English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese
Related, Global News & Editorials
For
April 16/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
Go into all the world and proclaim the good
news to the whole creation
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 16/15-18:”‘Go
into all the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation. The one who
believes and is baptized will be saved; but the one who does not believe will be
condemned. And these signs will accompany those who believe: by using my name
they will cast out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up
snakes in their hands, and if they drink any deadly thing, it will not hurt
them; they will lay their hands on the sick, and they will recover.’’”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese
Related News & Editorials published on April 15-16/2020
17 New Virus Cases Recorded, Lebanon to Receive Chinese Aid
Hariri Hospital: We have 30 cases, three recoveries
UNIFIL Support to Curb COVID-19 Spread Continues
Health Minister broaches means to strengthen epidemic control with WHO
Bcharre Hospital: 70 negative cases, one positive, one case retested
Israeli Drone Bombs Hizbullah Car on Syrian-Lebanese Border
Aoun Meets U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Lazzarini
Banking Association Lowers Beirut Reference Rate
Report: Diab to Address Lebanese on Coronavirus, Deposits Hairc
Diab visits former Prime Minister Salim Hoss
PM chairs work session between economic entities, several ministers
Diab Says No Haircut but Rather Bond Exchange
Lebanese Pound Sinks to Half Official Rate
Hamadeh: Rustom Ghazaleh's Clique Seeking to Destroy Economic System
Ministry of Finance to Pay Money Due to Hospitals
ABL recommends LBP 2600 average USD exchange rate for small depositors
Fahmi’s Press Office: Website cardholders not allowed free movement nationwide
ADCB files criminal complaint against individuals linked to NMC Health/Arab
News/April 15/2020
Lebanon’s Speaker Demands Jumpstarting Economy, Restructuring Debt
Earthquake Tremors Felt in Lebanon
Kubis discusses risks and opportunities of economic plan with Sfeir, Salameh
Corona Another angle of architecture in a pandemic period
COVID-19: Will breath-holding confinement help Lebanon avoid a surge of
deaths?/Rim Haidar and Joe Douaihy/Annahar/ April 15/2020Lebanon
Diab Cabinet Draft Proposal: Haircut should be the least of the Lebanese’s
concerns/Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/April 15/2020
Coronavirus could infect hundreds of thousands in Lebanon: Report/Mona Alami, Al
Arabiya English/April 15/2020
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
April 15-16/2020
More than 130,000 COVID-19 Deaths Worldwide
WHO Chief Voices 'Regret' at U.S. Decision to Halt Funding
On-Off Social Distancing May Be Needed Until 2022: Harvard Study
Struggle, Fear, and Heartbreak for Medical Staff on Virus Frontline
Berlin Hails Debt Halt for Poor Nations as 'Historic Int'l Solidarity'
Germany to Begin Easing Virus Curbs Says Merkel
IMF Says Still Assessing Iran's Funding Reques
UK death toll rises to 12,868 after 761 fatalities reported in one day
Kadhimi: Iraq Should be Distanced from Regional Conflicts
Egypt Police Neutralize Terrorist Cell in Cairo Suburb
How the Syrian war is lifted into Libya’s Battle for Tripoli
Concerns in Damascus after Limits on Bread Distribution
Hamdok Says Sudan’s Nile Share Will Be Kept for All Generations
Race Against Time to End Government Formation Crisis in Israel
Germany Arrests ISIS Suspects Plotting to Attack US Bases
Following Erdoğan's Promise To Convert Hagia Sophia 'Back Into A Mosque,' Quran
Verses, Call To Prayer Recited In The Ancient Church/MEMRI/April 15/2020
Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on
April 15-16/2020
Iran vs. Trump: Suleimani’s Legacy, and Khamenei’s Ambitions (Part 11)/Reuel
Marc Gerecht/FDD/April 15/2020
COVID-19 in Regime-Held Syria/David Adesnik/FDD/April 15/2020
Is Iran on the Brink of a Coronavirus Coup?/A.J. Caschetta/The Hill/April
15/2020
Iran Pushing Ukraine Not To Take Action For Downed Plane/Anna Raskaya/Radio
Farda/April 15/2020
And Labor Less Leftist in Britain/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al-Awsat/April 15/2020
A 100-Year Chance to Shake Up Debt and Taxes/Andy Mukherjee/Bloomberg/April
15/2020
Palestinians: Don't Believe UNRWA, They Are Not Helping/Bassam Tawil/Gatestone
Institute/April 15/ 2020
Turkey: Erdoğan's Post-Corona, Existential Economic Challenge/Burak Bekdil/Gatestone
Institute/April 15/2020
Can Mustafa Al Kadhimi finally put Iraq on the right path?/Mina Al-Oraibi/The
National/April 15/2020
Iranian regime facing a three-dimensional crisis/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh /Arab
News/April 15, 2020
The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on April 15-16/2020
17 New Virus Cases Recorded, Lebanon to Receive
Chinese Aid
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Lebanon on Wednesday confirmed 17 more novel coronavirus cases, which raises the
country's total to 658, the Health Ministry said. In a statement, the Ministry
said 12 of the infections were recorded among residents and five among the
expats who returned to Lebanon in recent days. It added that 941 laboratory
tests were carried out over the past 24 hours. A Chinese plane carrying medical
aid will meanwhile arrived at midnight at the Rafik Hariri International
Airport. The National News Agency said the shipment is the second batch of
grants donated by the Chinese government to the medical crews in Lebanon. A
handover ceremony will be held at 9:00 am in the presence of the ministers of
health and transport and a representative of the foreign minister, NNA added.
Hariri Hospital: We have 30 cases, three recoveries
NNA/April 15/2020
Rafic Hariri University Hospital announced on Wednesday, in its daily report on
the latest developments on the Corona Covid- 19 virus, that the total number of
laboratory-confirmed infected cases that were quarantined in the hospital's
health isolation section reached 30 cases. RUHU also received 15 suspected
infectious cases transferred from other hospitals. The hospital report also
indicated that three infected cases have recovered today after their PCR
examination tests turned out negative in both times, thus bringing the total
number of full recoveries to 84 cases. According to the directions of the World
Health Organization and the Ministry of Public Health, two cases infected with
the Coronavirus were released from the hospital to be home quarantined, after
the attending physician confirmed the patient’s clinical recovery, and informed
him of all measures and instructions related to domestic isolation,” the
Hospital statement added. It also indicated that the health condition of two
critical cases has improved, whereby the patients have been transferred from
intensive care to the isolation unit. “All those infected with the virus are
receiving the necessary care in the isolation unit, and their condition is
stable except for one case who is in critical condition.”
UNIFIL Support to Curb COVID-19 Spread Continues
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Donations from UNIFIL peacekeepers continued with various medical and personal
protective equipment handed to their host communities in south Lebanon in their
collective efforts to contain the spread of the COVID-19 Coronavirus, a press
release said. The peacekeeping mission’s Spanish, French and Ghanaian
peacekeepers handed out those life-saving items within their respective areas of
responsibility. During a ceremony in Suq al Khan in south-eastern Lebanon,
representatives of Hasbaya Caza and Al Arkoub Union of Municipalities received
5,000 surgical masks, 5,000 gloves, 20 full face shields, 18 protective suits
and 1,000 protective caps were handed over.
Health Minister broaches means to strengthen epidemic
control with WHO
NNA/April 15/2020
Minister of Public Health, Dr. Hamad Hassan, on Wednesday discussed the best
means to enhance cooperation between the World Health Organization and the
Ministry of Health in the context of strengthening efforts to control the
Coronavirus pandemic with WHO Deputy Regional Director, Dr. Rana Hajjeh, and WHO
representative in Lebanon, Dr. Iman Al-Shanqeeti. For her part, Hajjeh
underlined the importance of “not easing” the general mobilization measures in
Lebanon. She stressed the necessity of assessing the situation of the
pandemic, after which a decision could be made regarding a gradual mitigation of
the adopted measures. Hajjeh also highlighted the importance of conducting
Covid-19 tests at laboratories accredited by the Ministry of Public Health due
to the fact that not all laboratories are authorized to perform this test. “The
matter should in no way be commercial; laboratories must be approved by the
ministry of health after the necessary evaluation is made,” she added.
Bcharre Hospital: 70 negative cases, one positive, one case retested
NNA/April 15/2020
The Bcharre Governmental Hospital administration announced, in a statement on
Wednesday, the release of the 72 PCR examination results that were conducted on
April 13, 2020, which turned out as follows: 70 cases negative, one case
positive for a Syrian worker, and one case re-tested on 15/4/2020. The Hospital
added that the test results conducted on April 14, 2020, are still underway at
the laboratories of Saint George Hospital.
Israeli Drone Bombs Hizbullah Car on Syrian-Lebanese Border
Agence France Presse/Associated Press/Naharnet/April 15/2020
An Israeli drone targeted a Hizbullah car just inside Syria near the border with
Lebanon on Wednesday, without casualties, a source from the group said. "An
Israeli drone first struck near a car transporting Hizbullah members," the
source said, asking for anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the
press. "The passengers got out before it was then directly hit in a second
strike," the source said, but there were no casualties. The Britain-based Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights said "the Israeli aircraft targeted a vehicle near
the Jdaidit Yabous crossing" with Lebanon that is closed due to the coronavirus
epidemic. Syrian state news agency SANA reported material damage to a "civilian
car" in the same area, without mentioning what party had hit it. There was no
comment from the Israeli authorities. The drone attack came a week after
Israel's military released a video it said shows Syrian officers and Hizbullah
members working together on the edge of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Israel has warned for years of what it calls Iran and Hizbullah's "entrenchment"
in southern Syria close to Israeli army positions. There have been several drone
attacks near the Golan Heights in recent months targeting Syrians said to be
working with Hizbullah, according to Syrian opposition activists. Iran-backed
Hizbullah has been officially fighting in Syria to support the Damascus regime
since 2013, helping the regime regain key parts of the country. Israel has
carried out hundreds of air strikes in Syria since the start of the war in 2011,
targeting government troops as well as allied Iranian forces and Hizbullah
fighters. It is rare for Israel to claim responsibility for such strikes
directly. It says Iran's presence in neighboring Syria poses a threat and has
vowed to continue its strikes and prevent arms deliveries to Hizbullah.
Aoun Meets U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Lazzarini
Naharnet/April 15/2020
President Michel Aoun met on Wednesday at Baabda Presidential Palace with UN
Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon, Philippe Lazzarini, who came on a farewell
visit upon his appointment as UNRWA's new Commissioner-General, the Presidency
press office said.
A statement by Aoun’s office stated that "the meeting was attended by Former
Minister, Salim Jreisatti, UNRWA Representative in Lebanon, Claudio Cordone, and
Legal Counsel, Mary Shebly." It added that the President wished Lazzarini
"success in his new responsibilities, and thanked him for the efforts made
during his stay in Lebanon as UN Humanitarian Coordinator in enhancing relations
between Lebanon and UN organizations."
Banking Association Lowers Beirut Reference Rate
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Lebanon's banking association said on Wednesday that the Beirut Reference Rate (BRR)
was reduced to 5.75% for US dollars and to 7.75% for Lebanese pounds. The
statement said this was down from 9.35% for US dollars and 12.45% for Lebanese
pounds at the start of the year. It said the reduction in the reference rate for
lending which came after central bank circulars sought "to alleviate the burdens
of borrowing...and stimulate economic activity in the current tough
circumstances."
Report: Diab to Address Lebanese on Coronavirus, Deposits
Haircuts
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab is set to address the Lebanese on Thursday on the
coronavirus crisis in the country and the government’s reform financial plan,
al-Joumhouria daily reported on Wednesday. Diab had on Tuesday expressed
astonishment during the cabinet meeting, at what he said is a “campaign against
the government regarding proposals for a deposits haircut,” noting that he will
address this issue in a “detailed speech soon,” according to the daily. “We will
address the issue scientifically,” he was quoted as saying. “The Lebanese have
endured enough crises, they can no longer bear being used as human shields to
serve personal interests for some.”Proposals for a deposits haircut amid an
unprecedented economic and financial crisis in Lebanon drew the ire of
politicians and people alike, with Speaker Nabih Berri saying “haircut and
capital control were born dead.”Berri pointed to a number of steps that could
easily replace a haircut including “combating corruption, putting an end to the
waste of public funds, deducting from bank interests and pumping new liquidity
after merging and purifying banks.” Moreover, the coronavirus outbreak emerged
to add more crises to Lebanon's woes. Until Tuesday, Lebanon recorded 641 cases
of coronavirus and the death toll reached 21.
Diab visits former Prime Minister Salim Hoss
NNA/April 15/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab, on Wednesday afternoon, paid a visit to former Prime
Minister Selim Hoss at the latter's residence in Aysha Bakkar to check on his
health, accompanied by his Advisor Khodor Taleb, in the presence of Hoss’s
daughter Wadad and grandson Salim Rahal.
At the end of the visit, PM Diab said: “My visit to this house today comes as a
return to the school of principles and fundamentals we have been raised up on.
PM Salim Hoss is a school for all good people in the country and a school for
all those who embrace national and non-partisan principles that formed the
conscience of Lebanon and that of those who believe in the rationale of the
State, a State for all Lebanese people. In fact, PM Hoss is not only the
conscience of Lebanon; he is not just a good man. He is the incarnation of the
idea of the State, and is one of the pillars of Lebanon’s history, present and
future. We cannot think of reform without returning to the principles of PM Hoss;
that is why I came today to draw from this authentic source of inspiration. May
God grant him long life!”—PM Press Office
PM chairs work session between economic entities, several
ministers
NNA/April 15/2020
A working session between economic entities and several ministers has been
organized at the Grand Serail. It was partly chaired by Prime Minister Hassan
Diab and attended by Minister of Finance Ghazi Wazni, Minister of Environment
and Administrative Development Demianos Kattar, Minister of Information Manal
Abdel Samad and Minister of Industry Imad Hobballa. We present as well: Charles
Arbeed, Head of the Economic and Social Council, Mazen Soueid, Chairman of IDAL,
Fady Gemayel, President of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, Fouad
Zmokhol, President of the Association of Lebanese Businessmen and Women, Pierre
Achkar, President of the Lebanese Federation For Tourism Industries, Salah
Osseiran, Head of the National Council for Lebanese Economists, Fouad Rahme,
President of the Lebanese Businessmen Association, Nicolas Chammas, President of
the Beirut Traders Association, Nabil Fahd, Vice-President of the Chamber of
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Walid Assaf, Head of Indusries in Choueifat
and Taleb Saad, journalist specialized in economic and industrial affairs.
In a speech delivered at the beginning of the meeting, PM Diab said:
We thank you all for helping us, as we are trying to expand consultations to
reach all sectors, so that we can seek different opinions, since the economic
paper is everyone's business in Lebanon and is not only specific to stakeholders
or to the Lebanese government. Our goal is to be able to embark on the
restructuring of our sovereign debt, and therefore we are in need of a working
group that can reassure the international community that we will get out of the
grim tunnel, so that we can reimburse any additional loans we have to secure.
Therefore, Eurobond holders should be reassured when the financial advisor Lazar
begins negotiations with creditors, with the aim of starting the process of
sovereign debt restructuring. PM Diab added: Of course, we do not speak of
"haircuts", and this issue will certainly be replaced with bonds, as is
happening in all countries of the world, and we are not the first or last
country to face default. We need to run the country, in a sustainable and
beneficial way for the coming years. Thus, we need a program that can reassure
the international community; it is true that we are in the stage of
restructuring our public debt, but at the same time we have to restructure our
banking sector, and the central bank faces a large gap as you can see. We are
the first government to dare talk about this big gap, because, from the outset,
we have said that we would be transparent. We also need to set a budget over the
coming years. On the one hand, we would increase our income, and on the other
hand, we would control the cost; for this reason, there are many draft laws that
fall within this area. Of course, nothing is untouchable. We look forward to
benefiting from your experiences and opinions, and this is the goal of these
meetings as we try to expand our scope of work in these difficult circumstances.
Thus, several virtual meetings will be conducted, so as to benefit, as much as
possible, from different experiences, allowing the Ministry of Finance to draw
on your capabilities and experiences to develop this plan. M. Diab added: Toady,
we need, as a government, to agree on the general action plan; however, this
does not mean that if we agree on it, we will not be able to change it later on;
we would rather leave room for change. Nevertheless, Lazar needs to have a
program or plan ready to hold consultations and help with the issue of
restructuring that needs between 6 to 9 months. He further said: With regard to
the economic situation, it goes without saying that we must reboot our economy
with a timely economic program based on industry, agriculture, the banking
sector and the tourism sector until we move forward with restarting the economy
in order to reduce imports and increase exports. Many proposals are on the table
in this regard. The relevant ministers will examine this issue and submit
proposed programs to the cabinet.—PM Press Office
Diab Says No Haircut but Rather Bond Exchange
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab on Wednesday reassured Lebanon's Economic Committees
that there will not be a deposits “haircut” but rather a bond exchange in order
to manage Lebanon's debt. “Of course we are not speaking of a haircut,” Diab
said during a Grand Serail meeting between the Committees and a number of
ministers. “There will be a bond exchange, the same as happens in all countries,
and we are not the first or last country to go through a default,” the PM added.
“We need to manage the country in a way that can benefit us over the next years
and we therefore need a program that can reassure the international community,”
Diab went on to say. The International Monetary Fund projected Tuesday that
Lebanon's economy will shrink 12% in 2020 amid the country's worst economic and
financial crisis in decades. Lebanon has suffered in recent years from a lack of
economic growth, high unemployment and a drop in hard currency inflows from
abroad. But the financial crisis erupted after nationwide protests over
widespread corruption and decades of mismanagement by the ruling political class
engulfed the country in October. A lockdown aimed at curbing the coronavirus
pandemic has worsened Lebanon's economic and financial conditions and many
businesses have been closed for the past month to limit the spread of the virus.
Last month, Lebanon defaulted for the first time ever on a payment on its
massive debt amid ongoing popular unrest. Lebanon's debt reached $90 billion or
170% of GDP, making it one of the highest in the world.
Lebanese Pound Sinks to Half Official Rate
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/April 15/2020
The Lebanese pound fell in value Wednesday to more than 3,000 to the dollar on
the parallel market, half the official rate, foreign exchange bureaus said.
Lebanon has suffered its worst economic and financial crisis since a 1975-1990
civil war, resulting in recession, a plunge in foreign reserves and rising
inflation. A parallel market for the Lebanese pound emerged last summer for the
first time since it was pegged against the greenback at a rate of 1,507 in 1997.
The market rate is now at "3,000 to 3,100 pounds to the U.S. dollar," two
currency dealers told AFP on Wednesday, on condition of anonymity. A third
foreign exchange bureau said it was using an exchange rate of 3,000 to the
dollar. The steep depreciation comes despite the central bank in March
attempting to enforce a ceiling for the parallel market at a 30-percent margin
to the official rate, or around 2,000 to the dollar. Banks have since September
imposed major restrictions on dollar withdrawals, before they stopped all dollar
withdrawals late last month. Commercial lenders said the closure of airports due
to the spread of coronavirus made it impossible to import dollars. That move
provoked a plunge in the value of the local currency on the parallel market.
Banks have been accused of complicity with the political elite in building an
unsustainable debt burden that last month saw Lebanon go into sovereign default
for the first time. The country's public debt is $92 billion, equivalent to 170
percent of GDP, one of the highest levels in the world.
Hamadeh: Rustom Ghazaleh's Clique Seeking to Destroy Economic System
Naharnet/April 15/202
MP Marwan Hamadeh of the Democratic Gathering on Wednesday warned that “Rustom
Ghazaleh's clique” is seeking to “destroy Lebanon's economic system,” in
reference to some members and backers of Hassan Diab's government. “Lebanon's
entity is in danger and Rustom Ghazaleh's clique is seeking to destroy the
economic system. This is the clique that (Progressive Socialist Party leader)
Walid Jumblat has referred to,” Hamadeh said in remarks to MTV. Ghazaleh, who
died in 2015, was appointed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2002
to succeed the late Ghazi Kanaan as head of Syrian military intelligence in
Lebanon, where he was accused of intervening extensively in the country's
political affairs. Noting that Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran Bassil has
not changed his policies, Hamadeh lashed out at the government. “This is not a
government; it is barely a municipal council or a security detachment,” the
lawmaker said. “A coup mentality is prevailing and putting national accord in
jeopardy,” he warned. “Where are the reforms in electricity, telecommunications,
oil and the appointments that have been drafted by the judicial council before
being shelved?” Hamadeh went on to say. He also pledged that his bloc will no
longer “give the government a chance,” vowing that it would “act politically in
parliament.”
Ministry of Finance to Pay Money Due to Hospitals
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Minister of Finance Ghazi Wazni assured on Wednesday that the Ministry is
willing to pay "part" of the sums due to hospitals in a bid to mitigate the
financial difficulties they are enduring mainly in light of the coronavirus
outbreak, the National News Agency reported.
Wazni’s comments came during a meeting he held with the Head of the Syndicate of
Hospitals in Lebanon, Sleiman Haroun and in the presence of Head of the Finance
and Budget Parliamentary Committee MP Ibrahim Kanaan, added NNA. “The state must
pay the amounts dues to the hospitals in monthly payments in order for the
latter to pay the salaries of its employees and the dues owed to suppliers until
a clear and integrated plan is found after the crisis ends,” declared Wazni. The
Minister warned that any failure to pay these dues could likely lead several
hospitals to “shutdown.”
ABL recommends LBP 2600 average USD exchange rate for small
depositors
NNA/April 15/2020
The Association of Lebanese Banks (ABL) on Wednesday recommended the adoption of
LBP 2600 as an average exchange rate per USD for transactions performed by small
depositors with accounts not exceeding $3000 US dollars or LBP 5,000,000 pending
the activation of an electronic platform, which will be responsible for setting
the LBP exchange rate against the USD in the market. In another statement issued
on Wednesday, ABL said that Beirut Reference Rate (BRR) was reduced to 5.75
percent for USD and to 7.75 percent for LBP, making clear that this was down
from 9.35 percent for USD and 12.45 percent for LBP at the start of the year.
The reduction in the reference rate for lending came after Central Bank
circulars sought to ease the burdens of borrowing and stimulate economic
activity amid the current circumstances, according to the ABL’s statement.
Fahmi’s Press Office: Website cardholders not allowed free
movement nationwide
NNA/April 15/2020
Interior and Municipalities Minister, Mohammad Fami’s press office issued a
statement on Wednesday confirming that all website cardholders, issued in 2020,
were not allowed to move freely up and down the country in light of the general
mobilization nationwide.
“The aforementioned cards do not exempt their holders from implementing the law
restricting vehicles’ movement according to their plate numbers, or from the
imposed curfew,” the statement read. “Consequently, those who hold these cards
cannot use them, and they should consult with the Ministry of Information in
this regard before making any move," the statement added.
ADCB files criminal complaint against individuals linked to
NMC Health
Arab News/April 15/2020
ADCB statement: action was consistent with the objective of protecting its
interests
ADCB has a $981 million exposure to NMC Health
DUBAI: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, a key lender to NMC Health, said on Wednesday
it had filed a criminal complaint against a number of individuals linked to the
hospital operator with the Attorney General in Abu Dhabi.
The bank did not name the individuals, but said in a statement that the action
was consistent with the objective of protecting its interests.
“ADCB confirms that it has initiated criminal legal proceedings with the
Attorney General in Abu Dhabi against a number of individuals in relation to NMC
Health Group.” it said in a statement.
NMC — which recently revised its debt position to $6.6 billion, well above
earlier estimates — has seen its stock more than halve in value since December
after short-seller Muddy Waters questioned its financial statements.
ADCB, which has a $981 million exposure to NMC Health, is among the major UAE
lenders who have lent to the hospital operator.
Lebanon’s Speaker Demands Jumpstarting Economy,
Restructuring Debt
Beirut - Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Lebanon’s Speaker Nabih Berri declared on Tuesday that a potential government
haircut was “dead,” saying it has met the same fate of a plan on capital
control. “You can read the fatiha (Qoranic verse) on the suggested haircut as
you have done on the capital control proposal,” Berri said after chairing the
meeting of the Parliament’s Secretariat at his Ain al-Tineh residence. Berri
stressed that Lebanon’s economic and financial salvation is still possible,
though difficult. Asked about reforms, Berri’s visitors quoted him as saying
that there was a need to address the causes and consequences of the economic and
financial crisis. The Speaker also emphasized the need for reforms and law
enforcement, especially in corruption cases, including the squandering of public
funds. He also stressed that new laws should not tamper with the money of bank
depositors, which is a sacred matter. “We need measures that can help jumpstart
the economy and restructure national debt,” he said, adding that the government
should take steps capable of convincing the international community to provide
financial assistance to Lebanon. Political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat on
Tuesday that Berri is optimistic about an International Monetary Fund proposal
on Lebanon’s economic crisis. “The Speaker has been informed that the IMF would
be lenient with its proposals,” they said. Also Tuesday, Berri met with Finance
Minister Ghazi Wazni. They discussed the country’s economic and financial
situation.
Kubis discusses risks and opportunities of economic plan
with Sfeir, Salameh
NNA/April 15/2020
United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jan Kubis, on Wednesday said via
twitter, “I’ve held interesting discussions separately with Mr. Salim Sfeir,
Head of the Association of Lebanese Banks, and Central Bank Governor, Mr. Riad
Salameh, on risks and opportunities of the proposed draft economic plan of the
Government, on the need to address root causes of the current crisis, and to
ensure the existence of a strong, accountable, and transparent banking system,
needed for future recovery.”
Corona Another angle of architecture in a pandemic period
NNA/April 15/2020
With the coronavirus pandemic spreading all over the world, every aspect of life
has fundamentally changed. One main modification to human life is how much time
we are spending at home, both working and relaxing. While we take shelter there,
the rooms where we once spent a few hours, now enclose our entire existence.
Shedding light on the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on the future of residential
design, the NNA spoke to landscape and interior architect, Gilbert SABA.
With the pandemic spreading all over the world, and fundamental changes in our
lives, is there any impact on architecture?
As the new coronavirus continues to spread, cities and countries around the
world have ordered citizens to retreat to their homes and stay there. While we
take shelter there, the rooms where we once spent a few waking now enclose our
entire existence and this short-term recalibration can have long-term effects.
No one predicted that a global health crisis would turn our lives upside down,
fundamentally changes the way we live in our homes, and affects the future of
residential design. This pandemic reminds us of how important our homes are to
our daily well-being.
Any vision for the future changes in the interior and public spaces?
Houses have the power to bring joy and meaningful connections to our physical
world. And at these moments of being confined in our homes, while we need our
interior spaces to be flexible to accommodate temporary activities, more
importantly, we need to take advantage of the space regardless of the function
it serves. We delight in natural daylighting, quality materials, the quality of
healthy indoor air and access to comfortable outdoor spaces. In many ways, this
analogue moment is a return to simple life, and in the design of future homes,
we are thinking more about what is essential to experience the way we want to
live. For many in the design community, however, the rapid spread of COVID-19
has led to reassess the work of their lives, and what it could mean to create
for a world that will never be quite the same, especially when it comes to how
we gather and use large public spaces. Almost everyone predicts that public
spaces will evolve towards more automation to reduce contagion, with COVID-19
accelerating the development of all types of contactless technology, automatic
doors, voice-activated elevators, hotel room entrance controlled by cell phone,
hands-free light switches and temperature controls, and advanced airport
check-in and security. In addition to the social distancing that would seem to
be necessary, if a temporary action, it is reasonable to think that concerns
about future viruses could inspire architects to develop friendly open spaces
that allow and encourage people to spread out.
Does this current situation take us back in history? This won’t be the first
time in history cities and buildings will be redesigned in response to a better
understanding of the disease: Paris's renovation by Haussmann between 1853 and
1870, London's reconfiguration following the cholera epidemic of 1954, and New
York's reaction in the 19th century to the living conditions of residences. The
outcome of the COVID-19 experiment could very well be a wider acceptance of work
of home policies and telework, given the baptism by fire that the professional
world is currently embarking in. How do the spaces in which we live, eat and
play also allow for functional and separate use for work? How do small spaces
fulfill several functions, while creating a separation between work and home
life? How will public spaces and cities be more developed to alleviate septicity?
It seems that this should be another lens through which we assess the design of
residences and public spaces.
Earthquake Tremors Felt in Lebanon
Naharnet/April 15/2020
Nine consecutive earthquakes hit Lebanon on Wednesday and some were felt in
several Lebanese regions, media reports said.
Lebanon’s state-run National Center for Geophysics said the first earthquake was
recorded at dawn and was followed by a sequence of tremors. The epicenter of the
earthquake was located in the sea north of the city of Latakia in Syria, it
added. Residents of several Lebanese regions felt the earthquakes, mainly the
one occurring at 10:40 am and measuring 4.7 on the Richter scale, said the
National Center for Geophysics. “Residents in Keserwan, in Beirut and its
suburbs felt an earthquake that lasted for several seconds," media reports said.
Earlier in April, an earthquake measuring 4.4 on the Richter scale was felt in
Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon’s state-run National Center for Geophysics said its
epicenter was the sea off the Syrian-Turkish border.
COVID-19: Will breath-holding confinement help Lebanon
avoid a surge of deaths?
Rim Haidar and Joe Douaihy/Annahar/ April 15/2020Lebanon
The Lebanese government has been one of the first governments to impose strict
measures in order to control the pandemic within its territories.
With more than 1.8 million cases and 100 thousand deaths recorded worldwide as
of April 12, 2020, COVID-19 remains to spread rapidly. The Lebanese government
has been one of the first governments to impose strict measures in order to
control the pandemic within its territories. By tightly controlling its
residents’ movements, implementing a curfew at night and closing land, sea and
air borders, it hopes to minimize the damages that might result from the virus.
As of April 12, Lebanon has detected more than 600 cases and 20 COVID-19 related
deaths, as shown in the graph below.
With a crumbling economy and an inadequate social security system, how is
Lebanon managing to delay the extreme spread of the virus and COVID-19-related
deaths? In this article, we will explore different socioeconomic indicators that
may have had an impact on the number of deaths in countries like Lebanon. In
order to evaluate Lebanon’s response to the pandemic, we analyzed a sample of
countries (listed in figure 2 below) having similar population characteristics;
average age between 30 and 35, HDI between 0.66 and 0.86 (figure 3) and
population between 0.5 and 50 Million.
All other variables remaining unchanged, this article shows that deaths per 1
million habitants decline with population density government response, and GDP
per capita, and increase as a function of number of cases.
With an average age of 32 years old and a Human Development Index of 0.76,
Lebanon ranks among the developing countries whose inhabitants are mostly adults
(figures 3 and 4).We selected other countries having a similar-aged population
(average age bracket 30 – 35 years) and a similar Human Development Index (0.66
– 0.86) to isolate the driver effect that the population characteristics may
have on the surge of COVID-19-related deaths.
The sample (as shown in figure 2) also surrounds Lebanon’s infections (per 1
million residents) in a balanced way: Lebanon is almost in the middle- as of
April 12th, 2020. Moreover, all the countries of our sample have detected more
than 200 total cases. This will ensure a transparent comparison of its
socioeconomic characteristics and policies to other countries, of which some may
or may not have had better reactions to opposing the virus spread.
We use the diversity of this sample in terms of GDP and various other indicators
to illustrate the effects that they may have on the number of deaths of another
country.
Cross-country regression
The statistical method we used is a cross-sectional regression on our countries
sample: By fixing one point in time (April 12th), we tried to find a
statistically significant relation between Deaths per 1 million inhabitants,
Cases per 1 million inhabitants, GDP per capita, Oxford’s Stringency Index and
population density.
The resulting relation (Table 1) we find is:
It is statistically significant and represents 82% of the sample’s data
(R-Square). All our variables are statistically significant - we can safely
(with a high probability, p-value<0.05 and <0.1) reject the hypothesis that
there is no relation
All the results are displayed in table 1.
Population density
It seems logical that pandemics are more likely to spread in areas having a high
population density since citizens are at higher proximity with each other (Coxa,
Tamblynb and Tamc, 2003). However, high population density doesn’t necessarily
raise pandemic deaths.
Our cross-country regression finds that population density negatively affects
the number of deaths due to coronavirus. In fact, when the population density
increases by 1 unit, deaths per 1 million habitants are reduced by 0.01 unit
(Table 1) This effect could be interpreted by the fact that hospitals and
healthcare facilities tend to be more ubiquitous in areas characterized by a
high population density. For instance, we find more hospitals in urban areas
than in rural ones. Hence, in our sample, countries with high population density
are less likely to face deaths in times of pandemics since the needed medical
care is more readily available. In our sample, Lebanon ranks second in terms of
population density.
Government measures
In order to evaluate the impact of lockdown measures taken by the governments of
our sample on the number of deaths, we use the stringency index developed by
Oxford University. It is a composite index that summarizes the performance of a
country in 7 possible policy responses: school closing, workplace closing,
canceling of public events, stopping public transport, sharing public info
campaigns, restricting internal movements and controlling international travels.
Scores on each policy response are then averaged for each country to obtain the
stringency index (see table 2 in the annex for more calculations details)
As a result of our analysis, when the stringency index increases by 1 unit,
deaths per 1 million habitants decrease by 0.3 units. We assume that cases would
be reduced even more. Hence, according to our regression, countries that have a
high stringency index are less likely to face big numbers of deaths due to
coronavirus.
As of April 12, Lebanon’s stringency index marked 95.84. It would be important
to mention that this score indicates that the Lebanese government is
implementing sufficient measures to slow the pandemic, but it does not
necessarily imply that the measures are being executed efficiently: Oxford’s
stringency index doesn’t measure the efficiency of the policies implemented but
only gives us their amount and intensity. Thus, Lebanon’s situation is under
control, if we assume that measures are being efficiently executed and respected
by the Lebanese people.
GDP per capita
The annual Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) refers to the
average revenue of a country per year; we express it in USD terms (neglecting
recent unofficial devaluation) to allow comparisons between countries. GDP per
capita could be a proxy for many socioeconomic dimensions. In our regression, we
consider it to be a proxy for household resources which allow residents to face
the pandemic as well as the financial capacity of the country to face this
crisis.
Our regression shows that GDP per capita has a significant negative impact on
the number of deaths per 1 million habitants; when the GDP per capita increases
by 1 unit, deaths per 1 million habitants are reduced by 0.0005 units on average
(table 1).
Lebanon has a GDP per capita relatively low compared to other countries in the
sample, nevertheless, the impact of GDP per capita on the number of deaths per 1
million is not as weighty as potentially possible, despite being statistically
significant (we can reject the hypothesis that it isn’t with a high
probability).
Cases per 1M
Assuming transparency of the data used, without cases of COVID-19, there are no
COVID-19-related deaths. This result is backed by logic and by our regression
results: We find a positive relationship between deaths and cases. Worldwide,
cases have now been strictly increasing with days of the epidemic, and so are
deaths. Studies and estimations (Chaolin Gu, Jie Zhu, Yifei Sun, Kai Zhou and
Jiang Gue, 2020) show that there probably is a quadratic relation between cases
and days since the first case, which means that at one point, cases and deaths
will start decreasing. This relationship isn’t significant in our sample which
doesn’t give us the certitude needed to predict the exact number of cases and
deaths to come.
Even though our analysis conveys that countries of our sample haven’t reached
this threshold yet, the socioeconomic factors described in this article make us
believe that the peak of the Lebanese death to reach isn’t expected to be as
high as the extreme cases of this sample. Despite having a relatively low GDP
per capita, Lebanon has a relatively high population density and has reacted
well to limit the spread of the virus (as described by the stringency Index).
This partially explains why it is ranking in the middle of the studied sample in
terms of deaths per million residents.
However, having a relatively low number of confirmed cases (as per April 12,
2020) implies a great amount of incertitude in the future of the country. Its
relatively low GDP per capita makes it especially vulnerable to the virus as
unemployment is climbing sharply and social security inadequacies are showing
up.
*To track the daily pandemic data and to use our model dynamically, please visit
www.markingthemoments.com/COVID-19-Graphs/
*Rim Haidar, MS in Economic Policies, USJ. Her fields of interest include
Diab Cabinet Draft Proposal: Haircut should be the least of
the Lebanese’s concerns
Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/April 15/2020
Lebanon’s economic reform plan that leaked last week was long awaited. The
document caused a gale of criticism across Lebanon, as it proposed, among many
things, a restructuring of the Lebanese banks’ debt, and a partial confiscation
of the depositors money, or what remains of it.
In 34-pages, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hassan Diab proposes to fix decades
of corruption and suicidal government policies, which coupled with Hezbollah
hegemony over the Lebanese state, have placed the country in political and
economic ruin.
To be fair, some of the proposed reforms of the Diab government are a step in
the right direction, especially those under the revenue-enhancing measures
clause that will broaden the tax base and impose taxes on the more privileged
classes. For years, the upper echelons have benefited from Lebanon’s ridiculous
taxation system.
Yet this economic salvation plan as set forth by the Diab cabinet does not fail
simply because it proposes to confiscate the hard-earned money of the majority
of the Lebanese, but rather because this draft plan lacks a clear economic
vision that sets forth a future model to replace the current shattered one.
When the fathers of the Lebanese republic put together this model, they
underscored the importance of neutrality and that Lebanon should never allow
itself to be isolated from the Arab milieu it occupies. While true that this
liberal economic service economy has given the Lebanese a lot, it has equally
contributed to their current predicament.
Consequently, any suggestion to make the Lebanese depositors pay for the
political elites’ boundless corruption over the years needs to at least give
these bullied investors an insight into what the future model would be.
The draft plan suggests that restructuring the banks’ debt through forced
bail-in from their depositors in failing financial institutions is not uncommon,
as it has been implemented in Cyprus and Greece. However, the Greek and the
Cypriots never had an armed militia like Hezbollah that answers to Iran, nor did
they allow the same political class that led their countries into ruin to lead
their desired economic resurgence. The reform plan does not recognize the
political and economic implications of Hezbollah’s hegemony over the Lebanese
state, nor does it acknowledge that Hezbollah wishes to punish and control the
Lebanese banks for implementing the lethal US sanctions against Iran and its
subsidiaries.
More importantly, the plan promises to put the largest burden of the haircut on
the large stakeholders and less so on the medium and small dispositors.
While this is theoretically sound, everyone involved fully knows that these
so-called large depositors have transferred their money outside the country,
with the help of their political patrons, even before the start of the current
crisis and the October 17 revolution that ensued. Thus, the real victims of
these restructuring mechanisms will be the average Lebanese.
In addition to the absence of a clear vision, the draft plan consciously fails
to provide any sort of social protection net, especially to the underprivileged
class that will soon multiply as thousands of newly unemployed and victims of
the proposed “haircut” join its ranks.
Any responsible and credible plan would simply prepare for this impending
poverty typhoon that will transform Lebanon into a starving nation. The
government’s shortsighted solution is to give this downtrodden class cash
handouts that will not be enough to put food on their tables, and will certainly
keep them wretchedly poor.
Fully aware that the international community harbors no trust in the Lebanese
establishment, and the fact that the latter will never convince third parties to
bankroll them further, the ruling class will use poverty to invite the World
Bank and the IMF to contribute to easing the pain of suffering Lebanese.
While the plan does not directly infer privatization, as it is written,
eventually what remains of the state’s assets, such as telecommunications and
electricity, will be sold off under the façade of public interest.
The issue is not only the sale of these assets, but rather to whom these will be
sold. Given the current circumstances, assets will most likely go to shady
businessmen who will in turn offer kickbacks to the political parties, including
Hezbollah. The Iran-backed group desperately needs funds, as current US
sanctions against Iran and Hezbollah have dried up revenue streams, and it no
longer receives funds from its Shia counterpart at the same rate as it did
before.
While distracting Lebanese from the real problem, the real danger of the Diab
economic plan lies in the fact that is has sinisterly opened the way for this
same ruling class to oppose this plan and potentially come out as the real
heroes and the defenders of the underdogs.
Coming out of Lebanon’s current inferno might require a much harsher and more
radical economic plan, one that might be equally as unpopular as the current
proposal. But the difference is that for a future plan to succeed, it needs to
address the aforementioned challenges. More importantly, it must be spearheaded
by independent, competent – and above all – honorable policymakers, ones that
will end this crisis, and end the system and the politicians who allowed the
current crisis to emerge.
*Makram Rabah is a lecturer at the American University of Beirut, Department of
History. His forthcoming book Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the
Maronites and Collective Memory (Edinburgh University Press) covers collective
identities and the Lebanese Civil War.
Coronavirus could infect hundreds of thousands in Lebanon:
Report
Mona Alami, Al Arabiya English/April 15/2020
A recent report, obtained exclusively by Al Arabiya, projects a massive spread
of COVID-19 in Lebanon. The forecast put in place by an international medical
NGO, in early March, calculates that hundreds of thousands are at risk of
infection. However, strict confinement measures imposed by the government have
led to a downward revision of projections. These measures will continue curb
projections, for as long as they are strictly implemented.
An internal report by the international organization Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF),
was provided to Al Arabiya by a source in the medical aid community. The report
from early March, which was not intended for public release, projected that in
the best conditions 638,074 people out of Lebanon 6 million population-including
Syrian and Palestinian refugees – could be infected by COVID-19 over a
five-month period.
Without statistics from Lebanon, MSF adopted numbers from Italy to create a
worst-case scenario and from China to create a best-case scenario for their
analysis.
Krystel Moussally, regional epidemiologist for MSF who was contacted by Al
Arabiya to comment on the leaked report explains that it was developed to plan
the emergency response and that figures are now dated.
“The case fatality rate reported globally is different for each country. It is
affected by many factors such as the demographics of the population and age
distribution of the cases – knowing that elderly are the most severely
affected,” Moussally said.
“In Italy, over 35 percent of the cases are older than 70 years, in comparison
with around 13 percent in Lebanon, and the majority of deaths has been in this
age category,” she continued. “Other factors might affect the case fatality rate
and the need for hospitalization such as the prevalence of underlying risk
factors of the population.”
Moussally added that the capacity of the health care system to cope, how fast
the virus spread, and to what extent, are also factors that would affect the
quality of care provided and hence affect case fatality rate.
Additionally, the Lebanese government has imposed strict confinement measures
and nightly curfews, which have helped flatten curve and affect NGOs
projections.
Lebanon so far has 641 cases and 21 deaths.
These measures have nonetheless been increasingly difficult to implement in
impoverished areas in the cities of Beirut, Saida, Nabatieh, and Tripoli, which
could lead to new flare-ups and overwhelm the Lebanese healthcare system. There
are about 350 to 500 beds in intensive care units across the country according
to figures provided by the Global Health Institute, while a study by Blominvest
puts the number of hospital beds at around 15,000.
Despite the slowdown in the pandemic in Lebanon, the leaked MSF report should be
taken as a warning: its best case scenario estimates that 454,096 Lebanese could
be infected by coronavirus with another 159,519 Syrians and 24,460 Palestinians
residing in Lebanon, based on early March estimates. In the best-case scenario,
over 100,000 people out of the 6 million population in Lebanon could experience
mild cases, while over 17,000 people could require hospitalization and nearly
6,000 people could be expected to be in critical condition and requiring
intensive care.
The fear that more relaxed social attitudes would lead to infection flare-ups is
exacerbated by the ongoing repatriation of thousands Lebanese stranded abroad.
“The government has taken all measures at entry points. We trust the authorities
are following procedures that will protect the country from a transmission of
imported cases through expatriates, and urge the returnees to follow the rules
and guidelines for the collective benefit of their communities,” said Moussally.
Yet as the population grows restless with extensive confinement measures, set
against the backdrop of the country’s economic collapse, maintaining these
measures could become challenging for the Lebanese government, which could end
up pushing Lebanon’s pandemic to new peaks.
The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on April 15-16/2020
More than 130,000 COVID-19 Deaths Worldwide
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/April 15/2020
COVID-19 has killed at least 131,319 people around the world, with Europe
accounting for more than two-thirds of the deaths, according to an AFP tally
Wednesday from official sources.
Europe has reported 88,716 deaths, while the United States has the single
highest toll at 26,950. The U.S. is followed by Italy with 21,645 deaths, Spain
with 18,579 and France with 17,167..
WHO Chief Voices 'Regret' at U.S. Decision to Halt Funding
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/April 15/202
The World Health Organization chief on Wednesday voiced "regret" at U.S.
President Donald Trump's decision to suspend funding of the U.N. agency over
criticism it had mismanaged the response to the COVID-19 pandemic."We regret the
decision of the president of the United States to order a halt in funding to the
World Health Organization," WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told
a virtual news conference.
On-Off Social Distancing May Be Needed Until 2022: Harvard Study
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
A one-time lockdown won't halt the novel coronavirus and repeated periods of
social distancing may be required into 2022 to prevent hospitals from being
overwhelmed, Harvard scientists who modeled the pandemic's trajectory said
Tuesday. Their study comes as the US enters the peak of its COVID-19 caseload
and states eye an eventual easing of tough lockdown measures. The Harvard team's
computer simulation, which was published in a paper in the journal Science,
assumed that COVID-19 will become seasonal, like closely related coronaviruses
that cause the common cold, with higher transmission rates in colder months. But
much remains unknown, including the level of immunity acquired by previous
infection and how long it lasts, the authors said. "We found that one-time
social distancing measures are likely to be insufficient to maintain the
incidence of SARS-CoV-2 within the limits of critical care capacity in the
United States," lead author Stephen Kissler said in a call with reporters. "What
seems to be necessary in the absence of other sorts of treatments are
intermittent social distancing periods," he added. Widespread viral testing
would be required in order to determine when the thresholds to re-trigger
distancing are crossed, said the authors. The duration and intensity of
lockdowns can be relaxed as treatments and vaccines become available. But in
their absence, on and then off distancing would give hospitals time to increase
critical care capacity to cater for the surge in cases that would occur when the
measures are eased.
"By permitting periods of transmission that reach higher prevalence than
otherwise would be possible, they allow an accelerated acquisition of herd
immunity," said co-author Marc Lipsitch. Conversely, too much social distancing
without respite can be a bad thing. Under one modeled scenario "the social
distancing was so effective that virtually no population immunity is built," the
paper said, hence the need for an intermittent approach. The authors
acknowledged a major drawback in their model is how little we currently know
about how strong a previously infected person's immunity is and how long it
lasts.
Virus likely here to stay
At present the best guesses based on closely-related coronaviruses are that it
will confer some immunity, for up to about a year. There might also be some
cross-protective immunity against COVID-19 if a person is infected by a common
cold-causing betacoronavirus.
One thing however is almost certain: the virus is here to stay. The team said it
was highly unlikely that immunity will be strong enough and last long enough
that COVID-19 will die out after an initial wave, as was the case with the SARS
outbreak of 2002-2003.
Antibody tests that have just entered the market and look for whether a person
has been previously infected will be crucial in answering these vital questions
about immunity, they argued, and a vaccine remains the ultimate weapon. Outside
experts praised the paper even as they emphasized how much remained unknown.
"This is an excellent study that uses mathematical models to explore the
dynamics of COVID-19 over a period of several years, in contrast to previously
published studies that have focused on the coming weeks or months," Mark
Woolhouse, an infectious disease epidemiologist at the University of Edinburgh
said. "It is important to recognize that it is a model; it is consistent with
current data but is nonetheless based on a series of assumptions -- for example
about acquired immunity -- that are yet to be confirmed."
Struggle, Fear, and Heartbreak for Medical Staff on Virus
Frontline
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Doctors, nurses and healthcare workers have become the unwitting heroes of the
coronavirus pandemic, winning applause from balconies and streets around the
world. From Yaounde to Rome to New York, the pandemic has infected more than 1.9
million people and claimed 118,000 lives.
Hospital workers are dealing with a huge influx of patients, while also facing a
lack of equipment in many cases and the fear of becoming infected themselves.
Often, they face heartbreaking decisions while treating their patients. AFP
journalists spoke to healthcare workers around the world to find out what it's
really like to be on the frontline in the coronavirus pandemic.
ITALY: 'We can't get sick'
In Italy, one of the worst affected countries, dozens of doctors and nurses have
died from COVID-19 and thousands of healthcare workers have become infected.
Silvana de Florio, nursing coordinator in the COVID-19 intensive care unit of
the Tor Vergata Hospital in Rome, underlined the importance of being
appropriately kitted out with masks, visors, gloves, scrubs and suits to avoid
contagion. "We don't set aside a specific amount of time for it, but we have
estimated that for a seven-hour shift, about 40-50 minutes is spent just on
getting dressed," she said. "In terms of hand washing and hand decontamination,
we are talking about 60-75 minutes per day," she said after scolding a care
worker for not wearing a mask. "Medical staff can't get sick -- not so much
because of their ability to work, but because it would not be fair."
ECUADOR: the morgues are full
In the Pacific port city of Guayaquil in Ecuador, a sick nurse makes no attempt
to hide her anger: 80 of her colleagues have been infected and five have already
died. Ecuador is one of the worst affected countries in South America, with
hundreds of dead bodies lying inside homes because the morgues are full. "We
went to war without any weapons," said the 55-year-old nurse, who spoke on
condition of anonymity. "The necessary equipment was not ready when this (the
pandemic) was already happening, devastating Europe," said the nurse, who is
resting at home as there is no space in the hospitals. Patients with "severe
symptoms" were arriving at her emergency department, "but due to a lack of
tests, they were treated as if they had the flu and sent home.""We had no
personal protective equipment (PPE) but we could not refuse to treat the
patients," she said.
UNITED STATES: Lack of equipment In the United States, Judy
Sheridan-Gonzalez, president of the New York State Nurses Association, also
complained about the lack of protective gear for medical workers. "We don't have
the arms and the armor to protect ourselves against the enemy," she said at a
recent protest outside a hospital. Benny Mathew, a 43-year-old nurse in New
York, said he caught the virus after caring for at least four patients without
adequate medical dress. Not long afterwards, when his fever had subsided, the
hospital asked him to come back to work. "They told me if you don't have fever
you can come on work -- that was their only criteria," he said.
"I was told to wear a mask and come to work. We don't have enough staff so I
think it was my duty to come back. "But I was worried that I was going to
transmit the disease to my coworkers, to the patients who don't already have
it," he added. With more than 195,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and around
10,000 deaths, New York state is the epicenter of the pandemic in the US, the
worst affected country so far.
PHILIPPINES: A living nightmare
The doctors at Manila's San Lazaro hospital, a specialist center for infectious
diseases, are used to battling humanity's nastiest contagions -- but they've
never seen anything like COVID-19. Suspected coronavirus cases have died at
triage, terrified patients grow outraged when they can't get tested immediately
and the doctors have to manage the anxiety they could be carriers too. "It's a
living nightmare," said doctor Ferdinand de Guzman, who at 60 years old is
himself in a high-risk group. With a limited number of intensive care rooms and
ventilators, the doctors are burdened with horrific judgements. "We don't like
to play God," de Guzman said. "Clinicians just have to make decisions." Many are
afraid to go home after work. "We are worried about our families," de Guzman
said.
"We always reserve one or two beds for (hospital) employees. We never had this
problem before, ever."
CAMEROON: 'We are afraid'
Roger Etoa, a doctor in Cameroon, one of the worst-affected countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, admits that fear of catching the disease also affects
healthcare workers. "I live with my wife and children," the 36-year-old said.
"When I arrive in the evening I rush to the shower, but it is difficult to stop
the children from jumping on you." Etoa is the director of a healthcare centre
in Douala, the capital of Cameroon. As a precaution, he's started taking
chloroquine, a drug used to treat malaria. "We don't yet know if it works
preventively or even curatively, but I prefer (to take it) just in case," he
said. Early studies have shown that chloroquine, may be effective in the
treatment and prevention of COVID-19, though more evidence is needed.
"We are afraid, like the rest of the population. Afraid that our masks or suits
are not fitted properly when we are dealing with a patient who is showing
symptoms," the doctor said. "We're obviously afraid of catching it. When you get
up in the morning and you have a bit of a headache, you ask yourself, 'What if
this is it? What if it's our turn to get the virus?'"
SPAIN: Patients left alone
Antonio Alvarez, a nurse in the intensive care unit at Vall d'Hebron, the
biggest hospital in Barcelona, described the heartbreaking daily task of phoning
a family member to say goodbye to their loved ones -- from behind the protective
glass. "It's difficult to see patients who are alone and have no family with
them," the 33-year-old said. "They're saying goodbye from the door and it's
probably the last time they'll see them" since funeral ceremonies have been
banned, he said. "If it was a member of my family, I wouldn't be able to stand
just sitting there and seeing them behind the door," Alvarez said. "It's a very
difficult situation."
TURKEY: 'Like a war'
"Everyone is working like crazy, as though it was a war," said Nuri Aydin,
director of the Cerrahpasa Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University.
"The atmosphere here is not like a normal workplace, but a battlefield," he said
during a visit to the hospital. Istanbul, a metropolis with some 15 million
residents and Turkey's economic capital, has around 60 percent of confirmed
COVID-19 cases in the country. Many healthcare workers are sleeping in hotels or
converted student dormitories, afraid of infecting their families. "What they
are doing is superhuman. There's no price for the work of healthcare workers,
they're in the service of humanity," Aydin said.
GERMANY: Neighbourly solidarity
Thomas Kirschning is a senior doctor and intensive care coordinator in the
German city of Mannheim, near the border with France.
The city recently sent home two French patients from Colmar, aged 64 and 68,
after nursing them back to health. "It was very motivating for the team that we
were able to help," he said. "We still had capacity in Mannheim, and it went
without saying... that we would take care of these patients while there was an
urgent situation in France."Kirschning feels a little nervous when returning
home to his wife and two daughters. "I'm doing everything I can to make sure
nothing happens when I come home," he said. "We might not get as close as we
normally would if it wasn't for this pandemic. We are all a little bit worried
-- my family are worried for me, but of course I am also worried for my family."
Berlin Hails Debt Halt for Poor Nations as 'Historic Int'l
Solidarity'
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/April 15/202
German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz hailed a Wednesday agreement by G20 nations
to pause debt payments by the world's poorest nations as "an act of
international solidarity of historic dimensions."The G20's agreement to put debt
repayments from 77 of the poorest nations on hold this year "creates greater
financial room for maneuver for the affected countries, for example to invest in
health protection for their populations," Scholz said in a statement.
Germany to Begin Easing Virus Curbs Says Merkel
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/April 15/2020
German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Wednesday announced first steps in undoing
coronavirus lockdowns for the coming weeks, with most shops allowed to open
although schools must stay closed until May 4.
Shops up to 800 square metres (8,600 square feet) will be allowed to reopen once
they have "plans to maintain hygiene", Merkel said, while schools will gradually
reopened with priority given to pupils about to take exams.Meanwhile, a ban on
large public events will be upheld until August 31 to prevent possible mass
transmissions of the virus.
IMF Says Still Assessing Iran's Funding Request
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
The International Monetary Fund is still assessing Iran's request for $5 billion
in emergency financing in a process which is taking time partly because of the
IMF's limited engagement with Tehran in recent times, Reuters quoted a senior
IMF official as saying. Iran, the Middle East country worst affected by the new
coronavirus outbreak, approached the IMF last month to request the $5 billion
from its Rapid Financing Initiative, an emergency program that aids countries
faced with sudden shocks such as natural disasters. It was Iran's first request
for IMF aid since the country's 1979 Islamic Revolution. "We have received a
request for assistance, and since we have had limited engagement with Iran in
recent times, the process of obtaining the information we require to assess the
request is taking time," Jihad Azour, director of the IMF's Middle East and
Central Asia Department, told Reuters.
Iran has been struggling to curb the spread of the coronavirus. But the Tehran
government is also concerned that measures to limit public activities could
wreck an economy already strained by US sanctions reimposed since 2018, when
Washington exited an agreement to lift them in return for curbs to Iran's
nuclear program. Some businesses - including many shops, factories, and
workshops - resumed operations across the country in recent days. As of April
14, Iran's death toll from COVID-19 had reached 4,683 and it had 74,877 cases of
infected people. Tehran has blamed the United States and its "maximum pressure"
policy for restricting its ability to respond effectively to the coronavirus
pandemic. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said last week the IMF would be
guilty of discrimination if it withholds the money for the country, which is a
member of the IMF. "Any member of the fund has the same rights of access to the
IMF financing and resources subject to the fund's rules and approval by the
director board," Azour said. In its 2020 Regional Economic Outlook for the
Middle East and Central Asia, published on Wednesday, the IMF said Iran's
economy is expected to contract by 6% this year, against a 7.6% contraction in
2019. Inflation - which spiked after the United States reimposed sanctions - is
expected to hit 34.2% this year, down from a peak of 41.1% last year. Iran, a
leading member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
is also being hit by a plunge in oil prices. Brent crude futures traded at
$29.60 a barrel on Tuesday; Iran would need an oil price of $389.4 per barrel to
balance its budget this year, according to the IMF. The IMF forecast the Iranian
government's fiscal deficit to widen to 9.9% of gross domestic product this year
from a 5.7% deficit last year.
UK death toll rises to 12,868 after 761 fatalities reported
in one day
NNA /AFP/April 15/2020
he number of people who have died in hospital in Britain from the coronavirus
has risen to 12,868, according to health ministry figures published on
Wednesday. This is an increase of 761 on the previous day and official figures
also showed that the number of people who have tested positive for COVID-19 has
now reached 98,476.
Kadhimi: Iraq Should be Distanced from Regional Conflicts
Baghdad - Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Iraq’s Prime Minister-designate Mustafa al-Kadhimi has said that his cabinet
lineup was ready, adding he would discuss it with the different political blocs
to submit it to Parliament for approval. In a gathering on Tuesday with a number
of Iraqi journalists and writers, in the presence of Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Kadhimi
called on the country’s political parties to cooperate with his government,
which he said would focus on preparing for early elections and face the
unexpected challenges caused by the outbreak of the novel coronavirus and the
sharp fall in oil prices. “The problems and crises that we are now facing are
the result of a wrong set-up for the political process post 2003,” he said. He
added that “the US occupation of the country succeeded in destroying the
structure of the Iraqi state without setting up a correct rebuilding
process.”Asked about Baghdad’s position towards the United States and Iran, the
premier-designate emphasized that serious dialogue would be held with Washington
on the nature of its presence in Iraq. He stressed that “Iraq is not an arena
for settling scores,” saying he would work to distance his country from regional
conflicts. He also highlighted the importance of strengthening cooperation with
the Arab and Islamic worlds, based on the principle of common interests, which
“requires serious work on the economy and investments.”“We cannot continue to
depend on oil as the only source of national income,” the PM-designate remarked.
Underlining the need for a “real, internal and nationwide dialogue,” al-Kadhimi
said the country’s parties should work together to “establish a national vision
through which we can build state institutions.”
Egypt Police Neutralize Terrorist Cell in Cairo Suburb
Cairo- Mohammed Abdo Hasanein and Walid Abdulrahman/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday,
15 April, 2020
While Egyptians on Tuesday were waiting in front of their TV screens for the
daily COVID-19 report issued by the Health Ministry, they were surprised by news
reporting a security attack on a terrorist cell in Al Amiriya neighborhood, east
of Cairo. Egypt’s Interior Ministry said its security forces killed seven
suspected militants in a shootout eastern Cairo following intelligence provided
by the country’s security agency. It said clashes erupted as the forces raided a
10-story apartment in the neighborhood, where members of the cell were hiding.
The ministry, which oversees police, said the forces seized weapons and
ammunition in the raid, including six machine guns and four birdshot rifles.
During the raid, Lieutenant officer Mohammed Fawzy Al Hofi and seven terrorists
were killed while three others were wounded. The cell was reportedly planning
attacks on the country´s Coptic Christians during the Holy Week and Easter
Sunday. Egypt´s Coptic Orthodox Christians, one the world´s oldest Christian
communities, would celebrate Easter on April 19. Local television channels
showed images of the gun battle between Egyptian counter-terrorism forces and
the terrorist elements while security officers were appealing to people, through
speakers, to stay away from the area. Egyptian security forces have been
battling a long-running insurgency mainly in the Sinai Peninsula, northeast
Egypt, spearheaded by a local affiliate of the ISIS group. Authorities launched
a nationwide operation against militants in February 2018. Tuesday’s raid came
while Egyptian authorities are busy fighting the COVID-19 outbreak. Former
Assistant to the Minister of Interior Farouk al-Makrahy said: “the cell was
planning to commit its terrorist operation during the nightly curfew, taking
advantage of the states’ preoccupation with fighting the coronavirus.”
How the Syrian war is lifted into Libya’s Battle for
Tripoli
DebkaFiles/April 15/2020
Russia has just airlifted into Libya the 350-strong Syrian rebel “Fifth Legion,”
once linked to Israel, to combat a second Syrian rebel unit, this one deployed
by Turkey, in the battle for Tripoli. The two rival airlifts are pumping
reinforcements into opposing sides of the battle. The Syrian rebel outfit
deployed by Moscow bolsters the drive of Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s LNA to capture
the Libyan capital. Turkey is boosting the GNA, fielded by the UN-recognized
Tripoli government of Fayez al-Sarraj, in order to keep Haftar’s army at bay.
The Syrian “Fifth Legion” commanded by Abu Jaafar joins Russia’s mercenaries
under contract with Wagner, who are already fighting there. Haftar is also
backed by France and air support from the UAE and Egypt. Sarraj’s army is backed
by Italy and Turkey with the latter mounting drone strikes against the enemy.The
battle has swung back and forth without resolution since April 2019 when Haftar,
who rules eastern Libya from Benghazi in alliance with the Libyan House of
Representatives, launched his campaign to capture Tripoli. Meanwhile, the
oil-rich African country sinks every deeper into poverty.
Repeated UN attempts to reach a ceasefire and arms embargo have failed. On March
17, the world body and nine countries called on Libya’s warring parties to cease
hostilities, which also targeted medical facilities, and allow health
authorities to combat the new coronavirus. Libyan authorities admit to more than
20 confirmed cases of coronavirus, but this figure may be way off track due to
the small number of tests. The battle for Tripoli shows no sign of abating. It
may also escalate as meanwhile a corner of the Syrian war is imported into
Libya.
Concerns in Damascus after Limits on Bread Distribution
Damascus/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Despite rising poverty in areas under the control of the Syrian government and
the coronavirus pandemic, the regime has insisted on delivering subsidized bread
using a “smart card.” Citizens considered this decision an act of treason
because it crosses the “red lines” that the ruling Baath Party itself had put,
at a time when experts consider the move a first step toward removing the
subsidy on bread similar to other commodities. After people queued outside
bakeries in Damascus at the start of the war, the phenomenon is back and is
getting worse as the government takes precautionary measures to contain the
spread of the virus. This was accompanied by bakeries announcing that they would
no longer operate during unusual hours, an indication of a shortage in flour
supplies from the government.
A rejection and calls
These government hints were met with rejection on social media platforms and
included calls for President Bashar Assad to intervene and halt the new move
after the failed and bitter experience of acquiring gas, fuel and other main
food supplies such as sugar, rice, vegetable oil and tea using the “smart card”.
Although the regime had announced that each family is entitled to one gas tank
every 23 days, many families confirm that they have not received one for 75
days. Many household providers spend an entire day in front of government
institutions to receive sugar, rice, vegetable oil and tea, and may not even get
them the same day. If they do, they may not receive all of them.
Treason
Loay is a citizen who like many others was following what Internal Trade and
Consumer Protection Minister Atef Naddaf was going to say. He told Asharq Al-Awsat,
“Aren't a war, inflation, poverty and the coronavirus enough? The government has
betrayed the people and has started to fight them with a loaf of bread, a
primary and indispensable material”.
A margin for manipulation
Noteworthy in al-Naddaf’s speech is his announcement that “each commissioner is
entitled to 10% of the amount to deliver to families and people who do not own a
“smart card” after his name and national number are registered”! This could
allow agents to largely manipulate what happens to this amount.
Without mentioning how many of them are available, al-Naddaf talked about
“increasing the number of electronic car readers in bakeries,” amid information
that Damascus would need 1,000 devices while only 100 are available. This will
lead to large crowds in front of areas that do have the card reader, knowing
that each device costs more than 450,000 Syrian pounds.
Prices higher than the rest of the world
An economic expert who spoke with Asharq Al-Awsat and preferred to remain
anonymous, indicated that “there is a chance that the decision could be
preparatory to ending the subsidy on bread altogether.”
He pointed out that “similar scenarios had happened with other subsidized
commodities such as gas, oil and fuel, where they were rationed and then their
prices spiked to become higher than in the international market. A kilogram of
sugar in the international markets is less than 20 US cents, equivalent to 220
Syrian pounds, whereas in Syria it currently costs 600 pounds!”Before 2011,
Syria used to produce millions of tons of wheat every year and could export 1.5
million tons. An international report estimated that the production of wheat
last year was only around 1.2 million tons, the lowest number in 29 years, while
some sources indicate that it had only received 500,000 tons and that production
may drop even further in 2020.
Hamdok Says Sudan’s Nile Share Will Be Kept for All
Generations
Cairo - Khartoum - Mohammed Abdo Hassanein and Mohammed Amin Yassin/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday,
15 April, 2020
Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has stressed the importance of
maintaining Sudan’s share in the Nile River for the sake of all future
generations. He praised the great efforts made by the country's negotiating team
in reaching a draft agreement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in
Washington. During his meeting with Foreign Minister Asma Mohamed Abdalla and
Irrigation Minister Yasser Abbas, the PM reviewed the draft on the filling and
operation of the Dam that was agreed on by the Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia. On
April 9, a high-ranking Egyptian delegation that included Intelligence Chief
Abbas Kamel and Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Mohamed Abdel Aati
visited Khartoum. Hamdok discussed with the visiting delegation the latest
developments in the negotiations on GERD, the situation in the region and
bilateral cooperation in various fields. The Sudanese PM is expected to visit
Cairo and Addis Ababa to revive the stalled negotiations to continue dialogue on
the remaining outstanding issues. He agreed with US Secretary of Treasury Steven
Mnuchin to proceed with talks after the coronavirus pandemic is contained.
Meanwhile, Egypt looks forward for a firmer stance from Sudan against the
“Ethiopian intransigence”, especially that the tripartite negotiations on the
rules for filling and operating the dam have stopped. Ethiopia has also
announced that filling the dam would begin in July, while the completion of the
entire project is scheduled for 2023, without reaching an agreement with Egypt
and Sudan. The two Arab countries have been keen on clarifying their positions
to avoid any misunderstanding, a source from the Egyptian Ministry of Water
Resources and Irrigation told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said the two countries have
affirmed their adherence to the Washington agreement, yet Egypt hopes Sudan
would convince Ethiopia to agree on the draft and not take any unilateral
measures that would harm Egypt’s share of Nile waters. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan
had expected to sign the agreement in Washington in February, but Ethiopia
skipped the meeting. The US Treasury has been sponsoring the talks since
November, with the participation of the World Bank.
Race Against Time to End Government Formation Crisis in Israel
Tel Aviv- Nazir Majli//Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
Negotiations between Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing camp and Benny Gantz’s Blue
and White bloc appeared to reach a deadlock. However, a dramatic development
took place on Monday evening as both sides met for six hours and seven other
hours on Tuesday.
Afterward, they issued a joint statement saying they had made “significant
progress.” The two are set to meet again with their negotiating teams on
Wednesday evening. Gantz’s 28-day mandate to put together a ruling coalition
after last month’s inconclusive election was due to expire at Tuesday midnight,
but President Reuven Rivlin, who is overseeing the coalition talks, extended it
for two days. Despite the positive atmosphere, both sides were keen to speak
cautiously. A Likud source said negotiations are ongoing, while a Blue and White
source ruled out reaching an agreement anytime soon.
According to other sources, they reached an agreement on the committee to
appoint judges. It was decided that the issues discussed by the committee shall
be subject to a consensus between the Blue and White’s candidate, Avi Nissenkorn,
who is supposed to be appointed Minister of Justice, and Likud’s candidate,
sources noted. They also agreed to dissolve the government and the Knesset and
hold fourth Knesset elections in case the Supreme Court prevents Netanyahu from
forming a government. Sources pointed out that both sides agreed to postpone
discussions over the annexation and imposition of sovereignty over Palestinian
territories until summer. Meanwhile, the Defense Minister’s far-right “New Right
Party” has accused Netanyahu of betraying his allies, dividing the right-wing
camp, giving in to Gantz and freezing the decision to impose Israeli sovereignty
over settlements, the Jordan Valley, and the Northern Dead Sea. It announced its
withdrawal from the right-wing bloc that has supported Netanyahu throughout the
last three electoral rounds. In response to the New Right Party’s accusations,
the Likud party said these statements are attempts to thwart the formation of an
emergency government. It affirmed Netanyahu’s adherence to the principles of the
right-wing camp, foremost of which is the imposition of sovereignty.
Germany Arrests ISIS Suspects Plotting to Attack US Bases
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 15 April, 2020
German authorities said Wednesday that police have arrested four suspected ISIS
members alleged to be planning an attack on American military facilities.
Federal prosecutors identified the men as Azizjon B., Muhammadali G., Farhodshoh
K. and Sunatullokh K. — all citizens of Tajikistan. The suspects' surnames
weren't released for privacy reasons. The prosecutors said the suspects were
apprehended at various locations in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
German weekly Der Spiegel reported that the men's alleged leader, a 30-year-old
Tajik man identified only as Ravsan B., has been in jail since last year on
firearms charges. Prosecutors said the men swore allegiance to ISIS in early
2019 and had contacts with high-ranking figures in the group. They reportedly
first planned to carry out an attack in Tajikistan but later shifted their
target to Germany, including US Air Force bases in the country.
Following Erdoğan's Promise To Convert Hagia Sophia 'Back
Into A Mosque,' Quran Verses, Call To Prayer Recited In The Ancient Church
MEMRI/April 15/2020
In May 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: "A short time ago they
converted the Hagia Sophia from a mosque to a museum. Inshallah, after the
election, we will convert it namely from a museum back into a mosque."[1] On
March 23, 2020, a video titled "Hagia Sophia Mosque Sound Allah Call to Prayer
23/03/2020" was uploaded to YouTube. The video, which has the logo of the İhlas
News Agency, shows two men inside the Hagia Sophia reciting the Islamic call to
prayer as well as verses from the Quran.
History Of The Hagia Sophia
The Hagia Sophia was built in 537 as a church, was converted into a mosque in
1453 after the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, and was converted into a museum in
1935. While the Islamic call to prayer has been recited in the building since as
early as 1980,[2] in recent years there has been more discussion about
converting the building back into a mosque.
On March 31, 2018, President Erdogan gave a speech in the Hagia Sophia in which
he called on the audience to recite the first chapter of the Quran, Surah Al-Fatiha,
as a prayer for the "souls of all who left us this work as inheritance,
especially Istanbul's conqueror, Fatih Sultan Mehmet." Quran verses were recited
in the space before the speech.[3]
In October 2016, Turkey's Ministry of Religious Affairs appointed an imam to the
Hagia Sophia and Friday prayers were performed in the Hünra Kasrı section of the
building. From then on five prayers per day have been held there.[4] Noon and
afternoon prayers had been performed there since 1991.[5]
During Ramadan in June 2016, the Ministry of Religious Affairs televised a
special program on its Diyanet TV channel in which verses from the Quran and
calls of tekbir ("say: Allah is the greatest") were recited from the minarets of
the Hagia Sophia.[6]
On May 30, 2016, the 563rd anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul, supporters
of the Saadet ("Felicity") party, an Islamist party, wore t-shirts that said
"Shoes cannot be worn in a mosque," then took their shoes off at the entrance of
the Hagia Sophia and walked around inside without their shoes on.[7]
[1] Aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/erdogan-ayasofyayi-tekrar-muzeden-isim-olarak-camiye-cevirecegiz/1433726,
March 29, 2019.
[2] Yeniasya.com.tr/gundem/ayasofya-da-ilk-ezan-80-de-okundu_402430, October 20,
2016.
[3] Youtube.com/watch?v=XJjGs98yXgM, March 31, 2018.
[4] Aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/ayasofyanin-4-minaresinden-5-vakit-ezan-sesi-yukseliyor/668646,
October 20, 2016.
[5] Sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/ayasofyada-80-yil-sonra-ilk-cuma-namazi-1461762,
October 21, 2016.
[6] Diyanet.tv/-diyanet-tv-kadir-gecesinde-ayasofyada, June 30, 2016.
[7] Odatv.com/saadetciler-ayasofyaya-boyle-girdi-3005161200.html?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=d2e84280268322cbfff0e8193ff280b550a41322-1586279467-0-AdgSVuuXlpFGsDGy_ASR4ng1yKTs7a6OFMU5SSYL_TsCqiBrFJLwPuzoyAXk2kjqQ7kuafl8yajkoUeJCYGGSLT8eUUyQxy3aiPzdG8hytehXIbsoNzB8qTXtLUiHBnhGteqwxAPeJb3YKQwAjoPfJf948Bq-T5hi9wJeWz6vEXgJTVmzntp79fcNBvD8tC-ayA6G5DwJ0PX-4mo2_ezvdwuZBAHFOyDvEijJJhIWoMnKCDK08KA0rI7ET6CzG7Td2_KlIQoLR3D3AnuKszNj2t4_HN3d6SVls2iAHTOaZhqPTqrihHyP0EAPJFZ6UxyAvyPpS3mFNBNr0S_lS1g524,
May 30, 2016.
The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources
published on
April 15-16/2020
Iran vs. Trump: Suleimani’s Legacy, and Khamenei’s
Ambitions (Part 11)
Reuel Marc Gerecht/FDD/April 15/2020
روال مارك كاريشت/مؤسسة الدفاع عن الديموقراطية/الثورة الإسلامية في إيران بمواجهة
دونلد ترامب…اسطورة سليماني وطموحات الخامنئي
Part II. The Fallout
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/85120/reuel-marc-gerecht-fdd-the-islamic-revolution-vs-donald-trump%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%83-%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b4%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%b3%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84/
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, appears to believe that the
massive public turnout for funeral processions honoring Qassem Suleimani, shows
that the revolutionary spirit, Iran’s “divine power … the love, the loyalty, and
the resistance of the Iranian nation,” is strong. The United States targeted
Suleimani in an early-January attack in Iraq, pointing to the Iranian general’s
role in past and—the Trump administration credibly argued—future attacks on
Americans, their interests, and their allies. Leaked internal deliberations
among senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guards after the 2009 pro-democracy
Green Movement was crushed and disconcerted commentary among clerics and members
of parliament after the 2017 provincial demonstrations certainly suggest that
the theocracy’s frontline guardians have had doubts about the “love” of the
Iranian people.
What Khamenei doesn’t see or refuses to admit: Suleimani was sui generis. He was
the last charismatic figure of the Iranian revolution. The hundreds of thousands
who came out to pay their respects probably weren’t in the streets because the
regime had coerced them to be there. The mullahs have missed numerous
opportunities to orchestrate mass rallies in their favor after big, sometimes
violent, protests against the theocracy. The early Islamic Republic loved such
gatherings to show popular support. After 2009, the clerical regime avoided
these marches, surely because it was uncertain about the loyalty of the middle
and lower classes. Massive crowds can overwhelm, and the Iranian security
services are neither that large nor that mobile. (The regime remains hesitant to
use local police and Basij units, which are far more numerous, against the
denizens of their own neighborhoods.)
Yet with Suleimani it was different.
The Quds Force commander was, above all else, a Shiite warrior, an awe-inspiring
general who generated fear and loathing among Sunnis throughout the Middle East.
In his halting Arabic and more menacing Persian, he was a social-media poster
boy for the Shiite downtrodden. He was a symbol of Shiite pride against
centuries of Sunni hubris.
Suleimani was the archetype of the militant Shiite: faith converted into violent
idealism and brotherhood, propelled by an individualized, indomitable will. But
unlike Shiism’s doomed iconic heroes, unlike the legions of Iranian death-wish
believers who bled out in the battlefields of the Iran–Iraq War, Suleimani
survived. He saw horrible combat in that conflict and yet didn’t hide his
contempt for tactics that wasted the lives of his men. He was a man of action
amid clerics who rarely were.
Old-time Shiism had a lot of Christianity’s faith in redemption through trials
that may leave one dead but blessed. Patience and perseverance, not violence,
was always required against injustice. However, new-age Shiism, which Khomeini
helped to birth, is bold, assertive, averse to compromise, and, most important,
confident that victory against superior numbers (Americans or Sunnis) is
possible. One may need to martyr oneself, but the cause can actually win. The
faithful don’t have to wait for the Mahdi for the righteous to triumph.
Suleimani was the incarnation of that hope and awe until Trump killed him. With
his death, that dream probably perished.
The Arab Shia of Iraq and Lebanon, who constitute most of the Arab Shiites who
share Iran’s version of the Shiite faith, had, of course, stopped embracing
Suleimani’s revolutionary mission civilisatrice long before President Trump
tired of the general’s machinations. Suleimani’s standing, like the reputation
of the Iranian regime in general, had fallen precipitously among them. Among the
young, it appears to have collapsed. Persian hubris and the unconcealable
Iranian intention to keep the Iraqi Shiite community beholden tanked the
general’s reputation, which had risen high when Sunnis seriously threatened
(2005-2007 and 2013–2016).
As much as Syria, Iraq is where the general truly invested himself, where his
clandestine actions surfaced and he eventually became a public personality, an
open player in Iraq’s fractious, hard-ball democratic politics. A decade ago, it
would have been unthinkable for young Iraqi Shiites to storm the Iranian
consulate in Karbala, the historic home of Shiite militancy and martyrdom, and
take down the Islamic Republic’s flag and raise the Iraqi one. But they did just
that last November. As much as anyone, Suleimani helped to revivify the ancient
“Arab-Ajam (Persian)” antagonism, which has sometimes splintered Muslim and
Shiite solidarity.
It shouldn’t have been surprising to anyone, except perhaps Westernized Iranian
expatriates who believe that militant Shiism has been completely drained from
Persian society by the clerical regime’s tyranny, that Suleimani’s demise would
lead to massive processions. His fame rarely descended into the pitch-black
notoriety that has surrounded so many from the Guards and the Basij.
No one cried when the Guard commander, Brigadier Gen. Hossein Hamadani, died in
the battle of Aleppo in 2015; he was as important as Suleimani to Iranian
victory in Syria. But he had an open and instrumental role in smashing the
pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009. Even among university students who have
separated themselves from the Islamic Republic, who use social media to snipe at
the regime and voyage to freer realms, Suleimani didn’t always elicit the hatred
that is so quickly expressed for Khamenei, Rouhani, and others.
For many, the general had become what Shiites insist on in their guides: a
living myth. For the large number of Iranians who’ve embraced a popular,
mystical “village Shiism,” who see the coming of the Mahdi before “the end of
times,” and who’ve grown particularly hostile to the Shiism of clerics, the
processions for Suleimani, a truly poor Kermani boy who rose, were where one
could pour out one’s sadness. His death was a national passion play, the beloved
ritual that gives the faith some meaning beyond the hypocritical orations of
mullahs. Bidding farewell to the general was a way for many, especially those
who once cherished the Islamic Revolution and warmed to the anti-Western themes
that are part of both Islamic and Persian pride, to part with a forlorn hope and
a man who, if nothing else, terrified the Sunnis of Iraq, who’d brought misery
to countless Iranian families. As a ferociously anti-regime Iranian exile in
Europe pithily put it: “He killed thousands of Sunni Arabs. He scared the shit
out of the Saudis. What’s not to love?”
Post-Suleimani
Despite Suleimani’s death, Khamenei and senior members of the Corps probably
believed, at least before COVID-19 struck, that they were in decent shape, at
least better than before. In 2009 when pro-democracy demonstrators marched en
masse, Khamenei thought Islam was on “the edge of the abyss;” Soleimani’s
funeral processions symbolized for him, however, a national-religious awakening.
And this efflorescence of zeal arrived via an American missile. This take on
Suleimani is, most probably, egregiously wrong, but the supreme leader may well
believe that another small-scale confrontation with America is worth the risk
given the inspirational upside. Even if Khamenei and senior Guard commanders
know the vast majority of the Iranian people have gone south on them and the
revolution, the slim hope offered by Suleimani’s killing could be enough for
them to tempt fate since only a clash with the United States has offered any
hope that the regime still has a base of believers.
The coronavirus eruption, perhaps brought directly from China via
sanctions-busting flights run by the Revolutionary Guards’ Mahan Air, may
heighten the regime’s awareness of its internal fragility. Surely all know in
Iran the regime lied badly and poorly about the infection rate and fatalities.
They know that the Mahan Air flights kept coming until Beijing shut them down.
And the Islamic Republic’s public health system has long been a mess. The
regime’s coronavirus dishonesty and insufficiencies may not do much, however, to
weaken the regime’s oppressive capacity unless it affects the confidence of the
riot-control forces in the Guards and the Basij. Pandemics can advance state
collapse. The Muslim Arab invasions in the seventh century were greatly aided by
plagues that had depopulated important buffer zones for both the Byzantine and
Persian empires. The Mamluk empire never recovered from the Black Death. But
unless the death rate in Iran skyrockets further, or Khamenei becomes one of the
virus’ victims, it seems unlikely that the Iranian citizenry will grow any
madder or bolder than they already are.
In the short term, COVID-19 will certainly keep people from gathering, which is
what the security forces since 2009 have feared most. Down the road the disease
might be seen as a tipping point, a viral variation of Chernoybl. The disease
may do what U.S. sanctions have failed to do: paralyze the non-oil-based
economy. Iran is an institutionally weak state. But the strongest institutions
in the country—the clergy and the Revolutionary Guards—are likely to weather the
virus without cracking. They have the most to lose in another revolution. And
one of the regime’s strongest assets has been widespread, dispiriting cynicism
and emigration. Iranians expect the regime to cock up. They expect it to lie.
Too many among the best and brightest have fled. And the people’s righteous
anger, which is certainly growing, would need to overcome the security forces.
And the bloody efficiency of the supreme leader’s gunmen isn’t yet in doubt. The
slaughter last November and December (there are numerous reports of enfilading
fire against protesters) shows Khamenei’s and the Guards’ determination to quell
any new threat quickly. And rather than try to conciliate demonstrators and the
families of the fallen (Khamenei isn’t averse to doing a kill-and-regret
two-step), he has mocked them.
And the anti-regime explicitness of these demonstrations coincided with large,
anti-Iranian protests among the Iraqi Shia and “anti-corruption,” bad governance
protests among the Lebanese Shia, which were clearly aimed at the country’s
status quo, which is led by the Hezbollah, the first and favorite Arab child of
Iran’s Islamic revolution. Infuriated, Khamenei saw conspiracy everywhere. And
in Iran he acted decisively.
The denouement of the gasoline protests complicates Iran policy for the White
House. Senior administration officials are hopeful that the clerical regime is
on the precipice, that more economic coercion producing a crisis in
hard-currency reserves just might convulse the system enough to produce even
bigger rebellions and fissure the Guards and the Basij. No doubt the collapse of
oil prices is bad news for Tehran even though U.S. sanctions have already taken
away most of the regime’s hard-currency earnings from oil. Some senior officials
may even believe that they are close to a reckoning that could produce new
nuclear talks.
Yet this analysis has always reflected more domestic U.S. politics (since
another war in the Middle East isn’t an option, something else must work), a
certain exuberance about the possibilities unleashed by disciplined economic
warfare, and a hopeful, somewhat Marxist, theory of economic rebellion than a
deep dive into what makes the clerical regime tick (God, man, and Iran welded
into a transforming, often violent, mission). It also downplays the probable key
factor behind the initiation of Obama’s nuclear talks—big, pre-emptive American
concessions, especially uranium enrichment—and overestimates the coercive effect
of U.S. and European sanctions.
This hopeful analysis is increasingly off-kilter after the Iranian dead of last
winter. No doubt: Big demonstrations will come again. If enough parents and
grandparents die from coronavirus, a bigger swath of the youth might take to the
streets. Senior Guard commanders certainly give the impression, in their
unguarded moments, that spontaneous combustion is an omnipresent possibility.
But the regime’s military and security services do not appear as did the shah’s
before the fall: divided, listless, and leaderless. When soft power meets hard
power in the Middle East, the former loses. No exceptions.
Despite Khamenei’s and the Revolutionary Guards’ resolution, President Trump is
playing a decent hand against the clerical regime—so long as he is prepared to
escalate and is willing to walk away from Washington’s bipartisan proclivity for
nuclear negotiations with the Iranian theocracy. With the possible exception of
the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, there is no more powerful,
just-can’t-kill-it aspiration in U.S. foreign policy than arms control.
Unintentionally, Trump’s unorthodox approach may have already deep-sixed it as
the preeminent factor in U.S.-Iran policy (Tehran may no longer indulge us),
which opens up the possibility for containment, that is, a regime-change
strategy however patiently delivered.
Containing Iran would mean that the United States is willing—given the disparity
in power, it really ought to be eager—to box the clerical regime’s ears whenever
required. The more often the United States demonstrates that it is willing to
use overwhelming force, the less likely Khamenei will seriously challenge. Since
1979 the United States has done an abysmal job of holding the Islamic Republic
accountable for its actions, even when the mullahs murdered Americans. The
killing of Suleimani was a shocker in Tehran in part because it was so
un-American. But that effect is fading. The eagerness with which the State
Department announced that the administration didn’t want to escalate after the
Ayn al-Assad reprisal shows that the White House doesn’t want to change its
sanctions-heavy, no-containment, no-challenge approach. The decision by the
president not to respond to recent lethal Iraqi Shiite militia attacks against
U.S. and British personnel with bombing runs against Iranian forces and
facilities, in Iraq or elsewhere, shows that there was give in Secretary of
State Michael Pompeo’s warning that Tehran would be held accountable for its
proxies.
Maintaining Awe
Washington may suspend reprisals for the death of Americans inside Iraq in an
effort to help friendly candidates for prime minister, first Adnan al-Zurfi and
now Mustafa al-Khadhimi, and President Barham Salih, a politically brave,
pro-American Kurd. But that logic, if rigorously adhered to, will neuter
American power in Iraq and ultimately undermine anti-Iranian Iraqis. (Salih’s
standing in Iraq went up, not down, after Suleimani’s death.) It could also shut
down any American military reprisal against Iran anywhere. Tehran and its Iraqi
Shiite proxies will know we won’t kill to protect our own, let alone our allies,
which invites more attacks. This line of reasoning only works if our Iraqi
allies can politically and militarily gain the upper hand on Iran and its allies
within a relatively short period of time, and we can strike the clerical regime
elsewhere, and the U.S. armed forces in Iraq can hunker down adequately in the
interregnum. None of these is easily achieved.
Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 was a disaster for Iraq and the United
States, which was only partly reversed when we returned three years later. But
what was done may not be undone. If Iran’s minions continue to kill Americans,
then Washington will either have to strike back much more harshly than it has so
far, get out, or watch its influence in the country collapse. Fortunately, Iraqi
political dysfunction works here to Washington’s advantage: it’s actually hard
for Iran, through threat, murder, bribery, and appeals to Shiite fraternity, to
rally effectively the Iraqi Shiite community against the United States. Iranian
designs on Iraq have become open and crude. And the Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs,
who represent around 40 percent of the country, want America to stay. Kicking
the U.S. out probably can’t be done by a poorly executed and divisive
parliamentary vote when the parliament—the entire political establishment—is
held in contempt by an increasingly large slice of the electorate. Washington
has some maneuvering room.
Nevertheless, the administration would be well advised to prepare for a
worst-case scenario, which means that it needs to develop the necessary
capacities to keep U.S. troops at Dayr az-Zor, Syria, regardless of U.S. troop
presence in Iraq if Washington intends to deny Iran control of the northern
Middle East. That won’t be easy, and at a minimum may require the U.S. Air Force
and Navy to violate routinely somebody’s airspace. America could be driven out
of Afghanistan by the Taliban and Pakistan, from Iraq by Iran, and from Syria,
by Iran or Trump himself. Such a rout of the United States would likely have
cascading, global consequences.
And it won’t just be in Iraq where Khamenei tries to degrade President Trump’s
writ. Tehran has already started pushing its nuclear program beyond the confines
of the JCPOA. It is ignoring requests from the International Atomic Energy
Agency to explain apparent violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
to which Iran is a signatory, including denying access to a site at Turquz-Abad,
southwest of Tehran, where uranium conversion appears to have taken place.
The Obama administration played fast and loose with the
“possible-military-dimension” questions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Secretary of State John Kerry liked to dismiss concerns about weaponization by
suggesting that we knew everything. (That would be a first for the Central
Intelligence Agency.) The Europeans, too, have shown little desire to push for
answers since any information gathered that suggests Iran has an active arms
program that extends beyond uranium enrichment and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles might well crater the hope, to which the Europeans still cling, that
the JCPOA can be reborn with a Democratic president. But the clerical regime has
a way of alienating the Europeans. Stonewalling the IAEA on the NPT while openly
increasing the quality and quantity of enriched uranium may be enough to move
the Europeans, however begrudgingly, into opposition—despite their loathing of
President Trump. They probably wouldn’t implement their own punishing sanctions.
COVID-19, and economic self-interest, likely would prevent that. But Iranian bad
behavior could stop European statesmen from publicly opposing Washington.
In any case, eventually Trump, assuming the Iranians refuse his future offers to
negotiate, will have to decide whether he’s really going to do anything about an
Iranian A-bomb. One day Tehran will inject uranium oxide gas into its more
advanced centrifuges to test them. Khamenei may do it in the open to see what
Washington does. He may not, in which case the administration will be in the
dark since, outside of a lucky intelligence penetration, Washington simply has
no means to detect this work. With or without the JCPOA, we are blind outside of
IAEA-monitored sites. If the Iranians can technically do this before November,
and Khamenei believes doing so would hurt Trump, the supreme leader will most
likely give the green light.
This come-to-Muhammad moment for Washington was inevitable after Trump pulled
America out of the JCPOA. The administration hasn’t really prepared itself, and
certainly not public opinion, for this eventuality. The White House and State
have preferred to not think about the Iranian atomic progress since it
complicates what has been a simple and effective policy: billions have been
denied to the most troublesome, convulsive and murderous regime in the Middle
East. They stopped what had been the most successful case of foreign blackmail
in American history. And the economic contraction has helped to produce a
continuous stream of domestic protests since 2017, protests aimed explicitly at
the theocracy, not America. It is striking that Trump and the United States have
not become targets in these protests. Trump is responsible for a punishing
economic war against the Islamic Republic, yet it’s the mullahs and the
Revolutionary Guards, the entire theocratic apparatus of oppression, that have
taken the hit. The standing of the United States in Iran may have actually gone
up.
Many critics of the president who adamantly opposed the renewal of U.S.
sanctions now are tirelessly pushing the line that sanctions have been a
significant factor in Iran’s COVID-19 pandemic. Given the past commentary of
brave Iranian officials on the delinquency and corruption that exists in the
Islamic Republic’s government and health care system, given the actions of Mahan
Air, given the Swiss channel for procuring medical supplies and the billions of
dollars the regime still possesses, these criticisms seem obtuse. The Islamic
Republic has tenaciously sought what it wants, through legal and illicit
channels, for decades, often paying much more than others to ensure it gets what
it requires, especially if it has had anything to do with the nuclear program.
And yet we have not seen the regime use the same determination to contract for
medical supplies. We have, however, watched Khamenei suggest that the virus may
be an American plot, tailor-made to infect Iranians, possibly even with the help
of jinn (Khamenei’s conspiracies are vivid, omnipresent, religious, and
occasionally supernatural). This conspiracy, which the supreme leader likely,
deeply, believes, will certainly amplify his desire to strike the United States.
The American left has long been conflicted about the Islamic Republic.
Theocracies don’t normally elicit sympathy from progressives. Yet since the
1970s, the Western left has felt bad about the MI6/CIA-supported 1953 coup
against the oil-nationalizing Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. That
guilt grew in the 1990s as the anti-clerical Iranian left locked onto the coup
as the decisive factor in aborting the rise of an Islam–resistant democracy. But
Obama’s “transformative” outreach to Khamenei broke the dike, releasing the
left’s discomfort with American hegemony, sympathy for “exploited” Third World
countries, growing distaste for Saudi Arabia, and an estimable reverence for
Persian culture and history.
And what Obama unleashed Trump has put into overdrive. What he is for, the left
is against, especially if it entails the use of force. And Trump may see
declining support among Republicans if he chooses to contain the Islamic
Republic or check its nuclear advance. Americans now focus on the cost of
action; they don’t focus on what happens when Washington does nothing. (The
Munich dictum is kaput.) The odds that the United States was ever going to stop
the mullahs’ quest for an atom bomb were poor; in an age of American retreat,
when politics are so harshly polarized, those odds are worse.
Since World War II, nuclear proliferation has been slow in part because American
resolve against it has been great. But the American world order is cracking, and
Iran certainly has the capacities of North Korea. If the military option exists,
it’s probably Israel that will exercise it. And given the considerable success
the Israelis have had in Syria in checking Iranian ambitions, the odds of an
Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear sites have certainly increased. Israeli
senior officials seem less fearful, of both Iranian and American repercussions,
than they did in 2011–2012, when prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu was seriously
exploring the possibility of a preventive military action. In any unity
government, Blue & White-now-Israel Resilience leader Benny Gantz, a pretty
ardent Iran hawk, might well fortify Netanyahu, whose bark has always been more
profound than his bite.
Yet President Trump is a live wire precisely because he often takes actions that
don’t appear to be politically astute. But if he doesn’t strike as Iran
advances, and the smart money still is that Trump isn’t sufficiently
unconventional to do so, especially given his deep desire to lessen America’s
responsibilities abroad, then it will become more pressing for him to adopt a
policy that makes sense against an Islamic Republic armed with nuclear weapons.
The same would be true of a President Biden if he decides not to throw money at
Tehran.
Leaving behind the idea that the United States can actually thwart the Islamic
Republic’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might at least oblige Washington to
focus more seriously on the nature of the clerical regime, with whether the
moderation-through-engagement approach of the Democrats makes any sense.
Dartmouth’s Misagh Parsa has done a fine comparative study of unpleasant
authoritarian regimes that have evolved into democracies or just less oppressive
political systems. The Islamic Republic fails these evolutionary tests. Without
the illusion of arms control distorting the foreign-policy debate, we might have
greater clarity about how we view, 20 years after 9/11, the Iranian Islamist
threat (how much do we fear virulently anti-American mullahs with nukes?), the
Middle East (can we leave it?), human-rights and democracy among Muslims (do we
believe in their ameliorative effect on Muslim societies?), or whether we would
just prefer to trade with Iran’s theocracy because we don’t really have the will
to do anything else (scrape off the varnish of the European Union’s love affair
with soft power, this is essentially where most Europeans have been for years).
For whatever reasons, Trump has taken Tehran head on. He has probably scared the
mullahs and their guardsmen more than any president since Reagan in 1980. By
rejecting his predecessor’s evolutionary optimism about the Islamic Republic,
and a deeply flawed nuclear agreement that really only made technical sense if
one thought Iran was in rapid transition toward something less wicked, he has
set the United States on a collision course with religious revolutionaries who
have become accustomed to winning. Barring an electoral defeat in 2020 or death
by virus or just old age, Khamenei and Trump may well end the long-running,
region-defining clash. It could end in war. Or rebellion in the streets. Or just
the dismissive shrug of a declining superpower turning inward.
*For his part, Khamenei will certainly not go gentle into the night.
*Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the CIA, is a senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
COVID-19 in Regime-Held Syria
David Adesnik/FDD/April 15/2020
The regime of Bashar al-Assad continues to report implausibly low numbers of
COVID-19 cases, while evidence mounts of deliberate deception. The presence of
tens of thousands of Iranian-backed militia fighters may have introduced, and
likely accelerated, the spread of the virus.
Situation Overview
The regime acknowledged its first case of COVID-19 on March 22, after it spent
weeks denying reports of other infections. On March 10, a UK-based human rights
group reported, citing discussions with doctors inside Syria, that the virus had
already spread to four provinces over which the regime exercises effective
control, including Damascus. Physicians at the Tishreen Military Hospital told
journalists that they had treated foreign militia fighters for what appeared to
be COVID-19.
In addition, Pakistani authorities reported six cases of coronavirus involving
citizens who had just returned from Syria. The Zeynabiyoun Brigade, one of the
Iranian-backed militias fighting on Assad’s behalf, consists mainly of Pakistani
fighters. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the Zeynabiyoun last year for
terrorism and human rights violations.
Prior to acknowledging its first coronavirus case, the Syrian regime closed the
nation’s schools and suspended most foreign travel. In the final week of March,
Damascus imposed a nation-wide 6pm-to-6am curfew and banned inter-city travel.
Also that week, 11 Iraqi Shiite pilgrims tested positive after returning from
Syria. Gradually, the regime has raised the official number of reported cases,
which reached 29 on April 14, including two deaths. Meanwhile, independent
journalists aggregated reports of 46 cases, 35 of which were in Deir Ezzor, a
province with a high concentration of Iranian militia fighters.
To control the flow of information about the pandemic, Syrian intelligence has
embedded its personnel in the country’s hospitals, according to an expatriate
researcher from Homs. Syria-based physicians also told him they have observed a
drastic increase in pneumonia-related deaths, many of which likely were
undiagnosed coronavirus cases. Given its lack of capacity to test for COVID-19 –
there is a single lab in Damascus that can analyze samples – the regime itself
may have little idea of just how far the virus has spread.
COVID-19 in the Greater Middle East
Country Cases Deaths
Iran 74,877 4,683
Turkey 65,111 1,403
Israel 12,046 123
Pakistan 5,837 96
Saudi Arabia 5,369 73
UAE 4,521 25
Qatar 3,428 7
Egypt 2,350 178
Algeria 2,070 326
Morocco 1,888 126
Bahrain 1,522 7
Iraq 1,400 78
Kuwait 1,355 3
Oman 813 4
Tunisia 726 34
Afghanistan 714 23
Lebanon 641 21
Jordan 397 7
W. Bank & Gaza 308 2
Somalia 60 2
Sudan 32 5
Syria 29 2
Libya 26 1
Yemen 1 0
Source: JHU Coronavirus Resource Center
Data current as of 3:30 PM, April 14, 2020.
Implications
The Assad regime owes its survival largely to military and financial assistance
from Iran. An admission that Iranian-backed fighters brought and spread the
virus would be a major embarrassment to both the Assad regime and Tehran.
In the first week of April, the regime belatedly restricted movement in and out
of the Sayyida Zeinab neighborhood southeast of Damascus, where Iranian-backed
militias maintain their headquarters. Authorities also sealed the Sayyida Zeinab
shrine, which gives the neighborhood its name and draws tens of thousands of
Iranian pilgrims each year.
Western diplomats told Reuters that the Iranian carrier Mahan Air continued
regular flights from Tehran to Damascus even after the suspension of other
arrivals. Treasury first sanctioned Mahan Air in 2011 for supporting terrorism;
the department has also concluded that Mahan “contributed to mass atrocities” in
Syria through its years of support for the Assad regime.
What to Watch for
The precursors of a major outbreak are clearly visible in Syria, yet the
regime’s control of the healthcare system ensures that thousands of cases may
remain hidden from the outside world. The UN’s top aid official warned that the
handful of cases Damascus acknowledges represent only the “tip of the iceberg.”
The regime may be able to maintain the pretense of a minor outbreak until the
pandemic overwhelms the country’s dilapidated hospitals. A study by the London
School of Economics found that Syria’s healthcare system has only 325 beds with
ventilators in intensive-care units, although just over 40 are in areas outside
regime control. Based on the assumption that 5 percent of coronavirus patients
require ventilators, the study estimated that the system could handle at most
6,500 cases.
While a catastrophe may be imminent, it is also possible that the epidemic will
claim only several thousand lives, a number small enough to blend in with the
overall devastation that Assad and his allies have inflicted on Syria.
*David Adesnik is research director and a senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Center on Military
and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from David and CMPP, please
subscribe HERE. Follow David on Twitter @adesnik. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and
@FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute
focusing on national security and foreign policy.
Is Iran on the Brink of a Coronavirus Coup?
A.J. Caschetta/The Hill/April 15/2020
The Iranian regime's mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic is an unprecedented
political liability.
If you don't think that the coronavirus is a political issue, you must be
self-quarantining under a rock somewhere. People everywhere are watching as
their leaders respond to the pandemic. In free nations, their assessments will
be delivered at the polls, where some careers will be applauded and others
ended. But the credibility and durability of totalitarian states are at risk,
too. Some analysts even think that Chinese leader Xi Jinping may be vulnerable
to a coup.
Could the virus from Wuhan accomplish in a matter of months what seven U.S.
presidents, 19 CIA directors, and legions of Iranian secularists and dissidents
could only dream about achieving in Tehran? The answer is maybe — the
coronavirus may just deliver the coup de grace to the theocratic dictatorship
that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini started 41 years ago, but only if the
devastation and feckless government response inspires everyone, from the lower
classes to the ruling classes, to say "No more."
COVID-19 hit Iran hard because of the gross incompetence, ignorance and
superstition of its leaders.
We have been here before. By 2009, a genuine, indigenous, counterrevolution was
afoot in Iran, but Barack Obama ignored it in his efforts to pursue diplomatic
relations with fictitious Iranian "moderates." Since then, protests have become
more frequent. Defiance of the Islamic Republic has become bold. It will have to
become even bolder to topple the regime.
Iran was hit by COVID-19 worse than many countries because of the gross
incompetence, ignorance and superstition of its leaders. Its official infection
rate and daily body counts are no more trustworthy than China's. The Iranian
people understand this, and increasingly they are blaming their leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
When news of the virus first reached Iran, denial was the reflexive response.
Seeking to prevent a massive boycott of the Feb. 21 parliamentary elections (in
which only pre-approved candidates vie for seats) Khamenei said the threat was
exaggerated, that "negative propaganda about the virus" was being used by Iran's
enemies to "dissuad[e] Iranian voters."
Supporters of the Iranian regime posted videos of themselves licking shrines at
Shiite holy sites during the early days of the outbreak.
The most bizarre form of denial came as religious fanatics and sycophants
seeking favor with the regime posted videos of themselves licking shrines at
Shiite holy sites, daring the disease to infect them and expressing confidence
that their faith would protect them. One said he came to Qom to show everyone
that the virus "is nothing but stories. They want to take away our religion.
They want to harm us. What they are doing is meaningless. We won't listen to
this."
Those who were confident that their leaders were telling them the truth and that
their faith would save them probably were encouraged by the regime's
triumphalism. Iranian scientists such as Hossein Ali Shahriari, a member of the
medical committee of the Iranian parliament (majlis), boasted that medical
experts from all over the world were coming to Iran not to offer help to the
hapless but to learn from Iranian scientists. "In light of the measures we have
taken in Iran," he said, the outbreak "will certainly not last long." He
discounted advice from World Health Organization officials: "They certainly
don't have more expertise than the experts in Iran."
And what expertise did Iranian scientists offer to the people? Cleric Abbas
Tabrizian gave this advice: "Before sleeping, put a cotton ball dipped in violet
oil to the anus." Presumably someone gave Khamenei better advice because on Feb.
15 his bodyguards prevented Iranians from kissing his hand. This should come
back to haunt him. The opposition forces should publicize it widely.
When the bodies started to pile up and denial no longer was an option, Iran's
leaders turned to conspiracy theories.
When the bodies started to pile up and denial no longer was an option, Iran's
leaders turned to conspiracy theories. The regime's perennial target of hate,
Israel and "the Jews," were blamed in a March 5 broadcast on Iran's Press TV, an
English-language disinformation outlet: "Zionist elements developed a deadlier
strain of coronavirus against Iran."
On March 10, Gen. Gholamreza Jalali, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps' (IRGC) Civil Defense Organization hinted that the coronavirus "has many
characteristics of a biological weapon. ... The United States has many
biological labs in the region surrounding Iran that may be responsible for the
spread of the virus." Another regime figure, Hossein Momeni, was more direct on
March 10 when he pronounced it "without a doubt a man-made disease that has
emerged as a weapon against the Shiites, against the Muslims, and against the
Iranians."
On March 22, Khamenei himself spoke to the nation on live television and claimed
that the U.S. created the coronavirus, citing two of his "experts" whose
research shows that Israeli and American spies were using "demons" to spread the
virus in Iran.
A decade or two ago, Khamenei might have ridden this disaster out comfortably,
but recent riots in Iran suggest an awakening of the populace who see through
the illusion of democracy in Iran. And the opposition is growing in number and
influence. On March 29, a group of 100 Iranian academics published a letter
blaming Khamenei for the COVID-19 deaths in their country. The letter was
released on a website that the Middle East Media Research Institute cites as
being associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 2009 Green Revolution leader
still living a precarious existence under house arrest.
Their letter begins: "Mr. Khamenei, you are the No. 1 culprit in the COVID-19
pandemic becoming a national disaster!" This opening salutation "Mr. Khamenei"
(instead of "Dear Supreme Leader" or even "Dear Ayatollah Khamenei") is a bold
affront. The letter goes on to accuse Khamenei of "obfuscation" and mocks his
"conspiracy-based worldview." It ends by bitterly noting the ironic "disgrace
[of] a public afflicted with poverty and starvation in a country awash with
petroleum." These are fighting words.
The growing COVID-19 death toll could provide the tipping point for the military
to stop following Khamenei's orders.
There comes a time in every successful revolution when the military stops
following orders from its illegitimate leaders and sides with the people. Even
though Khamenei commands a police state skilled at terrorizing, the growing
COVID-19 death toll in Iran could provide the tipping point for the military to
stop following orders.
So what are the odds of a coronavirus coup in Iran? I'd give it 50-50,
especially if senior members of the regime die from the disease. That judgment,
admittedly, is colored by my hope for regime change in Iran. I was discussing
the matter last week with Daniel Pipes, who has followed Iran more closely and
longer than I, when he threw cold water on my optimism: "I'll bet any amount you
want, even odds, that the regime is there a year from now, even two." I didn't
take the bet.
*A.J. Caschetta is a Ginsberg-Ingerman fellow at the Middle East Forum and a
principal lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology.
Exclusive: Iran Pushing Ukraine Not To Take Action For
Downed Plane
Anna Raskaya/Radio Farda/April 15/2020
Radio Farda has learned that Iran is pushing Ukraine to sign a memorandum of
understanding obliging Ukraine and the families of victims of flight 752, shot
down over Tehran, to waive their right to pursue the matter any further through
courts.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard fired two missiles at Ukraine's flight 752 on January
8 in the wake of Iran's missile attacks on Iraqi military bases hosting U.S
forces. Iranian authorities took responsibility for downing the flight and
killing 176 passengers and crew members onboard the plane after three days of
denials and later claiming that 'human error" was responsible for shooting the
plane.
Radio Farda has learned that Iran has sent the draft of a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry according to which Ukraine
and the families of the victims are to accept "human error" as the cause of the
crash. The said document also stipulates that Ukraine and the families of the
victims should not pursue criminal and judicial action against Iran in return
for the payment of compensation by Iran and releasing the plane's flight
recorder's contents after they are analyzed.
To clarify issues related to a possible MoU proposed by Iran, Radio Farda asked
Andriy Guck, an international aviation law expert to comment on MoU possible
text. He pointed out that Iran may be seeking to create disunity among the
countries whose nationals were killed in the crash by seeking to reach such a
separate agreement with Ukraine.
Ukrainian Demands Explanation From Iran Over Shocking Remarks On Plane Crash
Guck also said the fact that Iranian authorities claim human error caused the
crash of the Ukrainian airliner does not mean that Iran has taken responsibility
for the tragedy. "The question remains whether Iran is prepared to be
accountable, explain why the airspace was not closed and the reasons for the
human error, compensate it or not," he said and added that the MoU draft
submitted to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry by Iran does not make any mention of
Iran's accountability and sets few conditions to start compensation
negotiations..
According to Guck, the question of whether Iran is prepared to compensate the
families of the victims and the aviation company that owned the airliner will
remain unanswered if Ukraine accepts Iran's position as expressed in the draft
document. In other words, Guck says, Iran considers the investigation into the
"human error" that possibly caused the crash and and all respective court
procedures an internal matter to be investigated and prosecuted solely by
Iranian authorities.
"First of all, the reason for the crash must not be attributed to human error
before the conclusion of an independent and proper investigation. Secondly, the
government of Ukraine cannot be made responsible for forcing the families of the
victims to forego their right of seeking an independent investigation as a
precondition for payment of compensation by Iran; and thirdly, Ukraine should
not have an obligation to provide Iran with the technical data of the Ukrainian
airline -- which is a private company – particularly because Iran is not
undertaking to provide its own data until Iran is not taking proper measures to
provide access to its data and at least preliminary investigation results to
Ukraine and other countries involved in the matter," Guck said.
Moreover, the draft MoU says Iran may allow international expert’s participation
in the flight recorders analysis but only if Iran recognizes that it cannot do
it. But so far it has been clear that Iran has not cooperated in this regard and
is not capable or willing to decode flight recorders, so it’s just delaying
clauses that do not foresee Iran’s obligations. The document prepared by Iran
does not indicate who the responsible party for the payment of compensation is
and lacks clear clauses for the identification of Iran's obligations and the
time frame for their realization, as well as any arbitral procedure if states
will not reach understanding, the Ukrainian international aviation laws expert
pointed out.
And Labor Less Leftist in Britain
Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al-Awsat/April 15/2020
Serious. Diligant. Hardworking. These are some of the qualities that have been
attached to the new Labor leader Keir Starmer. These attributes address the way
in which he manages things but do not provide a clear definition of the essence:
his ideology and politics remain somewhat vague. The Guardian said: yes, he is
vague, but one thing is certain, he is not a populist.
Starmer, it seems, is preoccupied, before anything else, with uniting the party
that was made to resemble many coexisting parties, hardly coexisting, by its
previous leader Jeremy Corbyn. This preoccupation also extends to regaining
labor bases in Scotland and Wales, and also in England, which populists have
grabbed. Maintaining a taxing and spending agenda and pledging to uphold some
just targets of Corbynism, such as abolishing tuition fees and increasing taxes
on the richest 5 percent, represent continuity with the previous period. Starmer
said the rich should pay their "fair share" to build the post-Corona society.
Also, in the shadow government, he handed over the education portfolio to the
leftwing Corbynist Rebecca Long-Bailey who competed with him in the leadership
race as the Corbynist candidate and came a very distant second. He won a big
victory, receiving 56 percent of the vote. Among those who supported him was the
largest labor union in the country, Unison (1.4 million members). This gives him
cover worker-wise.
But the Corbynists are generally uncomfortable. Most of them have been removed
from the shadow cabinet, and they are fearful of the party falling into the
hands of the "centrists". Some newspapers spoke of moves to establish a
"socialist campaign group", a lobby inside the party supervised by John
McDonnell, the chancellor in the previous shadow cabinet and Corbyn's most
prominent accomplice in shifting the party leftward. Some of them dread: Starmer
is another Tony Blair - "London's posh MP" and "A right-winger dressed in
leftist clothing".
Some of their worries are perhaps justified. The current shadow cabinet includes
15 Fabians, representing a return to one of the springs from which the party
flowed: a return to the group that was established in 1884 and whose members are
among its founding fathers.
Starmer apologized to the Jewish community. He vowed to uproot the anti-Semitism
that had festered during Corbyn's leadership. He brought Ed Miliband, the former
party leader, back under the spotlight. He handed him the energy, business and
industry portfolios. Miliband is involved with the ''Green New Deal,'' an
environmental grouping that cuts across countries and parties.
The Foreign Secretary post went to Lisa Nandy, who had criticized Corbyn for
refusing to condemn Russian actions and called on her party to take a radically
pro-remain position. He appointed Annelies Dodds chancellor; her public life
started in the European Parliament, and she mostly works on combating tax
evasion. Nick Thomas-Symonds, who was named Home Secretary, is a biographer of
Clement Attlee, his role model. Attlee won a sweeping electoral victory against
“war hero” Winston Churchill in 1945 and then built the welfare state. It has
also been said that Starmer will stop the defamation campaign against Tony
Blair, which had escalated in Corbyn’s era.
Kier Starmer was born in 1962 and has been a member of parliament for Holborn
and St. Pancras in London since 2015. His father is a hand tool maker, and his
mother is a nurse (she got sick at a young age). The parents named him after
Keir Hardy, the party's first leader. The family background is thus Laborite in
both its economic situation and its political choices. However, the young Keir
benefited from the relative class mobility of the 1970s, which the Thatcherite
eighties could not shut down completely.
With his seriousness and hard work, he graduated from some of the best
universities in the country (Leeds then Oxford). He became a brilliant human
rights lawyer and, as such, was appointed a member of the Queen's Counsel in
2002, and in 2008 he became the Director of Public Prosecutions. As a reward for
his roles, he was knighted in 2015; the title “sir” turned into a source of
bewilderment when he became Labor leader.
Those experiences took the acrimony out of his socialism. Parliamentary
legislation, therefore, took precedence over struggle in the factories, also
addressing some non-economic issues (human rights, euthanasia and same-sex
marriage).
Politically, two defeats and a victory shaped Starmer: the thunderous defeats
took place in 1983 under Michael Foot and in 2019 under Corbyn, while the
landslide victory occurred under Blair in 1997, which kept the Conservatives in
opposition for 13 years (the longest ever period they spent in opposition). The
two defeats were linked to the preeminence of ideological purity, and the
victory was linked to the preeminence of pragmatic politics. Blair convinced
Brits that the party had become "new". Foot and Corbyn reminded them of the
Industrial Revolution.
So, parliamentary victory became the priority. When asked which Labor leader he
hoped to emulate, he replied: Harold Wilson. The latter brought the party back
into power in 1964 after 13 years in opposition, and his name was associated
with modernization, promising "a new Britain ... forged in the white heat of
technological revolution''.The unity of the party was always the goal that
needed to be achieved to win the election. Although Starmer was anti Brexit and
for a second referendum, he avoided provocation to preserve the party's unity.
On the other hand, to block Brexit and the populists, he endorsed limitations to
immigration without touching the "free movement of labor." He is pragmatist of
the "soft left", not an ideological Corbynist of the hard or, rather, thorny
left. He will lead his party to the next elections in 2024 as such, keeping in
mind that the country, after the coronavirus, will inevitably be different from
what was before it. Parties and programs will also be different.
A 100-Year Chance to Shake Up Debt and Taxes
Andy Mukherjee/Bloomberg/April 15/2020
For 100 years now, capitalism has had a pro-leverage bias. Unlike dividends,
which are paid only after the state has taken its share of earnings, interest is
deducted from pretax profit, shrinking the pie available to the government.
This accounting oddity, which treats debt capital more favorably than equity,
has driven the leveraged buyout industry, led to a correction in a foundational
paper by a pair of Nobel economics winners, and played a role in the 2008
financial crisis. Disaffection with this anomaly has long swirled as an
undercurrent, especially in tax-starved developing economies. The coronavirus is
reheating the debate.
Industrial losses may need to be socialized en masse to get displaced workers
back on the job and prevent the global economy from spiraling into depression.
To manage the backlash against using public money for private gains, more
countries are likely to follow the US Congress and the UK banking regulator,
which have pushed for a halt to buybacks and dividends. But corporate rescue
this time may also involve a rewriting of accounting rules to encourage
deleveraging, so that bailouts are needed less often and are less costly.
It was in 1918, when economists were likening the global spread of an excess
profit tax on wartime corporate income to the deadly outbreak of the Spanish
flu, that the US relented and allowed all interest paid to be deducted from
taxable profit. It was a temporary measure to give firms relief, but although
the extra tax burden went away in 1921, the favorable treatment of interest
income stayed and was copied around the world.
The debt bias is very real. In the late 1950s, academics Franco Modigliani and
Merton Miller controversially asserted that corporations should be indifferent
to the mix of debt and equity in their capital structure. Five years later, the
professors issued a correction, acknowledging that a dollar of debt would raise
the value of a firm by 50 cents, the then-prevailing corporate tax rate.
The idea of withholding tax on interest payments has done the rounds since at
least 1982, but how does a foreign investor or a tax-exempt local investor get
credit? No country would want foreigners to shun its corporate debt and go where
there's no withholding. Developing economies have also been ambivalent. Their
tax authorities hate it when multinationals give loans to their profitable
subsidiaries, thus reducing their taxable income in poor nations.
On the other hand, it didn’t take long for local firms in Asia, Latin America or
Eastern Europe to figure out that they, too, could attract large pools of
Western savings by souping up shareholder returns with higher leverage. It
helped that the cost of the debt was tax deductible. To the extent the
borrowings came from state-owned local banks, the lenders’ interest income
flowed to the government as taxes and dividends.
After the 2008 crisis, policymakers looked aghast at the debt-financed expansion
in banking over the previous three decades. But beyond specifying higher
regulatory capital, they couldn’t do much to shake the inertia. As McKinsey &
Co. noted in 2010, replacing the stock of financial sector debt with equity in
just 14 countries would have required more than 60% of the then-existing global
equity capital.
No wonder, then, that the world economy has kept accumulating debt. China
stepped up borrowings to hold on to high growth in a slow-speed world; India
wrecked its finance industry to achieve China-like expansion. On the supply
side, as banks retreated under regulatory pressure for more capital, private
credit from insurers, pension funds and other non-banks took their place,
growing to a $300 billion industry by 2018 from $100 billion in 2010.
The additional corporate value garnered with cheap debt isn’t a free lunch. An
International Monetary Fund staff discussion note warned in 2011 that “costs to
public welfare are larger — possibly much larger — than previously thought.” The
2017 overhaul of the US tax code restricted interest deduction to 30% of
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization as an offset for
slashing the corporate rate to 21% from 35%. The UK, too, put a limit.
But then came the coronavirus. The sheer scale of economic disruption and job
losses means that governments and central banks will join hands. Japan’s near-$1
trillion fiscal spending has set the tone for outsize government borrowing. But
while assuming a more active economic role, governments will also want to show
that they aren’t running a Ponzi scheme.
Disallowing interest deduction will generate resources as well as play into the
zeitgeist for more public welfare.
As independent strategist Gerard Minack noted recently, our world is primed to
maximize financial returns on the assumption that nothing will go wrong. When
things do, not just once but twice in 12 years, politicians must ask whether a
smaller, more resilient firm, valued a little less than before, is better than a
large but fragile enterprise. Minack also believes that temporary restrictions
on stock buybacks could be accompanied by changes to the tax treatment of debt.
With industries of all hues begging governments for survival capital, rebates
and even employee wages, bargaining power of firms is at rock bottom. The
unfinished tax reform agenda has a chance. Given that suppliers of debt
financing are spread all over the world, a withholding tax on interest payments
could cause dislocations. “A less disruptive option,” as law professors Michael
Graetz and Alvin Warren, Jr. argued in a 2016 essay, “might be to deny
deductions for all or part of interest payments at the corporate level.”
Overcoming entrenched resistance to a once-in-100-years change won’t be easy.
The only time to even attempt it is when faced with a disaster not encountered
since the Spanish flu.
Palestinians: Don't Believe UNRWA, They Are Not Helping
Bassam Tawil/Gatestone Institute/April 15/ 2020
Those considering donating to UNRWA ought first to listen to the voices of the
leaders of the Palestinians in Lebanon who are accusing the UN agency of
negligence and failing to fulfill its promises to help the Palestinians battle
the pandemic.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese human rights activist Riad Issa alleged that UNRWA has
for years failed to assist the Palestinian refugees, and that the problem did
not begin with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. "The crisis is not
related to lack of funding," he said. "Palestinians have been complaining about
UNRWA's lack of services for many years."
If the Palestinians are saying that UNRWA hasn't been helping them for years,
why are the agency's heads appealing to donors for urgent financial aid?
The Palestinian public is trapped: Arabs appear to care nothing for their
Palestinian brothers, while UNRWA appears to care only about collecting funds to
pay the salaries of its managers and workers.
While UNRWA is boasting of its services to Palestinian refugees and asking for
donations, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are accusing the UN agency of
doing nothing to help them face the threat of the coronavirus pandemic.
Pictured: A Palestinian volunteer sprays disinfectant in the streets of UNRWA's
Shatila refugee camp, on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, on March 24, 2020.
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) claims that it is on the "frontlines of responding to COVID-19,"
and its officials are appealing for donations to help Palestinian refugees in
the Middle East. According to an UNRWA statement from April 5:
"UNRWA is doing its part to flatten the curve and has mobilized a number of
prevention and control measures across its field of operations, including the
issuing of hygiene products and protection gear to UNRWA staff, the distribution
of educational pamphlets to refugees, the regular sterilization of camps and
UNRWA facilities, and the support of students at home through our Education in
Emergencies programme. UNRWA is committed to providing emergency relief and
maintaining essential services like food assistance, education, and primary
health care for the millions of Palestine refugees that depend on us, but in
order to do so, we need your help."
While UNRWA is boasting of its services to Palestinian refugees and asking for
donations, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are accusing the UN agency of
doing nothing to help them face the threat of the coronavirus pandemic.
Those considering donating to UNRWA ought first to listen to the voices of the
leaders of the Palestinians in Lebanon who are accusing the UN agency of
negligence and failing to fulfill its promises to help the Palestinians battle
the pandemic.
The Palestinians' complaints against UNRWA are embarrassing for the agency's
administration and expose its attempt to mislead donors into believing that
UNRWA is making a herculean effort to assist the refugees in Lebanon.
The Palestinian accusations come in the aftermath of a report published last
year, detailing the abuses of authority among the agency's senior management
team.
The 10-page document, prepared by the agency's ethics office, cites "credible
and corroborated reports" that members of an "inner circle" at the top of UNRWA
have engaged in abuses of authority and nepotism for personal gain, to suppress
legitimate dissent and to otherwise achieve their personal objectives.
The report concludes that the senior UNRWA officials' conduct presents "an
enormous risk to the reputation of the UN" and that "their immediate removal
should be carefully considered."
It appears, however, that one year after the report was leaked, UNRWA has still
not drawn important conclusions from the allegations that its senior officials
have engaged in misconduct and nepotism. At least, that is what the Palestinians
in Lebanon are saying.
A group called the Leadership of the Alliance of Palestinian Factions in Lebanon
has accused UNRWA of "procrastination and negligence" in dealing with the
coronavirus pandemic and threatened to step up protests in the coming days if
the agency does not "assume its responsibilities towards the Palestinians."
The group condemned UNRWA's "failure" to respond to Palestinian appeals for
urgent help. "We initiated a meeting with the UNRWA management in Lebanon and
demanded that the agency accelerate necessary aid to the Palestinian refugees,"
the group said.
"The UNRWA administration promised to contact potential donors for financial aid
and grants, but nothing has happened. UNRWA's management has shown that it
deliberately failed to fulfill its promises of securing funds for aid, and even
exceeded the time limit they requested."
The group added that UNRWA's failure is a "clear indication of its indifference
and contempt towards the Palestinian refugees suffering from poverty, hunger,
and disease, particularly since the UNRWA administration has not yet seriously
dealt with the coronavirus pandemic."
Munir al-Maqdah, a senior official with the Palestinian Fatah faction in
Lebanon, accused UNRWA of "evading its responsibilities" and said he did not
understand why the agency was not sending specialized teams to the Palestinian
refugee camps to help their residents prepare for the outbreak of the virus. "We
are facing an imminent threat, and if the virus spreads there will be a real
catastrophe [in the refugee camps]," al-Maqdah warned.
He also complained that UNRWA did not spend the $5 million it had allocated as
aid for children in the refugee camps to help them deal with the negative
repercussions of the coronavirus, adding:
"Hunger is knocking on our doors and our people are suffering from extreme
poverty in light of the difficult economic and living conditions and the
unemployment rate that rose from 60 percent to 80 percent after the outbreak of
the coronavirus."
Salah Yusef, member of the Palestinian Liberation Front, another Palestinian
faction in Lebanon, complained that UNRWA "has done nothing despite repeated
appeals since the beginning of the crisis." UNRWA, he said, "must assume its
responsibilities to provide relief aid and employment for the Palestinians."
Ayman Shana'ah, a Hamas representative in Lebanon, also criticized UNRWA for
failing to deal with the coronavirus pandemic among Palestinian refugees:
"We have entered into a lengthy dialogue with the [UNRWA] administration since
the beginning of the coronavirus crisis, but we have not reached the desired
results yet, not in terms of health or relief."
The Hamas official said that UNRWA has not supported the Palestinian camps with
medical protective gear and disinfectants. In addition, he said, UNRWA has
failed to take any steps to provide the Palestinians with financial aid: "UNRWA
must assume its responsibilities with financial aid in order to avoid an
imminent social explosion."
UNRWA recently said it urgently needs $14 million to prepare and respond to the
coronavirus pandemic outbreak over an initial three-month period. According to
UNRWA Acting Commissioner-General Christian Saunders:
"Overcrowded living conditions, physical and mental stress and years of
protracted conflict all make the vulnerable population of over 5.6 million
Palestine refugees particularly susceptible to the ongoing threats of COVID-19.
All of the Agency's five fields' host governments and authorities have announced
a series of robust measures to cope with the spread of COVID-19, which UNRWA
will follow and factor into its operations."
Mustafa al-Sawwaf, a Palestinian political analyst from the Gaza Strip, said
that UNRWA has failed to help the Palestinian refugees. "The agency was supposed
to move quickly and without delay to help the refugees," al-Sawwaf said.
"However, UNRWA has failed to help the refugees."
Meanwhile, the Lebanese human rights activist Riad Issa alleged that UNRWA has
for years failed to assist the Palestinian refugees, and that the problem did
not begin with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. "The crisis is not
related to lack of funding," he said. "Palestinians have been complaining about
UNRWA's lack of services for many years. We haven't seen UNRWA do anything in
Lebanon to prevent the spread of the disease."
If the Palestinians are saying that UNRWA hasn't been helping them for years,
why are the agency's heads appealing to donors for urgent financial aid? Are the
donors aware of the Palestinians' complaints and will they demand explanations
from UNRWA about where the money is going? If UNRWA is not capable of helping
the Palestinians during a critical time of a pandemic, why is it continuing to
ask the international community to pump millions of dollars into its coffers?
A final question demands to be asked: Where is the responsibility of the
Lebanese government and the Arab states towards their Palestinian brothers in
Lebanon? Why does an Arab living in an Arab country need a UN agency or any
other international party to help him or her?
When will Arab governments hosting Palestinians assume their responsibilities
and provide them with the most basic line item of all: health care? The
Palestinian public is trapped: Arabs appear to care nothing for their
Palestinian brothers, while UNRWA appears to care only about collecting funds to
pay the salaries of its managers and workers.
*Bassam Tawil, a Muslim Arab, is based in the Middle East.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Turkey: Erdoğan's Post-Corona, Existential Economic Challenge
Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/April 15/2020
Before the coronavirus, Turkey hoped its tourism revenues might reach as high as
$45 billion this year. But in the first quarter of the year, the number of
passengers traveling through Turkish airports fell by 18.8%, and the second
quarter does not look promising. Economists agree that the year-end decline will
be even sharper.
This is where alarm bells ring for Erdoğan. Turks are scheduled to go to the
ballot box again in 2023 to elect the president and members of parliament.
Erdoğan owes his spectacular election victories, uninterrupted since 2002, in
large part to rapid economic growth and the subsequent improvement in the
standard of living. A reversal now could end his glittering political career.
Erdoğan remains the potential victim of a small virus.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan owes his spectacular election victories,
uninterrupted since 2002, in large part to rapid economic growth and the
subsequent improvement in the standard of living. A reversal now could end his
glittering political career. Pictured: Erdoğan speaks at a press conference
addressing the coronavirus crisis in Ankara, Turkey on March 18, 2020.
We may be months away from Covid-19's global peak but the punishing, global,
post-pandemic economic repercussions will vary from one country to another,
depending on what economic vulnerabilities the pandemic has caught off-guard.
One anticipated outcome is to see bigger post-corona damage to economies that
have a large dependence on tourism and on economies with fundamental imbalances.
Turkey belongs in both categories.
In the early days of the virus, before the skyrocketing number of cases,
Turkey's fragile economy boasted 4.3 million jobless. The official unemployment
rate was 13.8%.
That number may double before the end of the year, as tens of thousands of
mostly small- and medium-sized businesses are likely to close. Most new jobless
people will probably remain without welfare coverage. The temporary state
support for the jobless, announced by the government in Ankara, is at a mere
TL39.24 per month (approximately $5.85). Turkey could only announce an anemic
$15 billion plan to boost the economy, or 1% of its GDP. That compares with
stimulus plans at 11% for the United States, 8.4% for Canada, 4.9% for Germany
and 3.5% for Brazil.
A national relief program for the poorest, announced passionately by Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, collected only €200 million, less than the 2017
annual transfer fee for Brazilian soccer star Neymar da Silva Santos who was
signed up from Barcelona to Paris St. Germain for €222 million.
There are other figures that give Erdoğan reason to worry about his political
survivability. The assurances of Economy Minister Berat Albayrak (Erdoğan's
son-in-law) -- that "with its dynamic structure, the Turkish economy will be
among those that will get over this process with minimum damage and in a short
time" -- remain unconvincing.
In August 2018, the price of Turkey's credit default swaps (CDS), -- an
insurance scheme against debt default -- rose to its all-time high since 2009.
In May 2019, the price of Turkey's CDS again rose sharply, as investors started
to price in a default. On January 10, Turkey's CDS price was measured at 269
basis points, safer than 566 points in 2018 but far worse than 142 points in
2010.
One lack of a safety net for Ankara is its big foreign exchange liabilities, in
an economy not prepared for a sharp slowdown. After an increase of 20% within a
year, these liabilities have reached $300 billion. That puts Turkey's net
foreign liabilities at $175 billion -- after foreign assets of $125 billion are
deducted from total liabilities.
Turkey's reserves do not promise to help against that big stock of foreign
liabilities. Mismanagement and a palliative desire to keep the national currency
afloat have caused the Central Bank to burn through $65 billion in reserves
since January 2019. As a result, the Central Bank's net foreign currency
reserves have plunged to a meager $1.5 billion. This is a perfect disaster
scenario for an ailing currency and ballooning inflation rates.
Japan's MUFG Bank's forecast for the lira depreciation within a year is 18%, in
addition to the currency's fall against major western currencies by 7% since the
beginning of the year. That scenario will bring the exchange rate to a record
low 8 liras to the dollar at the end of the year, compared with 3 liras to the
dollar in September 2016. The lira depreciation and Central Bank's money
printing will fuel inflation, which is already above 10%.
A graceful exit from the current account deficit will not be easy with all the
pressure on foreign payments balances. In 2019, Turkey earned $34.5 billion in
tourism revenue. Before the coronavirus, Turkey hoped its tourism revenues might
reach as high as $45 billion this year. But in the first quarter of the year,
the number of passengers traveling through Turkish airports fell by 18.8%, and
the second quarter does not look promising. Economists estimate that the
year-end decline will be even sharper.
All this means that, even if the government miraculously contains the pandemic
damage by the end of 2020, the average Turk will suffer severe economic
hardships from the second half of 2021 to the end of 2022. This is where alarm
bells ring for Erdoğan. Turks are scheduled to go to the ballot box again in
2023 to elect the president and members of parliament.
Erdoğan owes his spectacular election victories, uninterrupted since 2002, in
large part to rapid economic growth and the subsequent improvement in the
standard of living. A reversal now could end his glittering political career.
In January 2019, PIAR, a Turkish pollster, found that a clear majority of Turks
thought unemployment and economic hardships were the country's top problems. In
March 2019, a survey by SODEV, a political foundation, revealed that half the
Turks who voted for the opposition defined the state of the economy as "bad" or
"very bad." It also found that pro-Erdoğan voters, too, thought the economy was
the country's biggest problem. In the municipal elections that took place a few
weeks later, on March 31, 2019, Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party lost in
all three of Turkey's biggest cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Istanbul. The defeat
of Islamists in Istanbul and Ankara had come after 25 years in power.
Erdoğan may still be the most popular politician in Turkey. But an ailing
national economy could be further eroding his ratings. As voters endure more and
more economic hardship, public opinion could again turn sour for Erdoğan, and at
a time, ironically, when he was hoping to boost government spending and economic
growth to maximize votes in 2023. Erdoğan remains the potential victim of a
small virus.
*Burak Bekdil, one of Turkey's leading journalists, was recently fired from the
country's most noted newspaper after 29 years, for writing in Gatestone what is
taking place in Turkey. He is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Can Mustafa Al Kadhimi finally put Iraq on the right path?
Mina Al-Oraibi/The National/April 15/2020
From easing tensions between the US and militias to rebuilding trust with
neighbours, there is much the new Prime Minister designate could achieve
Iraqi president names Mustafa Al Kadhimi as new prime minister-designate in
presence of leading Iraqi political figures and UN envoy to Iraq. The National
Third time lucky? That is the question being posed as to whether the third
candidate proposed by Iraqi President Barham Salih to head the country’s next
government can form a cabinet. So far, the answer seems to be yes. Mustafa Al
Kadhimi was given full political backing by Iraq’s leading political blocs, both
in public statements and in the presence of prominent party leaders during a
meeting held specifically to appoint him to the job.
The two previous candidates, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan Al Zurfi, did not
get the same endorsements. The meetings in which they received their credentials
from the President were low-key affairs. In Mr Al Kadhimi’s case, there is
evident external support for his appointment as Prime Minister designate, which
has been publicly welcomed by countries such as the US and UAE. Moreover, the
meeting to formalise the appointment was attended by the UN Secretary General’s
Special Representative to Iraq, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert.
Mr Al Kadhimi’s name had been floated as a suitable candidate Prime Minister for
several months. However, he was initially unable to garner the support needed to
make it through. A number of political parties, largely Iran-backed militant
groupings, publicly opposed him, in part because of his active drive against
their militias. Others complained that he did not have enough experience to run
a country as complex as Iraq. He also does not belong to any political party
that could lobby for him. Until his appointment as head of the intelligence
services, he did not hold a government position.
However, his experience as head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service over
the past four years gives him unique advantages. In that role, Mr Al Kadhimi has
built important relationships not only with regional neighbours – especially in
the fight against ISIS – but with a number of regional and international
interlocutors. The latter will prove useful in his leadership of Iraq. Mr Al
Kadhimi’s ties with a number of Arab countries, moreover, will enable Baghdad’s
ties with them to improve as well.
Internally, Mr Al Kadhimi has developed relations with a whole plethora of
actors. He is known to have good ties with Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Kurds,
civil society and several leaders of political parties who he knows from his
time in the opposition movement against the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Yet the general opinion of Iraqis about Mr Al Kadhimi remains unknown. The
public presence of the protest movement that started last October has diminished
due to the coronavirus outbreak. He will need to win the movement over and have
its input to ensure the validity of his tenure until the country can hold
elections. However, a number of militant groups had made their opposition to Mr
Al Kadhimi known. Asaib Ahal Al Haq and Kataib Hezbollah, two of the Iranian
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ proxies in Iraq, are among them. Some went so
far as to accuse him of being behind the killing of Quds Force leader Qassem
Suleimani and the head of the Popular Mobilisation Units, Abu Mahdi AlMuhandis.
However, in the last week, those accusers have fallen silent.
Why the Iranian-backed political parties chose not to block Mr Al Kadhimi’s
candidacy is not immediately evident. However, sources say that a number of
those parties and militias want to reduce the level of tensions with the US, and
Mr Al Kadhimi could be exactly the candidate to help with that. Moreover, not
all Iran-backed groups are the same. The competition between various militias
and groups continues, and parties like the Badr Organisation do not want to see
Kataib Hezbollah become the leading group in Iraq. Rather, they are aiming to
strike a deal with Mr Al Kadhimi to have a role in his next government while
keeping the more militant groups at bay. The naming of Mr Al Kadhimi came as
Washington announced a "Rewards for Justice" bounty of $10 million for Hezbollah
commander Muhammed Kawtharani. As Kataib Hezbollah gets squeezed in Iraq, other
Shia militant groups aim to consolidate their position.
An anti-government protester holds a placard with Arabic that reads, "We are a
stubborn people," during ongoing anti-government protests, in Baghdad, Iraq,
Sunday, February 23, 2020. AP Photo
On the other hand, Mr Al Kadhimi is faced with international forces, and
particularly American forces, withdrawing from the country. Meanwhile, the US
continues its efforts to limit Iran’s role in Iraq. Mr Al Kadhimi and the
government will be faced with the challenge of recalibrating relations with
Washington. The two countries are now preparing for a strategic dialogue set to
start in June and all of these issues are on the table.
It is worth noting that Mr Al Zurfi had been named as Prime Minister designate
on March 17, 17 years after then-US president George Bush gave his ultimatum to
Saddam before launching the war that would topple that regime. And on April 9,
the 17th anniversary of that regime’s fall, Mr Al Kadhimi was named the next PM
designate. Both candidates are men whose political fortunes were made by the
American invasion of 2003. And now Iraq-US relations are entering a new phase
during a challenging period for Baghdad.
Iraqis walk in an empty street in Baghdad on March 22, 2020 amid a curfew to
help fight the spread of Covid-19. AP Photo
Mr Al Kadhimi is taking the reins at a difficult time and is not to be envied.
In addition to the impact of Covid-19, a massively reduced oil price means that
the state’s finances are in even greater trouble than they have normally been
under the long-standing weight of corruption.
The reality is that as important as the naming of Iraq’s next prime minister is,
there is only so much one person can do. Without institutional change and a
re-establishment of the state’s monopoly over the use of force, Iraq’s woes will
continue. Building those institutions will take time and resources, and Mr Al
Kadhimi doesn’t have an abundance of either.
*Mina Al-Oraibi is editor-in-chief of The National
Iranian regime facing a three-dimensional crisis
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh /Arab News/April 15, 2020
د.ماجد رافيزادا: الحكم في إيران يواجه أزمة ثلاثية الأبعاد
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The Iranian regime is currently facing the highest level of pressure it has
experienced in decades. It is encountering three major problems, which are
interacting with each other, intensifying the overall crisis and creating a
vicious circle for Tehran’s leaders. The regime’s survival will be in great
danger if the authorities fail to handle at least one of the dimensions of the
crisis.
The newest facet that has been added to Iran’s crisis is related to the regime’s
views on public health. Before the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, the
Iranian leaders boasted about the government’s efforts and desire to improve the
nation’s health standards. One of the pledges made by President Hassan Rouhani
in his first presidential term was to provide health care to all Iranians. To
take credit for this move, he called the program “RouhaniCare.” He tweeted in
2014: “(The government) will extend medical insurance to all Iranians. First
step will be to cover 5 million uninsured Iranians by the social safety net #RouhaniCare.”
But, thanks to its mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic, the overwhelming
majority of the Iranian people seem to have come to the conclusion that the
regime is more concerned about its own survival than the health of its citizens.
Mahnaz, an Iranian nurse from the province of Esfahan, said: “The government
claims that it did not know about the spread of the coronavirus in Iran till
late February. But there is evidence that the leadership knew about the
existence of coronavirus in the country in early January. They decided not to
inform the public. Now many see how the mullahs did not care about the public’s
health.”
The regime most likely kept its citizens in the dark for its own political
gains. The parliamentary elections were on their way in late February and, if
the regime had warned the public about the impending health crisis, it would
have negatively affected voter turnout. Instead, the ruling mullahs wanted to
strengthen the hard-liners’ base and project to the international community that
it enjoys a high level of legitimacy.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei previously described his view that elections are
“very important in our country. Not only presidential elections but also
parliamentary and city and village council elections. Elections are one of the
two pillars of religious democracy… We boast to the whole world thanks to
elections. In order to strike the people of Iran and the Islamic Republic, the
enemies ignore and accuse our elections.”
The second problem facing the regime is public resentment toward it. This has
increased because, instead of responding to the Iranian citizens’ legitimate
demands, the authorities have escalated their use of lethal force, suppression
and human rights abuses.
This was highlighted when some 35 prisoners were reportedly killed by the
regime’s security forces for protesting over fears of contracting COVID-19. A
report by Amnesty International last week described what happened: “In recent
days, thousands of prisoners in at least eight prisons around the country have
staged protests over fears of contracting the coronavirus, sparking deadly
responses from prison officers and security forces. In several prisons, live
ammunition and tear gas were used to suppress protests, killing around 35
prisoners and injuring hundreds of others, according to credible sources.”
The third dimension of Iran’s crisis is linked to the country’s economic
outlook, which has become much worse thanks to the coronavirus crisis. Even
before the pandemic, in October last year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
adjusted its forecast for Iran’s economy, stating that it was expected to shrink
by 9.5 percent in 2019, rather 6 percent as previously predicted.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy continues, with
the US not extending its sanctions waivers for Iran’s eight biggest oil
customers. And, in the last two months, Iran’s currency has suffered a sharp
fall in value. In January, $1 was worth about 90,000 rials, but now it is nearly
160,000. This is why the regime has been rushing to reopen businesses, with
Rouhani last week stating: “We want to continue economic activities as much as
possible while fighting coronavirus at the same time.” This swift move will more
likely put the public at greater risk of contracting the virus.
The authorities have escalated their use of lethal force, suppression and human
rights abuses.
The Iranian government has also been asking international organizations, such as
the IMF and other governments, for an emergency loan. But Iran’s economy will be
massively hit because the IMF is unlikely to provide money to the regime. The US
government is seeking to block the funding to Tehran, with an official in the
Trump administration saying: “The world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism is
seeking cash to fund its adventurism abroad, not to buy medicine for Iranians.”
If not handled immediately, these three problems could combine to bring about a
crisis that will bring the theocratic establishment to its knees.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading
expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the
International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh