Three English Editorials addressing The Bold Iranization Of Hezbollah’s Lebanese New Government written by: Hanin Ghaddar & Matthew Levitt/Makram Rabah/Jonathan Spyer/ حنين غدار وماثيو لافيت/موقع الهيل: الضغوضات الأميركية المطلوبة للضغط على الحكومة اللبنانية الجديدة لمواجهة الفساد/مكرم رباح: حكومة حسان دياب ليس بمقدورها لا تلبية مطالب المنتفضين ولا مواجهة حزب الله/جونيثون سباير/جيرازولم بوست: حكومة لبنانية يسيطر عليه حزب الله للمرة الأولى في لبنان
Here’s how the US can pressure Lebanon’s new government tackle corruption Hanin Ghaddar & Matthew Levitt/The Hill/January 26/2020 حنين غدار وماثيو لافيت/موقع الهيل: الضغوضات الأميركية المطلوبة للضغط على الحكومة اللبنانية الجديدة لمواجهة الفساد
Hassan Diab’s cabinet is unable to meet protesters’ demands or confront Hezbollah Makram Rabah/The Arab Weekly/January 26/2020 مكرم رباح: حكومة حسان دياب ليس بمقدورها لا تلبية مطالب المنتفضين ولا مواجهة حزب الله
Hezbollah-dominated government emerges in Lebanon for the first time Jonathan Spyer/Jerusalem Post/January 26/2020 جونيثون سباير/جيرازولم بوست: حكومة لبنانية يسيطر عليه حزب الله للمرة الأولى في لبنان
================ Here’s how the US can pressure Lebanon’s new government tackle corruption Hanin Ghaddar & Matthew Levitt/The Hill/January 26/2020 حنين غدار وماثيو لافيت/موقع الهيل: الضغوضات الأميركية المطلوبة للضغط على الحكومة اللبنانية الجديدة لمواجهة الفساد
Against the backdrop of three months of political and economic protests, Lebanese politicians appear to have reached a deal establishing a nominally technocratic government in Beirut. Still beholden to Hezbollah, the government has little Sunni or Druze support. Some protesters already call this a “Halloween government” since it gives thinly disguised cover to longtime establishment politicians. But the new government is unlikely to be able on its own to tackle the single biggest challenge it faces: the rampant corruption responsible for the country’s acute financial crisis.
The formation of a new Lebanese government has been a central demand of the international community and a necessary precondition for any international aid. But that is not enough. The government must quickly take action to fight corruption and enhance transparency. For a country that has run on corruption and political patronage, this will be a very heavy lift.
Nearly all of Lebanon’s political establishment is entangled in Beirut’s deep-rooted corruption crisis, which cuts across the sectarian divide. Lebanon ranks 138th out of 180 nations in the Corruption Perceptions Index released by the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International. Meeting in December, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a final statement in Paris urging Lebanese authorities to “take decisive action” to tackle corruption and tax evasion while improving economic governance and the country’s business environment.
At the time, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that while Lebanon must take these steps, the U.S. is ready to “do the things that the world can do to assist the Lebanese people getting their economy right and getting their government right.”
Today, the U.S. should take action that would force the new government’s hand and empower it to take on the corrupt political establishment — something no Lebanese government could otherwise do on its own: Washington should issue sanctions targeting some of the most egregious corrupt actors across the Lebanese political and sectarian spectrum under the Global Magnitsky Act. Corrupt leaders seek profit and the political power that comes with funding patronage projects. Global Magnitsky sanctions would not only name and shame Lebanon’s most corrupt actors, it would block all property and interests they hold in the United States, which are likely to be substantial.
There are other tools available to designated political corruption — such as Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020. The State Department employed this tool earlier this month targeting Moldovan corruption, but it includes only a ban on visa to enter the United States for the designee and their family members, and it lacks the authority to block funds held in the United States. Global Magnitsky would be a better fit in the case of Lebanon.
The State Department issued anti-corruption designations under the Global Magnitsky Act targeting entities in Cambodia, Latvia and Serbia in December, and there are no shortage of strong candidates for such action among the political elite in Lebanon today. Under the umbrella of such a U.S. action, the Lebanese government could be empowered to take the kind of action necessary to clear the way for the international aid package the country desperately needs.
Such action would have broad public support. Since the Lebanese people took to the streets on Oct. 17, 2019, U.S. officials have supported protesters’ demands for anti-corruption measures and reforms. In fact, corruption is the main reason behind the economic collapse that has pushed people to the streets. They clearly oppose the new government, which provides former foreign minister Gebran Bassil, a Hezbollah ally and one of the most roundly protested political figures, with control of a third of the cabinet and, therefore, the power to block legislation not to his or Hezbollah’s liking. To be sure, demonstrators would cheer sanctions against corrupt politicians and their business-class enablers.
The most notable aspect of the Lebanese protests was its anti-sectarian rhetoric and cross-sectarian participation. People from all sects and regions of Lebanon rallied to demand the end of the sectarian system and accountability for corrupt politicians. This is not a coincidence. The link between Lebanon’s sectarian leaders and the country’s acute corruption crisis is very strong, because they use nepotism and exploit state institutions to strengthen control over their constituencies.
These sectarian leaders have been implicated in a laundry list of corrupt deals and transactions used to build their financial empires through the good offices of politically-allied corrupt businessmen. One need look no further than Lebanon’s electricity, gas and garbage sectors to see how corruption has depleted the state of its resources and led to the economic crisis.
Designating corrupt Lebanese businessmen and officials under the Global Magnitsky Act would offer a tangible response to the persistent demands of Lebanese protesters because such action would target corrupt individuals from all sects and complement the anti-sectarian rhetoric of the Lebanese street. Now that a government has been formed — one that is unlikely on its own to gain the trust of the street or the international community — this is the perfect moment to send a message of support to the Lebanese people.
*Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedman visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
*Matthew Levitt is the institute’s Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of its Reinhard program on counterterrorism and intelligence.
Hassan Diab’s cabinet is unable to meet protesters’ demands or confront Hezbollah Makram Rabah/The Arab Weekly/January 26/2020 مكرم رباح: حكومة حسان دياب ليس بمقدورها لا تلبية مطالب المنتفضين ولا مواجهة حزب الله
Almost a month after he was designated Lebanon’s prime minister, Hassan Diab announced the formation of his cabinet, which many Lebanese hoped would save the country from its political and economic meltdown.
For more than 100 days, millions of Lebanese have taken to the streets to demand an end to the archaic and corrupt system of governance and advocate for a cabinet of independent technocrats that would lead the country’s transition. Diab’s cabinet, unfortunately, does not fully respond to citizens’ demands.
While the group does include 20 ostensible technocrats, who are proven and capable in their respective fields, none are truly independent or capable of initiating real reforms.
Diab’s attempt to project an image of impartiality did not go over well with the public. Hundreds of people quickly took to the streets to express disapproval. The sentiment was shared by the international media, with many saying Diab’s so-called cabinet of experts was a “Hezbollah-backed government.”
While Diab claimed his cabinet was a product of the revolution, the riots and destruction caused by rebels in downtown Beirut and their clashes with Lebanese security forces showed that Diab and his government are perceived no differently from the rest of Lebanon’s political elite.
Even most pro-revolution Lebanese who do not engage in or support violence are hesitant to wager on Diab’s success. Few trust his cabinet’s ability and commitment to confront the ruling elite or Hezbollah’s hegemony over the state.
Diab’s mission is to meet the calls of the Lebanese revolution, which include serious structural reforms that allow the country’s faltering economy to rebound and for Lebanese to gain access to the savings that the banks have held hostage.
However rudimentary as these reforms might seem, they will legally end the political and economic monopoly of the ruling elite. Since Diab owes his newly acquired fame to this same junta, there is no indication he can take on the role of reformer.
Diab’s real enemy is time, a luxury neither he nor the Lebanese people have. The Lebanese economy has entered a very dangerous phase in which banks are no longer giving the public access to their accounts and have enforced unofficial capital control, limiting people to a few hundred dollars a week.
Aggravating the situation is the fact that major firms and businesses are either scaling down operations or shutting down, unleashing an unemployment crisis that Lebanon is ill-equipped to deal with.
Shortages of gasoline, medicine, medical supplies, wheat and other essential goods are looming because Lebanon relies almost exclusively on imports, which are paid for in dollars that are only found on the black market and from money exchangers, who also cater to Syria’s heavy demand on hard currency.
The Lebanese ruling establishment and its newly appointed government might assume they can ignore the rage in the streets and wrongfully dismiss protesters as being bent on vandalism and destruction but adding more cement walls and barricades to the parliament building and buying more creative and brutal anti-riot weapons will not make the revolution go away.
To exit Lebanon’s economic and political inferno, the Diab cabinet must heed the demands of its own people, demands that have been reiterated by the international community.
Adhering to diplomatic norms, the United States, France and Britain welcomed the formation of the Diab government and declared their intentions to help Lebanon, as they have over the years. Still, they were quick to remind the ruling elite that no grants or loans would come their way without proper reform and, more important, before Hezbollah and its regional excursions are curbed. Constitutionally, Diab and his band of technocrats have 30 days before they must appear before the Lebanese parliament with a plan of action and face a vote of confidence that would permit them to properly carry out their duties.
It has been 100 days since the Lebanese people first rose up and voiced rejection of the country’s corrupt leadership. They will not be fooled into supporting the same people who got them where they are now. Diab might get the vote of confidence from the 69 MPs who designated him but he has lost the support of millions of his own people.
*Makram Rabah is a lecturer at the American University of Beirut, department of history. His forthcoming book, “Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory,” (Edinburgh University Press) covers collective identities and the Lebanese Civil War.
Hezbollah-dominated government emerges in Lebanon for the first time Jonathan Spyer/Jerusalem Post/January 26/2020 جونيثون سباير/جيرازولم بوست: حكومة لبنانية يسيطر عليه حزب الله للمرة الأولى في لبنان
For the first time since the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 1990, the latter country has a government in which only Hezbollah and its allies are represented.
For the first time since the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, the latter country has a government in which only Hezbollah and its allies are represented. This is likely to have a significant negative effect on Beirut’s efforts to engage international partners and donors in order to alleviate the acute financial crisis facing the country. It will also impact on Israeli strategic planning vis-à-vis Hezbollah.
The new government is the product of escalating popular protests under way since October 15. The protests are in response to Lebanon’s dire economic state. Demonstrators were demanding the formation of a government of “technocrats” qualified to address the urgent issues facing the country and untainted by contact with Lebanon’s enormously corrupt political parties.
The new government appears to be an attempt to create the superficial appearance of such an administration. Its 20 ministers were presented by Prime Minister Hassan Diab as “specialists,” nonpartisan and without loyalties to this or that political bloc.
Few Lebanese are likely to be convinced by this claim. The “specialists” in question are individuals whose names were put forward by the political parties. The composition of the new government emerged in a process of wrangling and horse trading between these parties.
But, crucially, parties and movements broadly associated with the West and with Saudi Arabia stayed out of the negotiations. Individuals linked to prominent pro-Western and anti-Iranian political trends, such as the former prime minister’s Mustaqbal (Future) Movement and the Christian Lebanese Forces, are not to be found among the new ministers. The Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is also not represented.
The government that has emerged from this process comprises individuals linked to movements that are part of only one of the existing power structures – the one associated with Hezbollah and Iran.
The new administration is being described by Lebanese commentators as a government of “one color,” Lebanon’s first of this kind. The color is that of Hezbollah and Iran’s banners.
Hezbollah itself controls only two ministries in the new government. But the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, led by Gebran Bassil, and the Shia Amal movement, both closely associated with Hezbollah, control much of the rest. Smaller parties also associated with this bloc make up the remainder.
In this regard, Diab’s emergent government constitutes for the first time an administration that reflects the long-standing power reality in Lebanon. Hezbollah has long dominated the key nodes of power in Lebanon – in the military and intelligence fields. Its influence is also profound in the economic sector. The overt, formal political administration in the country will now reflect this.
Over the last decade and a half, Hezbollah has gradually removed all obstacles to its exercise of full-spectrum dominance in Lebanon. In a trial of strength in May-June 2008, it brushed aside an attempt by West-aligned forces to challenge its will by force. Hezbollah’s 50,000-strong armed forces obey the edict of no government in Beirut.
On October 31, 2016, long-standing Hezbollah ally Gen. Michel Aoun assumed the presidency of Lebanon.
Three of Lebanon’s four intelligence services – the General Directorate of General Security, the Military Intelligence Directorate and the State Security Directorate – are headed by individuals appointed by Aoun and approved by Hezbollah. The fourth, the Internal Security Forces, once constituted a potent Sunni-led intelligence organization, associated with anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah forces. Today, headed by Imad Othman, it no longer plays this role.
Following the elections of May 2018, Hezbollah and its allies dominated the legislature and executive. They controlled 74 seats in the 128-member parliament, and 19 of 30 cabinet portfolios. But until the resignation of prime minister Saad Hariri in October 2019, the facade of a coalition government continued. This situation was amenable to the Hezbollah-controlled deep state. It enabled normal relations with international institutions, including financial ones, and ensured the continued flow of US and European aid.
As of this week, however, the ambiguity appears to have cleared. Formal power in Lebanon now coincides with real power.
SINCE THE war of 2006, a body of opinion has emerged in Israel according to which, in the event of a future conflict ignited by Hezbollah, Israel should abandon the paradigm by which the Lebanese state is seen as a helpless but blameless hostage of the Shia terrorist group.
Representing this view, then-education minister and current Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said in May 2018, following significant electoral gains by Hezbollah and its allies, that henceforth “the State of Israel will not differentiate between the sovereign state of Lebanon and Hezbollah, and will view Lebanon as responsible for any action from within its territory.”
In 2006, the government of prime minister Fouad Siniora was orientated toward the West. Israel thus faced the difficult task of chasing Hezbollah in Lebanon, while avoiding harm to the Lebanese state infrastructure. The results were mixed. It has since become apparent that senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, including the late Gen. Qasem Soleimani, were present in Lebanon during that war, directing the campaign of their Lebanese franchise.
Given the events of this week in Lebanon, any such attempt at differentiation is unlikely to be repeated. Rather, in a future contest between Israel and Hezbollah/Iran, the state of Lebanon under its Hezbollah-dominated government will constitute the enemy. This, in turn, will enable Israel to exercise the full range of options available to it from a conventional military point of view.
It is not clear whether such a war would include a formal declaration of war between Israel and Lebanon. If it did, such a declaration would be highly misleading. A conflict of this kind would not in any meaningful sense constitute a war between two sovereign states. Rather, as recent events in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon have made clear, the praxis of the IRGC is to use its franchises to construct states within states. These structures then seek to occupy the formal body of the state, turning its independence and sovereignty into a fiction. This process appears this week in Lebanon to have reached its apogee. The formal state, up to and including the highest bodies of government, is now operated solely and overtly by Iran via its franchise, with the allies and clients of that franchise. This produces clarity, with its many attendant benefits.
