Kuwait Answers the Question: Should Iran’s Containment Policy be Dropped after the Deal?
Samir Altaqi &Esam Aziz/MEB/Middle East Briefing//August 22/15
The US strategy towards Iran prior to the nuclear deal was that of containment. No one tells us now what will replace this strategy. We only hear this barrage of simplification and flat arguments defending the deal and accusing its critics of war mongering and repeated parroting from the deal supporters of the “blockbuster” question: What is the alternative?
Fine. Time now to ask: What is the alternative to the containment policy with Iran? The expected answer in the current politicized debate is: We are placing Iran in the watch list. There are many problems with this answer. First, Iran exists in a region that has a very rapid crisis tempo. Iran is not Gabon or Liberia. This tempo requires swift responses and clearer categorization. Second, being in the so-called “watch list” is not a strategy. It is the polished name of lacking one. Third, for are all the cheap shots directed towards the critics of the nuclear deal, no official effort to explain the position of the new relations with Iran within a clear regional strategy was ever provided.
In the Middle East, you cannot claim to stand on the “neutral” fine line. There isn’t such a thing. You cannot claim to stand idle “watching” those who are in your watch list when your interests and alliances are directly threatened. The degree of polarization and levels of threat are such that you cannot avoid to have a stand.
And there is an invitation coming from Kuwait at this critical moment to remind all of us that the post nuclear deal debate should really get serious. The invitation calls us to avoid partisanship, cheap and flat rhetoric, attempts to shortcut the debate by representing the critics as war mongers and parroting the flat and deceptive question of the “alternatives”.
Any one in his right mind will resist any kind of moves towards another war in the Middle East. Do the critics, or us at least, prefer a war? Absolutely not. A new war will be even more catastrophic than the previous two. Do we think that it is a good thing to deprive Iran of nuclear weapons? Only a mad person will wish to see a nuclear Iran. The Middle East is absolutely safer with Iran minus nuclear weapons.
But that should not be the end of any meaningful debate. It should be its starting point. Now, it is time to answer: What is the alternative to the previous containment policy?
The Kuwaiti answer should be very significant in framing this debate. But first a couple of words about the context in which the Kuwait response came. There was a proposed conference between the Gulf 7. The conference, started as a Qatari idea, was roughly scheduled for the last week of September, and was to host all members of the GCC + Iran. But what came as a total surprise, particularly in the context of Iran’s charm offensive in the Gulf in the post nuclear deal era, was that Kuwait uncovered an expansive Iranian-Hezbollah terrorist ring Aug 12.
Kuwaiti security officials announced at first the arrest of three persons. The ring turned out later to be much bigger than that. A large cache of arms was found hidden in a room underground. The amount of explosives found, as reported by Kuwait’s interior ministry, was staggering indeed. A total of 144 Kilograms of high grade explosives, 19,000 Kilograms of ammunitions, hand grenades, guns and RPG’s were also caught in the ring’s storage room.
Kuwaiti newspapers identified the suspects as Lebanese and Kuwaiti Shias affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). A list of names were sent to the Lebanese authorities to investigate and explore chances of extradition of other suspects based in the south of Lebanon. The suspects confessed that they picked their massive arms cache on several loads from specific spots underwater off Kuwait’s Gulf coast after getting the GPS locations from their handlers.
Gradually, the real size of the ring was coming to light to stun even veteran terror observer. The facts emerging from the large scale investigation of Kuwaiti security forces were shocking. Smuggling arms to Kuwait was going on undetected for the past five years. The liaison officer of the ring to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was Abdul Rezza Baqer Dashti, a known Kuwaiti politician and a close relative of an Iranian Parliamentarian. The total number of operatives in the ring reached well over a hundred, mostly Lebanese, Syrians and Kuwaitis.
The ring planned a campaign of assassinations targeting foreign and Arab ambassadors, Kuwaiti officials and politicians, clerics and members in the ruling family. It appeared as well that the ring was well organized and financed. The sources of finance were Hezbollah, the IRGC and local economic activities (particularly currency exchange and construction businesses owned by members). The targets were designated, researched, photographed, and some dry runs were done. A group of sympathizers and facilitators were organized, some of them in high and sensitive positions.
Just after the arrest of the group, Hezbollah dispatched a group of its fighter to the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut where they circled the embassy in a not-very-discreet manner as if sending a message to the Kuwaitis. But why? This is the last thing Iran wants to see in the horizon of the current delicate moment. Jawad Zarif visited Kuwait only three weeks prior to the uncovering of the terrorist ring. While there, Zarif announced in a press conference that “good neighborhood, mutual cooperation between the Islamic Republic and working together to defeat terrorism” are the “unshakable foundation of Iran’s strategy in the Gulf.”
It is likely of course that the IRGC is moving according to a different drum than that of Zarif. After all, the Commander of Al Quds Brigades, the regional branch of the IRGC, Qassem Sullimani, hardly hides his dislike to the sophisticated foreign minister. But that does not make a big difference. It was Iranians who made their own foreign minister the laughing stock of the region.
Internationally, arresting the terrorist ring comes as a huge embarrassment to Iran just on the heel of signing the nuclear deal. The ring raises doubts about the authenticity of Tehran commitment to fight terrorism or to improve its ties with the GCC. Who can guarantee now that Tehran will not use terrorism internationally as it used to?
Kuwait’s response to the arrest of the agents was as balanced as its response to the attack on a Shia Mosque last June. In fact, Kuwaiti authorities arrested another ring, this time belonging to ISIL, just few days after announcing the first news about the Iran-Hezbollah group. The authorities kept their line of confirming that all Kuwaitis are determined to preserve their national unity. Kuwaiti authorities correctly warned that any sectarian cracks inside Kuwait will benefit only those who want to harm the country. It is more obvious than ever that the security of the GCC is really challenged.
Back to the Iranian-Hezbollah ring, it is known in the Middle East that Iran built a retaliatory mechanism prior to signing the nuclear deal. This mechanism was set in anticipation of a military action against Iranian nuclear sites if the negotiations broke down and must have contained operations where the US military bases are located in the Gulf. GCC countries as allies to the US were considered targets for Iran in case of military action. What should have happened after signing the nuclear deal, assuming Tehran’s good will, is a decision by Iran to dismantle its sleeper terror cells in the GCC. But obviously Tehran did not do that. In fact, it did exactly the opposite. Just three weeks before uncovering the Kuwaiti terror ring, Bahrain stopped a boat carrying 44 Kilograms of C-4 explosives and an amount of machine guns and ammunition coming from Iran.
Once again, the nuclear deal in itself is not the issue. The real issue is the strategic context in the Middle East when the deal was signed. Regional security is threatened by continuous Iranian expansionism. The quest for security in the region cannot be reduced to military hardware or joint exercises. There is a neighbor bullying all the others around him and threatening their security and US vital interests in the region. Patriot systems and Iron Domes cannot stop asymmetric war tactics. What can stop these tactics is international pressure on Iran to change its behavior. But what has just happened is the US administration and the international community lifted all pressure on Tehran after signing the nuclear deal with the Iranians. Furthermore, they consider Iran an ally in Iraq sharing military bases with its forces and coordinating military operations with its commanders.
The administration deliberately mislead the public in presenting the nuclear deal. A nuclear weapon was going to harm the region’s security and everybody is better off without it. But this should only be half the argument. For the nuclear weapon, by definition, is a weapon. There are reasons why people seek such weapons. If these reasons are preserved and if those who seek to have it keep their full arsenal, strategies, intentions, and set of goals, they would have only lost one single tool, however destructive, and preserved all their aggressive policies. It would not alert anybody if France, for one example, added a more sophisticated nuclear arm to its nuke arsenal or if Japan made a bomb. French and Japanese policies are known and clear. Therefore, the weapon itself is not the principle question. The principle question is the context for trying to have it.
It is time that the administration abandons its methods targeting those who approach the nuclear deal critically. It should just explain in clearer term what kind of strategy will replace the previous containment policy and how does it intend to prevent Iran from harming US and its allies’ interests in the Middle East or if there is any strategy to start with? Or is it that the Administration decided to handle Tehran as a “normal” player, like Gabon or Liberia, if not as an ally, while it is neither.
Kuwait shows clearly the nature of Iran’s intentions. Maybe it is time that the US congress asks the intelligence community to assess the Iranian threat to the GCC countries in the post nuclear deal region.
