Does Aoun have a plan B with Hezbollah?
Michael Young/The Daily Star/March 02/16
It has been over a month since Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah copped out on the election of Michel Aoun as president. We are with Aoun, Hezbollah’s secretary-general said in a speech in January, but will not force our allies to vote for him.What was remarkable in the statement is that Hezbollah has not hesitated to force its allies, above all the speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, to boycott election sessions for almost two years. So effective has been the party’s power of persuasion that even Sleiman Frangieh, a presidential candidate himself, refused to go to Parliament Wednesday to elect a president because he did not want to oppose the party. In other words, had Nasrallah stated that Aoun’s election was a key party objective – and time and again he has hinted precisely that – he wouldn’t have dithered in pushing his allies toward such an outcome. It is surprising how quiet Aoun has been since he was endorsed by Samir Geagea. For a man who deployed his supporters in the streets at every occasion last year, who repeatedly blocked government action in order to blackmail the political class into electing him, the current situation must be disconcerting. Aoun is no fool and must have guessed that Hezbollah, deep down, had no real intention of bringing him to office. But if that’s the case, did he not have a backup plan to address the situation?
Evidently, the general does not want, or does not yet want, to put his relationship with Hezbollah on the line. Perhaps he feels that it would be a bad idea at a time when the party is resurgent, amid military gains in Syria and the rise of Iranian influence throughout the region. But if so, the entire premise of Aoun’s strategy in the past decade – that of siding with Hezbollah against the parliamentary majority in order to secure his election – has effectively collapsed. Hezbollah could now easily swing a majority behind Aoun if it persuaded Berri and its lesser allies to support the general, but it simply refuses to do so.
This reality brings on another one. If March 14 has as its priority the filling of the presidential vacuum, then it could just as easily elect Aoun itself, regardless of Hezbollah. If the party is perpetuating the political vacuum, as it seems to be doing, then there is an easy way for March 14 to circumvent this and strike a blow against Hezbollah’s agenda: by voting for Aoun.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have suggested that their overriding aim is to isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon. If so, one might argue that opting for Aoun could push him to take his distance from the party. Far from being an Iranian peon, some argue, the general is an opportunist who would jump at the first occasion of being elected. Therefore why not guarantee Aoun’s election, fill a vacuum that benefits only Hezbollah, and push the party and its allies into a corner where they would be alone? Aoun does not seem to have even considered exploiting this potential opening. It may now have dawned on him that his followers’ relentless provocations directed against Lebanon’s Sunnis ensured that he would alienate not only the community itself, but also its regional backers. Nothing Aoun does will ever persuade the Saudis that he is anything but an Iranian agent – certainly not given the mood in the kingdom today.
But what is revealing is the extent to which many Aounists have failed to realize that Nasrallah abandoned their leader. They will still blame March 14 for the absence of a president. This only underlines how much the Aounist mindset is built on resentment, not political calculation. The party’s rank and file cannot even discern that they have been shafted.
As purported defenders of Christian interests, the Aounists should ask why Hezbollah insists on leaving the presidency vacant. Some have argued that the party’s real intention is to impose constitutional amendments that will give the Shiite community more political power by increasing its representation. The most-often-heard prediction is that Hezbollah seeks to redraw shares in the country so that Sunnis, Shiites and Maronites each get roughly a third of representation in parliament, the government and the civil service, with smaller shares for the other sects. In that way Hezbollah could better protect itself and its weapons in the future. Perhaps, but another view seems more realistic today. Since Hezbollah does not have a parliamentary two-thirds majority to amend the constitution, all it can do is push for legislation that enhances its own sway while reducing that of its rivals. That would mean a favorable election law, a friendly president, a friendly Army commander, and so on. In this scenario Aoun and Frangieh remain presidential candidates, but Hezbollah wants to bring one of them in at the right moment, on its own terms, not as a consequence of maneuvers by March 14. It’s likely that Aoun is aware of this. However, at 82 years of age he doesn’t really have the luxury of delaying. Frangieh senses that too, which is why he is keen not to break with Hezbollah. Sooner or later, he doubtless feels, his chances of becoming president will increase, especially if he becomes the Lebanese embodiment of the enduring Bashar Assad-Hezbollah alliance.
Faced with such a situation, can Aoun afford not to react? He is caught in a dilemma, but has left himself no room for escape. Even Geagea, the one person who has sided with him lately, is looking beyond Aoun to position himself as the great Maronite unifier. No wonder the general and his supporters always appear to be so resentful.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.
