An interview I conducted with the Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt last week somehow received a great deal of attention in Lebanon. Mr Jumblatt was speaking to Diwan, the new blog of the Carnegie Middle East programme, which I edit.
The Druze leader covered a wide range of Lebanese and regional topics, and his remarks were, collectively, an assessment of the region’s disarray. Mr Jumblatt matters because he has spent almost 40 years navigating the treacherous waters of Lebanese politics, and is still alive to apply the lessons learnt. He remains a dominant figure, despite his tiny community, and the way he leans in search of communal survival is a good indication of where Lebanon is heading.
Many of Mr Jumblatt’s individual statements were highlighted in the media, not least that he would not reconcile with Syrian president Bashar Al Assad because he would prefer to commit political suicide on his own terms. However, the Druze leader painted a more general context for his interpretation of regional developments. And it is this that his political enemies in particular must have retained.
In effect, Mr Jumblatt admitted five things. He mocked the international community over Syria and underlined that the United States was both “weak” and “didn’t care” about the Middle East. This situation led him to conclude, secondly, that the future of the region would be defined by “power-sharing” between the Americans, the Russians and the Iranians. Bolstering Iran’s influence was the nuclear deal the international community signed with Tehran.
Mr Jumblatt’s third admission was that Mr Al Assad would remain in office, “unfortunately and cynically and immorally”. At the same time, Lebanon would not have a president, because the election process was blocked by Iran and Syria. Both were looking to win in Syria and then “impose on Lebanon a new diktat, maybe with new terms”. This would be facilitated, he implied, by the fact that his strongest ally, Saad Hariri, was getting “weaker and weaker”.
And finally, when asked about his relationship with Hizbollah, given that it supported a Syrian regime he so ardently opposes, Mr Jumblatt replied: “To survive means to have good relations with all the components in the country, above all [Hizbollah]. That’s it. That’s the safest way for the Druze to survive and retain what they still have politically and demographically.”
Mr Jumblatt is a shrewd man and he was keen to publicise the interview, placing it on the website of his party newspaper. While up front the interview was a repetition of many of the things he said before about Syria and the region, particularly his antagonism toward Mr Al Assad and his criticisms of Russia, the essence of his portrayal was that Iran and Syria had won in Lebanon. And if Mr Jumblatt’s main aim is to ensure his community’s survival, adjusting to this new reality is imperative. This was the implicit message he was sending.
That is why I had asked the Druze leader about reconciliation with the Syrian president. He angrily rejected the idea. The more important question, which should have been posed, was whether his son Taymour, who today is slowly assuming the mantle of Druze leadership, would do so? After all, Mr Jumblatt himself travelled to Damascus after the assassination of his father in 1977, though he knew the Syrians were behind the killing, in order not to find himself on the wrong side of their new hegemony over Lebanon.
