Lebanese Protests Place Hizbullah In A Bind – Part I: Hizbullah’s Hostility To The Protests And The Reasons Behind It
H. Varulkar and C. Jacob/MEMRI/December 03
تحليل سياسي وثوثيقي من موقع ميمري من جزئين يشرح أسباب عداوة حزب الله للإنتفاضة الشعبية في لبنان
The mass protests in Lebanon over the economic crisis and government corruption, which broke out in October 17, 2019, have placed Hizbullah in a difficult position, because the organization, which for years has been presenting itself as the defender of the oppressed and fighter of corruption, is now an integral part of the government. Hizbullah initially tried to contain the protests, taking a very cautious position regarding them and expressing sympathy for the demonstrators rather than attacking them. This was evident in Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on October 19, and in statements by other Hizbullah officials.
Hizbullah maintained this cautious line for some ten days, apparently in hope that the protests would abate. However, when this failed to occur, the organization changed tack. In a speech he delivered on October 25, Nasrallah presented three No’s: no to deposing the president, no to deposing the government and no to holding early parliamentary elections, thus effectively rejecting the protesters’ three main demands. Nasrallah also claimed that the protests – in which several hundred thousand and perhaps even millions of people have participated, from every part of the country and from all social sectors – are neither authentic nor spontaneous, but are funded by foreign intelligence apparatuses and embassies. He called on the Lebanese not to attend the demonstrations, and urged the protesters to stop blocking roads and allow the country to go back to normal, warning against a possible slide into “chaos.”
Since delivering this speech, Hizbullah, by means of its officials and media, has continued to spread the narrative that the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia are encouraging the protests and even controlling them in order to sow chaos in Lebanon and topple its government, in which Hizbullah is a member, and in order to incite against this organization and its weapons. Things came to a point where, on several occasions, Hizbullah activists violently attacked protesters on the streets.
In the past week, the demonstrations have taken a more violent turn, with clashes breaking out between the supporters of rival parties, resulting in the death of two people and the wounding of dozens. In addition, Hizbullah has begun coming out against the protesters for blocking roads, describing them as “militias of chaos” that are driving the country to civil war, and accusing all those who call for the establishment of a government of technocrats of succumbing to U.S. dictates.
This report describes the bind in which Hizbullah finds itself since the outbreak of the protests, and the reasons for its hostile position towards them.
Mass protest in Lebanon (Source: lebanon24.com, November 11, 2019)
Hizbullah’s Difficult Position And The Reason For Its Hostility Towards The Protests
From the very start, the protests in Lebanon created a problem for Hizbullah that made it difficult for the organization to determine its position on them. Having presented itself as a the champion of the undertrodden and standard bearer of the fight against corruption, especially since the May 2018 parliamentary election, the organization felt the need to express solidarity with the demonstrators, who were protesting the difficult economic situation and demanding to punish corruption and restore stolen public funds. Moreover, the Shi’ites in South Lebanon have taken part in the protests, and demonstrations were held even in strongholds of Hizbullah and its Shi’ite ally, Amal, such as Al-Nabatieh and Tyre. The Shi’ite support for the protests and their demands is another factor that makes it difficult for Hizbullah to oppose them.
However, once it realized that many of the demonstrators’ demands – specifically the demands for the resignation of the president and government and the holding of early parliamentary elections – threatened the organization’s interests and the stability of the government, of which it is a central component, Hizbullah changed its attitude and began attacking the protests.
Hizbullah has several reasons to oppose the current wave of protests:
The organization dominates the current parliament and government, and is therefore uninterested in early parliamentary elections
In the May 2018 parliamentary election, the May 8 Forces, comprising Hizbullah and its allies, won the majority of seats. These results are also reflected in the makeup of the government, in which Hizbullah’s faction – which also includes the Shi’ite Amal movement and the Free National Current led by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil – has 18 ministers, as opposed to only 11 ministers from the rival March 14 Forces and one minister who is considered independent. Controlling nearly two thirds of the government ministries is the major achievement of the March 8 Forces, which allows it to veto any decision it opposes. Another achievement is that, despite American opposition, Hizbullah received the large-budget health portfolio, with Jamil Jabaq, formerly Nasrallah’s personal physician, serving as minister of health. Yet another achievement was the appointment of Elias Bou Sa’ab, who has been criticized as “identifying with Hizbullah,” as defense minister. Hizbullah is therefore uninterested in early parliamentary elections, which may cause it to lose these achievements.
Hizbullah fears the ouster of President ‘Aoun, Foreign Minister Bassil and Prime Minister Al-Hariri, Who Back It.
The political arrangement that lasted for several years, until the outbreak of the protests, whereby Michel ‘Aoun, a Christian, is president and the Sa’d Al-Hariri, a Sunni who is considered a rival of Hizbullah, is prime minister, actually benefited Hizbullah. In fact, this may be the optimal arrangement, as far as Hizbullah is concerned. President ‘Aoun and his son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, head of the Free National Current, which is the largest party in parliament, are both allies of Hizbullah. These two figures lend the organization absolute support, backing its decisions and granting it freedom of action – both in the domestic arena and in the international diplomatic arena vis-à-vis the U.S., which has imposed sanctions on Hizbullah for its terrorist activity. ‘Aoun and Bassil, both of whom are Maronite Christians, effectively serve as a Christian “fig leaf” for Hizbullah and its actions.
Paradoxically, the appointment of Al-Hariri, considered to be a rival of Hizbullah, as prime minister likewise worked in this organization’s favor. Regarded by the international community as an experienced and moderate statesman, Al-Hariri lent the Lebanese government a fairer guise, blurring the reality whereby Hizbullah effectively controls the country and imposes its position in nearly all matters. Al-Hariri thus served as the address for any complaint by the international community, and enabled the international community to continue cooperating with Lebanon, signing agreements with it, and extending aid to it.
Moreover, if in the past Al-Hariri was a vociferous opponent of Hizbullah and expressed harsh criticism of it, in the past few years he has allowed this organization to do as it pleased in the domestic and international arenas, and mostly refrained from speaking out against it. Given this state of affairs, Hizbullah clearly has no interest in placing one of its allies in the role of prime minister, for this would only make trouble for it and attract criticism, making it easier for the international community to take a firm position vis-à-vis Hizbullah and Lebanon as a whole.
Hizbullah fears it will be held responsible for the economic crisis in Lebanon due to the sanctions imposed on it.
The protests in Lebanon were sparked by the government’s intention to raise taxes despite the severe economic crisis in the country, including by taxing WhatsApp calls, a move that enraged many. Although the protests span all of Lebanese society and are not confined to any particular sector, many are convinced that Hizbullah bears much of the responsibility for the economic crisis, due to the U.S. sanctions on it. The crisis has grown even worse since the U.S. increased these sanctions, imposing them on more and more of the organization’s officials and institutions, and on Lebanese banks, and even threatening to extend them Hizbullah’s allies, such as Foreign Minister Bassil.
The most prominent expression of the crisis is a mammoth national debt of $100 billion (almost twice Lebanon’s gross domestic product), which has forced the Lebanese government to enact radical measures and reforms, in order to qualify for the $11 billion international aid package pledged to Lebanon at the April 2016 Cedar Conference in France. Furthermore, in the weeks before the outbreak of the protests, the Lebanese pound plummeted and the market suffered a dollar shortage, which further destabilized the local economy.
In fact, even before the protests broke out, many accused Hizbullah of causing the economic crisis and driving Lebanon towards economic collapse through its activity in the service of Iran. Thus, Hizbullah’s opposition to the protests may also stem from its fear that they could generate further accusations of this sort, and could spark a debate on its status and the status of its weapons, and about its terrorist activity around the world which causes sanctions to be imposed on it and on Lebanon.
The protests have an anti-Iran dimension
Another reason, perhaps the main one, for Hizbullah’s position is that the protests have an anti-Iran dimension. This aspect is hardly visible in the demonstrations themselves, but it is occasionally evident in articles by Lebanese journalists. Furthermore, the wave of protest in Lebanon is concurrent with the one in Iraq, in which opposition to Iran’s involvement in the country is openly expressed. This similarity between the protests in Lebanon and Iraq has been noted by many Arab journalists and analysts. Iran itself, Hizbullah’s patron, regards the protests in both Lebanon and Iraq as an American conspiracy aimed at eroding its influence in these countries, as its officials have claimed, and it is reportedly even acting to stop them. It appears that Iran’s position on the protests largely dictated that of its proxy Hizbullah.
Shi’ites participate in the protests while criticizing Hizbullah and Amal.
As stated, the protests have surprisingly involved even the Shi’ites of South Lebanon, who took to the streets voicing the same slogans and demands as the demonstrators in the rest of the country. Protests were held even in villages and cities where Hizbullah and Amal – Lebanon’s second Shi’ite party, headed by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri – are dominant, such as Al-Nabatieh and Tyre. According to some reports, Hizbullah and Amal were surprised by the scope and violence of the protests in these areas.
In Al-Nabatieh, dozens of demonstrators called out “Nabih Berri is a thief,” and some attacked the offices of the municipality, which is associated with Hizbullah. Dozens of protesters also came to the office of the chairman of Hizbullah’s faction in parliament, Muhammad Ra’ad, and shattered the sign at the entrance, shouting, “The people want to topple the regime.”
Furthermore, protesters came to the home of Amal MP Yassine Jaber and burned a sign bearing his name, and protesters also vandalized the office of Amal MP and political bureau member Hani Qobeisi.
 In Bint Jbeil, a demonstration was held in front of the office of Hizbullah MP Hassan Fadlallah.
 In Tyre, protesters torched a guest house belonging to Nabih Berri’s wife, Randa Berri.
Hizbullah presumably realized that the participation of the Shi’ite public in the protests, and the accusations of corruption made against it and against its ally Amal, may decrease its popularity among this public, which is its natural support base. Nasrallah therefore called on the supporters of the resistance not to participate in the protests, which indeed led to a significant decrease in their scope.
It appears that all these factors, together, are behind Hizbullah’s decision to oppose the protests and claim that they are funded by foreign elements hostile to the Lebanese state. Things came to the point where, on several occasions, Hizbullah and Amal activists on motorcycles arrived at the scene of demonstrations – especially in Shi’ite-dominated areas but also in Beirut – and tried to forcefully open the roads that the protesters had blocked.
*H. Varulkar is director of research at MEMRI; C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.
 Alahednews.com.lb, October 19, 2019.
 Alahednews.com.lb, October 25, 2019.
 On Hizbullah’s achievements in the parliamentary elections and government makeup, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1447, As U.S. Secretary Of State Pompeo Prepares To Visit Lebanon, Hizbullah Is In Complete Control Of Lebanese Government – And The March 14 Camp, Saudi Arabia, And U.S. Have Cooperated With It And Come To Terms With The Situation, March 21, 2019.
 On this, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 8332, Lebanese Politicians, Journalists, Before The Outbreak Of The Current Protest-Wave: It Is Hizbullah That Caused The Economic Crisis In The Country, October 25, 2019.
 See Al-Arab (London), November 17, 2019; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), October 22, 2019, November 12, 2019.
 Alarabiya.net, October 18, 2019.
 Alarabiya.net, October 18, 2019.
 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), October 20, 2019.
Lebanese Protests Place Hizbullah In A Bind – Part II: Hizbullah’s Position On Protests Evokes Unusually Harsh Criticism Among Its Supporters, Prompts Wave Of Resignations From Pro-Hizbullah Daily ‘Al-Akhbar’
By: H. Varulkar and C. Jacob*
The mass protests in Lebanon over the economic crisis and government corruption, which broke out on October 17, 2019, placed Hizbullah in a bind which made it difficult for the organization to formulate its stance on them. Hizbullah, which for years has been presenting itself as the defender of the oppressed and fighter of corruption, felt compelled to show solidarity with the protesters, who are decrying the difficult conditions in the country and demanding to punish government corruption. The fact that Shi’ites in Lebanon identify with the protests and their demands, and have participated in them, is another factor which makes it difficult for Hizbullah to come out against them. However, once it realized that many of the demonstrators’ demands – specifically the demands for the resignation of the president and government and the holding of early parliamentary elections – posed a threat to the stability of the government, in which Hizbullah is a major component, the organization quickly changed its position. It began attacking the protests, claiming that they are funded by foreign countries, chiefly the U.S. and Israel, with the aim of sowing chaos in Lebanon and harming Hizbullah. Things came to the point where, on several occasions, activists from Hizbullah and its ally, the Shi’ite Amal movement, violently attacked protesters and tried to disperse them.
Hizbullah’s dilemma regarding the protests is also shared by its supporters, especially by journalists with the pro-Hizbullah daily Al-Akhbar, and it appears that several of them do not agree with the Hizbullah position. Broadly speaking, Al-Akhbar adopted Hizbullah’s narrative that the protests had been derailed by foreign elements that took control of them. This claim was made in the paper on a daily basis, including in articles by its editor-in-chief, Ibrahim Al-Amin. However, the doubt expressed by Hizbullah, and especially by its leader Nasrallah, regarding the authenticity of the protests, and in particular the violence of Hizbullah activists towards protesters, apparently did not sit well with some of Al-Akhbar’s writers. Following these violent incidents, the daily took the unusual step of publishing articles harshly critical of Hizbullah, including one by Ibrahim Al-Amin himself, and another by a writer who described himself as a staunch Hizbullah supporter but nevertheless accused the organization of turning a blind eye to government corruption.
Subsequently, after Al-Amin decided to readopt Hizbullah’s position regarding the protests and stop the criticism against it, five Al-Akhbar journalists, some of them senior, resigned in protest of the daily’s bias and its hostility towards the protests. Some two weeks later, two senior reporters with the pro-Hizbullah television channel Al-Mayadeen resigned as well. These reporters gave no specific reason for their resignation, but some speculated that they too were motivated by the channel’s hostile coverage of the protests.
This report reviews the criticism expressed against Hizbullah in Al-Akhbar, and the resignation of the Al-Akhbar journalists.
Al-Akhbar Editor To Nasrallah: Stop The Brutal And Unjust Violence Against Protesters
On October 30, 2019, after Hizbullah and Amal activists attacked protesters in South Lebanon (especially in Al-Nabatieh and Tyre) and Beirut, Al-Akhbar editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al-Amin harshly criticized the attackers, whom he identified as Amal activists only, and called on Nasrallah, Amal’s ally, to prevent the recurrence of such events. He wrote: “Let me take this opportunity to address the attitude of the resistance and its supporters [i.e., the Amal movement] toward some ordinary citizens who, faced with the injustice perpetrated against them, consciously decided… to raise the level of their resistance and to cry out in protest. Employing the usual methods of protest, they expressed their opinion against the government and the corrupt authorities… What happened in Al-Nabatieh, Tyre and central Beirut can be described in only one way: as the ugliest sort of brutality…
“I am personally acquainted with Mr. Hassan Nasrallah. I have known him for a long time and I know his heart and mind. I know how he is [often] hard with himself and his family for the sake of [pursuing] a just cause. I know how often he has restrained himself and remained silent in the face of grave transgressions, just in order to protect the resistance… I know he knows the meaning of manliness, nobility of spirit, and human dignity. I know how much he feels for every child, man and woman, every father and mother, and therefore I ask him: Is it possible that you, [Hassan Nasrallah], will not take the initiative to stop this ongoing injustice your brothers are suffering just because they expressed an opinion that contravenes that of the leader and his associates?
“Let us be clear and honest. The Amal movement is directly and fully responsible [for what happened], from its head [Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri] to its [other] political leaders – ministers, MPs, municipal council members, security officers, clerics and [other] influential figures – as well as the thugs and the army of strongmen who acted to humiliate people and punish them just because they were protesting the [poor] performance of the government, of which Amal forms a sizable part…
“Every [incident in which a] resident of Beirut, South [Lebanon] or the Beqaa Valley was humiliated or pressured in order to prevent him from voicing his opinion, changing his opinion, or leaving his home [and taking to the street] is a barbaric incident that blackens the face of its perpetrators. The offenders must be punished, along with those who are behind their acts of brutality. This demand is no less important than the demands of the poor for a country where justice prevails.”
Lebanese Journalist To Nasrallah In Al-Akhbar Article: Hizbullah Has Ignored The Government’s Corruption; Your Statements Enraged Many Hizbullah Supporters Who Identify With The Protests
Two days later, on November 1, 2019, Al-Akhbar published an article by journalist Maher Abi Nader. After professing support for the resistance and admiration for Nasrallah, he addressed Nasrallah and pointedly accused Hizbullah of turning a blind eye to the corruption of the government in return for the government’s disregard of its weapons. He also condemned the Amal and Hizbullah activists’ “barbaric repression” of demonstrators, and rejected Nasrallah’s doubts regarding the authenticity of the protest, stating that it is a sincere outpouring of frustration by Lebanon’s poor, some of whom are Hizbullah supporters and deserve its sympathy, rather than its hostility.
Abi Nader wrote: “Like you, I was born and grew up in the Al-Nab’a neighborhood, part of the belt of poverty that surrounded Beirut before and after the civil war. Despite the ideological disagreements between us, I, like you, espouse the idea of opposing injustice, oppression, poverty and occupation. I regard you as a leader the likes of which the Lebanese people and Arab nation did not manage to produce for many long decades. I address you with love and appreciation, in a clear and sincere manner.
“First, honorable Sayyed [an honorific title denoting people accepted as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad], I would like to say that the so-called ‘presidential’ arrangement [i.e., the agreement reached in 2016 and implemented until recently, according to which Michel ‘Aoun became president and Sa’d Al-Hariri prime minister], did the resistance a grave injustice. [This agreement] granted the presidency to [Hizbullah’s] ally Gen. Michel ‘Aoun, and the role of prime minister to Sheikh Sa’d Al-Hariri. But the secret part of the arrangement was [an understanding that] the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah] would turn a blind eye to the government’s economic and fiscal policy – namely to the systematic corruption that prevails in the country – and in return, [the government] would ignore the weapons of the resistance and officially legitimize their existence. The first injustice here is the treatment of the weapons of the resistance as weapons of a group, party or sect, rather than as weapons of the homeland… The second injustice is that [the arrangement] transforms the resistance into a guardian of the bastion of corruption and all its components, whether voluntarily or by force of circumstance…
“Honorable Sayyed [Nasrallah], under this ‘presidential’ arrangement, which did the resistance an injustice, you were forced to accept a government whose makeup you could not tolerate… and an economic and fiscal policy [that drove] the country towards the abyss of poverty, hunger, want, unemployment and bankruptcy, until the situation became unbearable… The straw that broke the camel’s back was the decision of the media minister, which was also endorsed by the ministers of the resistance within the government, to tax WhatsApp calls, a free service that is based abroad and which the Lebanese state has no right to tax. This drove the public to take to the streets, regardless of religion, sect or party, [chanting] slogans unprecedented in Lebanon’s history…
“Between [the time of] your first speech after the outbreak of the protests and your second speech, the people’s demands did not change, nor did their pain and hunger. But your position towards the protest movement did change. I agree with you that certain elements and embassies tried to forcefully infiltrate the protest and derail it from its course… but they did not succeed.
“Sayyed [Nasrallah], the calls heard [at the protests] against you and against the resistance were voiced by a small group of demonstrators… a group that represents [forces] that were your partners in the government and your allies in the professional syndicate elections… Resistance members started reacting to this small group… by barbarically and violently repressing protesters in Al-Nabatieh and Tyre, which are strongholds of the resistance, causing some people – including former resistance fighters – to be injured, wounded or imprisoned. Later, dozens of unknown individuals on motorcycles stormed the main center of protests [in Al-Nabatieh and Tyre], waving Hizbullah and Amal flags. [They] also raided the protesters in [Beirut’s] Riad Al-Solh Square, calling out slogans [of support] for you.
“Your latest speech, Sayyed [Nasrallah], enraged people who support, love and cultivate the resistance. These supporters of the resistance [simply] do not want it to become the one that defends the bastion of corruption from its [i.e., the resistance’s] own support base, [namely from] poor people [who live in every part of Lebanon], from the tip of the north Beqaa Valley to the southernmost tip [of Lebanon], including in the Dahia [Hizbullah’s stronghold in Beirut], some of whose areas have become hotbeds of want and poverty. These [Hizbullah supporters] do not regard these mass protests as the product of [foreign] embassies that hatched a plot against the resistance, [as you claim].
“Oh Sayyed [Nasrallah], these people want to hear an apology for the gravely mistaken [actions] committed by certain elements against the resistance and its supporters and public, and against the demonstrators. Those who dared to place the resistance in conflict with its [own] people… by means of their brutal behavior at the scenes of the protest, [behavior] that does not befit the resistance members and their upbringing and culture, must be severely punished. Honorable Sayyed [Nasrallah],… just as the resistance is a natural outcome of the occupation, the popular protest, belated though it may be, is a natural outcome of the injustice, oppression, corruption and thievery. I call upon you to return the resistance to the bosom of the people and to its natural [position] of solidarity with the pain, the hunger and the outcry of the people…”
Al-Akhbar Journalists Resign Over Its Hostile Coverage Of The Protests
However, despite his criticism, Al-Akhbar editor Ibrahim Al-Amin ultimately maintained his support for Hizbullah and its positions. Apart from the two critical articles quoted above, the daily’s articles and reports continued to claim that the protests had been politicized and were controlled by foreign elements seeking to harm Lebanon and especially Hizbullah. As a result, five of the daily’s journalists resigned over what they called the daily’s slanted and hostile coverage of the protests.
The first to resign was Al-Akhbar’s culture reporter Joy Slim. In an October 29 Facebook post, she clarified the reason for her decision, lashing out at the daily for its position on the protests and even holding it responsible for the violent attacks on protesters by Hizbullah and Amal activists. She wrote: “Today I resigned from the Al-Akhbar daily after working there for five and a half years. The past few days were decisive for me. I gave up hope that the paper’s coverage of the uprising [would change]. For months, or even years, it kept explaining why [such a protest] must break out; but the minute it did, it rushed to join the counter-uprising and even advanced conspiratorial and inciting rumors that contributed to [prompting] the recent attacks on protesters in the streets by ‘residents,’ as Al-Akhbar called them on its Facebook page. The paper’s stance on the protests, and the way it covered them in the days after they broke out, was almost scandalous, in my opinion. The paper bears partial responsibility for every drop of protesters’ blood spilled by [those] ‘residents,’ supporters of the ruling parties [Hizbullah and Amal].”
Slim added: “This resignation comes at a difficult time for me, personally, but I nevertheless decided to take a leap into the unknown… rather than stay in a [work]place I felt had betrayed the people at the most crucial moment, myself among them…”
Three days later, on November 3, Mohammad Zbeeb, the head of the daily’s economic section, resigned as well. He tweeted: “In order to remove any doubt, [let me clarify that] I resigned from the Al-Akhbar daily… in protest of its stance towards the uprising.”
The other three reporters resigned On November 5. Sabah ‘Ayoub, who had been with the paper since its inception and had served as its deputy editor, its opinion section editor, and most recently as the head of its website team, tweeted: “I resigned from Al-Akhbar for a number of reasons, chief among them its coverage of the October 17 uprising.” Viviane ‘Akiki, who worked in the paper’s economic section, tweeted: “I resigned from Al-Akhbar for professional reasons related to its coverage of the popular uprising, as well as other reasons having to do with its professional performance, which were never addressed…” Muhammad Al-Jannoun tweeted: “I hereby announce that I have stopped writing in Al-Akhbar, because it does not recognize the legitimate right to [hold] the popular protests [of] the October 17 revolution. I thank the daily for the opportunity it gave me for five years, [but] it is inconceivable that freedom of the press should be influenced by politics or affiliation.”
As stated, a fortnight later, two reporters from the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen channel, which is likewise affiliated with Hizbullah, resigned as well. The first to resign was senior journalist Samy Kleyb, who was among the channels’ founders and is known as a supporter of the Syrian regime, Hizbullah and its allies. He tweeted on November 22: “I resigned from Al-Mayadeen today, prompted by my positions, beliefs and conscience. I wish them ongoing progress and success.” Although Kleyb did not specify the reasons for his resignation, some speculated that, like in the case of the Al-Akhbar journalists, the reason was the channel’s hostile coverage of the protests.” Two days later, journalist Lina Zahredine, who had been with the channel for eight years, announced her resignation, writing: “Due to the historic moments were are experiencing, I found it necessary to resign from Al-Mayadeen. I wish the channel longevity and our peoples [the Arab peoples] a better future…” Her resignation too was seen in the Lebanese press as an act of protest over the channel’s coverage of the current events in Lebanon.
*H. Varulkar is director of research at MEMRI; C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.