Could Egypt be key to political solution in Syria?
Ahmed Fouad/Al-Monitor/October 26/15
The Syrian crisis has taken a turn that could allow Egypt to act as a mediator in reaching a political settlement in Syria. Several Syrian and regional players are focusing on the fight against terrorism rather than on settling their political conflicts with President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and its opposing forces.
The priority has shifted away from the war between revolutionary or Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and a regime headed by a Shiite president who embodies “tyranny” for the opposition. Now at center stage is the conflict between Syria and the Islamic State (IS), whose growing influence threatens the Arab world and the Middle East. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, whose country is part of the international coalition against IS in Syria and Iraq, reiterated this stance in a Sept. 28 interview with CNN. Sisi was vocal about his concerns — since Egypt is fighting terrorism in its territories — when he said, “I am afraid that if the Syrian Arab army falls, its arms and equipment will fall in the hands of the radicals, thus giving them an additional push.” He added, “The situation between Assad and the Syrian opposition can be dealt with.” The intensifying crisis requires conflicting parties (Assad’s regime and the opposition) to seek a compromise or a political settlement as per the Geneva communique of 2012, which offers a perspective for the future of Syria within a firm timetable and without any further violence. The communique clearly stipulated the release of political prisoners, a transitional period capable of producing a freely and fairly elected multiparty parliament and a new constitution followed by a popular referendum. None of these steps oppose Russia’s, Iran’s and Egypt’s idea of Assad remaining in power at least until the security situation stabilizes and Assad’s hope of leaving power in a safe manner later.
A compromise remains a far-fetched goal since it has to be the product of an agreement between the regime and the opposition as well as among the countries supporting both sides of the conflict: on the one hand, Assad’s allies Russia and Iran, and on the other the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the rest of the opposition’s allies.
However, such agreement could prove feasible if all the parties were open to compromise, which is essential in the fight against IS. Otherwise, any intransigent party will have to pay the price for adding further confusion to the political situation in Syria at the expense of the nation’s war against the terrorist group.
In this context, Egypt could play a central role. At a joint press conference Oct. 4 in Cairo, following a meeting between Sisi and his Tunisian counterpart, Beji Caid Essebsi, Sisi stressed the need to work for a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Syria. The leaders agreed that such a settlement should preserve the unity and security of the nation while meeting the needs of its citizens.
In the September CNN interview, Sisi refused to admit Egypt’s support for Assad, but he indicated he is against overthrowing the regime by force, which would lead to the partition of Syria and the fall of its army. This may mean that the Egyptian government does not mind Assad stepping down as part of a gradual settlement that preserves the unity of Syria and the safety of the army. Egypt’s role in the political settlement of the Syrian crisis was reflected in an Oct. 17 meeting between Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian president’s special representative for the Middle East, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukri. The men issued a joint statement saying they have agreed it is necessary to implement a political solution based on the Geneva communique. This step would guarantee the formation of a transitional body in Syria while at the same time continuing to fight terrorism. Recent events in Syria offer an exceptional opportunity to Egypt to assume a mediator role between the warring parties to reach a political solution.
On Sept. 30, in a dramatic escalation of events, the Russian air force launched an aerial operation against IS ground targets in Syria. The president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNC), Khaled Khoja, said Sept. 30 that the Russian airstrikes killed 36 civilians that day. He accused Moscow of supporting the regime and creating chaos in Syria. The Russian airstrikes not only hit IS targets but the Syrian opposition too, which could pressure the SNC into accepting a political settlement. The Russian operation in Syria probably represents a pressure play on the coalition to accept a political solution, since 25% of the SNC’s higher committee accepted the initiative presented by UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura during an Oct. 10 vote. Although this represents a sizable percentage, de Mistura’s initiative was roundly rejected. Moreover, some of the coalition forces are “intransigent toward any political solution and insist on the immediate departure of Assad, no matter how hard it is according to many points of view amid the threats facing Syria,” Hassan Abdul-Azim, the head of the National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change, told Al-Monitor .
A senior SNC official, who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, said, “The Russian operation certainly adds pressure on some of the SNC’s parties who were indeed the 25% who approved de Mistura’s initiative — although this initiative did not require the immediate departure of Assad. However, this initiative has nothing new to add to the previous initiatives — which were met with stronger rejection, reaching 100% at times — amid the absence of any pressure like the one brought on by Russia’s bombing.”
Abdul-Azim added that Assad’s intransigence also hinders any attempt at a political settlement, though he pointed out that Russia wields the greatest influence on Assad regarding a political solution.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated Sept. 4 that Assad is ready to allow a “healthy” opposition to share power and hold immediate parliamentary elections; that is probably the result of Russia’s pressure. Putin also noted the unification of forces in the fight against terrorism should proceed along with a political process within Syria. The Pentagon announced Oct. 9 that it had abandoned its efforts to train rebel forces, deemed “moderate Syrian opposition,” and would focus on supplying arms and ammunition to Arab rebel commanders of existing Syrian units after screening them. On Oct. 10, the United States said it had resumed talks with Russia on air safety during bombing campaigns in Syria.
The new US stance may have shocked the SNC, whose forces were supposed to be trained by the United States. In light of these positions, the SNC was led to frustration over receiving further US support, as the SNC source believes these positions were the reason why more voters approved de Mistura’s political solution. The US-Iranian rapprochement following the nuclear deal earlier this year also raises Saudi concern and encourages the Arab kingdom to maintain strong relations with Egypt for fear of Iran and Egypt developing relations; both share a similar position in the Syrian crisis.
The Egyptian government can seize the opportunity to convince Saudi Arabia — a main ally and arms supplier to the SNC and armed opposition in their fight against Assad — to pressure the opposition into accepting a political settlement. This reasoning concurs with political analyst Bahaa al-Maghawry’s statement to Al-Monitor: “If Saudi Arabia agreed to a political settlement, this would leave Turkey as the SNC’s last ally refusing a political solution. But Saudi Arabia could also convince Turkey, as the two share a mutual stance.” It seems quite possible that Saudi Arabia will accept a political settlement in Syria in light of the kingdom’s rapprochement with Russia (Assad’s ally) after both parties agreed June 18 on the establishment of 16 nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia, with Russian help. Also, Saudi Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir met Oct. 11 with Putin in Russia and agreed on the necessity to reach a national Syrian reconciliation. Although de Mistura’s initiative was rejected, the above-mentioned factors should lead Egypt to assume a mediator role in reaching a political settlement in Syria, especially after it expressed its goodwill by hosting the Syrian opposition’s conference in June. However, these factors remain hypothetical and could be seen by the parties only as leeway to gain time and hide their true intentions from the Syrian and international public.
The Egyptian State: a ‘non-regime?’
H.A. Hellyer/Al Arabiya/October 26/15
Coverage of Egypt continues to exist in a broad variety of media outlets – both regionally in the Arab world, but also internationally in the broader international community. Since 2013, with the military’s removal of then president Mohammed Mursi from office following widespread protests, Egypt’s political authorities are invariably described as the ‘Egyptian regime.’ That’s particularly the case in the English language media worldwide – but is the word ‘regime’ really applicable in Cairo’s case? In a heated exchange between myself and a senior Iranian official a couple of years ago, I described Iran’s authorities as the ‘Iranian regime’ – a regime I felt had egregiously supported rather nasty policies in Syria. The Iranian official’s indisputably humorous disposition notwithstanding, he objected to the use of the word ‘regime’, claiming it was a word that was a ‘slight’ upon his country’s authorities. (I didn’t stop using the word.) He had a point, in that one seldom finds the use of the word ‘regime’ in a positive fashion when applied to a state’s authorities. On the contrary – the subtext of such a word is going to always be negative in one shape or form. But in one way, it is certainly a compliment – because a ‘regime’ is one that runs, and rather cohesively at that.
Regime or not?
Can one describe Cairo’s ruling authorities as a ‘regime’? Analysis of the country’s ruling authorities is not the easiest to engage in nowadays – but rather than use the word ‘regime’, one might consider three models of organization to explain how this particular political dispensation does – or does not – function.
The first is a rather historical one, and familiar to Egypt. I cannot take credit for it – a colleague of mine, though under Chatham House rules, expressed it – and that was the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. It’s an interesting model to ponder to understand how Egypt functions – because in Mamluk Egypt, the Sultans might have had the largest number of mamluks (soldiers), but the lesser powerful Amirs could have some troops as well. If we imagine the mamluk as an embodiment of power, then it is clear to identify that there was no single power centre in Mamluk Egypt – and sometimes-conflicting power centres, while an overall agreement on a basic trajectory. In Cairo today, many observers also agree that power is certainly disparate and not altogether well strewn into a single web – while a ‘regime’, on the other hand, would certainly be far more cohesive. Even after the Mamluk Sultanate was taken over, the Mamluks continued to hold a great deal of power – one of the reasons Muhammad Ali in the 19th century essentially declared war upon them as a class was due to their feudal power. They owned, in real terms, much of the country – and that would interfere with Muhammad Ali’s vision for control. (It didn’t end very well for the Mamluks, history records. Not at all. Muhammad Ali wasn’t exactly kind with them.) The second is another state model, but a much more contemporary one – and that is Vladimir Putin’s Russia. At the height of the Mamluk Sultanate (and the record does vary over hundreds of years), it represented a pinnacle of political, economic and cultural grandeur in the medieval era. One can’t really say that for Mr Putin’s Russia in the slightest.
Russia is certainly powerful on the world stage, but Putin has hardly made the country a bastion of great attraction for the world. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin is a rather popular figure in Russia. Under his predecessor, there was a massive financial crisis, a declining GDP, a substantial increase in poverty, and security anxieties via militant activity. Putin took over from Boris Yeltsin, imposed order, and was blessed by high oil prices. For the average Russian, if only due to comparing their lives under Putin to what they had before, it’s not hard to see why he gained popularity.The Egyptian Don?Moreover, the concern around stability and order, even if at the expense of civil rights, is a very critical issue to keep in mind – and that is true in Egypt today as well.
The presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is one that came into office on a promise of order – and by and large, the majority of the Egyptian population, particularly given the security situation in the country, as well as more regionally, view him as providing that stability. It may be an unsustainable kind of ‘order’ – many make that argument with a forceful degree of evidence to back it up – but perceptions needn’t always be true, and the perception is that this dispensation works (for now). Additionally, the disparate power centres within Russia itself also make for some interesting parallels to be drawn with Egypt. Nevertheless, none of those parallels are particularly flattering – at the end of the day, after all, Russia is hardly viewed as a paragon of virtue. It is 122nd out of 167 countries in the Democracy Index, and the World Justice Project views it as 80th of 99 countries in terms of the ‘rule of law’.
But if the Russian comparison is one that many might draw with regards to Egypt, there is one final one to consider – and it is an Italian one. It is not, alas, the current Italian state – that would be nice indeed. It would be good to think of Egypt as comparable to the third largest economy in the Eurozone, with a remarkably high level of human development and the highest life expectancy in the European Union. No, unfortunately, the comparison is far more baser – the Sicilian mafia. (Point of interest – Sicily used to be an Arab-Muslim sultanate, and some historians argue the word ‘mafia’ comes from the Arabic ‘marfud’. But I digress. ) The notion of the ‘Godfather’ was popularised through a variety of films by the same name – but it wasn’t a media creation.
The concept was certainly controversial for some historians, who argued that the ‘capo dei capi’, or ‘boss of bosses’ was a fiction – but others insist that the concept had genuine currency. It’s an interesting concept – because, again, many observers of Egyptian affairs argue that rather than the cohesiveness that the word ‘regime’ might imply, it’s far more useful to see the current political dispensation in the country as being much more about disparate power centres, with an eponymous figure on top of that structure. In that regard, there are some parallels. In the Sicilian case, each power centre (or ‘family’) has its ‘boss’ or ‘don’. An individual power centre has a certain degree and level of autonomy, to be sure – and it uses it – but there is a veto power to be employed by the ‘capo dei capi’.
The question is – when does he use it, and is he able to maintain a level of consensus on key issues, or not. If he can, and the other families do not rebel, then the ‘Godfather’ remains. It doesn’t mean he runs the show with full dictatorial powers, where all simply pay heed and obey – but it does mean the rules are more arbitrary than based on integrity, and the system is founded on power dynamics, more than they are on justice. That’s not exactly a grand system of respect for fundamental rights and responsibilities. It would seem, thus, perhaps, the Egyptian political dispensation is not, indeed, a ‘regime’ after all. The irony is, if only relatively speaking, it might be better if it were.
