Diana Moukalled/Al Arabiya: The bitter memories of war/Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya: Why the Syria ceasefire will not hold

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The bitter memories of war
 Diana Moukalled/Al Arabiya/May 04/16
Is forgetting better at resolving conflicts than an active collective memory? American author David Rieff raises this question in his book In Praise of Forgetting. He says the modern world has developed a pathological obsession with memories, and it is time to give forgetting a chance. Rieff discusses conflicts that the West has overcome, such as World War II, the Bosnian war and the Irish civil war. I recall this as the debate over the 101st anniversary of the Armenian genocide surfaced in Lebanon this week. This debate has been accompanied by media and political controversy for a century now. Some are keen to attack efforts to commemorate this anniversary, and have launched social-media campaigns to consider the genocide a matter of historical controversy. Before we discuss remembering and forgetting, we need to address the issue of moral double-standards. We cannot but ask why this genocide is still a source of international, ethnic and sectarian tensions. The mass murder committed by the Ottomans during World War I is a matter of historical fact, yet to this day it is still questioned by Turks, and by Arabs and Muslims who are enthusiastic about the Ottoman Empire. Reviving the memory of war does not prevent it from happening again. Syria teaches us this lesson every day
History repeating
Armenians insist on remembering the genocide – as is their right – to ensure it never happens again. However, has this not happened to other peoples since? What lessons can we draw when massacres continue to be committed? If we have not been fair to the Armenians after 100 years, do we really expect the world to be fair to the victims of current massacres? The Syrian regime’s shelling of Aleppo, which has become routine, continues to massacre civilians, and no one has acted to help them. Remembering is a moral duty toward victims and truth. We believe that reviving a painful tragedy may contribute to not repeating it. This is legitimate and sometimes necessary, especially when denial dominates. However, reviving the memory of war does not prevent it from happening again. Syria teaches us this lesson every day. Keeping the memory alive can turn the past into a source of hatred, especially when facts are painful. This further complicates our current reality.

Why the Syria ceasefire will not hold
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya/May 04/16
The last couple of months have seen a significant amount of reduction of fighting in Syria, on the back of the Russian-sponsored “ceasefire”. And with it, a significant decrease in the influx of Syrian migrants into Europe. But the “ceasefire” has not meant a complete cessation of hostilities, as per the usual definition. And this week, despite US Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts and intense shuttle diplomacy, the peace deal is teetering on the verge of collapse. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, Russia reserves the right to attack any “terrorist group”. But what Russia is defining as “terrorist group” is not nearly the same as what the US and the West would. It is not just ISIS, al-Nusra and other officially designated groups. Russia designates as “terrorist group” anyone who it wants to designate as a terrorist group, basically, anyone who is not sworn to the regime of President Assad, or possibly the Kurds.
Russia can therefore attack anyone under the pretext of attacking ISIS. And as we speak they continue to bomb Aleppo to bits. Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has only just gotten around to “hoping” that the ceasefire can be extended to the city, which, let us not forget, is not in fact an ISIS target.
Secondly, there are now thousands of small militias and groupings who are no longer immediately concerned with overthrowing Assad or defeating ISIS, but which, out of the chaos of the conflict, have established lucrative rackets for their members from smuggling, extortion and other similar activities. To them, any ceasefire poses a double threat.
The fragmented nature of the “opposition” means that there is a diffusion of responsibility and accountability, which makes meaningful dialogue very difficult
On the one hand, they will no longer be able to cover their activities behind a pretence of legitimate political fighting, and their activities will be targeted both by other fighting actors and by their local populations as the organized crime they really are. And on the other, after all they would have been involved in during the fighting, it is hardly likely that the gang members will be safe. They will have many enemies with many scores to settle. Ironically, for most of the people caught up in this situation, they will only be safe so long as the fighting continues. So we can expect them to continue fighting and do their best to undermine any attempts at ceasefire by the larger, political actors. Thirdly, the fragmented nature of the “opposition” means that there is a diffusion of responsibility and accountability, which makes meaningful dialogue between the Assad side and the “opposition” very difficult, as we have already seen during the current attempt at a ceasefire.
Rebel cooperation
Most rebel groups cooperate with each other to such an extent that it is very difficult to know where one groups ends (e.g. al-Nusra) and another begins. For the Russians and Assad’s troops, lines are all blurred as to who can be attacked and who cannot. But on the “opposition” side also, lines are blurred on who is bound by the ceasefire, and “safe” from Russian bombardment, and who is going to be targeted anyway and not bound by the “ceasefire”. In between these gaps in demarcation, individuals and groups will continue to settle scores, run rackets, carry out attacks without ever being sure what this means for the ceasefire and what the consequences of their actions will be for themselves as well. Lastly, Russia and Assad have much less reason to compromise with the “opposition” and the West. The dynamics on the ground are changing rapidly and they have the momentum to impose their political vision on ending the conflict on other parties. Aleppo is still resisting. But only just. It has almost been bombed completely into submission, and there is hardly anything left standing in the city. Elsewhere, the situation is similar. Russia and Assad feel they are now in the position to bomb every opposition group outside of ISIS into submission. So unless the ‘opposition’ concedes on Assad’s terms, which they will not, Russia and Assad will continue to bludgeon them until they are completely broken. After all this, the fears that the “opposition” had about the original ceasefire plan have been borne out: the plan was put forward simply to give Russia the cover it needed to consolidate its position. And that is exactly what Russia has done. The rebels now are in a position where they have little option but to concede. But they will not. And so, the tragedy will continue for a while yet.