanon has been able to benefit from a number of good practices and
international experiences.
Civil society has also been quite active, especially in ensuring that certain
necessary transparency and accountability measures are adopted. Organizations
have successfully advocated for contract disclosures, ratification of
transparency laws, and adjustments of certain regulations, assessments, and
policies. Additionally, civil society organizations in Lebanon have played a
major role in leveraging the citizens’ awareness around key issues related to
the sector.
But the key to ensuring that we continue developing this sector in a sound
manner is that we do not “cherry-pick” from the bowl of best practices. Indeed,
we should also be wary of not eclectically choosing which bad practices to
avoid.
The headlines for this phase of offshore drilling should be “managing
expectations.”
Lebanon is not yet an oil-rich country. It is definitely not an oil-producing
country. Lebanon is drilling the first offshore well where there is no more than
25 percent chance for making a discovery. The process of turning any discovery
into revenue is a long one that should be regarded with patience and wisdom by
the state and citizens.
In many countries with weak political institutions, such as Lebanon, economic
growth begins to decline before oil or gas is produced – a phenomenon called
pre-source curse.
Ghana is a famous example of the pre-source curse. Between 2007 and 2013 Ghana
had steady economic growth that averaged 7 percent. Though the African nation
first found oil in the 1970s, it wasn’t until this period that Ghana made a
major offshore oil discovery. Ghana’s president John Kufuor proclaimed, “Even
without oil we are doing well… With oil as a shot in the arm, we are going to
fly.”
A fast forward to today shows that Ghana is not flying. Besides experiencing a
drop in growth drop to 4 percent, the discovery and the mismanagement of
expectations has ushered economically imprudent behaviors exhibited through
heavy borrowing and excessive spending.
Another challenge was Ghana’s exposure to the oil price crash in 2014. A new
government took over in 2017 but the crisis continues. Lebanon should learn from
Ghana’s experience and manage its expectations.
Post-revolution Lebanon is witnessing an economic and financial meltdown. With
no robust fiscal rules, a lack of economic and fiscal reforms and an
unprecedented level of corruption, the economy is crashing. The jubilation at
the start of drilling or even a discovery that may happen in a year or more
should not prompt a borrowing spree, in a re-run of the reform-driven loans
promised by donors at the 2018 CEDRE conference, that are yet to materialize.
Mozambique is another bad model. After discovering quantities of gas offshore,
the government started an huge program of borrowing. Today, it is experiencing a
devastating economic regression.
Lebanon now must focus on the much needed economic, fiscal and political reforms
that will help it have a soft landing. Anti-corruption laws need to be passed.
Current transparency laws need to be implemented. Transparency and
accountability measures should be followed.
The government should hold open parliamentary committee sessions where citizens
could observe and engage constructively to support the reforms. People need a
seat at the table and not fed with false hopes that only serve to fuel political
victories.
Drilling is happening and exploration will take time. Let us stop day-dreaming
about the magic wand we think we discovered and come back to Earth. The state
needs to focus on the reforms that need to be implemented so that Lebanon’s
future generations may experience a resource blessing, instead of a curse.
October's Meeting': Together to Get Back The Abducted State
Hanna Saleh/Asharq Al Awsat/February 28/2020
A hundred years since Greater Lebanon was announced. 76 years since the Lebanese
Republic gained its independence. 45 years of civil wars, occupations, and lack
of social stability.
135 days have passed since the start of the revolution to restore dignity and
end decades of violations. Citizens are now facing a challenge: Either the
corrupt confessional system remains or the abducted state is retrieved and the
constitution is respected, achieving the October 17 Revolution’s most pertinent
aim to establish a state of human rights, rule of law, transparency,
accountability, and protection of freedom.
The political class that is clinging onto the traditions of power and is
dependent on the axis of resistance has put the Lebanese infront of a dangerous
sample of mafia-like behavior, putting the citizen at risk of death, either by
starvation after the country was looted and impoverished, or by the Coronavirus!
Maintaining flights between Beirut and Tehran has political reasons according to
the Hezbollah-affiliated Minister of Health, making dependency more important
than the state's priority of the general health of citizens.
On the other hand, the revolution is ongoing and every day it recruits new
damaged groups of people who have an interest in change. Even if they have not
said their final word yet, they have at least confirmed that after October 17 it
is impossible for the sectarian system to continue. The revolution has provided
a foundational moment for the establishment of a modern state that would bring
back the republic and its values and allow citizens to build a democratic regime
that's immune from fear, racism, and sectarianism, on the dead remains of a
confessional system condemned to them under illegitimate arms.
The citizenship-oriented public opinion that has risen to prominence was
expressed by the courage of the squares to strip naked the sectarian alliance
and shed light on confusions and atrocities, affirming the need for political
change. This is the alternative that the revolutionary public opinion has
expressed, on one hand, as a passageway to retrieve rights, and on the other, to
remove Lebanon from the regional conflict that has disturbed it in defense of
the Iranian Mullah-regime, burdening it with policies that serve none of
Lebanon’s interests.
The revolution is here. Let us all remember that what motivated it is actually a
rightful demand, triggered by the notorious decision to impose a monthly 6 US
dollars tax on Whatsapp. This was the tipping point that revealed the impact of
the chronic accumulation of violations of human rights and dignities for thirty
long years. From the start, Hezbollah’s response was to accuse people of treason
and claim that the revolution is targeting its weapons. The movement expanded
alongside an ignorance of the real reasons behind people taking to the street,
with the accelerated collapse of the Lebanese Pound against the US dollar, with
the former losing around 75% of its value, drastically reducing purchasing
power, leading to the collapse of institutions, spread of unemployment and the
exposure of the banking cartels that smuggled money and humiliated depositors.
The regime did not show any sign of concern for people’s interests. Until today,
it has not held a single meeting with those who were damaged by the disaster
that has struck Lebanon. All meetings held under the headline of confronting the
crisis were held with those who caused the crisis, to begin with, showing the
foolishness of those in power and their undermining of people’s suffering.
The means to confront the situation revealed that it was impossible to achieve
the bare minimum of the demands. It was therefore natural for the revolution to
escalate in demanding the inevitable reformation of the regime. It became
apparent that the revolutionary movement insisted on real change and that
gateway to this change is a government independent of the sectarian parties that
caused the crisis, with a conviction that the persistence of this sectarian
confessional system will allow the mafias in power to continue looting and
making profitable deals.
In parallel, activists, and groups involved in the revolution from diverse
backgrounds and with diverse experiences held discussions on directions that
would solidify the revolutionary course and the developments in the choices of
confrontation. This necessitates that they enter a new organizational stage that
conforms with what October 17 stands for as an end to the confessional system
and a step toward an alternative model that births a new republic. This
culminated in establishing the “October Meeting” as a political group that has
put before it the task to “contribute to the process of radical and
comprehensive change that would allow for a better life demanded by the
Lebanese, especially the new generation”.
The “October Meeting” that was announced on Sunday, February 23, with wide-based
trans-sectarian and trans-regional national participation, affirmed that it saw
its role at the heart of the groups who want to invest the capacities of the
Lebanese society in order to achieve political change and a “new social contract
between the Lebanese that unites them in moving toward a modern civil and
democratic state that is based on human rights”. In this context, a unified law
for personal status is of particular importance, as well as the implementation
of Article 95 of the Constitution that stipulates the elimination of
sectarianism paving the way for a new class of independent politicians that
represent the spirit of revolution and its principles. The “October Meeting”
that was born in the squares of confrontation and from the womb of the
revolution, will be put under a microscope, followed, critiqued and held
accountable. If it really did represent a surplus of diversity, expertise, and
national inclusiveness, then it will face a challenge to unite efforts and to
contribute to coordinating and innovating the forms of confrontation. It needs
to urge the rebels to highlight what they have in common, and indeed they have
much, during the foundational stage- set at 6 months, toward the establishment
of a political front that has no place for the orphans of the axis of
resistance, to retrieve the abducted state.
The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on February 28-29/2020
Canada strongly condemns targeting of
civilians in northwestern Syria
February 28, 2020 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the
Honourable Karina Gould, Minister of International Development, today issued the
following statement:
“Canada condemns in the strongest terms the deliberate attacks targeting
civilians, schools, medical personnel and health-care facilities now occurring
in Idlib, Syria. These ongoing attacks on innocent civilians by the Syrian
regime, its supporters and foreign facilitators must end. The violence has had a
disastrous impact on civilians, killing more than 298 since January 1, 2020, and
displacing almost 950,000 since December 1, 2019. “Canada calls for an immediate
ceasefire in the area and for all parties to respect basic human decency and
ensure full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in need.
“We remain steadfast in our commitment to supporting experienced humanitarian
partners on the ground that are addressing humanitarian needs in Syria and the
region. “Canada also supports the UN Secretary-General’s recent call for a
political solution to end the humanitarian crisis currently unfolding. Only a
negotiated political solution can generate a sustainable, peaceful end to the
Syrian conflict.”
Four Iranian MPs test positive for coronavirus
Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English/Friday, 28 February 2020
The number of Iranian parliamentarians infected with coronavirus has risen to
four, MP Mohammad Ali Vakili told the official IRNA news agency on
Friday. Thirty-four people have died so far in Iran due to coronavirus,
according to the health ministry’s spokesman Kianush Jahanpour. The total number
of people diagnosed with the disease is 388, he said in an announcement on state
TV. At the same time, MP Mohammad Ali Vakili said that four out of 30 MPs whose
results have come back have tested positive for coronavirus. MPs Mahmoud Sadeghi
and Mojtaba Zolnour had previously announced that they have been infected with
coronavirus. Vakili did not name the other two MPs who have also been
infected. “It is possible that the number of infected MPs will increase because
so far we only know about the test results for 30,” Vakili told the official
IRNA news agency. Iranian Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Masoumeh
Ebtekar as well as Deputy Health Minister Iraj Harirchi had also previously
tested positive for coronavirus.
Iran’s former envoy to Vatican Hadi Khosroshahi dies of coronavirus
Al Arabiya English/Friday, 28 February 2020
Iran’s former Ambassador to Vatican Sayyed Hadi Khosroshahi has died on Thursday
of the novel coronavirus infection, Iranian news media, including the official
IRNA news agency reported. Khosroshahi had been hospitalized in Tehran's Masih
Daneshvari hospital on Wednesday. Khosrowshahi was a prominent figure in the Qom
seminary and was a representative of Ayatollah Khomeini in the Ministry of
Islamic Guidance after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. After two
years became the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic to the Vatican.
US watching ‘closely’ to see if Iran tries to undermine peace in Afghanistan
AFP, Washington/Friday, 28 February 2020
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Friday warned Iran not to scuttle an
upcoming agreement with the Taliban, accusing the US adversary of seeking to be
a “spoiler.”Pompeo confirmed that a one-week partial truce was holding with the
Taliban, who are scheduled to sign the landmark accord with the United States in
Qatar on Saturday. “There is a history of Iran engaging in activity inside of
Afghanistan to act as a spoiler,” Pompeo told the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. “We’ve seen just these last six days a significant reduction in
violence in Afghanistan and we are watching closely to see if the Islamic
Republic of Iran begins to take even more active measure that undermine our
efforts at peace and reconciliation,” he said. He warned that Iran could
increase risks for US troops, whose numbers are expected to be sharply scaled
down under the Doha agreement.
Iran death toll from coronavirus reaches 210: BBC Persian
Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English/Friday, 28 February 2020 A The number of
deaths across Iran from the outbreak of the novel coronavirus is at least 210,
BBC Persian reported citing its sources from hospitals in Iran.The capital
Tehran has had the most deaths so far from the outbreak followed by the city of
Qom, BBC Persian said in its report. The death toll from coronavirus in Iran is
“much higher” than the official death toll, Iranian MP Gholamali Jafarzadeh
Imenabadi said on Friday, adding that he has documented “horrific numbers” from
cemeteries in his city Rasht in northern Iran.
Coronavirus death toll in Iran ‘much higher’ than what govt says: MP
Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English/Friday, 28 February 2020
The death toll from coronavirus in Iran is “much higher” than the official death
toll, Iranian MP Gholamali Jafarzadeh Imenabadi said on Friday, adding that he
has documented “horrific numbers” from cemeteries in his city Rasht in northern
Iran. The official death toll in Iran has risen to 34 and the total number of
confirmed cases to 388 as of Friday. Imenabadi urged authorities to provide the
real statistics, saying that officials “repeatedly hide statistics from the
public.”
“I say this explicitly, the statistics presented so far are not true,” he said.
Imenabadi said he has received reports from cemeteries about the death toll from
coronavirus that reveal “horrific numbers” that cannot be concealed. “It is not
as if we can hide the cemeteries,” he said. “I have statistics about the number
of deaths due to coronavirus from three different cemeteries in Rasht and I have
to say that the numbers are much higher than what is being said,” Imenabadi
added. Another MP from Qom had previously said that 50 people had died from
coronavirus in his city alone. It is “mandatory” to quarantine cities where
coronavirus has spread, Imenabadi said, adding that the Supreme National
Security Council has opposed the idea. Government officials, including President
Hassan Rouhani, have rejected calls and requests to quarantine Qom, the holy
Shia city believed to be the main source of the coronavirus outbreak across Iran
and neighboring countries. At the same time, a member of the city council of
Tehran has estimated the number of people infected with coronavirus in Iran to
be as high as 15,000. “The number of people infected with coronavirus across the
country could be between 10,000 to 15,000,” the semi-official ILNA news agency
quoted the head of the city council's health committee Nahid Khodakarami as
saying on Friday.
16 Syrian troops, militiamen killed in Turkish retaliation:
Monitor
AFP, Beirut/Friday, 28 February 2020
The retaliatory drone and artillery strikes hit Syria army positions in southern
and eastern parts of the province which were recaptured by the government in a
nearly three-month-old offensive against the rebel enclave, the Britain-based
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.
There was no immediate confirmation from Damascus of the reported deaths or any
comment on the flare-up with Ankara that prompted NATO to call an urgent meeting
of its ruling council for later Friday.
NATO Holds Urgent Talks as World Condemns Idlib Violence
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 28 February, 2020
NATO's ruling council will meet Friday for urgent talks on the Syria crisis
after at least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike blamed on
Damascus. "The North Atlantic Council, which includes the ambassadors of all 29
NATO allies, will meet on Friday 28 February following a request by Turkey to
hold consultations under article 4 of NATO’s founding Washington Treaty on the
situation in Syria," the alliance said in a statement. The United Nations on
Thursday called for urgent action in northwest Syria, warning that "the risk of
greater escalation grows by the hour." "The Secretary-General reiterates his
call for an immediate ceasefire and expresses particular concern about the risk
to civilians from escalating military actions," spokesman Stephane Dujarric said
in a statement. "Without urgent action, the risk of even greater escalation
grows by the hour." The statement came after the 33 Turkish soldiers were killed
in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib, as violence escalates in the
already chaotic region. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was following the
situation with "grave concern," Dujarric said. "The Secretary-General reiterates
that there is no military solution to the Syrian conflict," he said, calling for
a UN-facilitated peace process. The United States demanded that the Syrian
regime and its ally Russia end their "despicable" operation in Idlib and vowed
to support Ankara. "We stand by our NATO ally Turkey and continue to call for an
immediate end to this despicable offensive by the Assad regime, Russia and
Iranian-backed forces," a State Department spokesperson said. "We are looking at
options on how we can best support Turkey in this crisis." Reacting earlier to
preliminary reports on the killing of the Turkish soldiers, Kay Bailey
Hutchison, the US ambassador to NATO, said the incident amounted to a "huge
change." NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg condemned "indiscriminate" airstrikes by
the Assad regime and Russia, his spokesman said Friday. Stoltenberg “called on
them to stop their offensive, to respect international law and to back UN
efforts for a peaceful solution.”The NATO chief made his stance in a call with
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu. "He urged all parties to deescalate
this dangerous situation and avoid further worsening of the horrendous
humanitarian situation in the region,” Stoltenberg’s spokesman said.
Death toll of Turkish soldiers killed in Syria in February
alone reaches 53
AFP/Friday, 28 February 2020
The latest casualties bring to 53 the number of Turkish troops killed in Syria
this month alone after 33 soldiers were killed on Thursday in the battleground
northwestern province of Idlib. Turkey reprised and killed 20 Syrian soldiers
later on Friday with drone and artillery strikes hitting Syrian army positions
in southern and eastern parts of the province which were recaptured by the
government in a nearly three-month-old offensive against the enclave, the Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights said. At least 16 regime fighters died in those
strikes, while another four were killed by artillery fire on positions in
neighboring Aleppo province, the Observatory added. Also on Friday in Idlib,
four members of a single family, two of them children, were killed in
airstrikes, according to the Britain-based monitor, which relies on a network of
sources inside Syria. There was no immediate confirmation from Damascus of the
reported troop deaths or any comment on the flare-up with Ankara that prompted
NATO to call an urgent meeting of its ruling council. The alliance later Friday
offered solidarity and support to Turkey but no pledges of concrete new measures
to defend Ankara’s forces. Turkey had said it retaliated “from the air and
ground” for the deaths of the 33 soldiers, Ankara’s biggest single loss of
personnel by far since it launched its intervention in Syria in 2016. The deadly
strike comes after weeks of growing tension between Turkey and Russia – the main
foreign brokers in the Syrian conflict.
Top Russian, US generals discuss Syria amid tensions:
Report
Reuters, Moscow/Friday, 28 February 2020
The heads of the Russian and US general staffs discussed the situation in Syria
in a phone call on Friday amid mounting tensions over the province of Idlib, the
Interfax news agency cited Russia’s Defense Ministry as saying. The phone call
came after the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in a strike by Syrian government
forces in Syria’s northwestern Idlib region on Thursday.Russia is a close ally
of the Syrian government. Turkey and the US are members of NATO.
US offered to help Iran with responding to coronavirus:
Pompeo
Reuters, Washington/Friday, 28 February 2020
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Friday the United States has offered
to help with the coronavirus response in Iran, where the outbreak has killed 34
people, and raised doubts about Tehran’s willingness to share information. In a
hearing at House Foreign Affairs Committee, Pompeo said the Islamic Republic did
not have a solid healthcare infrastructure.
Moscow urges Ankara to protect Russian citizens in Turkey:
Report
Reuters, Moscow/Friday, 28 February 2020
The Kremlin said on Friday that Moscow hoped Turkey would do everything to
protect Russian nationals and Russia’s diplomatic facilities in Turkey amid
mounting tensions over Syria, the RIA news agency reported.
The comments followed the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in a strike by Syrian
government forces in Syria’s northwestern Idlib region on Thursday. Russia is a
close ally of the Syrian government. President Vladimir Putin met Russia's
Security Council on Friday to discuss Syria and said that Turkish troops should
not be positioned outside their observation posts in Syria's Idlib, the Kremlin
was quoted as saying.
EU fears all-out war over Syria conflict
AFP, Brussels/Friday, 28 February 2020
The EU is worried that the situation in Syria, where dozens of Turkish troops
were killed by regime air strikes, could descend into all-out war, foreign
policy chief Josep Borrell tweeted on Friday.
“There is a risk of sliding into a major open international military
confrontation. It is also causing unbearable humanitarian suffering and putting
civilians in danger,” he said. The EU urged a rapid de-escalation and “will
consider all necessary measures to protect its security interests,” he said,
adding that the bloc was in contact with “all relevant actors.”
Greece blocks migrants at border after Turkey says it will
let refugees into Europe
Agencies/Friday, 28 February 2020
Greece will not tolerate any illegal entries of migrants through its borders and
will increase its border security, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said on
Friday. Migrants and refugees started gathering at the Greek-Turkish land border
after Turkey warned that it would let out thousands of refugees stuck in the
country since a 2016 accord between Ankara and the European Union. In a tweet
Mitsotakis said Greece "does not bear any responsibility for the tragic events
in Syria and will not suffer the consequences of decisions taken by others."
Greek border guards on Friday blocked hundreds of migrants from entering the
country, police said, hours after Turkey announced it would no longer hold them
back from Europe. The head of Greece’s general staff and the minister for police
were dispatched to the area as the government said it had “tightened” border
vigilance “to the maximum level possible.”
Fears over Constitutional Vacuum after Iraq Parliament
Postpones Confidence Vote
Baghdad - Hamza Mustafa/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 28 February, 2020
-
The Iraqi parliament’s failure to approve the government of Prime
Minister-designate Mohammed Allawi has threatened to prolong the country’s
months-long crisis and create a constitutional vacuum. Parliament Speaker
Mohammed al-Halbousi adjourned on Thursday a session to approve the cabinet
proposed by Allawi because of a lack of quorum, after lawmakers who opposed his
nominees boycotted the session. Halbousi set another session for Saturday.
Allawi failed on Thursday to convince the 329-member parliament to have quorum
for a vote of confidence on his proposed cabinet that is made up of 18
ministers. Following talks with Halbousi and the Speaker’s deputy, Hassan al-Kaabi,
the PM-designate made changes to his proposed government and kept the ministries
of defense, interior, finance and justice vacant pending consensus among rival
political parties. Former Minister of Displaced Jassem al-Jaf, who is a member
of the Kurdish delegation that is holding consultations with Allawi, told Asharq
Al-Awsat that there are ongoing discussions with the premier-designate. “There’s
still an opportunity to achieve a formula that is acceptable by all sides,” he
said. However, Irada movement member MP Hussein Arab told the newspaper that it
is difficult to have consensus on a government accepted by the parliament.
“Ongoing differences among political parties and blocs make it difficult to
approve Allawi’s proposed cabinet,” said Arab. Political analyst Bahaa Alaeddine,
a former adviser to the Iraqi president, was more optimistic, saying the
PM-designate could receive the backing of the majority of lawmakers if he knew
how to negotiate with the political blocs. Allawi issued a long list of promises
when he was nominated this month: to hold early elections, punish people who
killed protesters, end foreign interference and check the power of non-state
armed groups - an ambitious program for a prime minister who has no particular
party behind him. But there are fears of a constitutional vacuum if Allawi
failed to win parliament’s vote of confidence on Saturday. The constitutional
deadline for his cabinet’s approval is Monday. If the deadline expires
with no new government, either the president would take over pending political
consensus on a new PM-designate, or the head of state would appoint a new figure
to form the cabinet. The country faces a mass protest movement that broke out in
October and brought down former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi two months
later. His cabinet has stayed on in a caretaker capacity, however.
Arab Health Ministers to Hold Urgent Meeting On Covid-19
Cairo - Sawsan Abu Hussein/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 28 February,
2020
The Arab Council of Health Ministers called for an urgent meeting on the level
of experts to review plans for monitoring and exchanging experiences on ways to
combat the new coronavirus (COVID-19). In a statement issued following the 53rd
regular session of the Arab Council of Health Ministers, held in the Arab League
headquarters in Cairo on Thursday, the ministers expressed solidarity with China
and its efforts to curb down the effects of the virus. The urgent expert meeting
will take place during the second month of March in Cairo, according to the
statement. The ministers also underlined the importance of implementing World
Health Organization (WHO) directives, saying that protection and the wellbeing
of citizens in the region was of utmost importance. “It is necessary to enhance
communication between the Arab member states, exchange information and
continuous coordination between health organizations and related sectors in the
Arab countries, as well as precautionary plans developed by Arab countries to
confront this disease,” the statement emphasized. It added that participants
urged Arab nations and organizations to follow up on the latest developments
concerning the COVID-19 virus, adding that the Arab League was eager to share
information in this regard with complete transparency and credibility.
UNRWA Warns of Reduction in Services over Lack of Funds
Ramallah - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 28 February, 2020
Spokesman for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA) Adnan Abu Hasna has stated that the agency is suffering
from an unprecedented financial crisis that might affect its programs and
operations in various regions. "UNRWA has faced an unprecedented financial
crisis for several decades. The crisis is getting worse and may effect our
programs and assistance provided to Palestinian refugees," said Abu Hasna. He
clarified that so far, there were pledges to pay USD299 million as part of a
total budget of more than USD1.4 billion that UNRWA needs during 2020. "We have
received so far USD125 million donations out of USD299 million," Abu Hasna said,
adding that "there is not enough funding for our emergency programs in Gaza and
the West Bank." UNRWA decided to reduce its running cost and will not employ
more staff or promote employees. The spokesman said in a press statement that if
the agency does not receive any funding, the services might be reduced in May.
Christian Saunders, Acting UNRWA Commissioner-General, called for a minimum of
USD1.4 billion to fund the agency's essential services and assistance, including
life-saving humanitarian aid and priority projects, for 5.6 million registered
Palestine refugees across the Middle East for the year 2020. Of the required
USD1.4 billion, the agency will use USD806 million for essential core services,
which encompass education, health, infrastructure and camp improvement, relief
and social services, protection and microfinance and contribute to the
realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda. The
presentation of the agency’s 2020 priorities and financial requirements comes in
the wake of the recent extension by the United Nations General Assembly of the
UNRWA mandate for another three years until June 2023. The agency will be able
to provide education to over half a million girls and boys in some 700 schools
across the region, and enable 8.5 million patient visits in its health
facilities, like it did in 2019. UNRWA revealed that an additional amount of
USD155 million is required to provide emergency humanitarian aid to the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza, and USD270 million is needed in
support of the Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal (Palestinian refugees from
Syria in Lebanon and Jordan). An estimated USD170 million is required for
priority projects, in particular, rehousing and reconstruction initiatives in
response to conflicts in Syria and Gaza, as well as, initiatives designed to
complete and strengthen program reforms and delivery.
Three Syrian Soldiers Wounded by Israeli Fire near Golan
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/February 28/2020
At least three Syrian soldiers were wounded by Israeli helicopter fire near the
annexed Golan Heights late Thursday, the official SANA agency reported. "Israeli
helicopters launched missiles above the occupied Golan Heights, hitting (Syrian)
army positions at Kahtaniyeh, Al-Horiyyat and the liberated town of Quneitra,
leaving three wounded among the troops," SANA said. The Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights (SOHR) said one Syrian soldier was killed in the attack and seven
were wounded, some of them seriously. It comes after a Syrian linked to the
Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah was killed in a cross-border Israeli drone
strike earlier Thursday, SOHR said. The strike targeted his car in Haidar
village in Quneitra province near the annexed Golan Heights, SOHR head Rami
Abdel Rahman told AFP. A source named the man as Imad Tawil, while Syria's
official news agency SANA said he was a civilian resident of Haidar. The Jewish
state has carried out hundreds of strikes on regime targets as well as forces of
the government's Iranian and Hezbollah allies since the Syrian conflict erupted
in 2011. On Sunday night, Israeli air strikes near Damascus killed six
pro-regime fighters, according to the Britain-based SOHR, which relies on a
network of sources inside Syria.
The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on February 28-29/2020
Saudi journalist Tareq Al-Homayed: The Iranian Regime Is 'The Deadliest Virus' –
And The West's Lenience Towards It Endangers The Region
MEMRI/February 28/2020
Four days after the February 21, 2020 elections for Iran's parliament, the
Majlis, veteran Saudi journalist Tareq Al-Homayed, former editor of the
London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, published an op-ed in the Saudi
daily 'Okaz headlined "The Virus of the Khomeini [Regime]." In it, he criticized
Western media, leftist organizations and U.S. Democrats for hypocritically
turning a blind eye to "the farce of the Iranian parliamentary elections" in
advance of which thousands of reformist and moderate candidates had been
disqualified by the regime.[1]
Attacking the Iranian regime for its destructive activity in Iran and in the
countries of the region, Al-Homayed warned that this "deadly virus" is wiping
out all progress and reform. He added that the West's puzzling lenience
vis-à-vis Iran's activity endangers not only Iran but the entire region.
The following are excerpts from Al-Homayed's op-ed:
"The farce of the Iranian parliamentary elections ended without [sparking] a
commotion in the West... There was no media uproar and no articles in the major
press outlets in recent days.
"This is despite the fact that the [Iranian] Guardian Council, whose 12 members
are appointed by the Iranian Supreme Leader, prevented 6,850 Iranians from
running for election for 290 parliamentary seats, on various [false] claims
including 'disloyalty to Islam!' The regime of the ayatollahs has done all this,
yet we have seen no storm of criticism or of [newspaper] editorials in the West.
Even the [U.S.] Democrats did not protest – not even as much as they [protested]
after the Trump administration assassinated the terrorist Qassem Soleimani, the
leader of the destruction in Iran and in the region...
"I am not talking here about the hypocrisy of the left, or of the Democrats, or
of some media institutions and organizations in the West – but about the risk of
ignoring the Iranian danger that threatens not only the Iranians but also the
region, and of underestimating it.
"The Iranian regime, the regime of [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini [founder of
Iran's Islamic Revolution], is a virus that is deadly for progress and reform in
our region. It is more deadly than any other virus. When 6,850 Iranians are
prevented from running for election, it endangers not [only] Iran itself but the
entire region. Indeed, this is what Iran has been doing in Iraq as well, since
2003; worse yet, it is doing this in Lebanon, as the government is being put
together, or as its allies [i.e. Hizbullah] eliminate their [political] rivals,
beginning [in 2005] with the assassination of [former Lebanese prime minister]
Rafiq Al-Hariri. Worse than all this is what Iran is doing in Syria, Gaza, and
Sana'a [in Yemen].
"What this Khomeini virus means, and what some in the West are ignoring, is that
there is no hope of progress and reform in the region, and that the resources,
the positive aspects, and the hopes of the peoples of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and
Syria are at risk. It also means that the hothouses of extremism and ignorance
are at work around the clock, and that as long as Iran's political corruption
continues and [as long as] the Khomeini virus is widespread in the region, ruin
will impact everyone.
"For some puzzling reason, this election farce in Iran, despite the scope of the
[Iranian] public's boycott of it [and even though] the regime prevented
thousands of people from running for election, appears to have gone unremarked
by editorials, reports, and detailed articles in the West to clarify the danger
of what is happening [in Iran], both for the Iranians themselves and for the
entire region. The truth is that the leniency of the [U.S.] Democrats, of the
left, and of the [international] institutions and organizations vis-à-vis Iran
is the worst possible propaganda [for promoting] democracy in our region, and
[instead promotes] the dangerous spread of the Khomeini virus that eradicates
any chance of a better future."[2]
[1] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 8582, Iranian Majlis Representative From Qom:
10 Deaths Every Day From Coronavirus In The City, The Regime Is Concealing The
Numbers Of Dead In Iran; Former Official In Office Of President Rouhani: 'Coronavirus
– A Gift From The Clerics Of The Islamic Republic [Of Iran] To The People',
February 24, 2020.
[2] 'Okaz (Saudi Arabia), February 24, 2020.
Israel's Iran Confrontation Is Pointing the Way to the Future of War
Seth Frantzman/The Hill/February 28/2020
Israel's new "Momentum" plan integrates all elements of its armed forces in
innovative ways.
Iran is shipping sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, drones and other
missiles to its allies across the Middle East. A seized shipment, revealed by
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on Feb. 19, included drone and cruise missile
components reportedly linked to an attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facility
last September. To confront the threat, Israel rolled out a new multi-year plan
to transform its armed forces' ability to both fight a multi-front war and to
confront Iran.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is trying to do something unique in history by
preparing the army for a potential future war that does not look like any
before. Often armies end up planning to face enemies of the past, with
disastrous results. This was the case with tactics of the U.S. Civil War, or the
French army's static defenses in World War II. Recent conflicts have revealed
how technology is transforming the battlefield. This is illustrated in the
counter-insurgency campaigns of the kind the U.S. has faced in the Global War on
Terror, and inter-state conflicts such as tensions between Iran and other
countries in the Middle East. Israel dubs its new plan "Momentum," and it says
the concept is to combine all the elements of its armed forces, including land,
sea, air, intelligence and cyber. Using one kind of force, such as just the air
force or just infantry, is a relic of the past. That means putting more
resources into units at the front, and more capabilities such as drones and even
high-energy lasers to confront drone threats. It also means using more accurate
precision-guided munitions. In a recent briefing by the IDF, the army
characterized this as going into "uncharted territory and leading the way. There
is focus throughout the world on what we are doing."
A visual representation of Fire Weaver's "digitized battlespace." (Rafael)
To imagine what the future battlefield might look like, it's worth looking at a
few Israeli technologies. One is called Fire Weaver, which will be integrated
into the army in the next several years. It links all the soldiers in an area to
a network, sort of like when you play a first-person-shooter video game and see
all the other players. It also uses artificial intelligence to optimize which
weapon system can be used against threats. For example, if one soldier with an
M-16 can't hit an enemy who is hiding in a building, the system can calculate
that a drone or another team on the other side of the village could hit the
enemy. The system is supposed to reduce friendly-fire, collateral damage to
civilians and give commanders faster intelligence to make decisions. It is a bit
like applying management information systems, or efficiency concepts one might
find in business, to war.
Another system Israel is using is high-energy lasers and layered air defense.
Developed with U.S. support, Israel built systems such as Iron Dome that have
confronted hundreds of rockets from Gaza. Lasers can down drone swarms, of the
kind Iran launched on Saudi Arabia in September, and they can defend aircraft.
We appear to be rapidly approaching a battlefield that looks more like scenes
from "The Terminator" and less like "Black Hawk Down." With that comes concerns
about the ethics of using unmanned aerial vehicles and artificial intelligence.
But drones or smart missiles don't make decisions on their own; they merely give
a commander more accurate choices. That's better than the carpet-bombing used in
Vietnam or previous wars.
Where Israel's looming confrontation with Iran has implications for the wider
world is in its hybrid nature. It is both a "high-trajectory" conflict, as the
IDF describes the threat, and one involving "terror-armies" such as Hezbollah
and Hamas. That means it's not just the counter-insurgency the U.S. has been
doing in Afghanistan or Syria, and it is not an old-style conventional war with
tanks and battleships. There likely won't be any Israeli tanks facing Iranian
tanks.
Land, air and naval forces operating separately is a thing of the past.
There is a challenge in developing ballistic missile, cruise missile and drone
threats and defending against them. This is a remarkable impersonal potential
war in that sense. Already, Israel has carried out more than 1,000 airstrikes in
Syria against some 250 Iranian targets, including 50 targets in the past year.
These were precision airstrikes and the number of Iranians killed was very low.
There are less than 1,000 Iranian personnel in Syria, according to estimates.
The ramification of such a future war will cast a shadow over militaries that
see themselves as having land, air and naval forces operating separately. Just
as the horse, airplane or rifle revolutionized war in the past, this high-tech,
multidimensional war that is coming fundamentally changes the role of army units
and soldiers. They are more like nodes in a network than the masses of men
depicted in the recent film "1917."
*Seth Frantzman, a Middle East Forum writing fellow, is the author of After
ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East (2019), op-ed editor of
The Jerusalem Post, and founder of the Middle East Center for Reporting &
Analysis.
A Corona-free Umrah
Salman Al-Dossary/Asharq Al Awsat/February 28/2020
In many countries around the world, starting internationally from China and
passing regionally through Iran, the new Coronavirus has spread and countries
are racing to take precautions to deter this illness before it turns into a
pandemic.
Cities are closed, flights are halted and citizens are banned from flying from
and to specific countries. All of these precautions, among others, are meant to
limit the impact of Corona and its spread. With Saudi Arabia taking the decision
to temporarily suspend Umrah-goers from entering, it can be said that the
Kingdom is one of the few countries in the world that have taken strict
precautionary measures before a single case of Coronavirus was recorded.
The decision was quickly welcomed by the President of the largest Muslim country
in the world, Indonesia. The Saudi precautions indicate that it does not take
its role lightly, not only to protect the health of its citizens and residents
but also to protect the world from this catastrophic spread that we might have
seen if Umrah remained open and those infected mixed with Umrah-goers.
What is happening now around the world in terms of Corona is limited in
comparison to what the mixing of hundreds of thousands of crowds around the
clock would have caused. No doubt that the level of alertness is escalating
internationally as the illness turns into a pandemic. In fact, the French
president announced that it has already turned into a pandemic. The world has
indeed witnessed many similar illnesses with minimal losses, but in such
situations, one cannot but take extreme precautionary measures which should
remain at the highest levels to prevent the worst.
This is what all countries in the world need to do, especially in densely
crowded places that would speed up the spread of the virus. Saudi Arabia, for
example, has the best crowd-controlling systems which have been successfully
employed in the Hajj and Umrah seasons. Even considering illnesses in past
times, Saudi Arabia was able to prevent illnesses from spreading among its
citizens, but this time it's much more serious.
With no current indications that its spread will be limited, the decision to
suspend Umrah temporarily and to constantly review this decision was taken until
the world is reassured that the Coronavirus is gone. The doors would immediately
reopen once the virus gets under control.
Many questions about Coronavirus remain unanswered and there is no sign that its
spread can be limited internationally. This is what the analysis published by
Robert Koch Institute states. The new advanced generation of the Coronavirus
will have a global impact, not only in terms of those directly infected by the
virus but also by the precautions the world will take, especially in light of
accusations against certain countries that they are not implementing transparent
standards and are misleading the world on what is happening inside them.
After all, countries are connected and without taking the necessary measures, no
matter how strict, it will be impossible to limit this illness which everyone
fears that it will develop into a pandemic.
Iran Elections: The Least Bad Outcome
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/February 28/2020
Describing the latest exercise in voting in Iran's “elections” may require a
high degree of indulgence. When all candidates are pre-approved by the
authorities and no one is declared a winner without the stamp of the “Supreme
Guide”, to speak of elections would mean stretching lexical flexibility to
breaking point. And, yet, the rigmarole in question merits attention for a
number of reasons.
To start with, the lowest percentage of eligible voters chose to go to the
polls. After days of hesitation, the authorities decided to report a turnout of
42 percent, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic.
In Tehran, voter turnout was around 24 percent. Four other provinces, Khuzestan,
Gilan, Qom, and Alborz also registered low turn-outs of around 30 percent.
While the main election was for the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the
unicameral ersatz parliament, mid-term elections for the Assembly of Experts,
which in theory supervises the work of the “Supreme Guide”, also took place.
There, turnout was even lower, in some cases as low as 20 percent. Only
Ayatollah Muhammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the Khomeinist theologian most in vogue,
managed to attract more than 30 percent of the votes in Mashhad.
All in all, two-thirds of eligible voters responded to the boycott call by a
wide spectrum of political forces.
More importantly, perhaps, a study of voting patterns shows that the boycott was
most effective among the poorer masses while the new middle class created since
the revolution ensured a bigger turnout. In other words, the Islamic Republic is
firmly rejected by the very poor masses that it claims to represent.
The composition of the next Majlis merits attention for other reasons.
For the first time in 40 years, the next Majlis will appear as a solid base for
radical Khomeinism, abandoning the four-decades long “hardline-moderate” comedy
designed to fool the old middle classes and the outside world.
The so-called “moderates” and “reformists” whose task was to give a North
Korean-style regime a Scandinavian varnish have been reduced to insignificance.
In fact, this could be regarded as the effective end of President Hassan
Rouhani’s administration, even though it is unlikely that he would do the
honorable thing and step down.
Of the 290 members of the next Majlis 221 are labeled “radical” or” hardliner”
while only 20 claim to be “reformists”. A batch of 15 members belongs to the
entourage of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who promotes himself as a
cross between Mahatma Gandhi and Chengiz Khan. A further 33 seats go to
weathervanes, individuals with a local base but always open to higher bids.
Finally, at the time of this writing, the fate of 11 seats, where no candidate
won a majority, was to be decided in the second round of voting.
The new Majlis is the first to reflect the true balance of power within the
Khomeinist establishment. The backbone of the regime, the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), forms the biggest bloc with 123 seats. Pro-regime clerics
with close ties to the IRGC will occupy a further 43 seats. Thus even without
Ahmadinejad’s bloc, the IRGC and affiliates enjoy a solid majority.
The fact that the new Majlis reflects the true nature of the regime as never
before must be regarded as a positive development.
Domestically, the elections put an end to “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei’s claim
that the regime’s failures in the past four decades have all been due to
“moderate” factions from the late Hashemi Rafsanjani’s “builders” to Rouhani’s
“New York Boys.”
In foreign policy, the new Majlis could end the illusion, most recently
entertained by former US President Barack Obama, that the way to bring Iran back
into the international fold is to back the “moderate” faction by offering
concessions to the regime.
The next Majlis reveals the true nature of the Khomeinist system as a typical
“Third World” regime with a military-security backbone and a thin ideological
varnish. Something like the Castrist outfit in Cuba, the Zimbabwe of Robert
Mugabe, and, above all, the People’s Democratic Republic of North Korea which is
Khamenei’s ideal model of government.
Seen in that light, no one would expect the Islamic Republic to respect human
rights, encourage citizen participation in decision-making and put the quest for
economic development above obsession with ideological purity. The new Iranian
middle class, including its apologists in the West, would have to accept, and if
they wish to adulate, the Khomeinist regime warts and all, unable to project on
it forlorn hopes of moderation and reform.
Abroad, powers interested in Iran, for better or for worse, would also know
exactly what kind of beast they are dealing with and either seek a modus vivendi
with it or work for regime change in Tehran. More importantly, they would know
that the Iranian figures they negotiate with aren’t mere actors playing
president or foreign minister.
US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, ostensibly aimed at
persuading Tehran to change its behavior has already succeeded in forcing the
regime to round the wagons and prepare for a final fight.
Paradoxically, however, that success has also revived the possibility of making
a deal with the regime. With the “New York Boys” scripted out, the IRGC and
affiliates no longer fear a US-backed putsch that could marginalize or even
exclude them from power. The world is full of nasty regimes that are tolerated,
or even befriended, by the US and other big powers as long as they keep their
nastiness within certain limits.
Last Friday’s elections produced the least bad outcome under the present
circumstances. Khamenei had dubbed the exercise “a new referendum” for or
against the Khomeinist system. The results show that the overwhelming majority
of Iranians either reject the current regime or, at last no longer actively
support it.
The elections showed that around a third of Iranians, including a chunk of the
new urban middle classes, still back the even smaller minority of the
military-security constituency that enjoys a monopoly over money and force. For
the Iranian opposition, the unmasking of the regime is a great boon; knowing who
exactly one is fighting against is the first step towards shaping a credible
strategy for change.
In the Middle East, coronavirus spreads along routes of
trade, faith, and war
Faisal al-Yafai/Al Arabiya/February 28/2020
There could be fewer more powerful signs that coronavirus is a threat to the
Middle East than the extraordinary decision to stop foreigners going to Saudi
Arabia’s holy cities for pilgrimage. It is the sort of signal that will give
pause to many, at a point when it looks like the risk of the virus spreading is
greater outside China than within its borders.
For many of those preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia, the pilgrimage is a
highly anticipated event planned long in advance. But this new coronavirus is
rewriting the rules of what a global crisis looks like.
In China, two-thirds of flights have been grounded. Worldwide, airlines,
shipping companies, and tourism industries are expected to lose billions of
dollars. In Italy, nearly a dozen towns have been put on lockdown. Just this
week, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned of
“significant disruption” to life in America, despite only a handful of cases in
the country. It isn’t one yet, but this novel coronavirus has all the hallmarks
of being a new, global pandemic.
Against that stark background, the sudden jump in cases in the Middle East is of
great concern.
Iran reported its first positive test for the disease just over a week ago.
Within days, that number jumped to double figures, and then again to triple
digits; it could even be much higher. There have been a handful of cases across
the region, but the fear is that the total could suddenly increase, as it has
elsewhere. On Tuesday this week, Italy reported 80 cases. By the following
night, that number had jumped to 400.
This epidemic, then, is far from over, even as scientists around the world
scramble to understand the epidemiology of the outbreak. In the Middle East,
even an outbreak like this has politics behind it.
What makes the situation so dangerous in the region is that the Middle East is
crisscrossed by lines of trade, faith, and war. At a moment of great instability
in the region, all three could exacerbate the coronavirus crisis.
The first big unknown is Iran, currently the country outside of China with the
highest death toll. The jump in cases in mere days has fueled suspicions of a
cover-up on the true scale of the outbreak. It is just weeks, after all, since
Iran mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet, and then lied about it for
days afterward.
It hasn’t helped that one of the public faces of the government’s response,
Deputy Health Minister Iraj Harirchi, tested positive for coronavirus himself, a
day after appearing feverish at a press conference meant to calm concerns. Other
officials, including the Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Masoumeh
Ebtekar and a prominent parliamentarian have also tested positive. There is
speculation that other leaders of the regime may also have the virus, as the
vice president attended a cabinet meeting on Thursday. In a country where many
Iranians believe the elite look after themselves first, the sense that even they
cannot stave off the infection is frightening.
But there is also a concern that Iran’s leaders are playing politics. Iran’s
president Hassan Rouhani told his cabinet there were no plans to quarantine any
cities or towns. The case of Qom, a center of religious pilgrimage, is of
particular concern. The member of parliament for the city, Ahmad
Amirabadi-Farahani, has alleged a cover-up, saying 50 people have died of the
virus in Qom alone. The city receives 20 million visitors every year – yet
clerics in the holy city were this week encouraging those who were unwell to
come to the city to be healed.
The Middle East cannot afford such errors. So far cases have been reported in
Iraq and Lebanon, two countries with close links to Iran, and where a
destabilized central government would struggle to contain an outbreak.
Both also border one of the most vulnerable populations in the world – Syria. An
outbreak in the midst of the devastation of the civil war would be disastrous.
The same is true of Afghanistan, which this week confirmed its first case. The
potential for crisis is real.
The exact way the virus has spread so far is unknown. While trade links between
China and Iran are the most likely method, yesterday brought news of a
Californian who tested positive for the virus without traveling to any hotspots.
What we do know is that there are closely-woven links between all countries of
the region. People moving for business, family and education, religious
pilgrimages, and, lately, shadowy militant groups cross the Middle East
regularly.
Taken together, such close links could create a perfect storm of infection.
An infectious disease that is spreading along the routes that bind the world
together has turned one of the great strengths of the Middle East – its
interconnectedness – into a sudden and unexpected liability.
How Iran's Regime Spread Coronavirus to the Middle East
النظام الإيراني ينشر فايروس الكورونا في الشرق الأوسط
Seth Frantzman/The Jerusalem Post/February 28/2020
On Monday, Iranian official Ahmad Amirabadi said there have been up to 50 deaths
in Iran from coronavirus. The regime did what it knows how to do best: It sought
to silence him and condemn him for spreading the news, claiming that only 12 had
died from the virus and that there were only 61 cases in the country.
However, for five days Iran has known that there were likely more cases
concentrated in the holy city of Qom, where religious pilgrims gather.
Iranians have been largely left in the dark since last Wednesday, when two
deaths were announced in the Islamic Republic from coronavirus. The regime
wanted elections to go well on February 21, so it sought to prevent any news of
the virus for days.
Iranians have been largely left in the dark about the local spread of the virus.
By Saturday it was too late, and the country moved to shut down schools and
universities. But Iranians and other pilgrims who came to Qom and became sick
with the virus were already on the move.
They flew back to Iraq's Najaf and via Dubai to Bahrain, as well as arriving in
Kuwait and Oman. Iran did not inform its neighbors until it was too late. Last
Friday, Turkish government officials were already warning that there might be
750 cases in Iran.
Iranian Deputy Health Minister Iraj Hairichi and MP Mahmoud Sadeghi now say they
are sick with the virus, and officials admit that many more are sick. New cases
in Oman and Bahrain were announced Tuesday – all linked to Iran.
Iran has now set the Middle East ablaze with fears of coronavirus. The virus was
mostly limited to China until two weeks ago. Then it moved rapidly to Italy and
South Korea, where there are thought to be hundreds and 1,000 cases,
respectively. But the regime in Tehran purposely hid the numbers of sick.
It may have done so partially out of incompetence, with a Health Ministry that
did not know how to find, quarantine or test the sick. In fact, Iran has not
done what China or Italy or other places have done. It has not been transparent
and did not even quarantine the cases in Qom or elsewhere. Instead, Iran has
acted like an incubator.
Iran has acted like an incubator for the coronavirus.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke with an Austrian delegation on Sunday.
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif smiled and laughed with the Austrians. The
virus was a big joke for the president and minister. Zarif later joked that he
did not have the virus. Rouhani claimed the virus was like US sanctions: It
seemed worse than it was.
Not far from where the men were laughing, Mojtaba Rahmanzadeh, mayor of district
13 in Tehran, was sick and hospitalized for coronavirus. He had been diagnosed
on Saturday. But the Iranian regime was not pressed by the Austrians to discuss
the issue.
After Iran closed schools and a university on Sunday and Monday, people began to
demand answers and protective masks. By Tuesday, three more had died, bringing
the toll to 15, the second highest outside China. Iran's police were hunting for
medical masks.
Fears of price gouging were rampant. The police claimed on Tuesday that they had
found millions of masks hidden in warehouses. The virus appears to be a national
emergency, because Ali Shamkhani of the Supreme National Security Council has
attacked Amirabadi for spreading news of the 50 deaths.
Iran's neighbors are fed up with the regime's lack of transparency. They have
closed their borders or instituted drastic checks. People who traveled to Iran
and arrived in Najaf in Iraq, Bahrain and Oman are now sick. There are eight
cases in Kuwait and six in Bahrain.
The UAE this week stopped dozens of flights to Iranian cities. Oman has stopped
imports from Iran. Kuwait has closed borders and ports. Afghanistan has shut its
border but is concerned over the thousands who cross illegally. Bahrain is
stopping flights from the UAE.
Iran's export of the virus has caused massive concern in Iraq. In Najaf there
are now 20 people under observation for the virus. And Iraq is not well
prepared. Medical masks are out of date, ministry phone numbers don't work, and
the country is struggling to stop travel to Najaf and suspend travel to Iran.
Iran and Iraq are closely linked in religious issues, weapons trafficking and
trade. Cutting off these contacts is a major move. It comes at a bad time for
Baghdad, after months of protests and with a new prime minister who lacks a
government. In the Kurdistan region there are long lines at gas stations as
people fear borders will close.
President Rouhani says divine help will enable Iran to overcome the virus.
Iran's government is in denial. Rouhani has claimed that the virus is no worse
than the flu in the US that kills thousands of people a year. He claims the
country, with divine help, will overcome the virus.
"The coronavirus is an uninvited traveler and goes to any country, but we have
to overcome this problem," he said Tuesday.
The truth is that Rouhani's government has made the situation worse by covering
up the extent of the virus and also by not providing transparent answers to the
international community or Iran's neighbors. The regime has gotten used to this
over the last few months, after downing a Ukrainian airliner and killing 1,500
protesters. The deaths from the virus do not matter to the regime, as Rouhani
indicates: If thousands die or even tens of thousands, it will be like any other
flu virus, and the country will move on.
For average Iranians, becoming collateral damage to the country trying to
preserve its reputation may not be what they bargained for. For Iraq, Bahrain,
Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon and other countries now under threat because of people who
traveled to Iran, the government's indecision – and its not treating the issue
as an emergency – could also be bad news.
Iran's regime has a siege mentality that is used to blaming foreigners for its
problems.
It is already causing panic in the Gulf and Iraq. Health ministries from Erbil
in the Kurdistan region to Abu Dhabi are trying to reassure people not to panic
or spread rumors. Tehran's unwillingness to take part in a regional response to
the crisis is not helping tamp down the rumors.
Iran's regime has a siege mentality that is used to blaming foreigners for its
problems. It blames foreign media for reporting on the virus. Even Iran's
authoritarian contacts in other countries will have warned it to take no chances
with this virus. China knows what the results can be, as do Gulf states.
But Iran did not listen. It kept its Mahan Air and other carriers flying.
Pilgrims kept coming because the theocracy, which is the regime, judged faith to
be more important than science. Pharmacies are now out of masks in Iran. People
are confused and worried – and so is the entire Middle East.
*Seth Frantzman, a Middle East Forum writing fellow, is the author of After
ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East (2019), op-ed editor of
The Jerusalem Post, and founder of the Middle East Center for Reporting &
Analysis.
*N.B: The above report was published on February 25/2020
Greece's Migrant Crisis: "A Powder Keg Ready to Explode"
Soeren Kern/ Gatestone Institute/February 28/2020
"People have seen their properties destroyed, their sheep and goats have been
slaughtered, their homes broken into. A few years back, when there were 5,000
migrants on the island, things seemed bad enough. Now there's a sense that the
situation has really got out of hand." — Nikos Trakellis, community leader in
Moria, on the Greek island of Lesbos.
"I fear for the safety of our people, the residents of Lesbos. For the situation
to change, many refugees have to be transferred to the mainland and new arrivals
from Turkey must be stopped. If not, we are doomed." — North Aegean Regional
Governor Kostas Moutzouris.
"Welcome in Greece are only those we choose. Those who are not welcome will be
returned. We will permanently shut the door to illegal human traffickers, to
those who want to enter even though they are not entitled to asylum." — Greek
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
Greek officials have said that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan personally
controls the migration flows to Greece and turns them on and off to extract more
money and other political concessions from the European Union.
Turkey, which currently hosts nearly four million Syrian refugees, has said it
cannot handle a new influx. It has repeatedly threatened to re-open the
floodgates of mass migration to Europe.
A plan by the Greek government to build new migrant camps on five Aegean islands
has sparked violent opposition from local residents, who fear that the
facilities will encourage yet more mass migration from Africa, Asia and the
Middle East. Pictured: Riot police on the Greek island of Lesbos face locals who
are protesting against the construction of a new migrant camp, on February 26,
2020.
A plan by the Greek government to build new migrant camps on five Aegean islands
has sparked violent opposition from local residents, who fear that the
facilities will encourage yet more mass migration from Africa, Asia and the
Middle East.
The government says that the new camps, expected to be operational by July 2020,
are needed to alleviate overcrowding at other locations that have been the focus
of international criticism. Local residents counter that the migrants should be
transferred to mainland Greece.
On February 25, more than 500 locals prevented construction workers from
accessing the site of a proposed new migrant camp at Karava Mantamadou on
Lesbos. Riot police used tear gas and stun grenades to disperse the crowds.
Similar clashes occurred on Chios, a large Greek island located less than 20
kilometers from Turkey, from where tens of thousands of migrants depart each
year in hopes of eventually reaching mainland Europe.
The new site on Lesbos will be a so-called closed camp that tightly controls
access and will replace the current open-access camp at Moria. The closed camps
will allow migrants to go out during the day but will require them to be locked
in at night. The objective is to control their movements and prevent them from
escaping to the mainland.
In addition to Lesbos, Greek authorities plan to build closed facilities on the
islands of Chios, Kos, Leros and Samos. The islands are all close to Turkey.
The camp at Moria — a sprawling facility built for no more than 3,000 migrants
but which is now accommodating at least 20,000, approximately one-third of whom
are under the age of 18 — has attracted widespread international criticism for
its squalid living conditions.
A spokesperson for Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF),
Sophie McCann, explained:
"They are living in squalid, medieval-like conditions... with barely any access
to basic services, including clean and hot water, electricity, sanitation and
healthcare. On a daily basis our medical teams are treating the consequential
deterioration of health and wellbeing."
In 2016, Greek authorities, with backing from the EU, introduced a so-called
containment policy aimed at deterring migrants from crossing to Greece from
Turkey. The policy requires migrants to remain on the islands — with no hope of
reaching the Greek mainland — until their asylum requests are processed. With a
backlog of tens of thousands of applicants, the asylum system has come to a
standstill. Approximately 40,000 migrants are effectively trapped on the
islands.
The containment policy has angered local residents, who complain that migrants
are responsible for a spike in crime. "People have seen their properties
destroyed, their sheep and goats have been slaughtered, their homes broken
into," said Nikos Trakellis, a community leader in Moria. "A few years back,
when there were 5,000 migrants on the island, things seemed bad enough. Now
there's a sense that the situation has really got out of hand."
In October 2019, the Greek government announced a plan to transfer 20,000
migrants from the islands to the mainland. A subsequent surge in new migrant
arrivals from Turkey, however, has left the migrant camps on the islands as
overcrowded as ever.
Greek authorities say that they are doing their best to satisfy locals, migrants
and human rights groups. "The government is making an effort to change
something, to implement a plan," a government official told the Reuters news
agency. "If we don't construct new facilities, living conditions won't improve."
North Aegean Regional Governor Kostas Moutzouris, who opposes the government's
plan to build permanent migrant camps on the islands, described the situation on
Lesbos as a "powder keg ready to explode." He added: "It's crucial that a state
of emergency is called." He also warned:
"I fear for the safety of our people, the residents of Lesbos. For the situation
to change, many refugees have to be transferred to the mainland and new arrivals
from Turkey must be stopped. If not, we are doomed."
Government spokesperson Stelios Petsas, who described the existing facilities as
"public health bombs," said:
"We are asking the local communities to understand that these closed facilities
will benefit the country and their communities. There's a trust deficit right
now that has been cultivated over previous years, and this needs to be restored.
We will build these closed centers but also close the existing open ones. That
is the government's promise.
"The new camps will make it much easier to speed up the asylum process so that
those who are entitled to asylum can be transferred west and those who are not
can be returned to Turkey."
Greece's center-right government, led by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos
Mitsotakis, who took office after parliamentary elections in July 2019, has
taken a more hardline approach toward migration than did the previous left-wing
government led by Alexis Tsipras:
July 2019. The new government revoked access to public health care for asylum
seekers and undocumented migrants arriving in Greece.
September 2019. The government raised the criteria for both the application and
approval of asylum status applications. It also vowed to strengthen border
security and return 10,000 illegal migrants back to Turkey by the end of 2020.
October 2019. The Greek parliament passed a new asylum law, which introduced
sweeping changes to the national asylum system, including cutting options for
appeal and facilitating the deportation of failed asylum seekers.
November 2019. The government said that it would tighten controls at Greece's
borders and clear bottlenecks in asylum vetting procedures.
January 2020. The government announced the construction of a floating fence to
deter migrants arriving by sea. The 2.7-kilometer (1.7 mile) barrier will be set
up off coast of Lesbos. It will rise 50 centimeters above sea level and have
lights that will make it visible at night. If the barrier is effective at
reducing migration, it could be extended to 15 kilometers or more.
February 2020. The Greek parliament approved a law to regulate all
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with migration issues. The
objective is to ensure that NGOs are not profiting from mass migration "in a
faulty and parasitic manner."
Mitsotakis recently said that, unlike under the previous government, Greece is
no longer open to anyone who wants to come:
"Welcome in Greece are only those we choose. Those who are not welcome will be
returned. We will permanently shut the door to illegal human traffickers, to
those who want to enter even though they are not entitled to asylum."
Since 2015, more than a million migrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East
have entered the European Union through Greece.
A March 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey reduced the flow, but the
number of arrivals resurged in 2019, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan and other members of his government threatened to flood Europe with
Muslim migrants.
Greek officials have said that Erdoğan personally controls the migration flows
to Greece and turns them on and off to extract more money and other political
concessions from the European Union.
Greek Immigration Minister Giorgos Koumoutsakos noted that when Turkey "keeps
repeating that we're going to open the floodgates, what migrants do is they move
closer to the floodgates waiting for them to open." He added:
"Europe cannot act under threats or blackmail. As Europeans should understand
the situation that the Turks are faced with, Ankara should on its part realize
that this is not the way to deal with Europe."
In 2019, approximately 60,000 migrants — an average of 164 per day — reached
Greece, according to UNHCR, the UN refugee agency. Nearly 80% arrived on Chios,
Lesbos and Samos.
The trend continues: More than 6,000 migrants — an average of 133 per day —
reached Greece during the first six weeks of 2020, according to the UNHCR. The
top countries of origin: Afghanistan (50%); Syria (21%); Congo (6%) and Iraq
(3.5%).
Recent fighting in Idlib, a war-torn province in northwestern Syria, has
uprooted nearly one million people — most of them women and children — who have
sought sanctuary near the Turkish border.
Turkey, which currently hosts nearly four million Syrian refugees, has said it
cannot handle a new influx. It has repeatedly threatened to re-open the
floodgates of mass migration to Europe.
*Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute.
Coronavirus could push major economies into the abyss
Dr. John C. Hulsman/Arab news/February 28/2020
As I have said here before, it is wise that even the best political risk analyst
approaches the world with a degree of humility. For example, if you had told me
at the beginning of the year that I would spend the lion’s share of my February
writing about a possible pandemic originating in Wuhan, I would have questioned
your sanity. But life, while it does have patterns, does not move in a straight
line. The absolutely central question remains: What causes things to actually
happen and can they be foreseen?
Here, inevitably, we come back to the coronavirus. For all the global fear this
near-pandemic has generated, I think the enduring political risk consequence of
all that is going on is likely to be economic. While the virus is not the main
cause of the possible economic calamities awaiting China, Iran and Italy — all
of which were already teetering on the edge of economic downturns or worse — its
unforeseen deleterious consequences could well provide the final nudge into a
much deeper abyss.
The economic mismanagement that preceded the black swan incident was there for
all to see; all it takes is a final unexpected setback to reveal how the world
was living on borrowed time.
Of the three, superpower China is most likely to ride out the economic storm,
but there remain serious risk concerns. For one thing, a full month after the
paramount leader, Xi Jinping, announced to the world the extent of the
coronavirus, much of the country, even those portions little-affected by the
virus, have yet to return to work.
This, coupled with the fact that a gigantic area around Wuhan — the center of
the virus outbreak — is under full quarantine (more than 50 million people, or
approximately the population of Spain), means that every day the virus remains
untamed is another body blow squarely directed at the Chinese economy. The
longer this lasts (and at present the coronavirus shows no signs of burning out
in this centrally affected region), the harder it will be for an embattled
Beijing to rebound.
But, even before the coronavirus struck, there were some under-reported danger
signs flashing regarding the continued vitality of the Chinese economy. Gross
domestic product (GDP) growth had naturally slowed from its double-digit prime
to an official number of 6 percent, though the real figure is universally
thought to be lower — a natural consequence of the economy maturing.
Structurally worse, China’s perilous demographic position — a result of the
decades-long one-child policy — means the country could well grow old before it
grows rich. All of this was already well in place ahead of the advent of the
coronavirus.
One long term and hugely disadvantageous consequence of the virus for Beijing is
that China’s bungling initial response will accelerate the decoupling of the US
and Chinese supply chains; a process already begun with the US-China trade war.
The coronavirus could well mark an unexpected chapter in the undoing of
globalization itself. Italy’s glaring economic
inadequacies are more advanced and, as a result, the danger from the unforeseen
shock of the coronavirus is more immediate. A simple, glaring fact must be kept
in mind when discussing the country: Italy is poorer now, uniquely in Europe,
than it was at the time of the Great Recession in 2008.
The most recent GDP numbers emanating from Europe only confirm this
decade-long sclerosis. In the fourth quarter of 2019, Germany, the motor of
Europe, stagnated (growing at zero percent), while the economies of France
(minus 0.1 percent) and Italy (minus 0.3 percent) actually went backwards.
Compared with recent relatively buoyant growth rates in economic competitors
China and the US, the past decade can be characterized in political risk terms
as a time when Europe was simply left behind.
Italy’s fragile economy, bereft of anything approaching political leadership and
direction, is greatly dependent on tourism, which accounts for fully 13 percent
of its GDP. With the continent’s coronavirus cases centering on Lombardy and the
Veneto, it is hard to imagine tourism not taking a fearful hit this year. And,
with this, Italy may well fall off the economic tightrope it has long been
walking on and into the abyss.
All it takes is a final unexpected setback to reveal how the world was living on
borrowed time.
Iran, despite its hapless and feckless denials, is another emerging center of
the outbreak. Years of governmental economic mismanagement and the surprisingly
effective sanctions ushered in by the Trump administration as a result of its
regional adventurism had already left it a basket case; it is projected that GDP
slumped by a whopping 9 percent last year. A further shock to this imploding
system could well lead to political and economic upheavals that have not yet
been thought through.
In each case, the coronavirus has not caused the problems to come; rather the
epidemic amounted to the last unforeseen negative consequence, enabling an
already precarious situation to get out of hand. This is how the world really
works, and how those of us who do political risk for a living must be thinking
as the planet weathers this latest, fearful, plague.
*Dr. John C. Hulsman is the president and managing partner of John C. Hulsman
Enterprises, a prominent global political risk consulting firm. He is also
senior columnist for City AM, the newspaper of the City of London. He can be
contacted via www.chartwellspeakers.com.
Polish actions threaten future of EU’s judicial integration
Ranvir S. Nayar/Arab news/February 28/2020
If asked to name three things that define the EU, most people’s answers would
likely include the common market, democracy, and common rules, regulations and
standards. However, most may miss one key element that underlies all these
facets — the law. At the foundation of the EU and its institutions was a strong
and independent judiciary and a fair degree of harmonization of laws governing
most aspects of commercial and social life in the bloc.
However, this very foundation of the EU — an independent judicial system — has
been under attack in recent years, bringing the European Commission in Brussels
face-to-face with a situation that is perhaps as unprecedented in its 50 years
as that of Brexit. While the challenge of Brexit came from the western frontier
of the EU, the judicial challenge comes from the eastern edge of its current
borders. Two EU members — Poland and, to a certain extent, Hungary — have been
implementing changes to their judicial system that seriously undermine the
independence of the judiciary and go directly against EU norms and rules.
The moves began about four years ago, when the Polish government, run by
the nationalist Law and Justice Party (PiS), brought in new rules that were
aimed at removing any checks on its power. It began by putting party loyalists
in the constitutional courts, replacing neutral judges, and attempting to sack
the chief justice of the Polish Supreme Court.
PiS has claimed that judicial reforms were long overdue, as the judiciary in the
country was inefficient and corrupt and hence needed streamlining, as well as
its processes overhauling. But the reality on the ground is starkly different
from what the ruling party claims. The common courts are no longer independent
and judges and prosecutors who don’t toe the party line now face disciplinary
proceedings and public humiliation.
For almost two years, the European Commission tried to engage the Polish
government in discussions, but eventually it was obliged to send the file to the
Court of Justice of the EU in December 2017, marking the opening of an
unprecedented legal challenge. Poland duly rejected all charges and said that
the judicial reforms were not only a necessity but also an internal matter and,
hence, brooked no interference from the commission.
Since then, Poland has been upping the ante on the issue. It has brought in a
series of new measures aimed at further compromising the judiciary. It has also
constituted a disciplinary committee for overseeing the judiciary and penalizing
or even imprisoning judges who fall out of line, even on the content of their
judgments. The matter is again likely to reach the
European Court of Justice, which will take months if not years to rule one way
or the other. The clashes between Warsaw and Brussels have already lasted far
too long and threaten to add to the uncertainties facing the EU, even as it
grapples with other serious threats and challenges, such as relations with a
post-Brexit UK, the rise of the extreme right within the EU, and the budget for
the next seven-year period, which needs to be passed this year.
The battle with Poland is already impacting the EU’s harmonized legal system. In
2018, an Irish court refused what ought to have been a routine drug-related
extradition to Poland, citing concerns about fairness and the independence of
the Polish judicial system.
However, the threat posed by the clash between Poland and the EU is much larger.
If Warsaw continues to hurtle down the path of crushing an independent
judiciary, other EU countries’ courts could decide to isolate Polish courts and
not recognize or enforce their rulings, as they are today. This could then go on
to threaten businesses all across the EU, as any commercial dispute involving a
Polish court or a Polish company could become impossible to disentangle.
The clashes between Warsaw and Brussels have already lasted far too long and
threaten to add to the uncertainties facing the EU.
Worryingly for the European Commission, Poland’s moves are seemingly being aped
by neighboring Hungary, where strongman Viktor Orban’s conservative government
has also taken measures to undermine the independence of its judiciary. But
resolving the conflict with Poland is also very complicated, as there is no
precedent for such moves and the commission will want to avoid the catastrophic
scenario where the common market or free movement of people across borders could
be threatened by the situation.
The EU is also bound by its own regulations and traditions of taking the big
decisions by consensus. If Brussels decides to inflict a harsh punishment, such
as suspending financial assistance to Poland or indeed suspending it from
certain EU institutions, it would need the full backing of all other members.
But, here, Hungary’s Orban is very likely to be among a few Central and Eastern
European nations to block any stringent action against Warsaw. In this
situation, the EU’s judicial integration could unravel.
*Ranvir S. Nayar is the editor of Media India Group, a global platform based in
Europe and India that encompasses publishing, communication and consultation
services.
Syria strike leaves Turkish-Russian ties in tatters
Sinem Cengiz/Arab news/February 28/2020
An airstrike by the Russian-backed Assad regime that killed 33 Turkish soldiers
in Idlib has raised tensions in the northwestern Syrian province to an alarming
level.
In the wake of the attack, late on Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan called an emergency national security meeting that lasted almost six
hours. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader, Kemal
Kilicdaroglu, also held an emergency meeting at his party’s headquarters.
Ankara was on full alert following the strike. Some experts described Thursday’s
events as “worse than Nov. 24, 2015” when Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet
involved in the Kremlin’s military campaign in Syria. At the time, Ankara said
it acted lawfully because the plane had crossed into Turkish air space; Moscow
rejected the claim and relations hit rock bottom.
Although Ankara and Moscow have overcome this situation, working together on the
Astana peace process, S-400 air-defense missile systems and the Akkuyu nuclear
power plant, the implications of the Turkish-Russian fallout over Idlib go well
beyond Syria and joint projects between the two countries.
The volatile developments on Idlib’s frontline have turned the de-escalation
zones laid out in a deal between Turkey and Russia in late 2018 into a
battlefield. Even after the situation eases, the cracks in Ankara and Moscow’s
relationship will remain.
Turkey’s main aims in Syria are to topple the Assad regime and secure a voice
for the future of the country. Ankara cares about Idlib for two main reasons.
First, the prospect of a further increase in refugees that could jeopardize
Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. The country is already housing nearly 4
million Syrian refugees. Second, if Turkey leaves Idlib, it would endanger the
northern border section of Syria that has been cleared of terrorist elements in
three cross-border operations — Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring.
Any withdrawal would allow militants to one again threaten Turkey’s national
security and stability.
Erdogan has set a Feb. 29 deadline for Syrian forces to pull back to the
Sochi-delineated positions. With time running out and neither side backing down,
it is becoming unnervingly clear how difficult the situation is becoming.
After Thursdays’ attack, Ankara has increased pressure on the West by saying it
will no longer stop Syrian refugees who want to head to Europe by land or by
sea. This is a clear act to encourage Western intervention in the conflict.
While Western capitals may appear deaf and blind to the situation in Idlib,
Turkish officials held separate phone discussions with US National Security
Adviser Robert O’Brien and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.
The airstrike came amid talks between Turkish and Russian delegations in Ankara
on Idlib. Although officials have negotiated a cease-fire, they have failed to
reach any compromise. Before Thursday’s attack Ankara was hopeful of a deal,
with Erdogan asking his Russian, German and French counterparts to meet on March
5 to discuss an agreement. But on Thursday, the Kremlin said Russian President
Vladimir Putin had no plans to attend a meeting on that date. It is clear that
Putin has no interest in a leaders’ summit and shows little sign of retreating.
Amid this power struggle, it is the conflict on the ground that will determine
the outcome for Idlib in the coming days. Many are warning of the growing risk
of a full-scale war between the Syrian regime and Turkey. However, there is no
genuine Syrian army, merely Russian-backed forces.
Many are warning of the growing risk of a full-scale war between the Syrian
regime and Turkey. However, there is no genuine Syrian army, merely
Russian-backed forces.
Needless to say, Russia, which cooperates with Turkey in many areas, will never
tolerate open conflict.
The Kremlin has already taken a step backward, saying it was unaware Turkish
troops were present at the site of attack — a clear attempt to defuse tensions
with Turkey, which seems ready to take firm steps on several fronts.
Testing the limits of Ankara’s patience by killing its soldiers will leave a
deep wound in the Turkish-Russian relationship.
*Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s
relations with the Middle East. Twitter: @SinemCngz
Fighters Without Borders”—Forecasting New Trends in Iran
Threat Network Foreign Operations Tradecraft
Matthew Levitt/ctc.usma.edu/Combating Terrorism Centre/February 28/ 2020, Volume
13, Issue 2
دراسة لماثيو ليفت/مقاتلون بلا حدود: التنبؤ باتجاهات ايرانية جديدة من خلال شبكة
العمليات الخارجية
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/83645/%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%ab%d9%8a%d9%88-%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%81%d8%aa-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%84%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%ad%d8%af%d9%88%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa/
Abstract: The threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East, and possibly in the
U.S. homeland, increased in the wake of the January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike
that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force chief General Qassem
Soleimani and Iraqi Shi`a militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. While the
primary overt objective of Iran and its proxies post-Soleimani will likely be to
push all U.S. military forces out of Iraq and the region, they will undoubtedly
also want to avenge Soleimani’s death. And as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
has made clear, all Iranian proxy militant groups will be expected to play their
parts in this campaign. When they do, Iran and the foreign legion of Shi`a
proxies at its disposal are likely to employ new types of operational
tradecraft, including deploying cells comprised of operatives from various proxy
groups and potentially even doing something authorities worry about but have
never seen to date, namely encouraging Shi`a homegrown violent extremist
terrorist attacks.
Speaking in the wake of the January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike in Baghdad that
killed the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani,
Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah made clear that the response to the
Soleimani assassination would be carried out by the full range of Shi`a militant
groups beholden to Iran far into the future.1 In the post-Soleimani era,
Nasrallah intimated, operations by Iran and its web of proxy groups would also
deviate from traditional tactics. “Whoever thinks that this dear martyrdom will
be forgotten is mistaken, and we are approaching a new era,” he said.2
To be sure, much of the established modus operandi honed over years of training
and practice by the Quds Force and Hezbollah will continue to feature
prominently in Iranian and Iranian proxy operations.3 But Nasrallah’s vague
pledge to modernize begs the question: What might be expected of a “new era” of
international operations carried out by Iran and its proxy forces?
One difference from past operations is opportunistic—prioritizing the effort to
push U.S. forces out of the Middle East. Iran will likely leverage Soleimani’s
assassination to achieve with his death what he aspired toward but failed to
achieve in life. Another departure is more strategic— further solidifying the
network of Shi`a militant groups Soleimani quilted together under the Quds
Force. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has described the Quds Force as
Tehran’s “fighters without borders,” but given the Quds Force’s control of this
network of Shi`a foreign fighters, the term more aptly applies to the Quds Force
and the Shi`a militant networks under its control.4 Hezbollah has already
stepped in to help guide Iraq’s various Shi`a militias, at least temporarily.5
Other changes will likely be tactical, increasingly focused on trying to enhance
operational security and the potential to carry out terrorist operations with
reasonable deniability.
This article focuses on the areas of tactical adjustment that the Quds Force,
Hezbollah, and other Shi`a militant groups might make to enhance their
international terrorist attack capabilities. First, the article explains why
U.S. authorities are so animated by the potential threat of a terrorist attack
against U.S. interests, possibly in the homeland, following the Soleimani drone
strike. Second, it forecasts and assesses in turn two specific lines of
operational effort that authorities fear Iran and its proxies (led by the Quds
Force and Hezbollah) are developing for future operations:
(a) Deploying teams including non-Iranian and non-Lebanese Shi`a militants from
around the world and representing a variety of Iranian proxy groups to carry out
international terror operations at Iran’s behest; and
(b) Developing and encouraging a terrorist trend common in the world of Sunni
extremism but not yet seen in the context of Shi`a extremism—Shi`a homegrown
violent extremism (HVE).
The Threat to the United States
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies long assessed that Iran and its
proxy groups were unlikely to carry out an attack in the U.S. homeland, unless
the United States took direct action undermining their interests.
For example, a 1994 FBI report, issued in the wake of the Hezbollah bombing
targeting the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires a few months earlier,
downplayed the likelihood of Hezbollah attacking U.S. interests, unless the
United States took actions directly threatening Hezbollah. “The Hezbollah
leadership, based in Beirut, Lebanon, would be reluctant to jeopardize the
relatively safe environment its members enjoy in the United States by committing
a terrorist act within the U.S. borders,” it assessed. “However, such a decision
could be initiated in reaction to a perceived threat from the United States or
its allies against Hezbollah interests.”6
In 2002, the FBI informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that while
“many Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the capability to
attempt terrorist attacks here should this be the desired objective of the
group,” Hezbollah had never carried out an attack in the United States and its
extensive fundraising activities in the United States would likely serve as a
disincentive for simultaneous operational activities.7
But over the past few years, well before the Soleimani hit, authorities
disrupted Iranian and Hezbollah operations here in the United States that have
forced them to reconsider longstanding assessments of the possibility that
either a state or non-state group might seriously consider carrying out an
attack in the homeland.8
In fact, in 2012, Iranian-American used car salesman Mansour Arbabsiar pleaded
guilty to plotting the previous year with Iranian agents to assassinate the
Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C.9 This was not the
first time Iran plotted an attack in the United States, but it was the most
spectacular and came at a time when few analysts assessed Iran would consider
such an operation.10 In the wake of that case, then Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress that the plot “shows that
some Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have
changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the
United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the
regime.”11
U.S. officials further worried that Hezbollah’s calculus may have begun to shift
in early 2015, when it became a matter of public record that the February 2008
assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, the founding leader of Hezbollah’s Islamic
Jihad Organization terrorist network, was a joint U.S.-Israeli operation.12
Hezbollah printed a deck of playing cards featuring Israeli leaders it held
responsible for Mughniyeh’s death, which some described as a hit list.13 Might
Hezbollah now seek to avenge Mughniyeh’s death by attacking American officials
too? As Matthew Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
at the time, testified just five months before Mughniyeh was killed: “Lebanese
Hezbollah remains committed to conducting terrorist activities worldwide. … We
remain concerned the group’s activities could either endanger or target U.S. and
other Western interests.”14
Then, in June 2017, the FBI arrested two alleged Hezbollah operatives, Ali
Kourani and Samer El Debek, for carrying out surveillance of U.S. targets in the
United States.15 “While living in the United States, Kourani served as an
operative of Hezbollah in order to help the foreign terrorist organization
prepare for potential future attacks against the United States,” U.S. Assistant
Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers said. These included
buildings housing the FBI and U.S. Secret Service in Manhattan, as well as New
York’s JFK airport and a U.S. Army Armory. Kourani was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to 40 years.16 El Debek has yet to stand trial.
Four months after the arrests, in October 2017, then director of NCTC Nicholas
Rasmussen told reporters that Hezbollah was “determined to give itself a
potential [U.S.] homeland option as a critical component of its terrorism
playbook.” “This is something that those of us in the counter-terrorism
community take very, very seriously,” he added.17
Kourani described himself as a Hezbollah sleeper agent. According to the FBI,
Kourani informed that “there would be certain scenarios that would require
action or conduct by those who belonged to the cell.” Kourani reported Hezbollah
operatives like him would be called upon to act in the event that the United
States and Iran went to war, or if the United States were to take certain
unnamed actions targeting Hezbollah, Nasrallah himself, or Iranian interests.
Kourani added that “in those scenarios the sleeper cell would also be triggered
into action.”18
In September 2019, the FBI arrested Ali Saab, an alleged Hezbollah operative who
underwent military and bomb-making training in Lebanon and later collected
intelligence on potential targets in New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. Saab
allegedly provided details on targets including the United Nations headquarters,
Statue of Liberty, and New York airports, tunnels, and bridges—including
detailed photographs and notes on structural weaknesses and “soft spots” for
potential Hezbollah targets “in order to determine how a future attack could
cause the most destruction,” according to the U.S. Department of Justice.19 Saab
has yet to stand trial.
The U.S. assassination of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (aka Jamal Jaafar
Ibrahimi), the leader of the Iraqi Shi`a militant group Kata’ib Hezbollah who
was with Soleimani at the time, appears to meet the standard Kourani described
for potential Hezbollah terrorist action, namely U.S. action directly targeting
a senior Iranian official, according to the assessment of this author. As such,
it is not surprising that in the wake of the Soleimani assassination,
Hezbollah’s threat rhetoric took a sudden and sharp shift away from focusing
primarily on Israeli targets. “America is the number one threat,” Nasrallah
announced after the drone strike that killed Soleimani, adding that “Israel is
just a military tool or base.”20
It seems clear that the primary overt objective of Iran and its proxies post-Soleimani
will be to push all U.S. military forces out of Iraq and out of the Middle East.
Nasrallah made this clear, warning that this included “the U.S. military bases,
the U.S. warships, every single U.S. officer and soldier in our region, in our
countries and on our territories.”21 And he intimated at how Hezbollah could
help evict U.S. forces from the region, boasting that “[t]he suicide attackers
who forced the Americans to leave from our region in the past are still here and
their numbers have increased.”22
While stating that his threats did not apply to American civilians in the
region, Nasrallah warned that when it came to U.S. soldiers and officials, “the
only alternative for them to be leaving horizontally [in coffins] is for them to
leave vertically, on their own.”23
Iran and its proxies will also want to avenge Soleimani’s death, possibly by
targeting a senior U.S. official in response to the assassination of one of
their own (an option Nasrallah has publicly downplayed)24 or by executing some
other type of reasonably deniable asymmetric attack.
Indeed, deniability is also important politically. Iran and its proxies will
want to be especially careful not to be tied to any action that might stem the
flow of anti-American momentum Tehran feels it has at its back, in Iraq in
particular, following the Soleimani strike. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah wants
direct conflict with the United States,a and in the wake of the Soleimani hit,
they have to take seriously U.S. threats to retaliate harshly for any attack on
American citizens.b
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence fear Iran and its proxies may well decide
to carry out a terrorist attack to avenge the Soleimani strike, a fact which
explains why the day after the strike, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued a bulletin under its National Terrorism Advisory System warning
that “Iran likely views terrorist activities as an option to deter or retaliate
against its perceived adversaries. In many instances, Iran has targeted United
States interests through its partners such as Hezbollah.”25 Following the
January 8, 2020, Iranian missile attack on military bases used by U.S. forces in
Iraq, former FBI deputy director Andrew McCabe warned of the potential for
terrorist attacks by Iran and its proxies—even in the U.S. homeland—in a
Washington Post editorial entitled “If you think Iran is done retaliating, think
again.”26
One consequence of the Soleimani assassination may be a weakening of Iranian
command and control over its various proxies, which were never a uniform bloc of
groups equally committed to taking orders from Tehran to begin with.27 But even
among those groups most closely aligned with the Quds Force, like Lebanese
Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, the loss of Soleimani—a charismatic
leader beloved by Shi`a militia foot soldiers and commanders alike—means the
Quds Force is now likely to be run by committee with a few more senior
commanders and experienced managers collectively trying to take on the many
roles previously filled singularly by Soleimani.28 Soleimani played a hands-on
role, involving himself personally in key operations, building rapport and
personal bonds with militia commanders, and mediating disputes over prestige or
money when those arose among Khamenei’s fighters without borders.29 Lacking the
personal touch Soleimani contributed to the command and control of these groups,
it is not clear that even if Iran wanted to stop one of its proxy groups from
carrying out a terrorist attack it would be in a position to do so. Kata’ib
Hezbollah, in particular, is likely to seek vengeance for the assassination of
its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, whose intimate ties to the Quds Force and
Hezbollah go back decades.30
A Hezbollah supporter holds a picture of Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian IRGC
commander killed in a U.S. drone strike, right, as Hassan Nasrallah, leader of
Hezbollah, delivers a televised speech, in Beirut, Lebanon, on January 5, 2020.
(Hasan Shaaban/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
The International Terror Threat from Iran’s Shi`a Liberation Army
All this begs the question: what might a “new era” of international terror
operations carried out by Iran’s “fighters without borders” look like?
A series of arrests of Hezbollah operatives around the world over the past few
years—including the three U.S. cases noted above and others in Cyprus, Thailand,
France, and Peru—collectively exposed a significant amount of information on the
modus operandi of Hezbollah’s covert operations.31 But these cases, some of
which only came to light recently, are most revealing about how Hezbollah
operated a decade ago, when the operational activities largely took place.
Iranian agents and Hezbollah operatives will undoubtedly play central roles in
this new strategy, but they will not, according to the aspirations of
Hezbollah’s leader, be acting alone. “Meting out the appropriate punishment to
these criminal assassins … will be the responsibility and task of all resistance
fighters worldwide,” Nasrallah said on January 3, 2020, shortly after the
Soleimani strike. “We will carry a flag on all battlefields and all fronts and
we will step up the victories of the axis of resistance with the blessing of his
[Soleimani’s] pure blood,” he added.32
One option law enforcement officials assess the Quds Force, Hezbollah, and other
elements of Iran’s threat network could employ would be to draw upon the deep
bench of Shi`a militants across the spectrum of Iran’s Shi`a proxy groups to
carry out terrorist operations. There is ample literature discussing Iran’s
ability to deploy Shi`a militia fighters to other battlefields in the region,33
but this new concern focuses on Iran’s ability to deploy select Shi`a militia
operatives not to fight in other regional conflicts but to carry out acts of
international terrorism.
In a Joint Intelligence Bulletin issued days after Soleimani was killed, the
U.S. intelligence community warned that if Iran decided to carry out a
retaliatory attack in the United States, it “could act directly or enlist the
cooperation of proxies and partners [emphasis added by the author], such as
Lebanese Hizbollah.”34
Security officials worry that the next “Hezbollah” attack in the West, or
infiltration across Israel’s northern border, could be carried out by
non-Iranian, non-Lebanese operatives within these proxy and partners groups from
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf States, or elsewhere. As Nasrallah himself
said in a speech following Soleimani’s death, “the rest of the Axis of
Resistance must begin operations,” implying that the burden of exacting a price
for the Soleimani assassination cannot be carried by Hezbollah alone.35
Hezbollah trained many of these Shi`a militants in the first place, typically in
training sessions lasting 20-45 days (though some received additional
specialized training), and then fought with them on the battlefield in Syria.36
The Quds Force and Hezbollah are well-placed to spot exceptional candidates,
provide them specialized training in terrorist tactics and operational security,
and dispatch them to carry out attacks in an effort to hide their own ties to
such actions. This may create dangers for Americans on U.S. soil and overseas.
The NCTC reported in October 2019, “Iran and Hezbollah’s ongoing efforts to
expand their already robust global networks also threaten the homeland.”37
Outside the United States, through the Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS), Iran also “maintains links to terrorist operatives and
networks in Europe, Asia and Africa that could be called upon to target U.S. or
allied personnel.”38
In 2016, an IRGC general first used the term “Shi`a Liberation Army” in
reference to the Fatemiyoun brigade of Afghan Shi`a militants fighting on Iran’s
behalf in Syria. “The upside of the recent [conflicts] has been the mobilization
of a force of nearly 200,000 armed youths in different countries in the region,”
the commander of the IRGC said that same year.39 Soleimani invested much time
and effort building up and coordinating the mix of Shi`a violent extremist
groups, which, despite having their own identities and local grievances, have
bonded together in an informal web of relationships serving as proxy agents for
Iran. U.S. officials often refer to this as the Iran Threat Network, or ITN.
Syria served not only as an operational training ground but as a finishing
school for operational tradecraft for this Shi`a foreign legion, providing Iran
a deep bench of experienced militants from among whom it could spot potential
candidates for terrorist operations training. Even just a few years ago, until
the wars in Syria and Iraq, Iran had no such option. As Colin Clarke and Phillip
Smyth noted in November 2017:
The wars in Syria and Iraq have given Iran the opportunity to formalize and
expand networks of Shi`a foreign fighters throughout the region. Units of Shi`a
militants from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are undergoing a transformation into a
“Hezbollah”-style organization that is loyal to Iran and willing to fight
alongside Iranian troops and advisers. Meanwhile, Afghan and Pakistani
Khomeinist networks have been reformed to supply thousands of fighters who can
be used as shock troops on battlefields stretching from the Middle East to South
Asia.40
To be sure, the U.S. intelligence community has given considerable attention to
Iran’s proxy relationships. In November 2019, for example, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) released a report entitled Iran Military Power:
Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance. According to the
report,
Through the IRGC-QF, Iran provides its partners, proxies, and affiliates with
varying levels of financial assistance, training and materiel support. Iran uses
these groups to further its national security objectives while obfuscating
Iranian involvement in foreign conflicts. Tehran also relies on them as a means
to carry out retaliatory attacks on its adversaries. Most of these groups share
similar religious and ideological values with Iran, particularly devotion to
Shia Islam and, in some cases, adherence to velayat-e faqih [Rule of the
Jurisprudent].41
The support Tehran provides these groups includes “facilitating terrorist
attacks,” the DIA reported. “These partner and proxy groups provide Iran with a
degree of plausible deniability, and their demonstrated capabilities and
willingness to attack Iran’s enemies serve as an additional deterrent.”42 The
DIA assessed in late 2019 that “Tehran is likely to continue using these
fighters in Syria,” but added that “it remains unclear if there are plans to
deploy them to other locations.”43
Whether or not Iran decides to dispatch Afghan Fatemiyoun, Pakistani Zainabiyoun,
or Iraqi Heidariyun Shi`a militantsc to other regional battlefronts such as
Israel’s norther border or Yemen, it could select the crème de la crème from
these militias for specialized terrorist operations training, much as Hezbollah
has handpicked militia fighters for its Islamic Jihad Organization terrorist
operations.44 As a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in London noted, “an essential function that Hizballah has performed on behalf
of Iran in the management and mentoring of many of Tehran’s Arab partners.
Indeed, the organization has become a central interlocutor for an array of Arab
militias and political parties that have sectarian and ideological, or simply
opportunistic, ties to Tehran.”45 Today, Hezbollah performs such a function for
a wider spectrum of Shi`a militant groups beholden to Iran, such as the Shi`a
militia groups in Iraq.46 d
To a significant degree, deploying terrorist attack cells with personnel drawn
from various components of Iran’s network of proxies would mark a return to old
tradecraft. Consider, for example, the Iranian-directed plots targeting Kuwait
in the mid-1980s. The first in this string of attacks were the December 12,
1983, bombings at the American and French embassies in Kuwait, at the Kuwaiti
airport, near the American Raytheon Corporation’s grounds, at a Kuwait National
Petroleum Company oil rig, and at a government-owned power-station. A seventh
bomb, outside a post office, was diffused.47 Six people were killed, and some 87
were injured in the attacks.48 The string of well-coordinated bombings, which
occurred within a span of two hours, were executed at Iran’s behest by Lebanese
and Iraqi Shi`a militants—including Lebanese Hezbollah’s Mustapha Badreddine and
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, then of the Iraqi Dawa Partye (who, according to the
United States and Kuwait, helped plan the Kuwait attacks49 and, as already
outlined, was killed in January 2020 alongside Soleimani). The nature of the
attack provided Iran grounds for plausible deniability. Iran denied any
involvement in the plots, insisting that “attribution of these attacks to Iran
is part and parcel of a comprehensive plot by the United States of America and
its agents against the Islamic revolution.”50
Iran has already found creative new ways to use its Shi`a militia proxies for
unorthodox purposes, such as deploying Shi`a fighters to break up anti-regime
demonstrations in Iran in November 2019.51 The month before, Iran-backed militia
snipers were deployed to Baghdad during anti-government protests there.52
And there is already evidence that Iran and Hezbollah have been moving in this
direction. For several years now, Hezbollah has been actively recruiting and
deploying dual-nationals—from the United States, Canada, France, Sweden, Great
Britain, and Australia, among other countries—who are able to travel for
operational purposes on their non-Lebanese passports.53 For example, Ali Kourani
traveled from New York to China on his U.S. passport to negotiate a deal to buy
ammonium-nitrate ice packs of the kind Hezbollah uses to construct bombs.54 And
Samer El Debek allegedly traveled to Thailand to remove explosive precursor
materials from a compromised Hezbollah safe house, and to Panama where he
allegedly conducted preoperational surveillance of American, Israeli, and
Panamanian targets.55
More recently, an article in Le Figaro reported that Hezbollah has begun
recruiting operatives with non-Lebanese profiles in the wake of exposures of its
Lebanese operatives traveling on non-Lebanese passports. According to this
report, in August 2019, a Pakistani suspected of being a Hezbollah operative was
questioned by authorities in Thailand. Dozens of operatives with non-Lebanese
profiles, including Shi`a from Pakistan and Afghanistan, have been recruited by
Hezbollah for foreign operations, and are often deployed using cover stories as
tourists, the report stated.56 Another cover involves recruiting Lebanese who
have lived somewhere abroad for a long time. In July 2019, Ugandan authorities
arrested a Lebanese national who had lived in the country since 2010 on
suspicion of being an undercover Hezbollah agent.57
Again, there is precedent for Hezbollah recruiting non-Lebanese operatives.
According to a 1994 FBI report, “an Iraqi-born Shia cleric, who is based in
Texas, has positioned himself in a leadership role of Hezbollah in the United
States.”58
The Quds Force has also begun to recruit non-Iranian Shi`a operatives for
espionage and terrorist missions abroad. In January 2019, German authorities
arrested a dual Afghan-German citizen, who worked as a translator and advisor
for the German army, on charges of spying for Iran.59 In another case, Dutch
authorities accused Iran of hiring local criminals to assassinate Iranian
dissidents in the Netherlands.60 And in December 2019, a Swedish court convicted
an Iraqi man on charges of spying for Iran, including “gathering information on
Iranian refugees in Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands.”61 Iran
recruited an African rebel to build up pro-Iranian terror cells in Central
Africa,62 and in June 2019, Israeli authorities arrested a Jordanian national on
espionage charges for trying to recruit people in the West Bank to spy on Israel
for Iran.63
By deploying members of its foreign legion of proxy groups, its “fighters
without borders,” Iran (and Hezbollah) seeks “to anonymize its action in order
to conduct its operations without being directly implicated.”64 To that end,
authorities are concerned about another possible new trend in Iran Threat
Network mobilization—one that to date has never occurred, but nonetheless has
the attention of U.S. officials.
Inspiring Lone Offenders: Shi`a HVE?
Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on February 5, 2020, FBI
Director Christopher Wray underscored that the international terrorist threat to
the United States had “expanded from sophisticated, externally directed FTO
[foreign terrorist organization] plots to include individual attacks carried out
by HVE [homegrown violent extremists] who are inspired by designated terrorist
organizations.”65 These lone offenders present unique challenges to law
enforcement, due to their lack of ties to known terrorists, easy access to
extremist material online, ability to radicalize and mobilize to violence
quickly, and use of everyday communication platforms that utilize end-to-end
encryption. While Director Wray highlighted the particular success the Islamic
State has demonstrated in leveraging digital communications to draw lone
offenders to its ideology, he noted that many other terrorist organizations
reach out to people who may be “susceptible and sympathetic to violent terrorist
messages.” In fact, law enforcement agencies are confronting “a surge in
terrorist propaganda and training available via the Internet and social
media.”66
Today, Iran’s Quds Force and other Shi`a extremist terrorist groups are
disseminating extremist material online. This trend has the attention of U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence officials, who have warned that one possible
“catalyzing event” for Shi`a HVE plotting in the United States would be if
“radicalizing enablers” began actively “amplifying anti-US and pro-Shia rhetoric
among audiences in the US.”67
Indeed, within 24 hours of the Soleimani drone strike, DHS released a bulletin
under its National Terrorism Advisory System warning of potential Iranian or
Iranian-inspired plots against the homeland. The bulletin stressed the
Department had no information regarding any specific, credible threat to the
homeland, but advised that “Homegrown Violent Extremists could capitalize on the
heightened tensions to launch individual attacks,” adding that “an attack in the
homeland may come with little or no warning.”68
A few days later, DHS, FBI, and NCTC released a joint intelligence bulletin
advising federal, state, local, and other counterterrorism and law enforcement
officials and private sector partners “to remain vigilant in the event of a
potential [Government of Iran] GOI-directed or violent extremist GOI supporter
threat to US-based individuals, facilities, and [computer] networks” [emphasis
added by the author].69 The report warned not only of Iranian-directed
plots—including both lethal attacks and cyber operations—but also of attacks by
supporters of Iran inspired to carry out attacks on their own.
Concern within the U.S. counterterrorism community over the prospect of Shi`a
HVE attacks predates the Soleimani strike. The intelligence community has given
the prospect of Shi`a HVE violence some thought, and NCTC defines Shi`a HVEs as
“individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran,
foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but
who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.”70
In an October 2018 analytical report, the product of a structured analytic
brainstorming session, entitled “Envisioning the Emergence of Shia HVE Plotters
in the US,” NCTC explained that although there have been no confirmed cases of
Shi`a HVE plotting attacks in the United States, analysts identified several
enabling factors that would increase the likelihood of Shi`a HVEs mobilizing to
violence.71 The first is the occurrence of a “catalyzing event” such as “direct
U.S. military action in Iran, sustained U.S. operations against Hezbollah in
Lebanon or Syria, or the assassination of a senior Iranian or Hezbollah leader
perceived to have U.S. involvement.” These events would be sufficiently
significant, the analysts assessed, to “push some U.S. Shia to radicalize and
consider retaliatory violence.” Such a scenario may have been theoretical
conjecture at the time, but the assassinations of Soleimani and al-Muhandis
surely, in this author’s assessment, meet this bar.72
For Shi`a HVE mobilization in the United States to occur, the U.S. intelligence
analysts assessed, some combination of a series of other boxes would also have
to be checked. Some of these boxes have been checked in the past without Shi`a
HVE mobilization, but the analysts noted that “repeat occurrences of such
incidents could contribute to or spark radicalization.” The analysts added that
these include catalyzing events other than U.S. military action, such as Shi`a
leaders and clerics calling for violence in the United States; Israeli or Sunni
Arab government lethal operations targeting Iran, Hezbollah, or other Shi`a; or
anti-Shi`a activity in the United States.73
The potential for Shi`a HVE mobilization to violence increases, the report
continued, if the catalyzing event occurred in conjunction with “radicalization
enablers.” Such enablers could include, for example, charismatic U.S.-based
radicalizers, perhaps people who have fought with Hezbollah or other Shi`a
militant groups overseas, promoting Shi`a grievances and advocating attacks.
Alternatively, social-media influencers tied to Iran or Hezbollah or independent
Shi`a websites promoting Shi`a grievances could conduct influence operations
intended to sow discord among Shi`a in the United States and mobilize them to
violence. The NCTC report notes, for example, the pro-Hezbollah “Electronic
Resistance” social media outfit, which supports Hezbollah but is not controlled
by it and which spreads Shi`a extremist material online. NCTC refers to these as
“Shi`a cyber actors.”74 If Shi`a media, which is dominated by Iran and its
proxies, began to open sanction retaliatory violence, that too, according to the
NCTC report, would serve as an enabling factor for Shi`a HVE mobilization.
As it happens, Iran runs extensive digital influence operations, including using
Instagram accounts to spam the White House and Trump family after the Soleimani
assassination with images of coffins draped in U.S. flags with the caption
“prepare the coffins.”75 Iran’s IRGC also disseminates its ideological training
materials online in Farsi. A new study by the Tony Blair Institute for Global
Change details how IRGC ideological training documents “propagate the idea that
there is an existential threat to Shiism and Shia Muslims from a ‘[Sunni]
Arab-Zionist-Western axis.’” Among the report’s key findings is that the
worldview within which the IRGC ideological training is framed is extremist and
violence. “It identifies enemies—from the West to Christians and Jews, to
Iranians who oppose the regime—and advocates supranational jihad in the name of
exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution.”76
And there are signs that Shi`a militia groups themselves are producing material
on social media aimed at radicalizing Shi`a and mobilizing them to violence. A
tweet by a Kata’ib Hezbollah spokesperson on January 3, 2020, right after the
Soleimani hit, encourages volunteers to undertake “martyrdom operations against
invading Crusader foreign forces” by noting that the first to register would be
the first to be martyred.77 A post on Twitter dated February 5, 2020, shows a
photograph of what it says is Kata’ib Hezbollah’s registration form for those
interested in carrying out suicide operations targeting U.S. forces in Iraq.78
A variety of factors inhibit the emergence of Shi`a HVE activity in the United
States—not a single case of Shi`a HVE activity has been reported to
date—including the fact that Shiism is hierarchical, and there is therefore an
inherent disincentive to carrying out truly inspired, lone-offender attacks
absent direction from senior Iranian, Hezbollah, or other authority figures. But
in the event that radicalization enablers follow one or more catalyzing events,
NCTC argued, these would “probably increase the number of Shia HVEs or
accelerate their mobilization to violence by amplifying anti-US and pro-Shia
rhetoric among Shia audiences in the US.”79
In another scenario, Shi`a HVE mobilization would not necessarily have to start
from zero. A case could be envisioned in which a member of the Shi`a community
in the United States is self-radicalized with the help of online extremist Shi`a
messaging, but still more likely is that someone already involved with a Shi`a
extremist group is mobilized to action on their own, independent of the
organization.
Such concerns warrant attention, especially in light of the historical
precedent. In August 1989, a Hezbollah operative died while preparing an
explosive device in a London hotel.80 Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh intended to
assassinate Salman Rushdie, the author whose 1988 publication, The Satanic
Verses, prompted Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a fatwa condemning him to death.
A Lebanese citizen born in Guinea, Mazeh joined Hezbollah as a teenager. He
visited the family village in Lebanon before making his way to England via The
Netherlands. Later, in the context of discussing Khomeini’s Rushdie fatwa, a
Hezbollah commander told an interviewer that “one member of the Islamic
Resistance, Mustafa Mazeh, had been martyred in London.”81 According to a 1992
CIA assessment, attacks on the book’s Italian, Norwegian, and Japanese
translators in July 1991 suggested “that Iran has shifted from attacking
organizations affiliated with the novel—publishing houses and bookstores—to
individuals involved in its publication, as called for in the original fatwa.”82
A shrine dedicated to Mazeh was erected in Tehran’s Behesht Zahra cemetery with
the inscription: “The first martyr to die on a mission to kill Salman
Rushdie.”83
Conclusion
Speaking at a ceremony marking the 40th day since Soleimani was killed, IRGC
Commander Major General Hossein Salami warned both Israel and the United States,
“If you make the slightest error, we will hit both of you.”84 A day earlier,
Iran’s foreign ministry released a statement—on February 12, 2020, the
anniversary of Imad Mughniyeh’s death—warning that “the Islamic Republic of Iran
will give a crushing response that will cause regret to any kind of aggression
or stupid action from this regime [Israel] against our country’s interests in
Syria and the region.”85
In fact, it is likely that any Iranian international terror campaign in response
to real or perceived action against its interests—be it the assassination of
Qassem Soleimani in Iraq or airstrikes in Syria targeting Shi`a militias or
weapons transfers destined for Hezbollah—would include actions taken by Shi`a
militants of varying nationalities operating at Iran’s behest. Under Soleimani,
the Quds Force built up its Shi`a militant foreign legion, and as a consequence
of their shared experience fighting in Syria and Iraq, these proxy groups are
both battle-hardened and strongly committed to Iran. For many, fighting in
Iran’s foreign legion is all they have known for the past several years. It only
makes sense for Iran to deploy these fighters to new theaters, be they
battlefronts or terror networks. Doing so provides Iran with reasonable
deniability, and enlisting operatives traveling on a variety of non-Lebanese and
non-Iranian passports may allow them to fly under the radar of law enforcement
and intelligence services. Indeed, as noted in this piece, both Hezbollah and
Iran have already started using these kinds of operatives for terrorist
missions, so there is every reason to think they will continue to do so.
Hezbollah has groomed Shi`a militants from a wide range of groups, and law
enforcement authorities now worry Iran may be actively pursuing a strategy of
radicalizing and mobilizing lone offenders to carry out attacks of their own out
of solidarity with, but without explicit foreign direction from Iran or
Hezbollah.
But the most likely scenarios for near-term ITN operations targeting the United
States or its allies involve attacks on U.S. and other forces in the region and
a wide range of cyberattacks.86 Iran and its proxies will undoubtedly look for
opportunities to avenge the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. As
counterterrorism officials try to forecast what new trends in Iranian and
Hezbollah operational modus operandi might look like, they are increasingly
focused on Iran’s Shi`a Liberation Army, its “fighters without borders,” and
potentially seeking to radicalize lone actors—Shi`a HVEs—as tools Tehran could
use to hide its fingerprints in any future attack on U.S. interests, in the
region, or in the homeland. CTC
Dr. Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of The Washington
Institute’s Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. He has served
as a counterterrorism official with the FBI and Treasury Department, and is the
author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. He has
written for CTC Sentinel since 2008. Follow @Levitt_Matt
Substantive Notes
[a] In the September 2019 issue of this publication, then Acting Director of
National Intelligence Joseph Maguire stated, “We assess that Iran will do
everything they can not to go into a conventional conflict with the United
States because they realize they cannot match the United States in its
conventional capability.” Paul Cruickshank and Brian Dodwell, “A View from the
CT Foxhole: Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence,” CTC
Sentinel 12:8 (2019).
[b] On January 4, 2020, President Trump tweeted that the United States would
target 52 Iranian sites if Tehran struck any American or American assets. See
Donald J. Trump, “….targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American
hostages taken by Iran many years ago) …” Twitter, January 4, 2020.
[c] Heidariyun is an umbrella term used to connote Shi`a militants from Iraq
employed by Iran to support its operations in Syria. The U.S. Treasury
Department describes the Fatemiyun as “an IRGC-QF-led militia that preys on the
millions of undocumented Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran, coercing them to
fight in Syria under threat of arrest or deportation.” It describes Zeinabiyun
as “Syria-based, IRGC-QF-led militia, composed of Pakistani fighters mainly
recruited from among undocumented and impoverished Pakistani Shiite immigrants
living in Iran.” See Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing
Regional Dominance (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, November
2019), p. 61, and “Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Fighter Militias in Syria
along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying Weapons to Syria,” U.S. Treasury
Department, January 24, 2019.
[d] As a point of comparison, two key things that led to the development and
rise of al-Qa`ida were the experience its recruits gained in an active combat
zone (i.e., Afghanistan) and the group’s ability to offer broad and specialized
training at scale. The specialized training also created an opportunity for al-Qa`ida
to talent spot. Today, a similar dynamic can be seen in the context of Iran’s
IRGC, Hezbollah, and related Shi`a militant proxies, specifically experience in
a conflict zone, large numbers, and robust training infrastructure.
[e] Founded in the 1950s, the Iraqi Dawa Party opposed the Baathist regime that
came to power in 1968, and after 1979 Iranian revolution, a faction of the party
formed a military wing based in Iran to target the Iraqi regime. This wing, tied
to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iran (SCIRI), subscribed to
the Khomeinist ideology of waliyat-e-faqih, and formed close ties to Lebanese
Hezbollah. After the fall of the Saddam regime, the Dawa Party entered the Iraqi
political scene. See Joel Wing, “A History of Iraq’s Islamic Dawa Party,
Interview With Lowy Inst. for Intl. Policy’s Dr. Rodger Shanahan,” Musings on
Iraq, August 13, 2012, and Ali Latif, “The Da’wa Party’s Eventful Past and
Tentative Future in Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August
19, 2008.
Citations
[1] Sara Taha Moughnieh, “Sayyed Nasrallah: Suleimani Revenge is Long Track,
Trump Biggest Liar in History of US Presidency,” Al-Manar, January 14, 2020.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Isn’t Just in Beirut. It’s in New York, Too,”
Foreign Policy, June 14, 2019.
[4] Maryam Sinaiee, “New Vice-Commander of Iran’s Qods Force Signifies
Khamenei’s Message of ‘Fighters without Borders,’” Radio Farda, January 20,
2020.
[5] “Tehran-Backed Hezbollah Steps in to Guide Iraqi Militias in Soleimani’s
Wake,” Reuters, February 11, 2020.
[6] “International Radical Fundamentalism: An Analytical Overview of Groups and
Trends,” Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, November 1994, declassified on November
20, 2008.
[7] “Answers to Questions for the Record from Assistant Attorney General Daniel
J. Bryant to Senators Bob Graham and Richard Shelby,” U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, July 26, 2002, Marked SSCI # 2002-3253; appended to
printed edition of “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States,” Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
United States Senate, 107th Congress, Second Session, February 6, 2002, p. 339.
[8] Matthew Levitt, “Why Iran Wants to Attack the United States, Foreign Policy,
October 29, 2012.
[9] “Man Pleads Guilty in New York to Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials
to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” Department of
Justice, October 17, 2012.
[10] Matthew Levitt, “Tehran’s Unlikely Assassins,” Weekly Standard, August 20,
2012.
[11] James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence,” Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 5.
[12] Adam Goldman and Ellen Nakashima, “CIA and Mossad Killed Senior Hezbollah
Figure in Car Bombing,” Washington Post, January 30, 2015.
[13] Roee Nahmias, “Hezbollah Prepares Hit List to Avenge Mughniyeh Killing,”
Ynet News, September 15, 2010.
[14] Matthew G. Olsen, “Worldwide Threats to the Homeland,” Testimony before the
House Committee on Homeland Security, September 17, 2014.
[15] “Bronx Man and Michigan Man Arrested for Terrorist Activities on Behalf of
Hizballah’s Islamic Jihad Organization,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern
District of New York, U.S. Department of Justice, June 8, 2017.
[16] “Hizballah Operative Sentenced to 40 Years in Prison for Covert Terrorist
Activities on Behalf of Hizballah’s Islamic Jihad Organization,” U.S. Attorney’s
Office, Southern District of New York, U.S. Department of Justice, December 3,
2019.
[17] Elise Labott and Laura Koran, “US officials warn of potential Hezbollah
threat to US homeland,” CNN, October 11, 2017.
[18] U.S. v Ali Kourani, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York,
Testimony of FBI Special Agent Keri Shannon, May 8, 2019, p. 236 of trial
transcript.
[19] “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Indictment of New Jersey Man for
Terrorist Activities on Behalf of Hizballah’s Islamic Jihad Organization,” U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, U.S. Department of Justice,
September 19, 2019.
[20] Moughnieh.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Qasim Abdul-Zahra and Bassem Mrou, “Iraq Vote, Hezbollah Threat Leveled at
US Troops in Mideast,” Associated Press, January 5, 2020.
[23] Moughnieh.
[24] “Sayyed Nasrallah: Qassem Suleimani’s Shoe is Worth Trumps Head (Video),”
Al-Manar, January 6, 2020.
[25] “Summary of Terrorism Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” National Terrorism
Advisory System Bulletin, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 4, 2020.
[26] Andrew McCabe, “If You Think Iran is Done Retaliating, Think Again,”
Washington Post, January 9, 2020.
[27] Becca Wasser and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s Network of Fighters in the
Middle East Aren’t Always Loyal to Iran,” Washington Post, May 21, 2019.
[28] Matthew Levitt, “The New Iranian General to Watch,” Politico, January 23,
2020.
[29] Ibid.; Ali Soufan, “Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,”
CTC Sentinel 11:10 (2018).
[30] For background on Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, aka Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, see
“Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi a.k.a. Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes,” Counter Extremism Project.
[31] See, for example, Matthew Levitt, “Hizb Allah Resurrected: The Party of
God’s Return to Tradecraft,” CTC Sentinel 6:4 (2013) and Matthew Levitt,
“Hezbollah Isn’t Just in Beirut. It’s in New York, Too,” Foreign Policy, June
14, 2019.
[32] “Hizbullah: Avenging Soleimani Responsibility of Resistance Worldwide,”
Naharnet, January 3, 2020.
[33] Hanin Ghaddar ed., Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Impact of Shia Militias on
U.S. Foreign Policy, Policy Note 46, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
February 2018; Colin Clarke and Phillip Smyth, “The Implications of Iran’s
Expanding Shi’a Foreign Fighter Network,” CTC Sentinel 10:10 (2017).
[34] “Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential
Threats to the Homeland,” Joint Intelligence Bulletin, DHS, FBI, NCTC, January
8, 2020, at https://cdn.ymaws.com/members.iamu.org/resource/resmgr/informer_2019/JIB_Iran_1-8-20.pdf
[35] Moughnieh.
[36] Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional
Dominance (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, November 2019), p. 61.
[37] Acting NCTC Director Russell Travers, “Global Terrorism: Threats to the
Homeland,” Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
October 30, 2019.
[38] Ibid.
[39] For both quotes, see Nader Uskawi, “Examining Iran’s Global Terrorism
Network,” Testimony submitted to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, April 17, 2018.
[40] Clarke and Smyth.
[41] Iran Military Power, p. 33.
[42] Ibid., p. 57.
[43] Ibid., p. 61.
[44] Matthew Levitt, “Hizballah and the Qods Force in Iran’s Shadow War with the
West,” Policy Focus 123 (2013): p. 3.
[45] “Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, an IISS Strategic
Dossier,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2019, p. 67.
[46] “Tehran-Backed Hezbollah Steps in to Guide Iraqi Militias in Soleimani’s
Wake.”
[47] Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon eds., Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol
III: 1983-84 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 405.
[48] Ibid.; Judith Miller, “Driver in Embassy Bombing Identified as Pro-Iranian
Iraqi,” New York Times, December 17, 1983.
[49] James Glanz and Marc Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker was Convicted in 1983
Bombings in Kuwait that Killed 5,” New York Times, February 7, 2007; Matthew S.
Schwartz, “Who Was The Iraqi Commander Also Killed In The Baghdad Drone Strike?”
NPR, January 4, 2020.
[50] “Iran Denies Kuwait Blast Role,” New York Times, December 14, 1983.
[51] “Iran-Backed Fighters Claim They Were Deployed Against Protestors in
November,” Radio Farda, February 4, 2020.
[52] “Exclusive-Iran-Backed Militias Deployed Snipers in Iraq Protests-Sources,”
Reuters, October 17, 2019.
[53] Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Criminal and Terrorist Operations in Europe,”
AJC, September 2, 2018.
[54] “USA v Ali Kourani, Complaint,” Southern District of New York, Department
of Justice, May 31, 2017.
[55] “USA v Samer el Debek, Complaint,” Southern District of New York,
Department of Justice, May 31, 2017.
[56] Nicolas Barotte, “Le Hezbollah cheche a constituer de nouvelle cellules
dormantes a l’etranger,” Le Figaro, January 23, 2020.
[57] “Exclusive: Ugandan and Israeli Intelligence Unmask International Terrorist
Plot in Uganda,” Kampala Post, July 22, 2019.
[58] “International Radical Fundamentalism: An Analytical Overview of Groups and
Trends.”
[59] “Germany Charges Man with Spying for Iran,” Associated Press, August 16,
2019.
[60] Raf Sanchez, “Iran Hired Criminals to Assassinate Dissidents in the
Netherlands, Dutch Government Claims,” Telegraph, January 8, 2019.
[61] David Keyton, “Sweden Sentences Iraqi Man of Spying for Iran,” Associated
Press, December 20, 2019.
[62] Jack Losh, “Revealed: How Iran Tried to Set Up Terror Cells in Central
Africa,” Telegraph, January 11, 2020.
[63] Judah Ari Gross, “Israel Says it Nabbed Iranian Spy in West Bank Trying to
Build Espionage Network,” Times of Israel, June 20, 2019.
[64] Barotte.
[65] Christopher Wray, “FBI Oversight,” Testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, February 5, 2020.
[66] Ibid.
[67] “Envisioning the Emergence of Shia HVE Plotters in the US,” NCTC Current,
National Counterterrorism Center, October 16, 2018, at https://www.infragard-la.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NCTC-U-FOUO-Envisioning-the-Emergence-of-Shia-HVE-Plotters-in-the-US.pdf
[68] “Summary of Terrorism Threat to the U.S. Homeland.”
[69] “Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential
Threats to the Homeland.”
[70] “Envisioning the Emergence of Shia HVE Plotters in the US.”
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour, “Iranian Digital Influence
Efforts: Guerrilla Broadcasting for the Twenty-First Century,” Atlantic Council,
February 11, 2020.
[76] Kasra Aarabi, “Beyond Borders: The Expansionist Ideology of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, February 4,
2020.
[77] Abu Ali al-Askari, “Bring lightness and gravity, and put your money and
yourselves …,” Twitter, January 3, 2020, courtesy of Phillip Smyth.
[78] Ali al-Iraqi, “In the name of Allah the Merciful, the architecture of the
Elamam State …,” Twitter, February 5, 2020, courtesy of Phillip Smyth.
[79] “Envisioning the Emergence of Shia HVE Plotters in the US.”
[80] Anthony Loyd, “Tomb of the unknown assassin reveals mission to kill
Rushdie,” Times (London), June 8, 2005.
[81] H. E. Chehabi and Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon
in the Last 500 Years (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), pp. 292-293.
[82] “Iran: Enhanced Terrorist Capabilities and Expanding Target Selection,”
Central Intelligence Agency, April 1, 1992.
[83] Loyd.
[84] “Iran Says it Will Strike U.S. and Israel if They Make the ‘Slightest
Error,’” Reuters, February 13, 2020.
[85] “Iran Vows ‘Crushing Response’ to Any Israeli Action against Regional
Interests,” Reuters, February 12, 2020.
[86] Mark Mazzetti, Ronen Bergman, and Farnaz Fassihi, “How Months of
Miscalculation Led the U.S. and Iran to the Brink of War,” New York Times,
February 13, 202
https://ctc.usma.edu/fighters-without-borders-forecasting-new-trends-iran-threat-network-foreign-operations-tradecraft/
دراسة تشرح الأسباب التي من أجلها تسعى روسيا لضم لبنان إلى محورها ووضعه تحت
مظلتها
Why Russia Wants Lebanon
Grigory Melamedov/Middle East Forum/February 28/2020
Middle East Quarterly
During the Syrian war, Jerusalem used Lebanese air space to foil weapon
transfers from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. But in September 2018, Syrian air
defenses shot down a Russian military aircraft during an Israeli operation.
Moscow blamed Israel and deployed air defense systems to Syria, limiting the
Israeli air force’s freedom of movement and ability to prevent such transfers.
Russia’s attempts to draw Lebanon into its sphere of influence by placing it
under Moscow’s air defense umbrella and selling weapons to Beirut have been
discussed by American experts for years. Some analysts argue that Washington
should not try to compete with the Kremlin there while others maintain that any
concession is unacceptable. Russian arms sales to Lebanon would likely not
affect the region’s balance of power, but Moscow’s expansion of its Syrian air
defense umbrella could tip the balance of forces in the Arab-Israeli and
Iranian-Israeli conflicts and create a serious challenge for the United States
in the near future.
Moscow on the Mediterranean
During the first half of 2018, Russia increasingly expressed unhappiness with
Israeli air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. On September
17, 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down a Russian Ilyushin IL-20 military
aircraft, supposedly by accident, during an Israeli operation. Moscow blamed
Israel for the incident and immediately deployed S-300 air defense systems to
Syria, significantly limiting the Israeli air force’s freedom of movement.
Russian military and civilian experts openly insisted that now was the time to
show Israel that the Kremlin dictated the rules in Syria. Fyodor Lukyanov,
chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy stated:
“If Israel were to defy Russia’s dominant role, Russia would react and take a
stand. This is unlikely to happen because Israel knows Russia defines the rules
in Syria.”[1]
The main Israeli objective in Syria was to prevent weapons transfers from Iran
to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Jerusalem used Lebanese air space to foil such
transfers. In November 2018, Lebanese president Michel Aoun asked Moscow to
protect Lebanon’s air space. Russian media reports that the defense ministry was
favorably considering the idea alarmed the Israelis.[2]
Earlier, in February 2018, Russian natural gas producer Novatek obtained
permission from the Lebanese government to develop natural gas fields in
territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea disputed by Lebanon and Israel. This
action signaled that Moscow unambiguously sided with Lebanon and claimed the
right to protect its natural gas investments during a military crisis.
The Russians remained neutral during Operation Northern Shield (December
2018–January 2019) when the Israel Defense Forces destroyed Hezbollah tunnels
that crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border into northern Israel. However, Moscow’s
ambition to draw Lebanon into its sphere of influence predates its intervention
in Syria and persists to this day. Tensions could rise again at any time.
Russia and Lebanon
Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern country where Moscow can rely on a
substantial Christian community. Its natural ally is the Orthodox Church,
subordinated to the Patriarchate of Antioch. Currently, the Orthodox community
comprises about 8 percent of Lebanon’s population. In the Lebanese government
formed in January 2019, four ministers represent the Orthodox community
politically, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Ghassan
Hasbani and Defense Minister Elias Abu Saab. Former minister of defense, Yaacoub
Sarraf, whom Russian media had reported as favoring Russian arms sales to
Lebanon, is also a member of the Orthodox Church.
Since the Stalin era, Soviet diplomats in Lebanon and Syria have been tasked
with holding the Antioch Patriarch within the sphere of influence of the Russian
Orthodox Church. Under Putin, contacts with the Orthodox Christians have
tremendously increased, and Moscow has also sought to ally with the Maronites—Lebanon’s
largest Christian community. Historically, the Maronites’ main international
partner was France, but this relationship significantly weakened when the
Maronite Patriarch of Antioch, Bechara Boutros Rahi, refused to support the
“Arab Spring” and welcomed Russian troops in Syria. Because Rahi is subordinate
to the Vatican, he tries to maintain a balance between Russia and the West, but
his position seems closer to Putin’s than to the West’s. As he stated on Vatican
Radio:
SO, IF YOU WANT DEMOCRACY, APPLY IT AND LISTEN TO WHAT THE PEOPLE SAY. WANT TO
KNOW WHAT THE FATE OF ASSAD IS? LET THE SYRIAN PEOPLE DECIDE! IT IS NOT YOUR
PLACE TO DECIDE THE PRESIDENT OF SYRIA, OF IRAQ, OF LEBANON.[3]
Putin has also revived a network of religious and secular organizations formed
to lobby for Moscow’s interests in Lebanon, which went dormant after the Soviet
collapse. The most noteworthy is the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS),
which had created roughly a hundred Orthodox schools in the region since its
foundation in 1872. Sergei Stepashin, former head of the Audit Chamber of the
Russian Federation, is the IOPS’s chairman, and Russia’s deputy foreign minister
Mikhail Bogdanov is a member. During the Russian operation in Syria, Bogdanov,
as a special presidential representative for the Middle East, tried to establish
a dialogue between Assad and the moderate opposition. Another prominent IOPS
member is Oleg Ozerov, deputy director of the Africa Department at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former permanent
representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The Association of Orthodox Families of Beirut also lobbies for Russian
interests in Lebanon and maintains close links with the IOPS. The Lebanese
Sursock family is one of its most influential and cooperated with the Russian
consulate general in Beirut as early as the nineteenth century.[4] Robert
Sursock, one of the family’s current representatives, served as chairman and
chief executive officer of Gazprombank Invest Mena from 2009 to 2015.[5]
Lebanese president Michel Aoun (left) meets with Russian president Vladimir
Putin, Moscow, March 26, 2019. The Aoun, Hariri, and Jumblatt families play
major roles in Lebanese politics, and the Kremlin uses these contacts to its
benefit.
Lebanon is the only Arab country other than Syria where pro-Soviet leaders
maintained power from the 1970s through the present. Nearly all of Lebanon’s
most powerful elites, both pro- and anti-Russia, remained in place after the
“Beirut Spring” in 2005. The Hariri, Aoun, and Jumblatt families are hardly
Russian assets, but they still play major roles, and the Kremlin uses this to
its benefit.
Leading Lebanese politicians have long sent lobbyists to Moscow who have strong
ties with Russian big businesses established over the past quarter century.
Notable among these are George Sha’ban, who has represented the Hariri family’s
business, Saudi Oger Ltd., in Russia for a long time and has helped Russian oil
monopolies break into the Saudi market, and Amal Abu Zeid, President Aoun’s
representative to the highest rungs of the Russian political and economic elite,
including President Putin. Abu Zeid’s company, ADICO Investment Corporation,
entered the Russian market in 2000, specializing in Russian oil enterprises in
Southeast Asia, and in 2014, Abu Zeid was made advisor for Lebanese-Russian
affairs in the Lebanese Foreign Ministry. He has active contacts with the
Russian Orthodox Church as an influential member of the Lebanese Maronite
community.[6]
Russia also influences Lebanese Christians via groups associated with European
far-right parties.
Finally, since Soviet times, Moscow, has relied on Russia-educated Lebanese
students, and there are some ten to twenty thousand of them now.[7] The
Association of Alumni of Soviet Universities in Lebanon was established in 1970
and has since intensified its activities, comprising some four thousand members
according to official Russian sources.[8] Russia experts also claim there are as
many as eight thousand mixed families in Lebanon formed by marriages of Russian
women to Lebanese men.[9] The Russian media often mention that former students
now occupy high posts in the Lebanese economy and political system and that
mixed families strengthen Russia’s ties with Lebanon.
According to Deutsche Welle journalist Benas Gerdziunas, Russia also influences
the Christian community via the European Solidarity Front for Syria, which is
closely associated with European far-right parties, as well as with Lebanon’s
radical Levant Party that calls itself the defender of Eastern Christianity in
the Arab world.[10]
Pushback inside Lebanon
However, Moscow’s growing influence worries some Lebanese politicians. That
became clear in January 2019 when Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy and Water gave
the Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft permission to manage the oil products
storage terminal in the city of Tripoli for twenty years. According to L’Orient
Le Jour, Druze leader and Progressive Socialist Party president Walid Jumblatt
tweeted that the deal was reminiscent of the colonial powers’ struggle for oil
in the region a century ago. “With Rosneft in Tripoli,” he wrote, “and tomorrow
in Banias and Basra, Zarif-Lavrov [the Iranian and Russian foreign ministers]
will be the headline of the new Middle East between the Russians and
Persians.”[11] Despite such statements, Jumblatt and his son Taymour still
frequently visit Moscow and maintain close contacts with Russian officials
including deputy foreign minister Bogdanov.[12]
Prominent Lebanese leaders signed a petition denouncing the Russian Orthodox
Church’s character-ization of Moscow’s Syrian military intervention as a “holy
war.” Bishop Elias Audi (above) of Beirut told Russian ambassador Alexander
Zasypkin that his congregation “never asked to be protected.”
Antioch patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim) opposed using the Orthodox Church for
political purposes before he died in 2012.[13] His successor, Patriarch John X,
takes a pro-Russian stance on many key issues,[14] making Moscow’s soft
penetration into Lebanon easier than it otherwise would have been.
At the same time, some Orthodox Christians in Lebanon follow the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople—with which Moscow broke off relations—rather than
the Antioch Patriarch. In October 2015, forty-six prominent leaders signed a
petition denouncing the Russian Orthodox Church’s characterization of Moscow’s
military intervention in Syria as a “holy war.” Russia’s claim that it is
“protecting Christians,” they said, is a pretext for its nationalistic and
political goals.[15] They believe that Moscow is using the same ploy to seize a
more active role in Lebanon. Bishop Elias Audi of Beirut told Russian ambassador
Alexander Zasypkin that his congregation “never asked to be protected.”[16]
Audi and his small group of supporters is the only organized political force in
Lebanon attempting to prevent Russian interference in the country. The
pro-Russian lobby is much better organized and more active.
Russian Objectives and Methods
Russia has two primary goals in the Middle East: to draw as many countries as
possible from the U.S. sphere of influence into its own and to achieve a
privileged position, if not a monopoly, in the regional weapons market. Both of
these goals include Lebanon.
Putin fosters large Russian businesses and increases their profits via the
Kremlin’s foreign allies.
According to Alexander Shumilin of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East
Conflicts at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy,
Putin has a two-pronged approach. As the Kremlin did during the Soviet era,
Putin seeks to bind client states to Moscow by providing military assistance and
economic support. The upside for the Russians is that the junior ally becomes
dependent on Moscow; the drawback is that it is expensive. Putin also looks to
foster the interests of large Russian businesses and increase their profits via
the Kremlin’s foreign allies. Each junior ally must, therefore, be financially
sound. Both approaches help Moscow fill spaces neglected by Washington.[17]
The interrelationship between these methods is evolving. Putin used the Soviet
playbook in Syria and rescued the Assad regime. However, near the end of the
operation, tycoons linked to Putin’s close aides signed contracts for postwar
reconstruction work in exchange for oil, natural gas, phosphate, and other
natural resource rights.[18]
After that, Russian expansion into Lebanon significantly changed. Though
initially based on the principle of “economics first, then politics,” Moscow
later rushed to link Lebanon to Russia by focusing on its relationship with
Hezbollah and its attempt to sell weapons to the government. This plan meant
sacrificing some of the economic benefits it might have reaped had it moved more
slowly.
Off and On Military Assistance
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were restructured in 2005-06, after the
assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent
withdrawal of Syrian forces. Most of their weaponry came from the United States,
though France, Germany, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, and Russia also
supplied weapons until 2008. Moscow’s contribution comprised of heavy-duty
mobile bridges, trucks, cranes, bulldozers, and other vehicles valued at about
$30 million.
The UAE contributed most to the small Lebanese air force with nine SA 342L
Gazelle combat helicopters armed with machine guns, and France supplied the
helicopters with fifty HOT long-range anti-tank missiles. Washington promised
sixty-six surplus M60A3 tanks transferred from Jordan (after modifying the
tanks’ stabilization systems to allow them to fire while moving) and thirty-four
M109 155mm turreted, self-propelled howitzers for delivery after 2009, though
only 10 tanks and 12 howitzers were actually supplied.[19]
There were, however, two main problems with U.S. military assistance to Lebanon
at that time: Washington’s reluctance to supply heavy weapons, and internal
bureaucratic procedures that slowed the implementation of the agreements.
Washington also self-imposed three constraints in order to manage the balance of
power:
It would provide the LAF with sufficient firepower to counteract Hezbollah and
Sunni terrorist organizations.
It would not transfer weapons that could be captured by Hezbollah.
It would not provoke any escalations at the Lebanese-Israeli border. [20]
Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri (left) meets with Putin in Moscow, September
2017. Following a failed 2016 arms deal, Moscow banned Lebanese officials from
Russia and refused to engage Beirut with similar initiatives. But the Russians
relented as Lebanon is central to Moscow’s Middle East goals.
These restrictions were clearly justified from the U.S. and Israeli perspectives
but were resented by many Lebanese journalists and politicians. In December
2008, Russia made the first attempt to exploit this dissatisfaction by offering
to sell T-54/T-55 tanks for roughly $500 million during defense minister Elias
Murr’s visit to Moscow. As the deal went nowhere, the Kremlin offered ten MiG-29
jet fighters for free, only to be told by the Lebanese government that its army
needed helicopters rather than these fighting aircraft.[21] Many experts in
Russia and Arab countries claimed that U.S. and Israeli diplomats killed the
deal,[22] but Moscow should have known that Lebanon would not be able to stomach
a $500 million price tag.
Either way, the offer sent an important message to Lebanon: If you can afford
it, we will sell you heavy weapons without conditions. In addition, Putin had
already demonstrated that he did not need approval from Russia’s Federal
Assembly to sign international agreements. Lebanon could purchase weapons
whenever it wanted.
Moscow made another attempt in early 2010 and offered six Mi-24 helicopters,
thirty T-72 heavy battle tanks, thirty 130-mm artillery systems, and a
significant quantity of ammunition. On February 25, 2010, Moscow and Beirut
entered a formal agreement on military-technical cooperation but nothing came of
it.
Russia perceived Lebanon as an extension of the Syrian war zone.
Then, in 2013, jihadists from Syria attempted to infiltrate Lebanon. In
response, Saudi Arabia pledged $4 billion in assistance, mainly to purchase
French military hardware. Riyadh suspended this pledge in 2016 after the
Lebanese government failed to condemn attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in
Iran.
Russia again tried to fill the void, and in summer 2016, Lebanon’s ambassador to
Moscow, Shawki Bou Nassar, revealed that the two states were negotiating the
purchase of a wide range of weaponry, including guns, 9M133 Kornet anti-tank
guided missiles, and T-72 tanks.[23] Putin expected the negotiations to succeed
and reacted harshly when Beirut failed to sign the deal, temporarily banning
Lebanese officials from Russia and announcing the Kremlin’s refusal to engage
Beirut with these kinds of initiatives again.[24] Nevertheless, negotiations
resumed after Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri visited Moscow in September
2017 and continued throughout 2018.
During this period, new factors influenced Moscow’s Middle East policy. First,
Russia’s military leaders acquired more political power during the Syrian war,
and the media repeated their talking points by pushing back against the opinion
that Russian troops should not respond to Israeli strikes on Hezbollah or
Iranian positions in Syria.[25]
Traditionally, the Russian military stayed out of politics and refrained from
announcing weapons deliveries to other countries. However, after Syria’s
allegedly accidental downing of the Russian IL-20 aircraft, the Ministry of
Defense blamed Israel before the foreign ministry commented. The defense
ministry then announced its decision to send S-300 air defense systems to Syria,
“in accordance with the President’s instruction to strengthen the safety of the
Russian military in Syria.”[26] Discussion of additional ways to “punish Israel”
appeared mainly in the media associated with Russian military circles.[27]
Also, U.S. military strikes in Syria further irritated Moscow. Russia perceived
Lebanon as an extension of the Syrian war zone, and its ambassador to Beirut,
Alexander Zasypkin, announced on al-Manar, a Lebanese satellite television
station affiliated with Hezbollah, that Moscow reserved the right to shoot down
U.S. missiles.[28]
Another factor influencing Moscow’s Middle East policy was its changing view of
possible military action in Lebanon following President Aoun’s November 2018
request that Russia extend its S-300 air defense umbrella to Lebanon. Third,
Russian news media suggested that a foothold in Lebanon could boost Moscow’s
recovery and restoration efforts in Syria.[29]
While all this was happening, U.S. aid to Lebanon declined. The Trump
administration recommended cutting military and security assistance by 80
percent from fiscal year 2016 to 2018.[30] Moscow responded by offering Beirut a
$1 billion line of credit for weapons purchases[31] and even offered some
assistance for free.[32] The draft agreement extended beyond the ordinary scope
of arms agreements by including the following:
Protection of Lebanese territory by Russian air defense systems deployed in
Syria.
Access to and use of Lebanese ports, particularly the port of Beirut, for entry
and repair of Russian warships.
Access to and use of Lebanese airspace for passage of Russian aircraft.
Access to three military bases, one of which had been used by the U.S.-led
counterterrorist coalition until 2017.[33]
The ultimate fate of this proposal remains unclear. Hariri declined it in
December 2018, but said he would accept Russian donations to Lebanon’s internal
security forces.[34]
In March 2019, Aoun met Putin in Moscow when, according to Russian media, they
discussed arms transfers in addition to the situation in Syria. However, the
official joint statement did not mention an arms deal.[35] Russian experts and
Lebanese supporters of an alliance with Moscow accused Washington of pressuring
the Lebanese leadership to sabotage the agreement.[36]
In Moscow’s view, Hezbollah should not be classified as a terrorist
organization.
Putin may not expect his entire proposal to be accepted; one or two provisions
may be enough to satisfy him. Either way, Russia is reverting to the Soviet
principle of prioritizing military and strategic interests over commercial
concerns.
Russia and Hezbollah
From Moscow’s point of view, the fact that Hezbollah has a so-called political
wing means the entity as a whole should not be classified as a terrorist
organization. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in early 2006:
THE QUESTION OF LEGALIZING HEZBOLLAH IS NOT RELEVANT. IT IS A LEGAL, POLITICAL
LEBANESE ORGANIZATION. IT HAS REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT.
HEZBOLLAH IS PART OF THE LEBANESE SHIITE COMMUNITY. IT IS NOT AN IMPORTED
PRODUCT.[37]
A political poster shows (left to right) Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah,
Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, Syrian leader Bashar Assad, and Russian
president Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin and Hezbollah cooperated substantially in
Syria. As many as 2,000 Hezbollah fighters may have been killed in Syria.
Hezbollah members of parliament visited Moscow for the first time in 2011. The
Russian media assumed they were probing the depth of Putin’s support for
Assad.[38] The Kremlin and Hezbollah cooperated substantially in Syria
throughout the Russian intervention there.
Since then, Moscow has repeatedly insisted that Hezbollah fighters withdraw to
Lebanon, for several reasons. First, Russia and Iran disagree about the future
of Assad’s army. Tehran wants to maintain a Shiite military bloc in Syria led by
Hezbollah that would be subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Moscow would rather restore the regular Syrian army and leave no place for
Hezbollah. Second, some Sunni militias have refused to make agreements with the
Assad regime, despite Russian efforts, because local civilians are afraid of
Hezbollah. Third, Turkey and Israel have demanded that Hezbollah withdraw.
Moscow cannot ignore these demands, especially since they align with its own
preferences. According to some reports, the Russian army has even tried to stop
a critical source of income for Hezbollah: drug trafficking along the
Lebanese-Syrian border.[39]
Hezbollah’s current posture toward Russia is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is
incensed by its envisaged eviction from Syria. “The world is heading to a new
achievement that Russia will cooperate with them to get Iran and Hezbollah out
of Syria,” Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah complained in June
2018.[40] On the other hand, Hezbollah suffered such heavy losses that it had no
choice but to reduce its presence. Despite what the party has won, it lost
popularity both inside Lebanon and among other Arabs. According to retired
Lebanese Brig. Gen. Hisham Jaber, some 1,500–2,000 Hezbollah fighters have been
killed in Syria, and hundreds have been left with disabilities.[41]
Russian efforts in Lebanon have failed precisely because Lebanon is politically
competitive.
Throughout 2018, many Russian experts blamed Beirut’s indecisiveness over an
arms deal on U.S. pressure and the Lebanese government’s internal problems.
Putin may have expected that the new government formed in January 2019, when a
Hezbollah-led bloc emerged with a significant majority, would pursue a more
pro-Russian policy. But Hezbollah’s political success alarmed the other factions
with Lebanese leaders routinely criticizing each other for aligning themselves
with Hezbollah and Tehran. In February 2019, the former coordinator of the March
14 General-Secretariat, ex-member of parliament Fares Soaid called for forming
an “opposition front” against Prime Minister Hariri, Foreign Minister Gebran
Bassil and Hezbollah. Walid Jumblatt criticized Hariri as well.[42] Bassil, too,
stated,
HIZBOLLAH MUST ADMIT THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE FREE PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT, IT
WOULD NOT HAVE MANAGED TO PERSEVERE IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL, TERRORISM OR THE
ISOLATION ATTEMPTS.[43]
Many are angry at Moscow as well. Even Jumblatt, a Kremlin ally during the
Lebanese civil war, said Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Zarif were trying to
divide the Middle East as Sykes and Picot did during World War I.[44]
Furthermore, in February 2019, Nasrallah began lobbying for the purchase of an
air defense system from Iran instead of Russia. In this political context,
Russia will have a hard time maintaining an effective lobby unless it uses
economic incentives and sacrifices Russian business interests for political
gain.
Putin’s Options
Putin follows the age-old adage of no permanent enemies and no permanent
friends.
Russia’s primary source of political capital in the Middle East are actions
taken by U.S. administrations that regional politicians interpret as weakness.
In order to leverage it, however, Putin’s image as a strong and resolute leader
must be consistent. He cannot abandon his goal of drawing Lebanon into his
sphere of influence after expending so much effort. All of Moscow’s present
clients are dictatorships, and Russian efforts in Lebanon have failed precisely
because it is politically competitive.
But, Putin will press forward, and he has several options:
To re-bind Lebanon to Syria by nurturing a powerful pro-Syrian coalition in
Beirut. Since the formation of the newest government, Lebanon is likely to
reorganize its political blocs, and Moscow may attempt to benefit from that
adjustment.
To establish Moscow as the principal mediator of Lebanese-Syrian relations while
guaranteeing Lebanese sovereignty. By actively promoting the repatriation of
Syrian refugees from Lebanon, Russia is improving its relations with the
Lebanese military, which may lead to an opportunity to police the
Lebanese-Syrian border. If it can pull off the latter, Moscow might be able to
expand its mission if violence erupts in the border region.
If Russian oil and natural gas companies can obtain additional extraction rights
in Lebanon, Moscow might be able to justify using private military contractors
to protect them. This practice began in Ukraine in 2014, from where it spread to
other parts of the world. In early 2018, for instance, over a hundred operatives
of the Russian private military group Wagner were killed in combat operations
near the Syrian town of Deir az-Zour. The group has been reportedly active in
Libya, Sudan, and a number of Central African countries, where its personnel
carry out security tasks for Gazprom, major Russian oil corporations, and
companies engaged in gold and diamond exploration.[45] Such military contractors
are not regulated by Russian law—meaning the Kremlin does not take
responsibility for them—and they could potentially intervene in new conflicts.
Moscow’s best bet is an à la carte offer of protection under Russia’s air
defense umbrella without strings attaching it to military aid. The strategy
would be based on the developments in the Iran-Israel conflict. If Israel
intensifies its attacks on Iranian and Hezbollah targets near its northern
border, the Russian military lobby will become increasingly anti-Israel. Even if
Putin does not want to aggravate relations with Israel, his desire or perceived
need to appear strong would pressure him to proceed anyway.
Most Russian experts believe Hezbollah and Israel are stalemated, that neither
side will seriously attack the other. But they are wrong. A heavily armed
paramilitary organization with fresh combat skills, recent experience, and
upgraded weaponry will not be idle for long if it is financially desperate.
Hezbollah has only two options if Russia blocks it in Syria: discredit itself by
inciting civil war in Lebanon or rally Arab support to its side by attacking
Israel with Russian air support.
Conclusion
While Putin follows the age-old adage of no permanent enemies and no permanent
friends, he exhibits no such flexibility toward the United States. He has
nurtured an atmosphere of anti-American hysteria in Russia since before he even
took office and has locked himself into a permanent anti-U.S. course to preserve
his legitimacy. If Washington takes action against Iran, Putin will support
Tehran both vis-à-vis the United States and in the Iranian-Hezbollah-Israeli
conflagration that will likely erupt in such circumstances. This will make
Lebanon a major battleground. It is therefore critical for Washington to ensure
that any U.S.-Russian agreement on Syria would prohibit an expansion of Russia’s
defense system to Lebanon. Whether or not Washington and Moscow can agree, a
comprehensive U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria would be best. The U.S.
administration should also focus on Christian communities in Lebanon to prevent
them from irreversibly falling under the sway of Moscow, Hezbollah, and its
Iranian patron.
GRIGORY MELAMEDOV HOLDS A DOCTORATE FROM THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES OF
THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND IS A MOSCOW-BASED, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER.
[1] The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), May 10, 2018.
[2] See, for example, Russkiye Vesti (Moscow), Nov. 22, 2018.
[3] Vatican News (Rome), Apr. 14, 2018.
[4] See, for example, Po Priglasheniyu IPPO Associaciya Pravoslavnyh Semey
Beiruta Posetila Moskvu, The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society website, June
23, 2014.
[5] “Robert K. Sursock, Executive Profile,” Bloomberg L.P., New York.
[6] Mohanad Hage Ali, “Our Comrades in Beirut,” Diwan, Middle East Insights from
Carnegie, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, Apr. 25, 2018; “Russia-Saudi
Arabia Relations: Facts & Details,” Sputnik News Agency (Moscow), Oct. 5, 2017;
Sanaa Nehme, “Amal Abou Zeid,” My Lebanon, Moscow, Nov.15, 2017; Reda Sawaya,
“Ibr al-Hudud Bayna as-Siyasa wa-l-Iqtisad,” al-Akhbar (Beirut), Apr. 22, 2015.
[7] “Chleny IPPO Prinyali Uchastiye Vo Vstreche S Livancami,” The Imperial
Orthodox Palestine Society, Feb. 9, 2015.
[8] “Vsemirnaya Organizaciya Vypushnikov Vysshyh Uchebnyh Zavedeniy,”
Association of Alumni of Soviet Universities in Lebanon.
[9] Veniamin Popov, “Russkaya Koloniya V Livane,” Moscow State Institute of
International Relations, Apr. 25, 2013.
[10] Deutsche Welle (Bonn), Aug. 5, 2018.
[11] Mohanad Hage Ali, “Le Liban, Nouveau Banc d’Essai des Ambitions Régionales
Russes,” L’Orient Le Jour (Beirut), Feb. 23, 2019.
[12] Ali, “Our Comrades in Beirut“; Rosanna Sands, “Hajj Lubnani Nahwa Musku?”
al-Bina (Beirut), Aug. 21, 2018.
[13] Al-Monitor (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 24, 2012.
[14] Orthodoxie.com (Paris), June 8, 2018.
[15] Ya Libnan (Beirut), Oct. 16, 2015.
[16] Deutsche Welle, May 20, 2018.
[17] Alexander Shumilin, “Rossiyskaya Diplomatiya na Blizhnem Vostoke: Vozvrat k
Geopolitike,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales,
Russie.Nei.Visions, May 2016, p. 8.
[18] See, for example, RBC News (Moscow), July 6, 2018.
[19] “US Military Assistance to Lebanon: Equipping LAF Not Transforming It,”
Defense Magazine (Beirut), Oct. 2012; The Times of Israel, Feb. 8, 2015.
[20] Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities
in Post-Syria Lebanon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 2009.
[21] See, for example, The Times (London), Dec. 18, 2008; Lenta.ru (Moscow),
Mar. 1, 2010.
[22] Nour Samaha, “Is Lebanon Embracing a Larger Russian Role in Its Country?”
The Century Foundation, New York, Aug. 7, 2018; Tehran Times, Apr. 10, 2011.
[23] Geopolitica.ru (Moscow), July 11, 2016.
[24] Ad-Diyar (Beirut), Dec. 12, 2017.
[25] See, for example, Riafan.ru (St. Petersburg), Federal News Agency, Sept.
22, 2017.
[26] TV Rossiya-24 (Moscow), Sept. 24, 2018.
[27] See, for example, Pravda (Moscow), Sept. 18, 2018.
[28] RIA Novosti, Apr. 11, 2018.
[29] See, for example, Gaseta.ru (Moscow), Apr. 24, 2017.
[30] Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah, “Playing the Long Game: U.S.
Counterterrorism Assistance for Lebanon,” Center for American Progress,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 30, 2017.
[31] The Arab Weekly (London), Mar. 18, 2018.
[32] Naharnet (Beirut), Mar. 17, 2018.
[33] Alexander Kuznetsov, “O Vozmozhnom Voyennom Sotrudnichestve Mezhdu Rossiyey
I Livanon,” The Institute of the Middle East, Moscow, Apr. 13, 2018.
[34] See, for example, al-Akhbar, Nov. 27, 2018.
[35] Joint statement between Michel Aoun, Lebanese president, and Vladimir
Putin, Russian president, Presidential Press Office, Kremlin, Moscow, Mar. 26,
2019.
[36] See, for example, Alexander Kuznetsov, “Situatsiya v Livane,” The Institute
of the Middle East, Moscow, Apr. 7, 2019.
[37] Sergey Lavrov, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, interview, “‘Hezbollah‘
Ne Importny Product,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, Sept. 6, 2006.
[38] Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia in the Middle East: Motives, Consequences,
Prospects,” Policy Focus 142, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 2016, p. 28.
[39] See, for example, Novaya Gazeta (Moscow), July 22, 2018.
[40] Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, speech, reprinted in Alahed News (Beirut), June 8,
2018.
[41] See, for example, Asharq al-Awsat (London), Jan. 12, 2019.
[42] Naharnet, Feb. 5, 2019.
[43] Ibid., Feb. 5, 2019.
[44] Muhannad al-Haj Ali, “Az-Zuhaf ar-Rusi ila Lubnan,” al-Modon (Beirut), Jan.
28, 2019.
[45] See for example, The Moscow Times, Nov. 12, 2014; Grzegorz Kuczyński,
“Putin’s Invisible Army,” The Warsaw Institute Foundation, Mar. 30, 2018; Arti
Gercek news agency (Köln, Ger.), July 11, 2018; Novaya Gazeta, Jan. 23, 2019.