Putin’s Syrian Messages and Macron’s Lebanese Initiative
Raghida Dergham/November 26/17
The journey of regional and international bargaining over the Middle East has kicked off, with the emergence of the features of realistic understandings in Syria, far removed from the erstwhile delusions about victory, now Syria having been spared from total collapse. Lebanon has also received a fair share of renewed regional and international attention, on the basis that safeguarding its stability requires conveying to Tehran that a return to the status quo ante is no longer acceptable, with a ladder placed in Hezbollah’s path to climb down quietly from its domestic dominance and meddling in various Arab battlegrounds, beginning with Yemen.
Internationally, Russia sits squarely at the helm of the Syrian issue, leading the march towards political settlement out of the Sochi Summit, which brought together this week Turkey’s Erdogan and Iran’s Rouhani alongside Vladimir Putin. Regionally, Saudi Arabia moved in parallel and coordination with Russia, hosting more than 1,400 Syrian opposition figures with a view to produce a unified delegation to take part in the UN-brokered Geneva talks to end the Syrian tragedy. In Lebanon, France was the key international player that helped contain the crisis, with Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri postponing his resignation as part of an initiative coordinated with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, after sending a crucial message to Iran. For its part, the United States has been in the backseat despite the importance of these developments, but it has been present behind the scenes in support of Russia’s efforts on Syria and France on Lebanon. In truth, the timing of both interventions has contributed to pushing events back from the edge of a cliff, towards a shift that may prove positive on several levels.
The one-hour phone call between Putin and Trump was made after the Russian leader hosted Bashar al-Assad, to tell him the time has come for a political settlement and pragmatic concessions, instead of continuing down his delusional and dangerous equation of victory and defeat. Putin boastfully recalled that Russia has prevented the collapse and partition of Syria and defended Syria’s ‘secularism,’ by intervening decisively against al terrorist factions, not just ISIS. The Russian president appears to also be seeking to slowly detach from his partners in the Syrian war, which requires, first a political process that does not insist on Assad’s departure, but rather, a transitional process that would naturally curtail the Baath’s dominance over power, because its monopolistic nature does not tolerate a pluralistic, democratic process in governing Syria.
One of the pillars of the Trump administration has explained the US consent to ending demands for Assad to step down by saying that it was former president Barrack Obama who had adopted that slogan without seeking to implement it. By contrast, he said, Trump’s policy does not adopt that slogan, but stresses the need to isolate Assad and turn him into a pariah. He added: “We are very worried about the rehabilitation of Assad, and insist on isolating him.”
The bottom line here is that Trump agrees with Putin that Assad will remain in his post until after the political process is launched and is well on its way, and not at its beginning. For his part, Putin has pledged not to exempt Assad from offering the necessary concessions, and said at the Sochi summit: “It is obvious that the process of reform will not be easy and will require compromises and concessions from all participants, including of course the government of Syria.” The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also said the path was clear for a political settlement and ending the crisis in Syria.
At the same time, Saudi diplomacy was playing its part, with a wide array of Syrian opposition factions meeting in Riyadh on the same day as the summit in Sochi, to unify their ranks ahead of the talks on Syria’s political future. This momentum was coupled with phone calls between Putin and, the Saudi king Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
On Iran’s role in Syria in the discussions between Trump and Putin, an informed US source said: “The substance of our position is that Iran must dial back its presence and influence in Syria. We are working with Russia to convince them of this goal.” Washington wants to prevent Iran from consolidating its presence in the territories liberated from ISIS, but the strategy to achieve this remains unclear. According to the source, the path to this goes through Russia, at least in the time being, through strategic understandings for de-escalating American-Russian relations towards a ‘gentler relationship’ built on ‘shared grounds’.
Iran appears as though it has understood the signs of a coming political siege, and acted calmly behind the scenes, through Hezbollah’s chief and others, confident of its victory in Albu Kamal, a key component of its land bridge from Tehran to Beirut, after a battle led by the notorious general Qassem Soleimani. Indeed, in addition to the US bid to isolate and sanction Iran and its Revolutionary Guards as well as its proxy Hezbollah, it was clear that Europe had started complying with US demands, particularly France, which strongly influences German policy in this regard too.
This week, French President Emanuel Macron secured for himself a new position by leading the negotiations on Lebanon and sending messages to Iran and Saudi Arabia, without forgetting to coordinate with international powers such as the US and regional powers such as Egypt, as well as the leaders of Lebanon.
What happened between Hariri’s televised resignation in Riyadh on November 4 and his return to Beirut on November 22 could well turn out to be the most important juncture in Lebanon’s future and regional and international relations, and it is worth analyzing the challenges and opportunities of the coming phase.
First: Lebanese President Michel Aoun is today at the forefront of shaping Lebanon’s future, and he carries on his shoulders some fateful responsibilities. He deserves appreciation of his efforts to uphold the constitution and protocol, on the basis of which he refused Hariri’s resignation from Riyadh. He also deserves recognition of his ability to contain as well as escalate, giving him the ability to maneuver and retreat as required by the situation. Aoun has proven that he can influence his main partners in Hezbollah to de-escalate and scale back their regional interventions. Aoun succeeded not only in securing Hariri’s return to Lebanon to attend Independence Day celebrations, but also, and more importantly, to become a component in the French-Egyptian-Saudi initiative that agreed the postponement of Hariri’s resignation until the president concludes a dialogue to address the contentious issues that had led to it.
Aoun is now required to avoid complacency and maneuvers by any side, because Lebanon is still in the danger zone, and will remain so unless it makes serious commitments regarding self-dissociation and neutrality, especially with guarantees that Hezbollah will end its interference in Gulf countries and Yemen. President Aoun is also required to control the damage he caused when he proclaimed that Hezbollah will not disarm until all the issues of the Middle East are resolved, which he can achieve by raising the future of Hezbollah’s arms in a serious intra-Lebanese dialogue, though this does not have to be a precondition for dialogue at present. In short, this is an opportunity for Michel Aoun to become president for all of Lebanon, rather than belong to one side in the Lebanese equation, thereby securing his legacy in the history of the republic.
Second: Obviously, this is a special opportunity for Saad al-Hariri to reap the rewards of the popular mandate he has obtained, which goes beyond his Sunni constituency, towards national leadership whose theme is insisting on self-dissociation and standing up to the Hezbollah-led camp as they attempt to dominate the coalition government. This is an opportunity for Hariri to expand the circle of his advisers and connect with his popular base, beyond the Sunni constituency of which he has returned an unrivalled leader.
Hariri faces the challenge of building a different kind of accord government, different from the outgoing one whose moderate members such as Hariri were thwarted, as the other side felt so triumphant that it assumed the anomalous status quo was natural and acceptable. Hariri has an opportunity to rebrand himself and prove wrong his doubters to become a different kind of leader.
Third: Saudi Arabia has an opportunity to revitalize its constructive role in Lebanon, especially as a partner in the initiative for de-escalation in Lebanon. Providing support for Hariri would dispel the impression that he had been under house arrest in Riyadh. Regardless of whether that and the allegation that his resignation had been forced or not, many in Lebanon were incensed by their perceived humiliation, and communicated to all parties that this would be costly. Some say this is nonsense and that economic disaster awaits if Lebanon foolishly escalated, but what happened is not in the interest of the Gulf countries either way. It is therefore in the Saudi interest to nudge Lebanon to guarantee that no party in its government shall assail Saudi Arabia’s national security, and to help the president secure these guarantees without media escalation, in order to contain any mistakes.
Fourth: Hezbollah has an opportunity to make decisions that give the Lebanese people the priority, instead of costing them highly. The Lebanese have shown determination to place civil peace above all else, so this is a chance for Hezbollah to prove that it belongs first and foremost to Lebanon, because its popular base is Lebanese, a base that wants Hezbollah to be Lebanese and want accord and not proxy wars. It is enough for Hassan Nasrallah to say he is not sending weapons to Yemen, while also declaring that Yemen is the most precious battle to him. There is a need here for a qualitative shift in dealing with the Gulf countries, the Arab nations, and the Lebanese equation. Otherwise, all of Lebanon will pay the price for Hezbollah’s arrogance and stubbornness.
The walk-back by all sides has started, but there is a need for a wise recalculation. The local and regional players in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, the IRGC, and Hezbollah in particular, have started to understand that triumphalism is unacceptable. The leaders of the great powers, especially Russia, does not want to share control of the Syrian issue, but also does not want to deal with Syria on the basis of the traditional victory and defeat equation. Russia is in the process of reformulating its international relations, led by the relationship with the US. It wants to withdraw militarily from Syria, to manage reconstruction and stabilization there, then prepare for elections in Russia.
In Lebanon, perhaps all the mistakes, miscalculations, and misconduct there will in the end provide a push for a better future, based on reining in Hezbollah’s interferences in the Arab arenas, and launching a serious discussion about the future of its arms in Lebanon, and a real determination to build the new republic. However, this requires for the Lebanese to take real action and not obfuscate, and return to burying their heads in the sand.
