تسفي باريل/هآرتس: من هو الذي تسميه إرهابياً ولغز ترامب وجماعة الإخوان المسلمين/Zvi Bar’el/Haaretz: Who You Calling a Terrorist… Trump’s Conundrum With the Muslim Brotherhood
Analysis/Who You Calling a Terrorist: Trump’s Conundrum With the Muslim Brotherhood تسفي باريل/هآرتس:من هو الذي تسميه إرهابياً ولغز ترامب وجماعة الإخوان المسلمين Zvi Bar’el/Haaretz/May 04/2019
When political considerations meet reality, the technical definitions of a terrorist group get pushed aside. The U.S. calls Hezbollah terrorists but still sells missiles to Lebanon, while Israel transfers Qatari money to Hamas.
Waiting on U.S. President Donald Trump’s desk is a request from his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi, to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. A similar request was presented two years ago by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan concerning Fethullah Gulen’s Hizmet movement. Trump is taking Sissi’s request seriously and has asked his national security adviser, John Bolton, to start the process for approval, while Turkey has already been told that no, the evidence on Gulen, who lives in exile in Pennsylvania, and his movement isn’t enough to prove terror.
How much do the lists rely on evidence and how much are they products of political and diplomatic considerations? This can be learned from Trump’s positions on his two counterparts’ requests – and from the differences between the American list and the EU list. The American roster includes 68 organizations and movements. The most recent addition was Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, which was added on in the middle of last month.
The European list includes only 21 organizations, or parts of organizations. For example, all of Hezbollah, both its political and military wings, are on the U.S. list, while the European Union – except for Britain – treats Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist group but the political wing, which includes three Lebanese cabinet ministers, as a legitimate organization. Brussels views it as “part of Lebanon’s political framework.”
This difference, in the case of Lebanon for example, can be important when Beirut seeks loans from European banks or cooperation agreements with EU member states. While Hezobllah’s participation in the government doesn’t damage Lebanon’s ability to conduct normal diplomatic relations with European countries, in similar cases the United States might put up obstacles or even freeze military aid to Beirut.
At least that’s the way it looks on paper. But in April the United States sent Lebanon six drones worth some $11 million, and in February it equipped the Lebanese army with laser-guided missiles worth about $18 million. This aid was justified by Washington’s desire to help Lebanon fight terrorism and Iranian influence. This is the same Lebanon with its Hezbollah cabinet members.
Tricky Turkey
The Turkish paradox is even more convoluted. Turkey defines the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, as a terrorist organization, as do both the United States and the European Union. But Turkey has expanded this definition to also include the Kurdish military units operating in Syria. Ankara is demanding that the EU and United States adopt this definition, saying these militias are allies of the PKK and take orders from it.
The problem is that the Kurdish defense units were the most important force in the war against the Islamic State in Syria; a great part of the victory against the group belongs to them. The United States provided these units with air support, training, weapons, ammunition and funds – and views these militias as important allies who deserve protection.
One of the worst sticking points between Ankara and Washington lies in this gap between the Turkish and American definitions. This disagreement naturally has a direct effect on Washington’s willingness to agree to Turkey’s request to recognize Gulen’s movement as a terrorist organization – and its refusal to extradite him to Turkey. If the United States decides to put this movement on its terrorism list, it will have to extradite Gulen and others, block the group’s funding and freeze its assets.
But the chances of this happening are slim, partly because of Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia, in defiance of Washington’s staunch position on the matter.
It’s unclear if Trump would have agreed to the Turkish demands if the S-400 deal wasn’t in the way, but surely the tensions between the two countries haven’t encouraged the White House to help Erdogan in his fight against Gulen.
This is the EU’s position too. The EU rejected Turkey’s request to include Hizmet on its terrorism list and doesn’t see Erdogan’s war on the movement as a fight against terror, but as the persecution of a political rival in which “terrorism” is being used to stifle freedom of expression, conduct mass arrests on suspicion of membership in the movement, and strike a mortal blow to human rights.
Turkey, which is running a slander campaign against European countries and has called their leaders “supporters of terrorism” because of their refusal to take the Turkish line on Gulen’s movement, has rejected a request from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to name the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. The Brotherhood enjoys freedom of action in Turkey, which sees itself as a patron along with Qatar and other Muslim countries. Turkey’s support for the Brothers may be the main reason for the wide rift between Egypt and Turkey, and between Sissi and Erdogan.
If the Trump administration and Congress – whose approval is necessary – put the Muslim Brotherhood on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, they could create more friction with Turkey. Trump will have to consider what’s more important to him: to placate Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – which all consider the Brotherhood a terror group – or reconcile with Turkey and reject Sissi’s request. Trump’s decision will be based on strategic considerations, not the intelligence community’s assessments.
The pesky Revolutionary Guards
Political considerations are what is dictating the EU’s position on Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. It seems the EU could use the American justifications to include the Guards on its blacklist. There’s no shortage of proof of the Guards’ involvement in terrorist attacks, including in Europe. The EU’s definition of terrorism is broad enough to include the entire Guards organization.
But a deep dispute exists between most European countries and the Trump administration over Washington’s leaving of the Iranian nuclear deal. Most EU nations see the agreement as the height of diplomatic success and proof that it’s possible to negotiate with Iran and produce sustainable results. But the United States sees the agreement as the surrender of the Western powers to Iranian intimidation and a serious threat to “world peace,” especially to Israel.
As a result, some European countries still implement – with no great success – the alternative mechanism for bypassing the American sanctions on Iran: Trying to encourage Iran to negotiate over additional issues such as its missile program and support for Hezbollah. This strategy doesn’t let the EU include the Revolutionary Guards on its list of terror groups because officially the Guards are an arm of government, for which no precedent exists for being declared a terrorist organization.
Estimates are that the American decision will affect some 11 million Iranians, of whom over 300,000 are serving in the Guards and the Basij volunteer militia. Hundreds of thousands more work in plants and businesses owned by the Guards.
But beyond the formal aspect, the chance of preserving the nuclear deal and encouraging negotiations with Iran could evaporate if the EU joins the United States in its declaration. The American decision to add the Guards to the terror list had plenty of opponents in the State Department and Pentagon, who feared an Iranian response against American forces in the Persian Gulf and Iraq.
Some even attributed the decision to the many steps Trump has taken to strengthen Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu such as recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. They also mention a wish by Trump to throw a bone to the Saudis, who have been scorched in Congress over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the unending civil war in Yemen. In any case, people in the U.S. administration are having a hard time explaining the timing of Trump’s decision; Iran has been in the sights of the war on terror for decades.
“Declaring an organization or movement a terrorist organization is largely a political statement whose practical meaning is limited,” a European diplomat told Haaretz. “Most of the organizations on these lists don’t manage their accounts in banks in Europe or the United States. And anyway, activists linked to these organizations who live in Europe and the United States are under surveillance or have been warned about continued cooperation with these groups.”
As he put it, “American law states that a terrorist organization can only be a foreign organization that’s not American, while the American organizations and movements that incite to terrorism on a racial or religious basis enjoy legal protection – and in some cases a blind eye from the president.”
Israel can provide evidence to support the diplomat’s view in its handling of Hamas. The definition of Hamas as a terrorist group hasn’t prevented Israel from approving the transfer of Qatari aid in return for calm and the ramping down of the protest marches at the Gaza border fence. This is the same Qatar that supports the Muslim Brotherhood, doesn’t recognize the legitimacy of Sissi, is the enemy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and is an ally of Turkey and Iran.
Will Trump label Qatar a state that supports terrorism because of its support for Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood if he puts them on the terrorism list? Don’t hold your breath. The United States has its biggest military base in the Middle East in Qatar. Trump’s war on terror will have to find a way to maneuver around these dilemmas.
