Burak Bekdil: Turkey and Israel: Happy Together/Shoshana Bryen: Turkey-Israel Rapprochement

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Turkey and Israel: Happy Together?
Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/June 29/16

Ironically, the futile Turkish effort to end the naval blockade of Gaza is ending in quite a different direction: Now that Turkey has agreed to send humanitarian aid through the Ashdod port, it accepts the legitimacy of the blockade.
Ostensibly, almost everyone is happy. After six years and countless rounds of secret and public negotiations Turkey and Israel have finally reached a landmark deal to normalize their downgraded diplomatic relations and ended their cold war. The détente is a regional necessity based on convergent interests: Divergent interests can wait until the next crisis.
UN chief Ban Ki-moon welcomed the deal, calling it a “hopeful signal for the stability of the region.”
Secretary of State John Kerry, too, welcomed the agreement. “We are obviously pleased in the administration. This is a step we wanted to see happen,” he said.
And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thinks that the agreement to normalize relations will have a positive impact on Israel’s economy. “It has also immense implications for the Israeli economy, and I use that word advisedly,” Netanyahu said, in likely reference to potential deals with Turkey for the exploration and transportation of natural gas off the Israeli coast.
A few years ago, according to the official Turkish narrative, “Israel is a terrorist state and its acts are terrorist acts.” Today, in the words of Turkey’s Minister of the Economy, Nihat Zeybekci, “For us Israel is an important ally.”
Turkey has long claimed that it would not reconcile with Israel unless its three demands have been firmly met by the Jewish state: An official apology for the killings of nine Islamists aboard the Turkish flotilla led by the Mavi Marmara which in 2010 tried to break the naval blockade of Gaza; compensation for the victims’ families; and a complete removal of the blockade. In 2013, Netanyahu, under pressure from President Barack Obama, apologized for the operational mistakes during the raid on the Mavi Marmara. The two sides have also agreed on compensation worth $20 million. With the deal reached now and awaiting Israeli governmental and Turkish parliamentary approvals, the narrative on the third Turkish condition looks tricky.
Announcing the deal, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said that a first ship carrying over 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid from Turkey to Gaza, part of the deal between Turkey and Israel, will set out for Ashdod Port on July 1. A 200-bed Turkey-Palestine “friendship hospital” will also be put into service as soon as possible. Turkey’s housing agency will engage in a development project in Gaza, too. And that is fine.
But then Yildirim claimed that the embargo on Gaza will largely be lifted under the leadership of Turkey. That is completely wrong and simply an effort to cheat, aiming at Turkey’s domestic consumption. A maverick way to tell Turkey’s massive Islamist voting base: “Sorry, we have failed to remove the blockade of Gaza but are trying to sell it as if we did.” Even before the deal, Turkey, like other countries, was free to send humanitarian aid to Gaza through Israel’s designated port of Ashdod. Now it will send aid through the same port, not directly into the Gazan shores. Hence, Netanyahu’s caution that “the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza would continue after the deal.”
After six tiring years of concerted efforts to isolate Israel internationally unless Jerusalem removed the naval blockade of Gaza, Turkey had to go back to where it first took off and, in embarrassment, trying to sell the deal as a major diplomatic victory. One pro-government columnist flagrantly wrote: “Ankara opened a humanitarian corridor to Gaza and accomplished the freedom flotilla’s historic mission.”
The ups and downs of Turkey’s relations with Israel — what comes next?
Left: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (then Prime Minister) shakes hands with then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, on May 1, 2005. Right: Erdogan shakes hands with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on January 3, 2012.
All the same, the government’s propaganda machine now spreading the message that the great power Turkey got Israel on its knees is not always working well.
“It looks like the government has given up on its principles and values. It will lose support as a result,” said Ismail Bilgen, whose father was one of those killed on the Mavi Marmara. “The Justice and Development Party [AKP] enjoys great support due to its resolute principled stance on issues but this move is in total contradiction to that.”
He added:
“Restoring ties in this manner is unacceptable. The Israelis are acting like the compensation is an act of benevolence on their part rather than a punishment for their crimes … My father and his friends died trying to bring international attention to the inhumane blockade imposed on Gaza and to have it lifted. It now appears like their martyrdom will have been in vain.”
Cigdem Topcuoglu, whose husband was killed aboard the Mavi Marmara, said:
“Our struggle will continue no matter what. I am against it [the normalization deal] completely … In no way should an agreement be reached or friendship established with the Zionists calling themselves Israel, and who have blood on their hands … Our president [Recep Tayyip Erdogan] when he met with us told us the blood of the Mavi Marmara martyrs was sacred. I hope our president doesn’t concede to Israel in any way and doesn’t make a deal.”
Too late, too wrong. The deal will go through, and under the approving looks of Erdogan. Ironically, the futile Turkish effort to end the naval blockade of Gaza is ending in quite a different direction: Now that Turkey has agreed to send humanitarian aid through the Ashdod port, it accepts the legitimacy of the blockade.
**Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a Turkish columnist for the Hürriyet Daily and a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8346/turkey-israel-together

 

 

Turkey-Israel Rapprochement
Shoshana Bryen/Gatestone Institute/June 29/16
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8347/turkey-israel-rapprochement

Israeli policy (assisted by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden) produced perhaps the best possible outcome.
The UN Secretary General’s Report on the Gaza Flotilla concluded that Israel was within its rights to use force, and found the blockade of Gaza to be legal.
Turkey agreed to Israel’s original condition to the flotilla ships — aid bound for Gaza will offload in Ashdod.
Israel had also wanted to oust Hamas from Turkey — something that may not have been accomplished. But Turkey, by agreeing to a number of humanitarian projects in Gaza, will increase its leverage over Hamas in ways that might benefit Israel.
The announcement of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement was touted first as an economic achievement for Israel. It should be noted, however, that Turkey-Israel civilian trade, as distinct from military trade, was already robust, rising from $1.5 billion in the first half of 2010 to $5.6 billion in 2015. Israel has an interest in Turkey as a customer for Israeli natural gas fields, but a number of countries — including Russia — also seek partnerships in natural gas.
The deal has also been linked to the resolution of three Turkish conditions arising from the “Gaza Flotilla” of 2010. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (who was prime minister at the time of the Gaza flotilla) had demanded an Israeli apology for the deaths of Turkish citizens on one of the flotilla ships, financial compensation, and the lifting of the Israel’s naval blockade on Gaza. The first two were agreed to by Israel years ago. The resolution — or non-resolution — of the third is a window into what is really going on, which is both more, and less, than the news reports.
Critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu naturally blame Israel for delaying the restoration of political and presumably military ties, but, in fact, Israeli policy (assisted by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden) produced perhaps the best possible outcome.
Israel has had some success working with Sunni governments in the region — including Saudi Arabia — on the basis of shared opposition to ISIS and to Iranian plans for regional hegemony. Both are better done with Turkey than without. And Israel’s political and military interlocutors, Russia and Egypt, needed some assurance that would ameliorate their displeasure with Turkish-Israeli reconciliation.
For Russia, there was a public apology from Erdogan for shooting down a Russian plane over Turkey, which resulted in the death of the pilot — an act that Russian President Vladimir Putin called “a stab in the back.” In an obsequious letter, Erdogan wrote,
“The Turkish side… made a great effort to recover the body of the Russian pilot… The organization of the pre-burial procedures was conducted in accordance with all religious and military procedures… Ankara has treated the family of the dead Russian pilot as if it were a Turkish family… and is ready for any initiatives to relieve the pain and severity of the damage done.”
Erdogan called Russia a “friend and strategic partner.”
For Egypt, there is assurance that the naval blockade of Gaza, important to Egypt’s fight against ISIS and Hamas (the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), would not be lifted. The 2010 flotilla was organized by the Hamas-related IHH “charitable group” and supported by the Erdogan government. A CIA report had linked the organization with “Iran and Algerian groups,” and the IHH office in Bosnia “has been linked to Iranian operatives.” As the flotilla neared the waters off Gaza, Israel broadcast orders for the ships to land in the Israeli port of Ashdod where the “humanitarian aid” for Gaza would be offloaded. Six of the seven ships did so; the Mavi Marmara did not and was boarded by Israeli commandos. In the ensuing melee, nine Turks were killed and ten Israeli commandos wounded.
The UN Secretary General’s Report on the Gaza Flotilla, while criticizing the IDF for “excessive” force, nevertheless found that IDF troops faced an “organized and violent” assault from a group on the ship. It concluded that Israel was within its rights to use force and found the blockade of Gaza to be legal. Israel, therefore and in consideration of its relations with Egypt, steadfastly declined to lift the blockade.
Israel’s determination resulted in Turkey agreeing to Israel’s original condition to the flotilla ships: aid bound for Gaza will offload in Ashdod. As Al Jazeera reported:
“One of the interesting things that we’ve come to find out recently is that the material Turkey will be sending to Gaza will first land in the Israeli port of Ashdod. Obviously the third condition has not been met because if this deal stipulates that Turkey must send in materials to Ashdod, it means that the siege is still in place. Anything that is reaching Gaza must still get there via the Israeli port, meaning it requires Israel’s approval.”
That should mollify Egypt.
Israel had also wanted to oust Hamas from Turkey — something that may not have been accomplished — but Israel and Turkey will have diplomatic avenues for Israel to try to influence Turkey’s support of Hamas. At the same time, Turkey, by agreeing to a number of humanitarian projects in Gaza — through Ashdod — will increase its leverage over Hamas in ways that might benefit Israel.
Israel had wanted to oust Hamas from Turkey — something that may not have been accomplished in this week’s deal. Pictured above: Turkish President (then Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) meeting with Hamas leaders Khaled Mashaal (center) and Ismail Haniyeh on June 18, 2013, in Ankara, Turkey. (Image source: Turkey Prime Minister’s Press Office)
And the regional elephant in the room — Israel’s support for Kurdish separatism, in Iraq and Syria if not directly in Turkey — was not addressed in the new arrangement.
What cannot be judged at this moment is the degree of commitment to the elements of the deal on the Turkish side. Israel has made its apology and agreed to the sum it will pay in damages to Turkish citizens. But Turkey has been moving toward a more stridently Islamist political and ideological posture since Erdogan’s first election in 2003, offering encouragement to Islamists and jihadists of various stripes.
It may be that the combination of economic advancement and an easing of regional isolation will modify Turkey’s behavior — and Erdogan’s mouth. That remains to be seen. But from Israel’s point of view, its basic requirements have been met, no unacceptable conditions have been imposed, and the deal so far can be considered a diplomatic success.
**Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of the Jewish Policy Center.
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.