English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For November 24/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
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Bible Quotations For today
Jesus said to those who did not believe who is He: ‘Prophets are not without honour except in their own country and in their own house.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 13/54-58: “Jesus came to his home town and began to teach the people in their synagogue, so that they were astounded and said, ‘Where did this man get this wisdom and these deeds of power? Is not this the carpenter’s son? Is not his mother called Mary? And are not his brothers James and Joseph and Simon and Judas? And are not all his sisters with us? Where then did this man get all this?’ And they took offence at him. But Jesus said to them, ‘Prophets are not without honour except in their own country and in their own house.’And he did not do many deeds of power there, because of their unbelief.”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 23-24/2021
By Al Mighty God’s Will Lebanon Will Reclaim Its Confiscated Independence/Elias Bejjani/November 22/2019
Israel police says Hezbollah smuggling weapons to Arab Israelis
Children Skipping Meals in Majority of Families in Lebanon, UNICEF Says
U.N. Says Generation of Children 'at Stake' in Lebanon Crisis
Lebanon Receives Port Blast Satellite Images from Russia
Report: Aoun, Berri, Miqati Agreed Bitar Issue Must First be Tackled by Judiciary
Berri to Find 'Formula' with Hizbullah over Cabinet Sessions
Rizkallah Reverses Mezher's Decision to Adjoin Bitar, Elia Files
Report: Hochstein to Carry Important Israeli Stance to Lebanon Soon
Reports: Serious Attempt to Resume Cabinet Sessions in Upcoming Days
Lebanese Independence Day Meeting Thaws Tensions between Aoun, Berri
Lebanon's election debacle to come/Michael Young/The National/November 23/2021
Bahraini Writer Abdullah Aljunaid: Hizbullah And Nasrallah, The Sayyed Of Garbage, Have Turned Lebanon Into A Garbage Dump
Lebanon has yet to give IMF figure for financial losses, central bank governor says
Lebanon’s interior minister: Crisis with Gulf could worsen
Hariri’s Exit… his Return to Politics/Nadim Koteich/Asharq Al Awsat/November 23/2021
244,442/Dana Hourany/Now Lebanon/November 23/2021
Hizbullah Waging Campaign Against U.S. And Its Influence In Lebanon: ‘We Know How To Hurt Them And Threaten Their Interests’/ H. Varulkar*/MEMRI/November 23, 2021

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 23-24/2021
Israel Dismantles Hamas Cell Accused of Plotting Attacks
Abbas Condemns Israeli Attack on Jerusalem Governor
Two Palestinians End Hunger Strike after Deal with Israel
Israel, Jordan to Partner in Water-for-Energy Deal
Egypt, Jordan Conduct Joint Military Exercises
Controversy in Jordan’s Parliament over Constitutional Amendments Expanding King’s Powers
Arab Parliament: Sudan Agreement Step towards Stability
Tunisian Parties Denounce US 'Meddling' in Political Affairs
US ‘Cautiously’ Welcomes Sudan Political Agreement
Bus Crash in Bulgaria Kills at Least 45 People
Doctor Warns Iraqi Kurds: Illegal Path to EU Can Be Deadly

Titles For The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 23-24/2021
It’s Time to Get Honest About the Biden Doctrine/Anne-Marie Slaughter/The New York Times/November, 23/2021
It’s too soon to write the obituary of the anti-Iran alliance in the Middle East/Jonathan Spyer/Fathom/November 23/2021
Iran nuclear talks are restarting, but they’re pointless: Biden needs a bipartisan strategy/Anthony Ruggiero/New York Post/November 23, 2021
Hiring An Arsonist As Fireman: Qatar To Serve As America's 'Protecting Power' In Taliban-Ruled Kabul/ Yigal Carmon and Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI/November 23/2021
Tunisia’s President Kais Saied now faces a reality check/Oussama Romdhani/The Arab Weekly/November 23/2021
The length of time Sudan’s military will leave Hamdok in power is anyone’s guess/Rami Rayess/Al Arabiya/November 23/2021

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 23-24/2021
By Al Mighty God’s Will Lebanon Will Reclaim Its Confiscated Independence//لبنان القداسة، بإذن إذن الله سوف يتحرر ويسترد سيادته واستقلاله
Elias Bejjani/November 22/2019
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/104307/elias-bejjani-by-al-mighty-gods-will-the-holy-lebanon-will-reclaim-its-confiscated-independence-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9%d8%8c-%d8%a8%d8%a5%d8%b0/
Psalm 92:12: “The righteous will flourish like a palm tree, they will grow like a cedar of Lebanon”.
Today, the Lebanese back home in beloved Lebanon, as well as those living in Diaspora are all remembering with sadness, anger and frustration their country’s confiscated Independence Day. In reality, Lebanon is currently and since 2005 is totally occupied by Iran’s terrorist armed proxy, the notorious Hezbollah.Although our beloved Lebanon is practically not independent and fully occupied by Hezbollah, but every sovereign, faithful and patriotic Lebanese is hopeful and fully confident that this era of terrorism, evilness, oppression and hardship is ultimately going to end. By God’s will Lebanon’s freedom spring is on the horizon.
Today Free and Patriotic Lebanese call on all the free and democratic countries to help in Liberating the land of the Holy Cedars.
Lebanon, the land of the Holy Cedars, and the 7000 years deeply rooted glory, holiness and history at the present time is sadly an occupied, impoverished, and oppressed country. The ferocious occupier, Hezbollah, is an evil force that portrays and simplifies all that is stone ages concepts.
This terrorist armed militia totally controls and by force confiscates Lebanon’s decision making process on all levels, and in all domains, including the peace and war one.
Meanwhile the majority of the Lebanese officials, as well as the politicians, are mere mercenaries appointed by Hezbollah, and like puppets carry its wishes and orders.
The USA and other democratic countries can help Lebanon, and the Lebanese people in reclaiming back their confiscated independence and stolen country through strong, loud and official practical stances, and not only by rhetorically routing on going statements.
Lebanon can only be helped by the immediate implementation of the three UN resolutions that addresses its crisis: the armistice agreement, 1559, 1701 and 1680
What every country must be aware off is that the Lebanese people, who are taken hostages are unable on their own to liberate their country without a real and clear practical support from the UN and all the democratic countries.
The Lebanese people want a prosperous, democratic, independent, fully sovereign, peaceful Lebanon, reliant (including for security) on effective, transparent government institutions subject to public accountability.
After liberation, and with the right government, officials and politicians in place, and with a solid renewed international support, Lebanon re emergence from dust and ruins should not be impossible to achieve.
Yes, that’s what the majority of Lebanese want and yarn for. But between now and then, there is a blocking force that is hindering and opposing moving Lebanon in that direction.
This evil force, the Hezbollah terrorist occupier is feared by many, and countering it has no local strategies, in official policies. Hezbollah is obstructing prosperity, reform, sovereignty, and protecting all kinds of corruption and corrupters
From our Diaspora, we hail and command the courageous and patriotic Lebanese citizens who bravely call Hezbollah by its actual name, an Iranian terrorist occupation army, no more no less.
May Almighty God bless, safeguard Lebanon and grant its oppressed people the power and will to free their country and reclaim it back from Hezbollah, the Iranian terrorist Occupier.

Israel police says Hezbollah smuggling weapons to Arab Israelis
Tuqa Khalid, Al Arabiya English/24 November ,2021
The Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah is trying to smuggle weapons into Israel to be used by Arab Israelis in future clashes, Israel’s police said on Tuesday. Israel’s police noticed a “significant increase” in attempts to smuggle weapons into the country by Hezbollah through the Lebanese and Jordanian borders since May, The Times of Israel reported. Israeli police added that the quality of smuggled weapons has increased sharply, and the number of attempts has risen, presenting what they describe as a “strategic threat”.
The police said the weapons are meant to reach “crime organizations in the Arab community” with the purpose of being used in “terror attacks” should there be a “surge in violence between Jews and Arabs”.Since the beginning of 2021, Israel’s northern district police have seized 140 pistols and 20 assault rifles, but the officers estimate that many more weapons were successfully smuggled into the country. Israel describes Hezbollah as the biggest threat on its borders. Hezbollah was founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in 1982 to fight Israeli forces that invaded Lebanon that year. The Shia group, classified by the US as a terrorist organization, has since grown in power, armed and financed by Tehran. Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) and the defense ministry’s National Emergency Management Authority launched at the end of October a week-long exercise simulating a full-scale war with Hezbollah.

Children Skipping Meals in Majority of Families in Lebanon, UNICEF Says
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
More than half of families in Lebanon had at least one child who skipped a meal by October 2021 amid a "dramatic deterioration of living conditions", the UN's children's fund said in a report released on Tuesday. Children have been hit hard by the country's deep economic crisis exacerbated by the global coronavirus pandemic which has left about eight in 10 people poor and threatens the education of some 700,000 children including 260,000 Lebanese, the report said. The multifaceted crisis, rooted in decades of corruption and mismanagement, has led to a breakdown in the provision of basic services such as electricity and water, Reuters said. Nearly half of households had insufficient drinking water by October 2021, the report said, with a third of them citing cost as the main factor. "The staggering magnitude of the crisis must be a wake-up call," said Yukie Mokuo, UNICEF representative in Lebanon.
The report noted that less than three in 10 families had received social assistance, leading them to take "desperate measures". The proportion of Lebanese families sending children to work increased sevenfold to seven percent between April and October, the report said. Prime Minister Najib Mikati's government has been slow to implement social safety programs including a $246 million World bank-funded one adopted by parliament in March and a $556 million ration card scheme backed by the legislature in June. "Urgent action is needed to ensure no child goes hungry, becomes sick or has to work instead of receiving an education," Mokuo said.

U.N. Says Generation of Children 'at Stake' in Lebanon Crisis
Agence France Presse/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
The U.N. children's agency Tuesday called on Lebanon to take urgent action to protect children after it documented a spike in child labor rates and food insecurity since April. "Urgent action is needed to ensure no child goes hungry, becomes sick, or has to work rather than receive an education," said Yukie Mokuo, UNICEF representative in Lebanon. "The staggering magnitude of the crisis must be a wake-up call," she said, quoted in a statement. Lebanon is grappling with its worst-ever financial crisis, with nearly 80 percent of the population estimated to be living below the poverty line.
UNICEF in October followed up with the more than 800 families it had surveyed in April and found that since then living conditions had deteriorated dramatically. "The future of an entire generation of children is at stake," it said in its latest report titled "Surviving without the basics".
The survey found 53 percent of families had at least one child who skipped a meal in October 2021, compared with 37 percent in April. "The proportion of families... who sent children to work rose to 12 percent, from nine percent," UNICEF added. It said almost 34 percent of children who required primary health care in October did not receive it, up from 28 percent in April. "Life is very hard; it is becoming harder every day," Hanan, a 29-year-old mother, was quoted as saying by UNICEF. "Today I sent my four children to school without food. "I have suicidal thoughts and the only thing stopping me from doing this is my children. I feel so bad for them." Amal, a 15-year-old who works as a fruit-picker in southern Lebanon, said she had to take up the job to support her family. "Our parents need the money we earn. What would they do if we stopped working now?" UNICEF quoted her as saying. "When I look to the future, I see life getting harder."

Lebanon Receives Port Blast Satellite Images from Russia
Associated Press/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said Monday Lebanon has received from Russia satellite pictures of the Port of Beirut on the day of last year's devastating blast. The imagery would be the first made available by a foreign government to the Lebanese probe marred by legal challenges and political disputes. Bou Habib said he hoped the images would help figure out what happened that tragic day. He is visiting Moscow and was speaking after a meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. "We thanked and highly appreciate receiving satellite images for the blast at Beirut Port on Aug. 4, 2020 and we will hand them over to the Lebanese judiciary, hoping that can help in revealing the truth of this tragedy that has hit Lebanon," Bou Habib said during a press conference. Russia's space agency Roscosmos said it would provide the satellite images after a request from Lebanese President Michel Aoun.
The imagery would be the first received by Lebanon of the day of the blast, a Lebanese judicial official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media. Requests to other countries have not been answered, with some saying their satellites were not directed at Lebanon at the time of the blast. Lavrov said he hoped the images help in the investigation. He said that the images showed the port of Beirut before the blast and also the scene after the blast. "Roscosmos experts said it should help specialists figure out what happened based on the character of destruction," Lavrov said.
"Let's hope that the Lebanese experts, probably with the help of foreign colleagues, will sort out this issue that has become a serious political irritant for Lebanon," he said. "We would like to help resolve it as quickly as possible."Nearly 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate -- a highly explosive material used in fertilizers -- had been improperly stored in the Beirut port for years. On Aug. 4, 2020, the fertilizer ignited, causing a massive blast that killed over 216 people and injured more than 6,000, while destroying parts of the city.
It was described as one of the worst non-nuclear explosions in the world. But more than a year later, it is still unknown what triggered the initial fire that caused the explosion, who was responsible for storing the material in the port, and why it stayed there for so long. The probe investigating the blast has hit many obstacles, including domestic political disputes and legal challenges by defendants, all of them former government officials or current lawmakers. The probe is now suspended until a high court decides in a legal challenge asking to replace the current leading investigator, judge Tarek Bitar. Lebanese officials have either questioned his integrity or refused to cooperate with him. The judicial official said the satellite imagery from Russia would remain sealed and in the possession of the prosecutor general until the court reaches a decision on whether Bitar can resume or is replaced. It is not yet clear when a decision will be reached. Bitar is the second judge to lead the investigation after the first one was removed by a court order following similar accusations leveled against him. Politicians, many who knew of the fertilizers' presence at the port, accuse the judge of bias or of politicizing the probe. Theories abound about what triggered the explosion, including even a possible Israeli strike, although nothing has emerged to back up that theory.

Report: Aoun, Berri, Miqati Agreed Bitar Issue Must First be Tackled by Judiciary

Naharnet/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
President Michel Aoun, Speaker Nabih Berri and PM Najib Miqati agreed in their meeting on Monday on “finding a solution through the judiciary for the issue of Beirut port blast investigative judge Tarek Bitar,” LBCI TV said.
They also agreed that “should the judiciary fail to resolve it, a solution can be found through parliament,” the TV network added. As for the issue of Information Minister George Kordahi’s resignation, LBCI quoted sources as saying that the matter cannot be resolved in Cabinet. “He personally has the ability to take a decision, seeing as the door of sacking is closed while the door of resignation is open for Kordahi himself,” the sources added.

Berri to Find 'Formula' with Hizbullah over Cabinet Sessions
Naharnet/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
The Baabda meeting between President Michel Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Miqati was obviously a positive milestone, but many points remained unresolved, al-Liwaa newspaper said.
An understanding needs to be reached with Hizbullah, the newspaper said, adding that Berri "has showed flexibility" and has promised "to solve Hizbullah’s objections and to work on finding a practical formula."Also "no judicial solution has been found concerning the dismissal of lead investigator in Beirut port blast Judge Tarek Bitar," the newspaper said.Well informed sources told al-Liwaa that the meeting, that broke the ice between Aoun and Berri, indicates that files are being discussed and that a dialogue has started but the date for an upcoming Cabinet session has not been set yet.

Rizkallah Reverses Mezher's Decision to Adjoin Bitar, Elia Files
Naharnet/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Beirut Court of Appeals first chief Judge Habib Rizkallah on Tuesday issued a ruling reversing a decision by Court of Appeals judge Habib Mezher to adjoin the recusal lawsuits against the judges Tarek Bitar and Nassib Elia.
Rizkallah’s ruling separates the two files and returns Bitar’s file to the original committee of Chamber 12 headed by Elia. The request to separate the two files had been filed by the lawyers of the foreign victims of the Beirut port explosion.

Report: Hochstein to Carry Important Israeli Stance to Lebanon Soon

Naharnet/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
U.S. envoy to the Lebanon-Israel sea border demarcation talks Amos Hochstein will return soon to Lebanon to convey an Israeli stance, LBCI TV reported. “It is believed that the envoy has managed to make a certain breakthrough in the Israeli stance,” the TV network quoted sources as saying.
“Israeli and the United States are hurrying to find an agreement before March, the date when the Israelis will begin drilling for oil in the Karish offshore field, and they don’t want to face any threats during the drilling operation,” LBCI quoted observers as saying. The observers added that the Israelis have likely agreed to give Lebanon a complete field in return for having the entirety of the Karish field.

Reports: Serious Attempt to Resume Cabinet Sessions in Upcoming Days

Naharnet/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Prime Minister Najib Miqati will make a serious attempt to resume Cabinet sessions, as soon as he returns from Rome, MP Ali Darwish said. Darwish told Voice of Lebanon, in a radio interview that “Miqati has given all parties some time to see for themselves “the urgent need” for resuming Cabinet sessions. According to Darwish the Baabda meeting between Miqati, President Michel Aoun and Speaker Nabih Berri “is supposed to create a positive atmosphere in the coming days.”Well informed sources have also told al-Joumhouria newspaper that the talks between Aoun, Berri and Miqati were “calm and transparent.”The three leaders agreed on the need to intensify consultations in the coming days and to quickly resolve the “abnormal situation in the country,” the sources said. Media reports described the talks as "positive," and confirmed that "there is an intention to call for a Cabinet session, but the date has not been set yet.”

Lebanese Independence Day Meeting Thaws Tensions between Aoun, Berri
Beirut - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Lebanese President Michel Aoun and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met on Monday on the occasion of the country's Independence Day, marking the first meeting between the rivals since the formation of Najib Mikati's government. The meeting was an opportunity to tackle pending issues, especially the suspension of cabinet sessions. Lebanon has been in political paralysis since Oct. 12, amid a row over the lead investigator of the August 4, 2020’s deadly Beirut port blast disrupted a government meeting. Mikati had said he would not call for another cabinet meeting until a framework for a solution over the matter was reached. On Monday, Aoun, Berri and Mikati attended a military parade at the Defense Ministry marking Independence Day and later met at the Baabda presidential palace. After the meeting, Mikati described the talks as "serious". Ministerial sources said the fact that the meeting was held was enough to "thaw tensions that could in turn lead to some sort of solution." The sources told Asharq Al-Awsat: "Had there not been something significant to discuss, the meeting would not have been held at Baabda."Informed sources said the meeting was "positive". The officials were in agreement that the current situation in the country demands the swift easing of tensions and the need to keep communications open in hopes of reaching a result soon, they told Asharq Al-Awsat. There is a desire to call cabinet to meet soon, but no date for the session has been set yet, they added. They speculated it may convene after Mikati returns from a visit to Rome later this week. A presidency statement said the three officials discussed the general situation and latest developments in the country.

Lebanon's election debacle to come
Michael Young/The National/November 23/2021
The country will hold parliamentary and presidential elections next year, and both votes are a tangled mess
As Lebanon prepares for legislative elections, scheduled for March, an increasing number of Lebanese are beginning to doubt whether they will actually happen. The polls will be held in a particularly tricky year for Lebanon, with two major elections – those for Parliament and the presidency – taking place in 2022.
In an interview published on Friday in the pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al Akhbar, President Michel Aoun announced that “at the end of [his] term, [he] would certainly cede his office, in the Baabda Palace, to a president who will succeed [him]." He said: "I will not leave a vacuum.” The phrase was widely interpreted as
a threat, implying that if parliamentary blocs failed to reach a consensus on a successor (Parliament elects presidents in Lebanon), Mr Aoun would refuse to leave office.
The link between parliamentary and presidential elections will be very tight. Mr Aoun would like to hand his office off to his son in law, Gebran Bassil, but it is evident that Mr Bassil does not enjoy majority support in Parliament. If he were to perform poorly in parliamentary elections, at the head of the Free Patriotic Movement, his chances would sink even further, all the more so as he is currently under American sanctions.
Mr Bassil’s political rivals, and they are many, would be delighted by such an outcome, which is evidently why they agreed to a March election deadline. Their assumption appears to be that the President and his son in law are likely to lose votes in Christian-majority constituencies because of Lebanon’s dire situation; therefore, it is best to give them a shorter timeframe in which to prepare. Mr Aoun, in turn, has said he would not sign the decree for March elections, and would only do so if elections are held in May.
Beyond the complex calculations of the parties, one thing is near-certain: Hezbollah would prefer to postpone elections, as this would mean that the present Parliament, in which it holds a majority with its allies, elects a new president. While the party may be confident that it will retain Shiite support, as will its ally the Amal Movement, it can’t be sure that Mr Aoun and Mr Bassil, their allies, will hold the line from their end.
In other words, holding legislative elections promises considerable uncertainty for Hezbollah. If it loses its majority, the party would find it difficult to bring in a president of its choice, with the possibility that a compromise candidate would have to be found.
There are several problems, however, in delaying elections. First, a two-thirds majority is required to amend the constitution in that direction, and Mr Aoun would have to sign off on the decision.
Extending Parliament’s term would be controversial amid domestic anger and international pressure to hold the vote on time. Moreover, Mr Aoun has said that elections should not be delayed, suggesting he may refuse to sign an extension.
This may be a form of pressure on his part to impose one of two alternatives. Either elections go ahead on time, an outcome that Hezbollah would not welcome. Or, if no elections are held and Parliament’s mandate cannot be extended, there would be no functioning legislature to elect Mr Aoun’s successor, leaving the incumbent in office. This would create a void in the state, but Mr Aoun and Mr Bassil may be calculating that any solution to the problem would require a package deal that brings Mr Bassil to power.
Whichever way one looks at the issue, the ambitions of Mr Aoun and Mr Bassil are creating underlying tensions with Hezbollah and Amal. While it is highly unlikely that Mr Bassil would break with Hezbollah, he seems willing to play on the party’s political liabilities to secure his position as the successor to his father in law.
Hezbollah will also face another problem. If it decides to back a candidate other than Mr Bassil, it will have to pick an alternative who can benefit from Christian legitimacy, or see its ties to the Christians wilt. If Hezbollah were to choose Suleiman Franjieh, a close ally who also has support from the Syrian regime, there is little doubt that both Mr Bassil and the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea would strongly oppose him.
In that case, the parties might have to search for a compromise candidate. The only person who currently stands out is the army commander, Joseph Aoun. Hezbollah would not welcome him, however, because it views the
general as being close to the Americans, and it was the army that took the lead in neutralising Hezbollah and Amal when they entered Christian areas with their weapons on October 14.
According to media reports, Michel Aoun recently brought together Joseph Aoun and Mr Bassil, supposedly to improve their relationship. While this could possibly be to prepare for the compromise candidacy of the army commander, it is far more probable that the President was sending a stark message to Hezbollah: if you don’t back Mr Bassil, then expect us to support Joseph Aoun.At a time of deepening economic crisis, Lebanon appears to be entering an even darker period of discord. The country’s political rivalries will surely mean more debilitating stalemate amid widening national poverty.

Bahraini Writer Abdullah Aljunaid: Hizbullah And Nasrallah, The Sayyed Of Garbage, Have Turned Lebanon Into A Garbage Dump

MEMRI/23 November/2021
Source: Russia Today TV (Russia)
Bahraini writer Abdullah Aljunaid said in a November 20, 2021 interview on Russia Today that Hassan Nasrallah, whom he referred to as the "sayyed of garbage," has turned Lebanon into a garbage dump. He commented that Beirut used to be a "lighthouse of science and culture." He criticized Hizbullah, which he called a "cancerous political party," and he said that it is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Arabs in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. He also questioned how Hizbullah could be considered a resistance movement if it has killed far more Arabs than it has Israelis. For more about Abdullah Aljunaid, see MEMRI TV Clip No. 8740.
Journalist: "Your colleague says that the only problem that the Gulf countries have with Hizbullah is that it is a resistance party that did what the Gulf regimes had failed to do."
Abdullah Aljunaid: "What did the Gulf countries fail to do? Turn Beirut into a garbage dump? Beirut, which used to be a lighthouse of science and culture, was turned into ruins by Hassan Nasrallah. Is this considered an achievement?
"How has this cancerous political party managed to distort everything Lebanese?
"As for the resistance you are talking about – does training terrorists and sending them to kill our children in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in Iraq, and in Syria constitute resistance? How many Israelis has Hizbullah killed, compared to the hundreds of thousands of Arabs [it has killed] from Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia?
"If you want to talk about resistance, go back to your sayyed of garbage, who has turned Lebanon in its entirety into a garbage dump."

Lebanon has yet to give IMF figure for financial losses, central bank governor says
Reuters/23 November ,2021
Lebanon has yet to give the IMF its estimate of losses in the financial system as discussions on the issue continue, but is working hard to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Fund by year-end, governor Riad Salameh told Reuters on Tuesday.
Disagreements in Lebanon over the size of the losses and how they should be distributed torpedoed IMF talks last year. The central bank, banks and political elite rejected figures set out in a government plan that was endorsed by the IMF at the time. The issue has obstructed attempts to chart a way out of the crisis that has devastated Lebanon since 2019, sinking the currency by more than 90 percent, causing poverty to skyrocket and leading many Lebanese to emigrate. Speaking in an interview for the upcoming Reuters Next conference, Salameh also said the bank had $14 billion of available liquidity in its reserves, and reiterated denials of wrongdoing as judicial authorities in France and Switzerland investigate money laundering allegations against him. Salameh said an IMF program was essential for Lebanon to exit the crisis, noting the external financing it would unlock and discipline that would impose reforms. Therefore the central bank would accept the figures for the losses as decided by the government, he said. “We are, at this stage, still in the process of gathering the data that is requested by the IMF and the issue of the losses - the number of these losses - are not going to be a hurdle for these negotiations, at least from the side of the central bank,” he said. Asked whether there was agreement yet on who will bear the burden of the losses - such as depositors, bank shareholders, the government and the central bank itself - Salameh said no decision had been taken “because we don't have yet the final figures that are agreed with the IMF for the total losses”. Last year, several sources said Salameh dug in his heels over the losses which the previous government's plan suggested were in the $90 billion range. Ruling parties and commercial banks also objected to the figures, saying they were too big. Asked when the figure would be ready, Salameh said Prime Minister Najib Mikati had set a deadline for signing the IMF memorandum of understanding by the end of 2021, which the government and central bank were working “very hard to achieve”.
Funding needs
Salameh became Banque du Liban (BDL) governor in 1993 and managed a pegged exchange rate that underpinned the import-dependent economy from 1997 until the meltdown. As Lebanon's currency sunk, the reserves were depleted as BDL provided dollars at heavily subsidized exchange rates to finance imports including fuel, food and medicine. Salameh noted that this policy had now been largely phased out - the only imports for which dollars are being provided at subsidized rates today are medicines for some chronic illnesses and wheat, while BDL sells dollars for gasoline imports at a small discount to the market exchange rate. “Our expectation is that if we stay on this model, for the next 12 months ... the BDL will have to fund $2.5 billion,” he said. BDL might recoup $300-$500 million from its foreign exchange platform, Sayrafa, in that timeframe, he said.
The reserves were recently boosted by the sale of over $1 billion of IMF Special Drawing Rights. Salameh is being investigated by authorities in four European countries, including the Swiss inquiry over alleged “aggravated money laundering” at BDL involving $300 million in gains by a company owned by his brother, Raja Salameh. Last week, he said he had ordered an audit of transactions and investments that had been the focus of media reports and this had shown no public funds were used to pay fees and commissions to the company owned by his brother. Raja Salameh has not publicly commented on the accusation. Salameh gave the prime minister a copy of the audit last week but declined to provide Reuters with one. “In this report, it is clear that there was no embezzlement or money laundering on my side or under my guidance at the central bank,” he said.

Lebanon’s interior minister: Crisis with Gulf could worsen
The Associated Press/November 23/2021
Lebanon’s interior minister said Tuesday that every delay in resolving the diplomatic crisis with Gulf nations threatens to affect the lives of more Lebanese already reeling from a massive economic crisis. Bassam Mawlawi said resolving the crisis begins with the resignation of the Cabinet minister whose comments sparked the ire of Saudi Arabia, calling it long overdue. Saudi Arabia, a traditional ally of Lebanon, withdrew its ambassador and asked the Lebanese envoy to leave last month following televised comments by George Kordahi, Lebanon’s information minister. Kordahi said the war in Yemen was futile and called it an aggression by the Arab Coalition. Yemen’s war began with the 2014 takeover of Sanaa by the Houthi rebels, who control much of the country’s north. The Arab Coalition entered the war the following year determined to restore the internationally recognized government and oust the rebels.
Kordahi recorded the comments weeks before he was named minister and has refused to apologize or step down despite appeals from many, including the prime minister. Lebanese officials have said his remarks do not represent official government views. “This is taking a long time. It should not take more than a month to be resolved,” Mawlawi told The Associated Press. “He should have resigned before. He should have resigned immediately. ... Every delay causes more grave damage to the Lebanese, whether those in Lebanon or in the Gulf.”Bahrain, The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait followed Saudi Arabia and also recalled their ambassadors. The Saudis have also banned Lebanese imports, affecting hundreds of businesses and cutting off hundreds of millions in foreign currency to Lebanon, which is already facing a major economic meltdown.
Mawlawi warned the Saudi import ban could be expanded to curtail all trade with the Gulf nations, which could also undermine the employment or residency of Lebanese living in the oil-rich nations. The livelihoods of over 350,000 Lebanese living in the Gulf nations are at risk.
“We should not wait until the noose is tightened around all the Lebanese people’s necks so that we take measures that we could have taken earlier and that could have been easier,” he said. “I think the delay makes the crisis more complicated.”Mawlawi said Kordahi is not resigning because he needs the approval of his political backers, including the powerful Iran-backed Hezbollah, which has criticized the Saudi pressure. The standoff has paralyzed the government, which has been unable to convene for weeks.
Prime Minister Najib Mikati can’t dismiss Kordahi without the approval of two-thirds of the Cabinet. Mawlawi called on Mikati to do so if he can secure the votes. “The government must take initiative. I don’t think the government should wait for any initiative or steps from the Gulf countries,” he said.
Mawlawi acknowledged the crisis with Gulf nations precedes Kordahi’s comments. Saudi Arabia took the first punitive measures against Lebanon last spring after it announced it had seized over 5 million pills of the amphetamine drug Captagon hidden in a shipment of pomegranates coming from Lebanon. Then, it banned the import or transit of Lebanese produce through its territories. Two suspected smugglers were arrested in May. Mawlawi said he has already ordered tighter security measures at border crossings to prevent smuggling and said an investigation into the smuggling ring continues. “Lebanon continues to cooperate (with Saudi Arabia on the probe) but we have not reached the results we expect,” he said. “We must reach a conclusion in cooperation with the Saudi authorities to figure out what all the details of the issue that threaten the security of Saudi Arabia and Arab communities.”

Hariri’s Exit… his Return to Politics
Nadim Koteich/Asharq Al Awsat/November 23/2021
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/104364/104364/
Will the former prime minister and leader of Al Mustaqbal Movement, Saad Hariri, abandon the political life?
This question has preoccupied Lebanese politicians and the media for weeks, as such news, if confirmed, will be the most major political transformation in the history of the Second Republic, which was named after the Saudi city of Taef.
Despite all the crises that afflicted Hariri as a person, and the Hariri current as a political proposal that drew part of Lebanon’s contemporary history, the name remains among the main political equations, as many calculations are built in light of its continuity or end.
Some people believe that Hariri is maneuvering to kill two birds with one stone. It is not a matter of conspiracy theory: First, to lure financial prospects to fund his electoral battle, and second, to take advantage of the concern about his alleged intention to retire, in order to convey messages about his centrality in the life of Lebanon and the Lebanese.
However, what I think is closer to reality is that Hariri is in the process of retiring, and perhaps totally abandoning the political life. He has many compelling reasons for this.
I will put aside some of the “babble of the foolish”, who will see in the following lines a “malicious urge” for Hariri to retire – a step that I know he studies carefully, and that he is closer than many imagine to the moment of his decision.
On a personal level, the prices paid by Rafik Hariri’s son are unconceivable. The man was not always the victim which his fans liked to portray, but it is certain that in many cases, he was indeed the prey.
He was a victim of the injustice of politics in Lebanon, and the cruelty of the structure that does not resemble him, although he acquired towards the end of his experience, especially after the presidential settlement, some of its features, either directly or through an intermediary.
In any case, the Hariri current was surrounded by a multi-layered tragedy that began with the assassination of the founder, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and ended with the collapse of the financial empire inherited by Saad Hariri, and the subsequent downfall of the image and the international, regional, national and Sunni political “brand”. The father was a legendary rise story.
He can rest and take a distance from things, individuals, files and issues, looking for ways to reproduce himself in a personal and private sense, before the general, political and national meanings.
He can rest and give himself a chance, and provide the country the choice to find a way of life outside the glow of the legend of Rafik Hariri - the greatest political experience in Lebanon’s contemporary history.
It is unfair for Hariri to remain captive to those longing for Rafik Hariri’s return, or for the country to remain hostage to the son’s pursuit of his father’s resurrection.
Rafik Hariri has been much honored for having ruled Lebanon as a martyr longer than he governed the country as a prime minister.
As for the broader political meanings, Hariri’s reluctance to run in the elections and perhaps withdrawal from the political life is a long-delayed option, after the man was pushed into compromises that squandered much of his political balance and his national, regional and international immunity.
The settlements did not stop at the process of forming governments and managing the Council of Ministers, as well as the deadly improvisation game of renewing the blood of Al Mustaqbal Movement, or dispatching Aoun to the presidency of the Republic. Rather, they went up to “reaching a settlement” on the outcome of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which looked into Hariri’s assassination, without achieving any national gain that would compensate for a grain of the losses that resulted from the assassination.
To be fair, the changes that affected the strategic environment embracing Hariri and his current should not be overlooked, since the beginning of the lifting of the siege on Bashar al-Assad in France in 2007, to the deterioration of Hariri’s relationship with Riyadh, passing through the episodes of the Syrian hell, the exorbitant results of which constituted the greatest political shocks for Hariri and placed him under the fear that Lebanon’s Sunni community would face the fate of Syria’s Sunnis.
In the political sense as well, Hariri’s reluctance to run in the elections and perhaps his decision to withdraw from the political life would constitute a necessary condemnation of the illusion of Lebanese democracy, which is hijacked by the force of Hezbollah’s weapons.
What’s the point of running in the elections? The political coalition led by Hariri has won the elections twice since 2005; nonetheless, the man was prevented from ruling through a government that allows him and the Lebanese to test his political and economic plan.
When the Hezbollah alliance took over, and Qassem Soleimani said on that day that there was a government of resistance in Lebanon, Hariri was brought in to be the permanent scapegoat and the appropriate cover for the ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ republic.
I am reminded here that the main difference between Saad Hariri’s governments and the cabinets of his father, which were also not completely his own, is that Rafik Hariri was hinging on appropriate regional balances, especially during the first five years during which Lebanese politics was governed by a settlement between Damascus and Riyadh, until the death of Hafez al-Assad.
In this sense, Hariri’s exit or suspension of his participation in political life could trigger the fiercest protest against the reality of the militia’s occupation of the political and national decision in the country, and pave way for the birth of a pressing political moment to amend the rules of political partnership and contribute to its liberation from Iranian hegemony. Saad Hariri would be right to announce his political exit, but he should do so in a well-calculated and organized political manner, not with intimidation, anger or frustration. In this sense, by not participating in politics, he will have the opportunity to be more efficient than his presence as a lion in Hezbollah’s cage.

244,442
Dana Hourany/Now Lebanon/November 23/2021
As the registration window for Lebanese expats ended on November 20 with a record number, Lebanese living abroad say the communities remain politically divided and many feel still unsure about how organized the opposition is.
Ralph Hraoui, 26, splits his time between his postgraduate studies in Paris and volunteering with uniteddiasporalb, a social media-based global Lebanese expat network that aims at raising awareness about the electoral process in Lebanon. He left the country in 2020 to pursue his master’s degree in Business Strategy and International Development. His ultimate goal was to find a job and settle in France.But on Saturday, November 20, he spent his day online helping Lebanese based in Latin America register to vote online for the parliamentary elections before the midnight deadline.
“The [Lebanese] ambassadors of these countries didn’t do their jobs right and did not inform people about the elections. So all of them rushed to register today, before it’s too late and I’ve been busy all day trying to help them by first convincing them to register and then instructing them on how to do so,” he told NOW. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry said on Sunday that the final expat voter count reached 244,442, more than double the number of expats who registered in 2018, 93,000. Half of the expats registered the last week of the registration window, following widespread social media campaigns by various organizations and new political parties that are counting on votes of the Lebanese living abroad to garner enough support and enter the parliament.
However, analysts and Lebanese expats say that although the number of registered expat voters is largely seen as a step forward, the non-sectarian portion remains unknown. Moreover, though many expats welcomed the help and the reminders received online, others felt chased and also thought the political messages put too much pressure on a diaspora that is as politically fragmented as the society at home. “I feel like this campaign has put the Lebanese under two umbrellas, the good Lebanese – the ones living abroad who will initiate the change during the elections and the bad Lebanese – the hopeless residents that are a lost cause. This is the sentiment that’s coming across and it’s simply not true,” Joseph El Khoury, psychiatrist based between Lebanon and Dubai and social media influencer, told NOW.
The savior illusion
He said that the image of the relaxed, happy, worry-free diaspora that was detached from its homeland and did not really want to get involved politically that circulated in various media outlets was an illusion.
For El Khoury the campaigns worked through the employment of guilt tactics to push people to register before the deadline. But this deepened the divide between the two groups – the diaspora and the Lebanese still residing in the country. The former constantly felt responsible for the latter which, in turn, felt passive and constantly dependent. Psychologically speaking it would have been more productive to address the diaspora under the slogan of joining forces with the residents so that we could undergo the battle together, not separately. “Psychologically speaking it would have been more productive to address the diaspora under the slogan of joining forces with the residents so that we could undergo the battle together, not separately,” he pointed out. Most Lebanese expats did not become worry-free as soon as they left the country, and have never been disconnected and uninterested either, El Khoury said. They think of taxes, financial decisions related to their families back home, and deal with the emotional distress that follows emigration.
“[Some Lebanese back home] think that expats are not concerned with their country’s problems, but they are. They share the same mindset as the ones still in Lebanon, they have families to take care of and money to worry about so they could easily vote for the same people their resident counterparts would vote for,” he said.
Divided
The psychiatrist also explained that the act of changing countries does not guarantee that one is no longer a supporter of a sectarian party.
El Khoury explained that many expats who emigrated during the Lebanese civil war still support the establishment parties, and their children, who did not grow up in Lebanon, may also carry inherited sectarian ideologies. Many of them still live in isolated sectarian communities in the countries they emigrated to, he added. Yara Lakkis, 25, a Lebanese political science bachelor’s student in Germany agreed that the Lebanese in the diaspora reflect the Lebanese society as a whole: they are as fragmented in terms of political affiliation and support abroad as they are at home.
“My friends and I would have conversations with people who claim to be pro-change, but they can easily switch to defending their [sectarian] parties and start making excuses for them as if they still saw hope in them,” Lakkis stated.
For this reason, Lakkis said she felt demotivated to vote. But she said she will for the sake of the experience. She considered the media campaigns to mobilize the diaspora “poetic” and didn’t believe the political class would allow for any change to take place.
It’s funny how most of the responsibility falls on our backs when a large number of us have left to find work and get some fresh dollars. We didn’t leave to fight for change. If change was to happen, it would have happened from inside the country.
“It’s funny how most of the responsibility falls on our backs when a large number of us have left to find work and get some fresh dollars. We didn’t leave to fight for change. If change was to happen, it would have happened from inside the country,” Lakkis explained.
Joseph, 40, who wanted his last name and location to remain anonymous, told NOW that he did not register to vote abroad in 2022, although he’s been working and residing in a European country for 7 years. The reason, he explained, was that he registered in 2018 and he voted in the embassy in his country of residence only to find out that his vote was cancelled.
“I voted for the independent list,” he said. “The sectarian parties were present with observers and electoral materials at the poll station. I found out later from a fellow expat that my vote had been cancelled. He knew it was mine because I was the only one from my home region who had voted. And I know for sure there was no reason to cancel it,” he explained.
He also says that it felt pointless to complain and that in 2022 he would be voting in his hometown in Lebanon where he feels the opposition can have more control and better means to observe the voting process.
The unknowns
Unity, campaigns, profiles of candidates, and political programs are seen as vital elements that the diaspora needed in order to make up its mind concerning the elections. However, with new political parties still waiting for legal registration from a reluctant government controlled by establishment parties, and with an ongoing quarrel between the Presidency and the parliament over the actual date of the legislative poll, none of these are yet known and a large number of voters, including expats, still feel confused, Lakkis explained.
That, she said, sows the seeds of doubt over the capabilities of the opposition parties that mobilized after October 17.
“I don’t see any campaigns or candidates. Are they just going to appear one month before the elections? There are also rumours about the elections not taking place so it’s all very vague,” she explained.
El Khoury agreed over the lack of proper campaigning.
“They can’t just introduce themselves three months before the elections and start talking to people,” he said. “This groundwork should have been done before, where they made sure to spread their ideas. A lot of groups also emerged out of the 2019 revolution that lack seriousness. At least half of them should merge,” he explained. Slogans that incited anger and appealed to emotions could not be translated into governance.
Hraoui, the Paris-based volunteer, says his contribution was passion-driven and that, despite all the unknowns, he still believes the opposition can score some wins in 2022. “I’ve been active since the [October 17] revolution and I see what’s going on inside this opposition from groups from discussions and political visions so I believe in change,” he explained.
He did, however, point out that the opposition’s pace in establishing itself was still slow. They should have been more widely known by now and have introduced themselves in more areas across the country, he pointed out.
The plan was to convince people to at least register so that they could have the option to decide later on whether to vote or not, once the candidates were announced. There should be a degree of transparency about what can be realistically achieved so that if the results were disappointing, the ones who were very hopeful will feel as if they’ve lost everything.
As far as Lakkis is concerned, Lebanese voters need to establish a new relationship with their state so that they could all become citizens and not eighteen sects. “Usually the citizen would be a partner in the country’s decision making but in Lebanon, we were never taught how to do so. This was due to the sectarian state that manipulates the people and strengthens the traditional parties,” she explained.
She also feels that many of the lebanese eligible to vote among her expat friends are still set to support old sectarian political parties.
“I know people who will vote for Lebanese Forces just because they’re anti-Hezbollah,” Lakkis stated.
El Khoury said that the main force of change would be the recent diaspora, the Lebanese who left after the 2019 economic collapse. The reason, he said, was that they were more connected to the country’s reality and also wanted to come back once circumstances improved, which made them more involved politically. “These people want to see a concrete plan that will put Lebanon back on track in 2-3 years so we need trustworthy leadership that will start implementing the seeds of change and not just push us to vote for the sake of voting,” he said.
El Khoury warned against the opposition overusing emotional messages to rally voters. Disappointment in the eventuality of not delivering may be more damaging than anything else, he stressed.
“There should be a degree of transparency about what can be realistically achieved so that if the results were disappointing, the ones who were very hopeful will feel as if they’ve lost everything,” he said.
But for Hraoui and many of the recent youth diaspora, hope was everything. He called his decision to move to France “forced exile” and he explained that political activism was his way to still be connected to his homeland.
“The ones who dislike Lebanon and are happy they left are a minority, we [the involved ones] are the majority. We are 80 percent versus 20 percent. So don’t underestimate us, we are capable of change,” Hraoui said.
*Dana Hourany is a multimedia journalist with @NOW_leb. She is on Instagram @danahourany and on Twitter @DanaHourany.

أتش. فارولكار/موقع ممري: حزب الله يشن حملة ضد الولايات المتحدة ونفوذها في لبنان: ويقول بأنه يعرف كيف يؤذيهم ويهدد مصالحهم
Hizbullah Waging Campaign Against U.S. And Its Influence In Lebanon: ‘We Know How To Hurt Them And Threaten Their Interests’
By H. Varulkar*/MEMRI/November 23, 2021
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/104357/h-varulkar-memri-hizbullah-waging-campaign-against-u-s-and-its-influence-in-lebanon-we-know-how-to-hurt-them-and-threaten-their-interests-%d8%a3%d8%aa%d8%b4-%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%88%d9%84/

In the past months, while exacerbating the economic crisis in Lebanon, Hizbullah has been conducting a campaign against the U.S. in the country, blaming it for all of Lebanon’s troubles, including the dire economic situation and the fuel and electricity shortages, and even the rampant corruption. Hizbullah has also been accusing the U.S. of interfering in Lebanon’s judiciary system, especially in the investigation of the August 2020 Beirut Port blast, and of meddling in Lebanon’s politics by employing local agents and funding civil society organizations that promote its agenda. In fact, the organization has for months been constructing a discourse of incitement against the U.S., making more and more accusations against it. Hizbullah leaders, from secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah to minor officials, have been repeating these messages at every meeting, gathering and public event. Media outlets affiliated with the organization, such as the Al-Ahed website and the daily Al-Akhbar, have been reiterating these messages as well.
Hizbullah’s primary accusation against the U.S. is that it is waging an economic war against Lebanon and its people with the aim of humiliating and subjugating them. According to Nasrallah, “the Americans are starving [the Lebanese people] so that they give up their honor, sovereignty, and national rights…” This economic war against Lebanon, say Hizbullah officials, includes the U.S. sanctions on the Lebanese banking sector and Lebanese politicians; the Caesar Act, which prohibits trade and transactions with the Syrian regime and thereby harms Lebanon’s economy as well; a ban on various countries transferring financial and other aid to Lebanon, and threats aimed at deterring Lebanese leaders from receiving aid from the Eastern countries, especially Russia, China and Iran. Hizbullah officials accuse the U.S. of bringing Lebanon to a state of bankruptcy, with 80% of its citizens living in poverty, and of fostering corruption among Lebanese politicians.
As noted, Hizbullah also accuses the U.S. of interfering with Lebanon’s judiciary, and especially of trying to subvert and distort the probe into the August 2020 Beirut Port blast, so as to place the blame on Hizbullah. In the recent months, as Tarek Bitar, the judge presiding over the investigation, sought to question officials close to Hizbullah and to its political allies, the organization began accusing him of bias and of politicizing the investigation, and appealed to the government, the president and the judiciary, demanding his dismissal. Hizbullah officials claim that the U.S., seeking to settle scores with the organization, is intervening in the probe in an attempt to impose dictates and lay the blame on Hizbullah and its allies.
On October 14, Hizbullah and its ally, the Amal Movement, organized a protest in Beirut’s Al-Tayouneh neighborhood to demand Bitar’s dismissal. The protest developed into violent clashes between Hizbullah and Amal members on the one side and members of the Lebanese Forces, the Christian party headed by Samir Geagea, known for its opposition to Hizbullah, on the other. The clashes, which included exchanges of gunfire, led to the death of seven people, six of them members of Amal. Hizbullah was quick to blame the U.S. for the bloodshed, claiming that it was behind the events. According to Hizbullah officials, the U.S. incited the members of Geagea’s party, who are agents of America and promote its agenda, to start the clashes, and this was only “one of a series of events cause by the U.S.” in Lebanon, aimed at destroying Hizbullah, even at the cost of civil war, bloodshed and the destruction of the Lebanese state.
In addition, Hizbullah accuses the U.S. of interfering in Lebanese politics, especially ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections, to be held in less than a year. It claims that the U.S. funds not only Geagea’s party but also various civil society organizations, intending them to participate in the elections, change the political balance in the country and confront Hizbullah. The organization describes the U.S. embassy in Beirut as the hub of America’s subversive activity in the country and of its efforts to “plot against the Lebanese people,” as Nasrallah put it. Accusations are also frequently directed at U.S. Ambassador Dorothy Shea.
The anti-U.S. incitement has recently escalated, shifting from accusations to actual threats. Several Hizbullah and pro-Hizbullah officials threatened that the organization would launch a campaign to eliminate the U.S. influence in Lebanon, and clarified that Hizbullah knows how to hurt the U.S. and harm its interests.
This report reviews Hizbullah’s incitement against the U.S. in recent months and the threats by its officials to eliminate the U.S. influence in Lebanon and harm its interests.
Hassan Nasrallah: The U.S. Is Starving The Lebanese; Its Ambassador Is Plotting Against Them, Seeking To Start A Civil War
As stated, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah has played a central role in spreading incitement against the U.S. by reiterating the messages in many of his speeches in the past months. In an August 17, 2021 speech, he said that the U.S. is conducting “an economic war to subjugate the Lebanese people and the resistance,” and “wants Lebanon to be submissive and humiliated” because it is part of the axis that has often defeated the U.S. He said: “What is happening today is a real economic and financial war… that was planned [by the U.S.] in advance in order to bring the [Lebanese] people and state to collapse… The Americans are starving [the Lebanese people] so that they give up their honor, sovereignty, and national rights…” He added that America’s economic war against Lebanon started shortly before 2019, when the U.S. began funding NGOs in Lebanon that are directly linked to its embassy in Beirut and are funded by it.[1]
In another speech two days later, Nasrallah repeated these messages, accusing the U.S. of “conducting an economic war against Lebanon in the service of Israel,” and added that “the U.S. embassy in Beirut, [which] is conducting [this] economic and information war against Lebanon and inciting against it,” is not a diplomatic representation but “an embassy for plotting against the Lebanese people.” However, it will fail in these attempts, as it failed in the past, he said.[2] In remarks delivered on August 23, he said that the U.S. was “interfering in everything, even in the issues of the petrol, fuel and medicines, and in municipal affairs,” and added: “The U.S. embassy wants Lebanon to be in a state of chaos, and wants harm to come to the Lebanese society and to the Lebanese [citizen], his honor and his family,” so that not only Hizbullah but also the Lebanese state and society will collapse. He also said that the U.S. was preventing other countries from extending economic aid to Lebanon.[3]
In a speech on August 27, Nasrallah claimed that the U.S. has been besieging Lebanon for some two years. It “forced [various] countries to withdraw their deposits from the [Lebanese] central bank,” and threatened them with sanctions in order to keep them from investing in Lebanon and from extending it aid, grants or loans. The U.S. is also threatening Lebanese officials, he said, and telling them: “If you accept investments by China, Russia or [any other] Eastern [country], we will slap you with sanctions… Is this not a siege?” He stated that the Caesar Act, which imposes sanctions on Syria, is also part of the siege on Lebanon, because it “gravely harms the Lebanese economy” by keeping Lebanon and Lebanese companies from investing in Syria and helping to rebuild it, which would have revitalized the Lebanese economy. Nasrallah blamed the U.S. for Lebanon’s severe energy crisis as well, claiming that in the past years it has kept Lebanon from importing gas from Egypt and electricity from Jordan.[4]
In an October 22 speech addressing the issue of Lebanon’s growing electricity crisis, Nasrallah stated that the U.S. blocks the Lebanese government from receiving aid from other countries that could have helped it to resolve this crisis. Addressing the Lebanese government, he said: “There are many offers [of assistance] from various countries around the world, both Eastern and Western. You do not want [to receive aid] from the East? Fine, so [obtain it from] the West. Unless there is an American veto [preventing this]. If the Americans keep you [from getting aid], tell the Lebanese people sincerely: We are afraid and cannot bring European companies [to Lebanon] because the Americans will be angry at us, and they prevent us from doing so…”
Referring to an offer by the Iranian foreign minister to build two power plants in Lebanon at Iran’s expense, he wondered: “Have [the Lebanese officials] given him and answer?… We regard the U.S. as an enemy… but you regard it as a comrade, ally and close friend. So ask this friend and comrade of yours – whom you trust so much, considering it [a champion of] humaneness, [good] values and human rights – for an exemption [from the sanctions on Iran, which prevent economic cooperation with it]. Iraq received such an exemption, and so did Afghanistan under the previous government… and other countries in the region. [So] you should request one too.” [5]
As for Hizbullah’s allegations against the Beirut blast probe, already in his August 27 speech Nasrallah called the investigation political and arbitrary.[6] In his October 11 speech, he harshly attacked Judge Tarek Bitar, who is leading the investigation, accusing him of targeting particular political elements: “This judge is behaving like a politician,” he claimed. “He is using the blood of the those martyred and injured [in the blast], and the catastrophe and tragedy, to promote political goals.”[7] In an October 19 speech, he warned that there is an attempt to harm Hizbullah’s political and media standing, and to direct accusations at its “allies and friends,” adding that Bitar has been intimidated by the U.S. into serving its agenda. “Since the day of the incident [i.e., the explosion],” he said, “people have faced intimidation and threats of imprisonment,” and there are pressures “by the U.S., France and the West.” He said that some people are trying to blame Hizbullah for the explosion because “that is what the U.S., Israel and [various] Western and regional forces want,” and added: “When anyone asks to replace the judge, [the U.S.] sees this as a threat. But at the same time it itself threatens to stop the aid to Lebanon if the judge is replaced. French elements unknown to me are telling Lebanese officials that this judge must not be touched [i.e., dismissed], and religious and political authorities in [Lebanon] are defending him. This judge will end up becoming a dictator…”, said Nasrallah. [8]
Nasrallah also alleged that the U.S. funds Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces party, so it will further America’s plans, even at the cost of precipitating a civil war in Lebanon. Referring to the October 14 deadly clashes in Al-Tayouneh, he claimed that the Lebanese Forces party and its head, who “serve foreign countries that have plans and interests in Lebanon,” are responsible for the violence and deaths. “They have no problem [deliberately] causing events, even if they develop into deadly clashes with martyrs and victims on both sides, because this serves their goal,” he said, and added: “[They don’t care] even if the result is a broad military confrontation or a war … The real plan of the Lebanese Forces is [to start] a civil war” in the service of the U.S., Israel and other elements.[9]
Hizbullah Official: U.S. Responsible For Economic Crisis, Interferes In Lebanon With Help Of Its Agents
The vitriol against the U.S. in the recent months has come not only from Nasrallah himself but also from other officials in Hizbullah and circles close to it. They blamed the severe economic crisis in Lebanon on the U.S., saying that its sanctions on Hizbullah, on Lebanese officials close to it, and on Syria are aimed at delivering a death blow to the Lebanese economy in order to weaken the country and subjugate it.
Nasrallah’s deputy Na’im Qassem said in an October 9, 2021 speech in the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s stronghold in Beirut: “Two [reasons] – the U.S. interference [in Lebanon], and the corruption of the ruling elite – are responsible for the deterioration of the economic and social situation [in the country]… America’s role in paralyzing Lebanon’s economy has been clearly proven, and is no longer hidden from anyone. [The Americans] are the ones who imposed sanctions, sabotaged the banking system and prevented it from holding contacts with many countries despite our difficult circumstances. [The Americans] passed the Caesar Act against Syria and prevented it from maintaining economic ties and cooperation with its neighbor Lebanon… They brought the country to a state where 80% of society lives under the poverty line…”[10]
Hizbullah Political Council member Mahmoud Qamati blamed the U.S. for hunger in Lebanon. In a September 18 speech, he said: “The equation they tried to plant in the minds of the Lebanese people, that the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah] and its weapons are the reason for your hunger, pain and shortages, has collapsed… The resistance has proved that the one depriving the Lebanese people of water, medicines and fuel, and the one keeping them hungry and thirsty, is the U.S. itself, and its policy in the region.”[11]
Shi’ite mufti Ahmad Qabalan, who is close to Hizbullah, said in his October 1 Friday sermon: “It is not true that Lebanon is an Iranian protectorate. On the contrary, throughout [its] history, Lebanon has been an American protectorate, exposed to corruption, theft and bankruptcy thanks to its American sponsor and its allies, who are known to all…” Calling on the Lebanese government to accept the aid proffered by Iran and China, and not to believe the U.S., he added: “Lebanon is exhausted and is in need of oil, offers [of aid] that will rescue it, infrastructure, power plants and railways. The Iranians and Chinese are generously offering to provide all this, and the government must consider their proposal seriously, for the national need is great. If Washington really cares about Lebanon it should do something [to help it]. Time will reveal the extent of its sincerity…”[12]
U.S. Trying To Subvert Investigation Of Beirut Port Blast, Place Blame On Hizbullah
Many Hizbullah officials claimed that the U.S. was interfering in every Lebanese affair, especially in the probe into the explosion in the Port of Beirut, in a bid to frame Hizbullah for the catastrophe and crush it politically. Hizbullah officials were particularly incensed by a statement issued October 1, 2021 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which expressed esteem for Judge Bitar and alarm about Hizbullah’s reported role in delaying the investigation of the explosion, and urged the Lebanese government to “ensure that judges and other investigators can safely carry out their duties.” U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price likewise voiced opposition to Hizbullah’s threats against the judiciary. [13]
A report aired on Hizbullah’s Al-Manar TV claimed that U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea was intervening in every aspect of Lebanese politics, including in the issue of Judge Bitar’s reliability and professionalism, and that it was she who had requested the Foreign Relations Committee to issue the abovementioned statement.[14] Hizbullah MP Hassan Fadlallah called this statement “a flagrant blow to Lebanon’s sovereignty and open interference in the investigations [of the Beirut Port blast] in a bid to dictate judicial decisions… The stated U.S. position on the unfolding of the investigations and on the role of Judge [Bitar] proves that there is direct American interference in this issue, in an attempt to use it to settle scores inside Lebanon, after the wars and the siege have failed to defeat [Lebanon]…”[15]
Another Hizbullah MP, Ibrahim Al-Moussawi, condemned “the U.S.’s blatant [undermining] of the Lebanese judiciary,” adding: “The U.S. administration follows a rationale of dictates. The blunt American intervention in Lebanon has reached a climax and is evident on several levels, [yet] some [Lebanese elements] keep silent in the face of [these] American violations.”[16] Hizbullah MP Hassan ‘Izz Al-Din objected to “any attempt to falsify [the outcomes of the investigation], to politicize justice or to shift the blame from one side to another… The Americans still think that the explosion in the Port [of Beirut] is a tool they can… use against their rivals in [Lebanon’s] upcoming [parliamentary] elections, so as to change the balance in parliament in favor of so-called civil society [organizations], associations and the like who are [actually] their allies and supporters.”[17]
Muhammad Raed, head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, condemned the U.S. expressions of support for Bitar, saying: “When we want to replace the judge investigating [the Beirut Port blast], they [call it] terror, but when U.S. Ambassador [Shea] threatened that he must not be touched, that’s not terror but advice… We reject these double standards…”[18]
An article by Fatima Salameh on Hizbullah’s Al-Ahed website likewise accused the U.S. of interfering in Lebanon’s judiciary in an attempt to subvert the investigation. She wrote: “Washington is bringing all its weight to bear on the Lebanese judiciary in an attempt to achieve what it hasn’t managed to achieve by other [means]. It is using the issue of the Beirut Port explosion to achieve known goals as part of its main plan to sow destruction in Lebanon… Washington does not support Bitar as a [private] individual. It supports his judiciary style, which is based on selectiveness and double standard. It prefers to repeat the scenario of 2005[19] by falsifying charges and testimony, so as to implement the political plans it has been dreaming of implementing for many years.[20]
U.S. Employs Agents In Lebanon, Is Responsible For The Bloodshed In Al-Tayouneh
In the wake of the October 14, 2021 deadly clashes in Al-Tayouneh during a protest by Hizbullah and Amal against Judge Bitar, in which seven protesters were killed, Hizbullah blamed the U.S. for the bloodshed. It accused the U.S. of inciting the Lebanese in order to start a civil war, and of using members of Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces party as its agents and as a “Trojan horse” in the country.
Shi’ite mufti Ahmad Qabalan, who is close to Hizbullah, posted on the day of the clashes that “all the bloodshed, internal strife, security anarchy, and threats to public order that occurred today against unarmed protesters, or will occur [in the future], are caused by the U.S. embassy, by Judge Tarek Bitar, who must be dismissed, arrested and firmly held to account, and by the American forces of terror …”[21]
Hashim Safi Al-Din, head of Hizbullah’s executive council, said at the funeral of the protesters killed in Al-Tayouneh: “We are facing a massacre and a crime of sheer premeditated murder perpetrated by the Lebanese Forces party… The scenes we saw yesterday [in Al-Tayouneh] were a link in a chain of events perpetrated by the U.S. [in Lebanon and] funded by certain Arab [elements]… Everyone in Lebanon must know that there is a force and a party in Lebanon that is acting in the service of the Americans and of Arab elements, and wishes to drag the country into civil war. Everybody must take a position on this.”[22] On October 23 he said: “The Lebanese Forces have placed themselves at the disposal of the enemies’ plans, [helping them] to implement their goals, which are to spark internal strife and cause a rift in Lebanon. The Americans and Israelis want Lebanon to be plunged into internal strife… Whoever acts in the service of the American plans and the goals of its embassy is acting to destroy the country and its future… This group has turned itself into a Trojan horse in the service of criminal plans…”[23]
The deputy head of Hizbullah’s executive council, Sheikh Ali Da’moush, said in an October 15 Friday sermon: “What happened yesterday [in Al-Tayouneh] was a planned and deliberate criminal act perpetrated by the Lebanese Forces party [in response to] American incitement. [This incitement comes] in retaliation against the ones who exposed the [U.S.] plot to harm Lebanon and against the resistance and its allies and the ones who exposed the extent of the politicization of the investigation of the [Beirut] Port blast…”[24]
Ibrahim Al-Amin, editor of the pro-Hizbullah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, said that Lebanese elements, including civil society organizations, Geagea’s Lebanese Forces party, Judge Tarek Bitar and others were all U.S. agents in Lebanon. In several articles, he called them “fledglings of [foreign] embassies” who, since the blast in August 2020, have been acting to destroy the country on orders from “the great American chicken.” “The lunatics among them, and they are many… have gone so far as to… blame the explosion on the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah].” In another article he posted after the Al-Tayouneh clashes, he wrote that “the Americans, the French, the British, the Germans, the Saudis and the Emiratis” are all “complicit in” and “directly responsible for” the events, and wondered if they think they will get away with it. [25]
Accusations against the U.S. and its “agents” were also posted by Hizbullah supporters on Twitter. Following the Al-Tayouneh clashes, Lebanese journalist Hussein Murtada, who is identified with Hizbullah, tweeted a composite photo of Lebanese Forces party head Samir Geagea, Judge Tarek Bitar and U.S. Ambassador Dorothy Shea, with the caption: “The American ambassador of destruction interfered in the events.”[26]
Hizbullah officials reiterate that, in addition to Geagea’s party, the U.S. funds various civil society organizations, which are meant to confront Hizbullah and change the political balance in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Sheikh Ali Da’moush said on September 24: “All the American pressures [on Lebanon] failed, and they lost in the political [arena] just as they lost on the ground. [So now] they are looking for new political agents that will present themselves as saviors rescuing [the country] from corruption… The Americans’ options in the next stage include [employing] civil society organizations to whom they have extended financial and moral support. Now they are preparing the ground for [these organizations] to participate in the parliamentary elections so as to form a parliamentary majority and a new political echelon that will trumpet the slogan of honesty. In practice, these organizations are worse than the corrupt political circles, for they are directly and insolently linked to [foreign] embassies. They present themselves as champions of freedom, sovereignty and honesty, but nobody knows how much money they received after the [Beirut] Port incident…”[27] Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Na’im Qassem also said in an October 9 speech in the Dahiya that the Americans interfere in Lebanon using civil society organizations loyal to them. “These elements,” he said, “are amassing large amounts of money in order to destroy the country, change the public climate and confront the resistance. They do all this [knowing] it may lead to destruction and ruin…”[28]
Hizbullah Officials And Supporters: U.S. Is An Enemy; Lebanese Must Rise Up Against It
Hizbullah officials and affiliates recently threatened to launch a campaign to end the U.S. influence in Lebanon, while clarifying that the organization knows how to hurt the U.S. and harm its interests. In a meeting with members of Lebanon’s Union of Muslim Ulama, Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Na’im Qassem said that the resistance is entitled to use every legitimate means at its disposal to defend Lebanon and its people and confront the “American siege.” He added: “We will not let anyone to attack us without retaliating. We will accept nothing except [a situation in which we are] strong and prepared for every challenge on every level…”[29]
Hashim Safi Al-Din, head of Hizbullah’s executive council, was more explicit in his threats, saying on October 3, 2021 that the organization will launch a campaign to purge the state institutions of American influence and that there are several ways to harm the Americans and their interests in Lebanon. In a speech he delivered in the village of Bint Jbeil in South Lebanon, he said: “America’s influence in Lebanon affects the security, political, financial and economic levels. [The Americans] have a strong presence in Lebanon and a lot [of influence]. So far we have not launched a campaign to purge the state institutions of American [influence], but when the day comes and we wage such a campaign, the Lebanese will see something new. We have not done so [yet] because we know this country’s power of endurance. The U.S. is an enemy no less hostile than Israel, and sometimes even more so. We look and listen and assess the Lebanese people’s ability to withstand [such a campaign]…
“The campaign we launched regarding the fuel [i.e., Hizbullah’s initiative to import Iranian fuel to Lebanon in disregard of the international sanctions that forbid this] is an escalation of [our] defiance of the discriminatory siege imposed by the U.S. and the West on Lebanon. It is not the last move [we can take], and I hope we won’t need to take the second and third move, for we have many moves we can take, which will embarrass and make difficulties [for the Americans], and the cost [they will pay] may even be higher… We know how to hurt them and how to threaten their interests, not necessarily with weapons…”[30]
An October 19 article on Hizbullah’s Al-Ahed website repeated Safi Al-Din’s threats. It stated that Nasrallah’s claim in his speech that day, that Hizbullah has 100,000 soldiers, was a message to the U.S. and Israel that if they continued pushing Lebanon towards civil war, Hizbullah would launch its campaign to end the U.S. influence in Lebanon. The article said: “For the first time, and surprisingly, given Hizbullah’s policy [until now], Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah disclosed a number related to Hizbullah’s military array… [namely that it has] 100,000 fighters… The gist of [Nasrallah’s] message is that [America’s and Israel’s] insistence on pushing the fools [i.e., Geagea and his followers] to start a civil war will be the last step towards ending the American influence in Lebanon. Or as Hizbullah executive council head Safi Al-Din put it: ‘So far we have not launched a campaign to remove America’s [influence] from the state institutions.’ [But America’s and Israel’s] insistence on [pushing for a civil war] will be the starting point of this war…”[31]
Shi’ite mufti Sheikh Ahmad Qabalan, who is close to Hizbullah, also called to end the American influence in Lebanon, saying: “It is inconceivable to leave the country in this state of complete paralysis and collapse… The state is drowning, the poor are becoming victims… and they are appeasing the U.S. by announcing Lebanon’s bankruptcy… What we need to do is [launch] a national uprising against the U.S. and accept the [aid] offered by Iran, China or Russia. Whoever prefers darkness, poverty and drowning to [accepting] the Iranian, Chinese or Russian offer is betraying the rights of this deprived [Lebanese] people.” Qabalan called “to end the U.S. patronage of the country, because allowing it to continue will bankrupt Lebanon, starve its people and cause the state to disintegrate and perish.”[32]
Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1606 /https://www.memri.org/reports/hizbullah-waging-campaign-against-us-and-its-influence-lebanon-we-know-how-hurt-them-and
* H. Varulkar is director of research at MEMRI.

[1] Alahednews.com.lb, August 17, 2021; Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), August 18, 2021.
[2] Almanar.com.lb, August 19, 2021.
[3] Alahednews.com.lb, August 22, 2021.
[4] Alahednews.com.lb, August 28, 2021.
[5] Alahednews.com.lb, October 11, 2021.
[6] Alahednews.com.lb, August 28, 2021.
[7] Alahednews.com.lb, October 11, 2021.
[8] Alahednews.com.lb, October 18, 2021.
[9] Alahednews.com.lb, October 18, 2021.
[10] Raialyoum,com, October 9, 2021.
[11] Nna-leb.gov.lb, September 18, 2021.
[12] Elnashra.com, October 1, 2021.
[13] Foreign.senate.gov, October 1, 2021; state.gov, October 14, 2021.
[14] Almanar.com.lb, October 3, 2021.
[15] Alahednews.com.lb, October 3, 2021. In further remarks on October 13, Fadlallah said that the U.S. State Department’s interference in the investigation, manifested in its support for the policy of Judge Bitar, was “an attempt to intimidate the Lebanese officials and keep them from bringing the investigations back to their legal path and remove them from the circle of politicization.” Alahednews.com.lb, Alahednews.com.lb, October 13, 2021.
[16] Alahednews.com.lb, October 4, 2021.
[17] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), October 10, 2021.
[18] Al-Jumhouriyya (Lebanon), October 25, 2021.
[19] The reference is to the investigation into Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri’s assassination, in which Hizbullah and figures close to it were implicated.
[20] Alahednews.com.lb, October 27, 2021.
[21] Elnashra.com, October 14, 2021.
[22] Almanar.com.lb, October 15, 2021.
[23] Alahednews.com.lb, October 23, 2021.
[24] Alalhednews.com.lb, October 15, 2021.
[25] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), October 11, 15, 16, 2021.
[26] Twitter.com/HoseinMortada, October 14, 2021.
[27] Alalhednews.com.lb, September 24, 2021.
[28] Raialyoum.com, October 9, 2021.
[29] Alalhednews.com.lb, October 5, 2021.
[30] Alalhednews.com.lb, October 3, 2021.
[31] Alalhednews.com.lb, October 19, 2021.
[32] Alalam.ir, October 9, 2021.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 23-24/2021
Israel Dismantles Hamas Cell Accused of Plotting Attacks

Ramallah - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
The Israeli Shin Bet announced that it had dismantled in recent weeks a cell belonging to the Hamas movement in the West Bank. In a statement, the security agency said that the cell consisted of more than 50 members and was preparing to launch attacks against Israel.
The announcement came a day after an attack by a Hamas member in East Jerusalem killed an Israeli individual and wounded three others, including two policemen. The operation prompted Israeli security to raise the level of alert in Jerusalem for fear of further attacks. The Shin Bet said that it dismantled, in cooperation with the Israeli army and police, a terrorist cell affiliated with Hamas in the West Bank, which aimed to carry out attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Weapons, explosives and military equipment were seized. The agency added that the cell members received funding from Hamas leaders, led by Saleh al-Arouri, deputy head of the Hamas political bureau, who is responsible for the West Bank area. According to the Shin Bet, activists from different areas in the West Bank, such as Ramallah, Hebron and Jenin, were recruited for the cell. One of these members, Hijazi al-Qawasmeh, 37, had been arrested several times for planning attacks against Israeli targets. Fadi Abu Shkhaydam, 42, one of the movement’s political leaders in the Shuafat camp in the city, carried out the Jerusalem operation and was killed during a clash there. Israeli Defense Minister Omer Bar-Lev said that the operation was orchestrated and well-planned, based on the fact that the wife of the perpetrator had left Israel a few days before. However, Abu Shkhaydem’s wife returned on Sunday with her son and was immediately arrested by the Israeli security authorities.

Abbas Condemns Israeli Attack on Jerusalem Governor

Ramallah - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has condemned the “brutal” attack by Israeli forces on Jerusalem Governor Adnan Ghaith and his family on Monday. Abbas praised in a statement “the national role played by Ghaith in serving Palestinians in Jerusalem, strengthening their steadfastness and confronting the Judaization schemes.”He further hailed the “steadfastness of the Muslim and Christian Jerusalemites in the face of the Israeli occupation and its measures against the holy city and its Islamic and Christian holy sites.”Abbas made a telephone call to Ghaith and wished him a speedy recovery, the statement added. Special units of the Israeli occupation forces stormed Ghaith’s home in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Silwan and assaulted him, his sons and cousins, some of whom were injured. They also detained three of his relatives. Israel occupied east Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War and later annexed it in a move never recognized by the international community. It considers the entire city as its capital, while the Palestinian Authority considers east Jerusalem the capital of its own future state and tries to maintain a presence on the ground. Israel bans all PA activities in the city. As a result, the PA has a minister for Jerusalem affairs and a Jerusalem governor located in Al-Ram, just on the other side of an Israeli wall that separates the city and the occupied West Bank. Ghaith has been arrested at least 28 times since his appointment in 2018 for allegedly carrying out PA activities in east Jerusalem. Last year, Israel’s commander of the Home Front Command informed Ghaith that based on the 1975 Emergency Law, his movement will be limited to Silwan only and that he is banned from contacting 50 Palestinian officials, including Abbas.These figures include Prime Minister Mohamed Shtayyeh, Abbas's deputy in the Fatah movement Mahmoud al-Aloul, Secretary General of the Fatah Central Committee Jibril Rajoub, Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, Minister of Jerusalem Fadi al-Hadmi, as well as several officials inside and outside Jerusalem.

Two Palestinians End Hunger Strike after Deal with Israel
Associated Press/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Two Palestinian hunger strikers, including one who went without food for 131 days, have suspended their strikes against Israel's controversial policy of detaining them without charge after reaching a deal that will allow them to go free in the coming months, a prisoner rights group said.
Israel's internal security agency said that it had arrested more than 50 members of a Hamas cell in the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem that were involved in planning attacks on Israelis. In a statement issued by the Palestinian Prisoners Club, a group representing former and current prisoners, Kayed Fasfous, 34, and Ayyad al-Harimi, 28, said they were ending their months-long strikes after Israeli authorities agreed to release them from "administrative detention."Administrative detention is a policy that allows Israel to hold suspected Palestinian militants for months and even years without charge. Israel says the tactic is needed to protect sensitive intelligence that could compromise valuable sources, but rights groups say it violates the right to due process.
Fasfous, the symbolic leader of a current high-profile hunger strike by several prisoners, will be released in December while al-Harami will be set free in March 2021, the group said. The Shin Bet internal security service did not respond to a request for comment. In past weeks, demonstrations across the occupied West Bank and Gaza have leveled mounting pressure on Israel to release the hunger-strikers. Two other Palestinian prisoners recently ended their hunger strike, having reportedly reached similar deals with the Israeli authorities. Hunger strikes are common among Palestinian prisoners and have helped secure concessions from Israeli authorities in the past. Israel currently holds in excess of 4,600 Palestinians on security-related charges. The incarcerated vary from senior militants charged with deadly attacks against Israelis to political activists who took part in demonstrations and teenagers held for throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. Several hundred Palestinians are held in administrative detention, according to human rights groups. Meanwhile, the Shin Bet announced the Hamas arrests a day after a Hamas gunman killed an Israeli man and injured four others in a shooting near a flashpoint holy site in Jerusalem's Old City.
The security service said it had uncovered the cell in recent weeks and that the group was planning several attacks in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel. It said the militants "were involved in establishing a terror infrastructure and money, armaments, weapons and material for preparing explosives were apprehended."The Israeli man killed in Sunday's attack, 26-year-old Eliyahu Kay, was buried in Jerusalem on Monday. At least one other person injured in the attack remained hospitalized. The attacker was identified as a 42-year-old Palestinian man from east Jerusalem who belonged to Hamas. He was shot dead by police at the scene. Hamas, an Islamic militant group that seeks Israel's destruction, praised Sunday's attack and confirmed the shooter was one of its members. But it did not say whether the shooting was an operation organized by the group or whether the gunman had acted alone.
Israel and Hamas have fought four wars since Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, most recently an 11-day battle last May.

Israel, Jordan to Partner in Water-for-Energy Deal
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Israel and Jordan have signed a declaration of intent for a water-for-energy deal, Israel's Energy Ministry said on Monday, in the first such deal between the two countries. The project would see Jordan build 600 megawatts of solar generating capacity which would be exported to Israel, contingent upon Israel providing water-scarce Jordan with 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water. Feasibility studies would start in 2022, said a statement from Israel's diplomatic mission in the United Arab Emirates, where the deal was signed.
It has not been decided over how long the agreement would be carried out. The deal was signed by the UAE's climate change minister, Jordan's minister of water and irrigation and Israel's energy minister at the Expo 2020 world fair currently being hosted by Dubai.
The UAE, which became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel last year, said it was pleased to play a role in bringing the two countries together in demonstrating the benefits of establishing diplomatic relations. "All residents of the Middle East will benefit from this memorandum of understanding, not just Jordan and Israel. This is a message to the world on how countries can act together to fight the climate crisis," said Israel's Energy Minister Karine Elharrar. Jordan, which signed a peace treaty with neighbor Israel in 1994, said on Monday the deal was not "legally or technically" binding and the kingdom would only proceed if it secured these quantities of water, Water and Irrigation Ministry Spokesman Omar Salamah said. Israel, which already sells Jordan some freshwater supplies, had long sought to sell desalinated water to its neighbor, but the kingdom had resisted. "Climate change and the influx of refugees have further exacerbated Jordan´s water challenges, however, there are many opportunities for regional cooperation to help increase sustainability in the sector," Jordan´s Minister of Water and Irrigation Mohammad Al-Najjar said.

Egypt, Jordan Conduct Joint Military Exercises
Cairo - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Units from the Egyptian and Jordanian Armed Forces on Monday launched joint military drills, code-named Aqaba 6. The exercises will last until December 2 with the participation of the Egyptian and Jordanian maritime, air, and ground forces. The Egyptian armed forces revealed that the preliminary phase of the training included practical and theoretical lectures to learn about combat expertise and to unify concepts between the participating sides. They also aim to introduce the technology of weapons and equipment in addition to field skills, to confirm the forces' readiness to carry out joint combat actions. The exercise aims to develop defense capabilities within agreed-upon plans, exchange expertise in planning, control, and command, and unify joint military concepts. The drill is part of a strategy to enhance military cooperation between the armed forces of both countries. The Jordanian-Egyptian military drills code-named Aqaba 5 were held in Oct. 2019.

Controversy in Jordan’s Parliament over Constitutional Amendments Expanding King’s Powers
Amman - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Jordan’s Parliament witnessed a heated debate on Monday while holding the first session for reviewing proposed constitutional reforms submitted by the government last week. The reforms had already triggered widespread responses on social media and among political elites. At the start of Monday’s session, which King Abdullah launched its activities last week, Jordanian deputies referred the draft constitutional amendment to the Legal Committee before electing its members, triggering far-reaching criticism. Lawmakers criticized amendments to about 30 articles in the constitution, the most prominent of which was linked to expanding the monarch’s powers through forming a National Security Council. Prominent deputies criticized the accountability and oversight mechanism of a council headed by the king and comprising the prime minister, the army chief, the directors of the security services, the ministers of foreign affairs and the interior, and two members appointed by the king. They argued that the move creates a political body parallel to the legislative and executive powers in the country. While Parliament Speaker Abdulkarim Dughmi tried to refer the draft amendment to the Legal Committee to prevent parliamentary interventions, deputies demanded more discussions. In the face of the government’s referral of the draft constitutional amendment and granting it “urgency and priority,” the deputies chose to talk about the parties and elections bills. They warned against tampering with the map of electoral districts at the expense of confiscating the rights of voter representation in extended geographical areas that may prejudice demographic equations due to merging electoral districts with high population densities. For his part, Prime Minister Bisher al Khasawneh rejected accusations against the government on “overturning the constitution” or compromising the “objective unity” of the Jordanian constitution, which stipulates “the principle of associated authority and responsibility when it comes to the work of institutions.”

Arab Parliament: Sudan Agreement Step towards Stability

Cairo - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
The Arab Parliament on Monday welcomed the signing of the political agreement between Sudan's top general Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. “This step heralds a new stage for laying the foundations of security, unity and sustainable stability in Sudan, for protecting the political and economic gains of its people, and achieving their aspirations to accomplish development,” the parliament said in a statement. It also praised the wisdom and responsibility of the Sudanese parties in reaching an agreement that can guarantee the success of the transitional period, in a way that serves Sudan’s supreme interests.The parliament expressed confidence in the Sudanese people’s ability to overcome the current stage, particularly in light of the constitutional, legal and political agreement that governs the transitional phase.
Secretary General of the Arab Lawyers Union, Makkawi bin Issa, said the agreement reached between political leaders in Sudan is a return to the right political track and to the constitutional declaration of 2019, which represents a unique and serious step towards achieving political stability in Sudan.
“The wise vision of the two signatories to the agreement defused the crisis and it returned Sudan to the roadmap that guarantees a peaceful transitional period during which the Sudanese people can aspire for stability and progress,” Makkawi said. Nearly a month after Burhan ousted Hamdok, the two sides signed a breakthrough deal Sunday to reverse the military takeover that had sparked international condemnation and mass protests. The 14-point deal they signed officially restores the transition to civilian rule that had been derailed by the October 25 putsch in the country.

Tunisian Parties Denounce US 'Meddling' in Political Affairs
Tunis - Mongi Saidani/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Tunisian political parties, including the Free Destourian party, led by Abir Mossi, and the Movement Party chaired by Moncef Marzouki, denounced the perceived US interference in their country's political affairs. Tunisian President Kais Saied had held telephone talks with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Sunday. Blinken encouraged Saied to make reforms to respond to Tunisians' hopes for "democratic progress" The parties accused the presidency of undermining Tunisia, saying it is publishing inaccuracies and shameful insults and degrading the Tunisian state and people. The US embassy in Tunisia revealed that Blinken spoke with Saied to discuss recent developments in Tunisia, including the formation of the new government and steps to alleviate the economic situation. The American official encouraged a transparent and inclusive reform process to address Tunisia's significant political, economic, and social challenges and respond to the Tunisian people's aspirations for continued democratic progress. Meanwhile, security forces used tear gas to disperse the Environment, Plantation, and Gardening Company workers' protests in Qibili (south). The workers gathered at the entrances of the state, expressing their anger over unpaid wages over the past two months. Residents said the use of gas was "excessive," stressing that the tear gas bombs fell near and inside some houses, which led to the suffocation of some residents. According to a statement by Lhadi Lahmar, head of the Gardening Syndicate, they were forced to leave their homes. Unemployed university graduates also organized similar protests after Saied backtracked on Law 38 which calls for hiring them in the public sector.

US ‘Cautiously’ Welcomes Sudan Political Agreement
Washington - Paris - Ali Barada and Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Officials from the United States and the United Nations have “cautiously” welcomed the breakthrough deal between Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to return the transitional process back on track. “While I am relieved to see Sudan PM Hamdok released from the custody of Sudan’s military junta, this is but a first step to undo the harm from an unjustified coup,” said Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee Gregory Meeks. “Any deal to revive Sudan’s civilian-led transition must lead to a free, fair and inclusive democratic process.”
“The world is watching and will hold military and civilian authorities accountable for their actions,” he stressed. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he is encouraged by reports that talks in Khartoum will lead to the release of all political prisoners, reinstatement of Hamdok, the lift of the state of emergency and resumption of coordination. “I urge all sides to further talks and redouble efforts to complete key transitional tasks on a civilian-led path to democracy in Sudan,” he tweeted, reiterating the US call for security forces to refrain from excessive force against peaceful protesters. If the political agreement is taken seriously, all detainees must be released immediately, stressed head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) Volker Perthes. UNITAMS welcomed the initial announcement of an agreement between Burhan and Hamdok to reach consensus on resolving the constitutional and political crisis that was threatening the stability of the country. It stressed in a statement the need to protect the constitutional order to safeguard the basic freedoms of political action, freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. “The transition partners will need to urgently address unresolved issues to complete the political transition in an inclusive manner, with respect for human rights and the rule of law,” it added. “We deplore the loss of so many Sudanese lives over the last weeks and as per the agreement, we stress the need for transparent investigations and accountability to ensure justice for the lives of these victims.”The mission also called on all parties to the political process in Sudan to include the voices of the youth to address the demands of the Sudanese people. Women’s meaningful participation and the advancement of their hard-earned rights and role in the democratic transition must be maintained, it stressed. Nearly a month after Sudan’s top general ousted the premier, they signed a political agreement on Sunday to reverse the military takeover that had sparked international condemnation and mass protests. The 14-point deal they signed officially restores the transition to civilian rule that had been derailed by the October 25 putsch in the poverty-stricken northeast African country.

Bus Crash in Bulgaria Kills at Least 45 People
Associated Press/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
A bus crash in western Bulgaria early Tuesday has killed at least 45 people, authorities said.The bus, registered in North Macedonia, crashed around 2 a.m. and there were children among the victims, authorities said. Seven people were taken to hospitals for treatment. The cause of the crash was not immediately confirmed, but it appeared that the bus hit a highway guard rail, crashed and caught fire. Officials said an investigation will be launched. Bulgarian news agency Novinite said representatives from North Macedonia's embassy visited a hospital where some of the victims were taken.
Photos taken shortly after the crash showed the bus engulfed in flames with plumes of thick, black smoke rising from the scene. Bulgarian Caretaker Prime Minister Stefan Yanev visited the site of the crash and told reporters it was "a huge tragedy.""I take this opportunity to send my condolences to the relatives of the victims," Yanev said. "Let's hope we learn lessons from this tragic incident and we can prevent such incidents in the future."North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev told Bulgarian television channel bTV that he had spoken to one of the bus survivors. "One of the passengers told me that he was asleep and woke up from an explosion," Zaev told bTV, adding that the authorities will gather information that is "important for the families of the dead and the survivors."Oliver Varhelyi, a European Union Commissioner, sent his condolences to the families and friends of those affected by the crash. "Terrible news about the tragic bus accident in Bulgaria in early morning hours," Varhelyi wrote online. "My thoughts & condolences are with the families and friends of those who died as well as with the people and the authorities of North Macedonia."In 2019, Bulgaria, an EU nation of 7 million, had the second-highest road fatality rate in the 27-nation bloc with 89 people killed per million population, according to European Commission data.

Doctor Warns Iraqi Kurds: Illegal Path to EU Can Be Deadly
Associated Press/Tuesday, 23 November, 2021
Dr. Arsalan Azzaddin was seeing migrants from Iraq and Syria being brought into a hospital in eastern Poland every day with hypothermia, pneumonia, broken bones and severe dehydration. So he asked a Kurdish TV channel to let him go on the news to warn people in his homeland not to attempt the dangerous journey into the European Union through the Belarus-Poland border. "I want them not to come. They could die," Azzaddin told The Associated Press. At first, the medical director of the Bielsk Podlaski hospital was accused by some viewers of doing the bidding of the Polish government, which has taken a hard line in seeking to keep out migrants, using razor wire and a show of border police and military to stop attempts to sneak across the EU's eastern border. So he returned again to Kurdish TV, this time letting his patients describe their suffering from their hospital beds.
And he also had a message for the Iraqi leaders: "Save those people," he said. "Kurds don't deserve something like this."
Only days later, the Iraqi government began taking steps to stop the migration of Iraqis, many of them Kurds, to Belarus. They halted flights to Belarus, closed offices that issued travel visas to Belarus and sent government planes to bring stranded people there back home.
EU officials also mounted pressure on Iraq to halt the migration, but Azzaddin is convinced that his appeals on TV, which he said reached 2.5 million viewers, played a significant role. Azzaddin, originally from Irbil in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, has lived in Poland for 40 years. His hospital in Bielsk Podlaski, a town of 25,000, is located 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border with Belarus, which migrants and refugees, mostly from the Middle East, have been trying to cross since the summer in hopes of finding better lives in the EU.
The EU accuses the authoritarian leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, of orchestrating the migration in retaliation for sanctions imposed on Belarus over an presidential election in 2020 that was widely viewed as rigged and a harsh government crackdown on peaceful protesters.
Most of the migrants seek to reach Germany or elsewhere in Western Europe. But after 1 million refugees came to the EU in 2015, the bloc has sought to keep out any large new groups of asylum-seekers. The way it has done so, tacitly allowing the pushbacks of migrants and outsourcing migration control to Libya and Turkey, has prompted rights groups to accuse the EU of abetting human rights abuses.
With Poland's border increasingly sealed, it has gotten harder and harder for migrants at the border. Many are getting trapped in a dank forest of bogs that sees subfreezing temperatures at night. There have been reports of at least a dozen deaths along the border, and Azzaddin believes there are more on the Belarus side, based on his monitoring of social media posts.
With flights to Belarus from the Mideast coming to a halt, Azzaddin says he believes there are no more migrants in Poland's forest but there are still 2,000 people on the Belarusian side. Azzaddin said his hospital had lately been receiving two to five migrants a day needing urgent medical treatment. One was a Syrian woman who suffered a miscarriage after being stuck in the forest for 22 days. When she was finally taken to the hospital, she caught COVID-19. The woman, a 38-year-old from Aleppo, was escorted away from the hospital on Monday by Border Guard officers who would not let AP journalists speak to her. Azzaddin supports the strict Polish approach to migration. He says if Poland were to allow in all the people that Belarus was shepherding to the EU's doorstep, the numbers would only grow and Lukashenko would prevail in his geopolitical standoff against the West. The problem, he says, should be addressed at its roots. He sharply accuses Iraqi authorities of failing to create conditions where people can have dignified lives. "You have to ask why people are coming," he said. "The leaders of many countries, of the United States and the European Union, must ask the Iraqi authorities why people are fleeing. These are educated people. They don't have work, they don't have anything to survive on." He supports immigration, but wants to see it happen in a legal, controlled way.
"We must teach young people that the illegal way is not a good way. If you have an education, look for a job, do it legally," he said. "I am the medical director of this hospital. If 20 doctors wanted to work here, I could give them work tomorrow. But they must fulfill certain requirements. Coming here by risking the death of your family and children is not a good way."

The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 23-24/2021
It’s Time to Get Honest About the Biden Doctrine
Anne-Marie Slaughter/The New York Times/November, 23/2021
A year after President Biden’s election, we’re beginning to see the contours of his foreign policy: He has something for everyone. For balance-of-power realists, he has countered China by working much more closely with “the Quad” — India, Australia, Japan and the United States — and creating a new British, Australian, US nexus with the AUKUS submarine deal, no matter how clumsily handled.
For liberal internationalists, he has re-engaged with global institutions: rejoining the World Health Organization and the UN-sponsored Paris Agreement to limit climate change and recommitting to NATO. For those advocating “restraint” in America’s military might, he has ended at least the visible “forever wars.”
And for democracy and human rights activists committed to a values-based foreign policy, Mr. Biden will be hosting a Summit for Democracy next month. The administration has also ratcheted up both its rhetoric and its actions on human rights issues, accusing China of both genocide and crimes against humanity for its treatment of its Uyghur population and authorizing sanctions against several officials responsible for the war and humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia.
Yet when everyone gets something, no one gets everything, which is why the core principles of Mr. Biden’s worldview have been hard to pin down.
Not for lack of trying, however. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Mr. Biden is continuing many of Donald Trump’s “America First” policies in a different guise. Joshua Shifrinson, a Boston University professor, and Stephen Wertheim, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, claim that the Biden Doctrine is “pragmatic realism,” pursuing US interests “in a competitive world” and changing course as necessary to achieve them.
On the values-based side of the foreign policy ledger, a growing number of observers insist that the real Biden Doctrine is to preserve and prove “the supremacy of democracy” worldwide. As Jonathan Tepperman, former editor in chief of Foreign Policy, argues, the “global contest between democracies and autocracies” provides an “organizing principle” to link investing in infrastructure and industrial policy at home, pursuing a foreign policy for the middle class and working to build coalitions of democracies abroad.
Perhaps Mr. Biden is perfectly comfortable with multiple “Biden Doctrines.” He might say that reconciling conflicting impulses and brokering compromises is his trademark as a politician who knows how to get things done.
The problem is that swinging from one framework and set of goals to another without a set of clear principles and priorities risks falling radically short of the progress that the world needs on existential issues. What difference does it make whether the United States “beats China” if our cities are underwater, the Gulf Stream stops warming northern Europe and the United States, and hundreds of millions of climate refugees are on the move? If we destroy the biodiversity on the planet? If millions more people die from serial pandemics? If people the world over do not have the means to flourish and care for one another?
It is time to break free of 20th-century thinking. Two decades of Mr. Biden’s 50-odd years in public life were spent during the Cold War and a third during the 1990s with the United States as a hyperpower. For most of this period great-power competition and making the world safe for democracy were fused. “People” issues were relegated to human rights advocates and development experts. Diplomacy and defense were the provinces of nations and the field of international relations.
The frameworks, paradigms and doctrines of that era, of any kind, are simply insufficient to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Bolder thinking is required, thinking that shifts away from states, whether great powers or lesser powers, democracies or autocracies. It is time to put people first, to see the world first as a planet of eight billion people rather than as an artificially constructed system of 195 countries and to measure all state actions in terms of their impact on people. Instead of competing with China today on one issue and cooperating tomorrow on another, Mr. Biden must prioritize cooperation on global issues and challenge other nations, regardless of whether they are democracies, autocracies or something in between, to join in.
This approach is known as globalism, which has a bad name because of its association with globalization. But globalism is actually closer to localism, to beginning with people, where they live and what they need, regardless of what colored square on the map they happen to be born in. It is a people-centered rather than a state-centered approach to problem-solving on a global scale. It does not pretend that governments don’t exist or don’t matter, but rejects the idea that interstate rivalry matters as an end in itself — the essence of geopolitics.
Globalism also sees government officials as a set of actors who can contribute to either global problems or global solutions. To succeed as problem solvers, however, they must work side by side with global corporations and networks of cities, civic groups, faith groups, universities, scientists and others. These actors are not just “helpers” or catalysts or constituents. They are players in global politics.
Mr. Biden sometimes seems to be moving in this direction. His speech to the UN General Assembly in September laid out a long list of global problems, from health and climate change to inequality and corruption. In my view, his greatest foreign policy achievement to date was to secure a minimum global corporate tax rate of 15 percent, ensuring that corporations worldwide pay at least a portion of their fair share for the public goods — from roads to intellectual property laws — that they rely on and that benefit all citizens. The Biden administration also embraces an “all of society” approach to fighting climate change.
Time and again, however, Mr. Biden’s other goal — of beating China, or more broadly of lining up the democracies to beat the autocracies — gets in the way. This week, thanks to the work of John Kerry, the climate envoy, the United States and China reached an important agreement to cooperate on deeper cuts to both carbon dioxide and methane emissions. It’s not enough, however, and misses a larger opportunity to mobilize the United States, China, the European Union and India as co-leaders on a global climate challenge.
The lure of competition — often on the edge of conflict — with a rival superpower is just too strong, both for Mr. Biden and for the tight-knit band of brothers who form the core of his foreign policy team. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, are veterans of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” a concept designed and advanced in large part by Kurt Campbell, now the White House Asia czar.
From the perspective of 20th-century geopolitics, it makes sense for the Biden administration to approach its relationship with China as one in which the United States has many different goals: economic, military and diplomatic. On some issues, like climate or health, we seek China’s cooperation. On many more, like military primacy, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, fair trade, intellectual property rights, cybersecurity and human rights, our relationship requires competition and coercion. Hence we have the frequent trade-off debate, in which China hawks have demanded that Mr. Kerry not give an inch to get concessions on Chinese emissions or to encourage other actions that are necessary to stop the globe from warming another degree.
From a people-first perspective, saving the planet for humanity must be a goal that takes precedence over all others. The United States should openly challenge China to a competition to see which country can deliver the cleanest and safest environment for its people while at the same time increasing their well-being. Which country can build and deploy clean technologies the fastest? Which country can help the most developing countries upgrade their infrastructure and wean themselves off carbon?
It should be possible to develop common measures to assess the climate impact of China’s Belt and Road investments versus the Build Back Better World initiative — a project of the Group of 7 wealthiest economies — and the E.U.’s Global Gateway investments and to agree on a set of nongovernmental organizations charged with applying and publicizing these metrics. Global youth movements, from the Sunrise Movement in the United States to the China Youth Climate Action Network and Greta Thunberg’s followers everywhere, would be ideal candidates.
When it comes to the Covid-19 pandemic, if our collective goal really is to vaccinate and treat as many people as possible worldwide, then it’s time to ignore geopolitics. Back in September, the Biden administration’s global vaccine summit brought together over 100 governments and an additional 100 global actors to commit to vaccinating 70 percent of the world’s people by 2022. China has said that it is now working with 19 nations to produce vaccines and cooperating with another 30 countries on vaccine distribution through the Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, President Xi Jinping of China proposed a Global Vaccine Cooperation Action Initiative at the Group of 20 summit last month, without an apparent response from the United States. Aboard Air Force One, on his way to Rome, Mr. Sullivan told reporters that “the main thrust of the effort on Covid-19 is not actually traveling through the G20.” My translation: The Chinese and their partners have one effort and the United States and its partners have another.
Mr. Biden believes in the inherent value and ultimate superiority of democracy. He sees it as the form of government that best recognizes human dignity and agency, and that can deliver well-being and prosperity for the greatest number of people. So do I. But this conviction, which was as reflexive as breathing for most Americans during the 20th century, must now be put to an empirical test, starting at home.
Mr. Biden gets this, in part. He has made clear that the United States must demonstrate that our democracy can in fact represent and deliver results for our own people. Bolder thinking would insist that the United States face all the ways in which our democracy has fallen short for millions of our people and accept at least the possibility that other forms of government could be better. Beyond US borders, the contest between democracy and autocracy should be an open competition to see which governments can deliver more — materially, intellectually, spiritually and all the other ways we measure human flourishing — for their people. One measure might be which country does the most to achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, as assessed by a global coalition of civic organizations.
Globalism is not mushy government idealism — far from it. It does not deny the existence or importance of government — at the local, state, national and international levels — or of intergovernmental diplomacy. But it insists that the great-power games, as deadly as they have been and could still be, must give way to planetary politics, in which human beings matter more than nationalities. Competition itself is fine and natural, but it needs to be competition to achieve a goal that benefits us all.
Under normal circumstances, administrations set goals and navigate the conflicting interests that are the essence of politics. They muddle through one crisis, one summit, one speech at a time. But we are not living in normal times. As Mr. Biden understands and is striving to achieve on the domestic front, it’s time for bold, transformative change. To vaccinate fewer people globally in the hope of demonstrating American or even democratic superiority is a moral calamity that will hurt us all.
To some, adopting people-centered policies at the national and global levels might seem so fanciful as to be delusional. But history shows that it is possible to change course, even drastically. Just over a hundred years ago, the United States Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and turned its back on the League of Nations. At the time, no one would have predicted that a quarter-century later, President Franklin Roosevelt would be a principal architect of the United Nations and that the United States would embrace a set of global institutions designed to maintain peace, prosperity and security. Gen Z and many millennials are already thinking in planetary terms, putting people ahead of states. It is time for the rest of us to catch up.

It’s too soon to write the obituary of the anti-Iran alliance in the Middle East
Jonathan Spyer/Fathom/November 23/2021
The claim that the pro-Western alliance in the region has collapsed in the wake of a US withdrawal is an exaggeration, says Jonathan Spyer. Yes, the old map of relationships is in flux as the US draws down, but Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt continue to share a long list of shared concerns about Iran and Jihadism, and any new map will reflect that. Indeed, in the medium to long term the US retreat is likely to provide an advantage to Israel as the only country within this group of states that is able to provide a credible military threat against Iran, and specifically against the Iranian nuclear programme.
PART 1: THE OLD MAP
Mainstream Israeli foreign policy analysis in recent years has depicted the key strategic dynamic in the region as a contest between a number of rival camps. These camps varied greatly both in their quantitative size, their relative strength, and the extent to which they were strongly linked and possessed a clear, common sense of mission. Nevertheless, the notion of a competition between rival alliances was a useful analytic tool, able to account for both the motivations and the behaviour of states in a variety of regional contexts.
This author was among the analysts who employed this characterisation and found it useful. In my own estimation, and that of a number of others, it has been possible to discern four broad regional camps. These are:
(i) Iran’s regional alliance
The regional alliance consisting of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its various proxies, allied regimes and satellites. The latter include the Assad regime in Syria, the Popular Mobilization Units/Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Ansar Allah/Houthis movement in Yemen, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Hamas area of control in Gaza (partially) and a number of smaller Shia Islamist opposition movements in the Gulf. This camp is the most crystallised and well organised of regional alliances. The Iranian regime, via such agencies as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its expeditionary Qods Force, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS, commonly known to Iranians as the ‘Etelaat’) exercises a high level of influence and in some cases control over other elements of this alliance. The Iranian method of establishing and then utilising proxy political-military formations across the Arab world has proved especially useful to Tehran over the last decade in building power and influence across the poorly or partly governed spaces of the Arabic speaking world – Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and to a degree among the Palestinians. It is noteworthy that this alliance consists almost exclusively of Shia formations. The Palestinians and arguably the Alawi dominated Assad regime are the exceptions to this general rule.
(ii) Sunni Political islam
A second discernible power alliance in the Middle East has been gathered around the broad banner of Muslim-Brotherhood (MB) type Sunni political Islam. This group includes AKP-ruled Turkey, the Emirate of Qatar, Hamas-controlled Gaza, the UN recognised Libyan government in Tripoli, the Turkish supported Syrian National Army in northern Syria and a number of smaller opposition groups.
(iii) Salafi Jihadi Political Islam
A third regional trend is that of Salafi jihadi political Islam. This finds organisational form in two region wide networks – al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. There is some crossover between this camp and the previously noted bloc of MB-style Sunni political Islam.
(iv) The Western-Aligned ‘Moderates’
In opposition to all these groups, Israeli analysts have discerned a much looser gathering of states broadly aligned with the West, and broadly opposed to political Islam in both its Shia and Sunni variants. Within this loosely defined bloc, there have throughout been strong differences in the relative importance attached by members to this or that challenge. There is also no real unifying mode of governance or broad outlook uniting the members of this camp. Rather, such commonality as exists derives from a perception of shared threats from one or all of the other groupings noted above, and a broad alignment with the US and the West. This group is often held to include Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as core elements. Other members include Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Non-state affiliates to this broad grouping include the Kurdish Regional Government of Prime Minister Masrour Barzani in northern Iraq (KRG), the Palestinian Authority (PA) of President Mahmoud Abbas, and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
The list of names to be included in this broadly defined grouping reveals immediately its loose and contingent nature. It includes countries with no formal diplomatic relations (Israel-Saudi Arabia), entities involved in unresolved conflict with one another (Israel-PA), and countries with a variety of systems of governance, ranging from absolute monarchy and theocracy (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to representative democracy (Israel), via authoritarian semi-democracy (KRG, AANES).
It is clear that this depiction of camps in the Middle East involves a certain level of simplification, in that the dividing lines between these blocs have never been absolute. Israel and Turkey, for example, retain a healthy trade relationship despite diplomatic difficulties. Turkey’s relations with Iran are similarly ambiguous, combining strategic rivalry with cooperation against common adversaries in certain areas (see the role of Turkish banks in enabling Teheran to bypass sanctions.) There was never, also, a clear dividing line between the Turkey-Qatar camp and that of the Salafi jihadis. Rather, as exemplified in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan, Turkish and Qatari efforts at making use of paramilitary proxies have involved de facto collaboration with Salafi forces.
Nevertheless, despite these inconsistencies, observation of events over the last decade in the region indicate that this broad framework contained a considerable amount of descriptive relevance, and some predictive power. An observer using this broad map of rival camps, for example, as a guide to understand the region would not have been surprised by the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan in August, 2020. Rather, this would be seen as the formalisation of already existing links and commonalities based on shared enemies and a broadly pro-Western outlook.
Similarly, Turkish and Qatari support for the MB associated government of National Accord in Tripoli, and Egyptian and Emirati backing for the Ancien Regime general Khalifa Haftar in the same country, would make clear sense within this framework (some evidence has also emerged of Israeli involvement in support for Haftar).
The Iranian investment in support for proxy militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, even at a time of economic difficulty for Iran, similarly makes sense when viewed through this framework of regional strategic rivalries.
PART 2: A NEW MAP
US Drawdown
In the course of the last year, however, a number of developments have taken place which raise serious questions regarding whether it is still possible to maintain the existence of a broad alliance of pro-Western states in the region, arrayed in opposition to the other three alliances listed above.
Specifically, efforts at rapprochement between the UAE and Iran, the opening of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, similar moves between the UAE and Turkey, and between Egypt and Turkey, raise the question as to whether the broad framework for viewing the region outlined above now needs to be replaced with a new map. Similarly, UAE rapprochement with Assad’s Syria, and its pioneering of efforts to return the Assad regime to the Arab fold (the UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018) appear to go against the ongoing Israeli campaign against Iranian efforts at consolidation and entrenchment in Syria, in alliance with Assad. The Israeli interest, after all, is in the continued weakness and isolation of the Assad regime, which makes possible the prosecution of the Israeli bombing campaign on Syrian soil.
These moves, in turn, derive from a sense of flux in the region caused by the perception that the US is leaving, or at least greatly lessening its focus on the Middle East. This makes problematic the notion of a bloc of US-aligned states preserving regional order and perceived by both friends and foes as enjoying the clear backing of Washington DC.
This perception of US withdrawal or partial drawdown is not new. It has been apparent for a decade that Washington wishes to avoid further major commitments, is centrally committed to facing the peer-level strategic challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific, and no longer has a pressing need based on its own energy requirements to underwrite the security of the region.
A series of events have taken place in the region to reinforce this sense of US drawdown. Among them: The Obama Administration’s failure to enforce stated red lines with regard to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria in August 2013; the same Administration’s decision to quit Iraq in 2011 (before returning to face ISIS in 2014); the Trump Administration’s erratic announcement of a withdrawal from Syria, on two occasions, in 2018 and 2019, before failing to complete the withdrawal and, very importantly, the failure to defend Saudi Arabia after the large scale attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil-processing facilities on 14 September 2019. The Biden Administration’s rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 has also served to raise concerns among US allies about the reliability of Washington’s commitments, and hence the advisability of depending on them.
Gulf States Recalibrate
This has led to efforts by Gulf countries at shifting away from a rigid notion of regional cold war. Hence the Emirati outreach to Iran after the Fujayrah incident on 12 May 2019, in which an Emirati registered vessel, two Saudi registered oil tankers and a Norwegian registered oil tanker were attacked, almost certainly by Iran, off Emirati waters.
Emirati outreach to Iran is now accompanied also by Saudi-Iran talks, and by Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian efforts at normalising relations with the Assad regime in Syria, contrary to the US stance in favour of continued isolation for Damascus.
Since Syria is a strategic ally of Iran, these efforts form an additional element in attempts by the UAE, supported by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, to move beyond previously existing patterns.
Some pro-Emirati voices have suggested that these moves represent the birth of a new strategic period in the region, in which competition between rival blocs will be replaced by economic cooperation between regional countries.
It’s too soon to call time on the anti-Iran alliance
This situation led to some voices in Israel in 2021 warning that Jerusalem is in danger of being left behind by events – remaining isolated in a position of concern vis a vis Iranian regional ambitions, at a time when other ostensible members of the pro-US bloc in the region are, in the wake of US negotiations with Iran for a return to the JCPOA, normalising relations with Iran and its allies.
According to this view, as exemplified by senior Haaretz correspondent Zvi Barel in an October 14 article, entitled ‘Teheran-Riyadh détente could mark the end for Israel’s anti Iran coalition,’ ‘if the negotiations between the House of Saud and the Islamic Republic of Iran do result in an agreement and normalization, this will be the final chapter of the anti-Iranian coalition’. He adds: ‘Israel relied heavily on this coalition.’
But subsequent events do not appear to be developing along the lines of increased normalisation for Iran vis a vis its Arab neighbors and the US, and consequent Israeli isolation.
Rather, the nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran are at deadlock. Meanwhile, Saudi-Iranian negotiations are continuing but with little apparent progress. In a recent France24 interview with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud, the latter noted that so far talks have been ‘exploratory,’ rather than substantial. The foreign minister pointed to sharp differences on the issue of Iranian nuclear efforts, and domination by Hezbollah of Lebanon. These are matters of deep division, in which the basic ambitions of the sides seem diametrically opposed. Short of the abandonment by one or other of the sides of core positions on these matters, and on additional areas of dispute such as Yemen and Iraq, it is difficult to see how these differences will be bridged.
The regional competition between the sides, meanwhile, appears far from over. In the last week of October, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Lebanon. The precipitating issue was remarks made by Lebanese Information Minister George Kordahi criticising the Saudi role in Yemen. But clearly, beyond this is the Saudi view that Lebanon is now an asset owned by Iran. The removal of ambassadors follows the imposition of sanctions on Lebanon by Saudi Arabia in April.
Similarly, intense concerns at the advances made by the Iranian nuclear programme remain common to Israel and the Gulf monarchies. The current situation, in which Teheran is enriching uranium to the 60 per cent level, stockpiling enriched uranium at quantities far beyond that permitted by the JCPOA and producing uranium metal, along with its continued efforts at regional hegemony and its investments in its ballistic missile programme are of deep concern to Gulf countries. They remain also concerned regarding the issue of Sunni political Islam. These issues have not disappeared because of the current regional flux brought about by the US relative drawdown. Rapprochement with or surrender to Iran cannot address these problems. Connections to Israel, formal or informal, are an important element in doing so.
On the issue of Syria, meanwhile, UAE led diplomatic efforts toward ending the isolation of the Assad regime are continuing apace. But it is highly unlikely that this will result in a substantial distancing of the Syrian regime from Iran. Iran is entrenched within the Syrian state forces, and controls one of Syria’s international borders (Albukamal/Al-Qaim). Iran offers the regime a type of ground level, hard power support which the Gulf states cannot replicate. It is therefore likely that the Assad regime will seek to benefit from connections to both camps, while avoiding a decision to fully commit to either.
Thus, the notion of a collapse of a pro-Western alliance in the region in the wake of a US withdrawal is an exaggeration. But it derives to a degree from an earlier exaggeration in the opposite direction. The pro-Western alliance in the region was always a complex and somewhat fragile arrangement. Israel and the UAE, for example, while seeing a list of threats in common, have always prioritised different items on this list. For Israel, the Iranian threat is deemed paramount, the challenge of the Iranian nuclear programme front and center, and all other issues secondary. For the UAE, by contrast, the challenge of MB-style Sunni political Islam, and indeed the regional ambitions of Turkey itself and its alliance with Qatar, constituted threats of no less urgency to the Iranian challenge. The UAE also engages in a burgeoning trade relationship with Iran (it is Iran’s second largest trading partner, after China).
But these differences of emphasis do not detract from the long list of areas of commonality and shared concern between Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt, as the core members of this alliance: in essence, this remains an alliance of status quo states, broadly aligned with the West, and hostile to political Islam, in both its Shia (Iran led bloc) and Sunni (Turkey led bloc, Salafis) forms.
It should be noted that while there is undoubtedly a sense of flux in the strategic picture of the region at present, deriving from the US change of focus, in the medium to long term this is likely to provide an additional advantage for Israel. Israel is the only country within this group of states that is able to provide a credible military threat against Iran, and specifically against the Iranian nuclear programme. It is becoming increasingly apparent to regional powers that the US, despite occasional statements by senior officials, has no intention of laying down a serious military threat to the Iranians, in the event that the current push towards a nuclear weapons capacity continues. In the absence of this threat, there is a risk that Teheran may see no disincentive toward pushing on to a threshold nuclear weapons capacity, while continuing in its efforts to seed proxies and exploit them for both political and military purposes throughout the region.
Only Israel can provide such a ‘plan B’. This is not, of course, to underestimate the very serious apparent limitations to Israeli options in this regard. A single operation to destroy the Iranian nuclear programme, of the type mounted against Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 is probably not possible vis a vis the Iranian programme, because of its spread out and well defended nature. But Israel, in its current campaign against Iranian efforts in Syria, Lebanon and sometimes also Iraq, is demonstrating currently the only real hard power pushback to Iranian attempts at regional domination. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and other countries threatened by the prospect of Iranian hegemony, are likely to find an obvious utility in the maintenance of this pushback, particularly in a situation where an alternative hard power deterrent element is not available.
In this regard, it should be noted that while it is often stated that Iran has, through its use of proxies, succeeded in partially ‘surrounding’ Israel – through its control or partial control of proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – it is also the case that Israel appears to be following a diplomatic strategy which seeks similarly to surround Iran. This is attempted not, as in the Iranian case, by organising proxies, but rather by seeking alliance and closer relations with countries in close proximity to Iran. Such countries include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and, notably, Azerbaijan, to Iran’s north.
The strategic contest between Iran and its allies, and the loose, interests-based alliance of West-aligned countries is thus set to continue in the Middle East. The contest is based on concrete issues, and on the impossibility for West-aligned countries of accommodating Iranian ambitions, because of the extent and scope of those ambitions – both in the nuclear field, in Iran’s efforts to subvert and dominate Arab states, and in its ambitions to destroy Israel. It is important to understand the deep rationale behind this process, and not to be caught up by momentary developments into concluding either that the anti-Iran alliance is about to break up, or, conversely, that it has greater depth, solidity and potential than it in fact possesses.

Iran nuclear talks are restarting, but they’re pointless: Biden needs a bipartisan strategy
Anthony Ruggiero/New York Post/November 23, 2021
President Joe Biden’s Iran policy is failing, and the indirect negotiations restarting in Vienna Nov. 29 won’t yield a win.
Biden assumed that goodwill gestures and proactive concessions would bring Tehran to the table. Instead, Iran is patiently moving toward a nuclear weapon — or at least a turnkey nuclear option — narrowing the president’s decision space.
Out of ideas, Biden should quickly assemble a high-powered, bipartisan team of outside advisers — think Condoleezza Rice and Leon Panetta — to craft a new policy that can unify Washington while Tehran signals it’s preparing to sprint for a bomb.
Iran has produced uranium enriched up to 60 percent purity, a short distance to the 90 percent needed for nuclear weapons. It’s also producing uranium metal, an important step in nuclear-weapon development.
In February, Tehran announced it would no longer adhere to the Additional Protocol, which allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct short-notice nuclear-site inspections. It also halted IAEA access to surveillance and other electronic data collected at its declared nuclear sites. Meanwhile, it’s stonewalling IAEA investigations into its undeclared nuclear activities.
In short, Tehran’s actions are not remotely consistent with a peaceful nuclear program. For Biden, the inconvenient truth is Iran has taken its most troubling and aggressive steps after he took office.
An often-overlooked element of good policy-making is evaluation. Is the policy achieving its intended goal? It’s obvious Biden’s Iran policy is not.
That may be the only thing on which people on both sides of the issue agree. The administration’s friends say this is because former President Donald Trump poisoned the well with his hostile rhetoric, relentless sanctions and the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. Just keep negotiating, they say, and Tehran will come around.
Those excuses are just an exercise in passing the buck.
When Biden entered office, Iran was hurting from his predecessor’s “maximum-pressure campaign,” yet the White House refused to apply the leverage it inherited. Robert Malley, Biden’s chief negotiator, declared in April that we saw “the result of the maximum-pressure campaign. It has failed.”
What did Biden get in exchange for his good will? Nothing. His team isn’t even allowed in the same room with Iranian negotiators. Tehran received sanctions relief without any commitments.
Now the Islamic Republic wants “more for less”: an arrangement where America provides even greater sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear restrictions far less stringent than in the 2015 nuclear deal.
Diagnosing the problem with Biden’s Iran policy is easy; developing a solution is more difficult.
US Defense Secretary vows to keep nukes out of Iran’s hands
The IAEA board of governors meeting this week is an important opportunity. The Biden administration should pursue Tehran’s censure for covering up clandestine nuclear work throughout the deal’s existence. It’s resisted in the past, worried that Iran would become less cooperative at the negotiating table, but the talks are moribund, so it’s time Biden signaled that Washington is done waiting. When the board passed a June 2020 censure resolution, Iran (briefly) complied with the IAEA’s requests for information and access.
More important, the president should use the delay Tehran’s stonewalling has created to order a policy review co-led by a Democrat not in his administration and a Republican who wasn’t in the Trump administration. Several candidates come to mind: Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, former defense secretaries, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former CIA Director David Petraeus and former Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.).
The policy review should be quick, ideally 30 to 60 days, and start with a review of the Islamic Republic’s motivations. Is Tehran increasing its nuclear activities as leverage for sanctions removal and a return to the 2015 nuclear deal? Or does Iran look at North Korea, which tested its first nuclear weapon more than 15 years ago, as an example to follow?
The answers to those questions will determine whether a return to the 2015 nuclear deal or any agreement that provides Tehran much-needed sanctions relief is advisable. If Tehran is only interested in pursuing a financial lifeline for limited nuclear concessions, then the “longer and stronger” deal that Biden initially advocated is not possible. Removing all leverage for an expiring deal — or one that’s even worse — is not in America’s interests.
Some experts will say there’s no time for such a review. But Biden has already spent nine months waiting for Iran to become a cooperative negotiating partner — he can spare 30 to 60 days to get his approach right. If he doesn’t, Tehran will follow Pyongyang’s path to a nuclear weapon.
*Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and served as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the National Security Council.

يكال كميرون والبرتو فرناندس/موقع ممري: اختيار أميركا لقطر لتكون وكيلة لمصالحها في أفغانستان مع حركة طالبان، هو توظيف مشعل حرائف ليقوم بأطفائها
Hiring An Arsonist As Fireman: Qatar To Serve As America’s ‘Protecting Power’ In Taliban-Ruled Kabul
Yigal Carmon and Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI/November 23/2021
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/104388/yigal-carmon-and-alberto-m-fernandez-memri-hiring-an-arsonist-as-fireman-qatar-to-serve-as-americas-protecting-power-in-taliban-ruled-kabul-%d9%8a%d9%83%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%83%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1/
Qatar | MEMRI Daily Brief No. 338
The news was almost universally hailed as a plus, a diplomatic achievement. The U.S. Department of State trumpeted that Qatar had agreed to serve as the "protecting power" overseeing U.S. interests in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, through Doha's embassy in the Afghan capital.[1] The arrangement is actually an odd one. The tradition often is that a neutral, Western power would play that mediating role for the U.S. In Castro's Cuba years ago, and in today's Islamic Republic of Iran, Switzerland plays that role for the U.S., overseeing U.S. diplomatic interests. In Assad's Syria, that role is played by the Czech Republic.
Qatar is not a neutral player, but actually an enthusiastic and open supporter of the Taliban, very much in line with Qatar's open support for other Islamist movements worldwide. The analogy would be if the U.S. had chosen the old Soviet Union to look after its interests in Castro's Cuba. If the U.S. intends to pursue an adversarial relationship with the Taliban, the choice of Qatar makes little sense.
But if the U.S. is mostly pursuing a policy of regional withdrawal and retrenchment, a minimalist presence focused on getting the thousands of American citizens and other persons of interest abandoned and trapped in Afghanistan out, then the decision is more understandable.[2] On the ground, both hard-pressed allies and encouraged adversaries will, in any case, see this more as American surrender than retrenchment. It is hard to imagine such an arrangement should the U.S. decide to target Al-Qaeda elements embedded within the Taliban bureaucracy.
In September 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken praised Qatar, saying that "no country has done more than Qatar" in helping the U.S. evacuate people during and after the precipitous American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Qatar's "diplomatic win" came as the U.S. and the wealthy emirate held their fourth Strategic Dialogue meeting in Washington, D.C. last week.[3] At the same time as the U.S. and Qatar were holding their strategic dialogue, a senior U.S. diplomatic representative was meeting with the Taliban "foreign minister" in Islamabad, along with diplomats from Russia, China and Pakistan – all countries in favor of better relations with the new jihadi regime in Kabul.[4]
It is worth noting that the first of these yearly U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogues was held during the Trump administration in 2018, under Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and with the presence of Defense Secretary James Mattis.[5] Interestingly enough, that diplomatic meeting was described as, in part, driven by the need to confront Iran. The fourth, just concluded, dialogue focused on a range of issues: "regional stability, defense cooperation, public health, counterterrorism, combatting human trafficking, human rights, climate change, energy efficiency, energy independence, humanitarian aid, economic cooperation, and cultural and educational exchanges."[6]
The laundry list of issues comes as reports emerge of fissures on the U.S. side over weapons sales to Qatar, which has been a major purchaser of U.S. weapons systems in recent years. The Pentagon is reportedly in favor of a $500 million sale of advanced MQ-9 Reaper drones to Qatar, while State Department officials were reportedly more hesitant, expressing concerns about reactions from Qatar's rivals in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (the latter became the first Arab country authorized by Congress to purchase this class of American drone in November 2020).
Qatar has already purchased Bayraktar TB2 combat drones from its close ally Turkey in 2018 (delivered in 2019) with a larger batch of 24 bought earlier this year and due to be delivered in 2022.[7] Trying to close the military gap between itself and its two main Gulf Cooperation Council rivals, Qatar has been on a military spending spree lavishing billions of dollars in arms purchases on France, Germany, the U.K., the U.S., Italy, Turkey, and China.[8]
Despite the defense expenditures, Qatar's greatest strength is still economic and political, using money, media and diplomacy to advance a broad Islamist agenda from North Africa to Kabul. In this, the regime in Doha, which calls for democracy in Tunis while welcoming its overthrow in Kabul and suppression in Ankara, is ideologically consistent, promoting an Islamist agenda no matter the differing circumstances.[9] Doha consistently follows this ideological pole star with startling tenacity and aggressiveness. Qatar got the U.S., for example, to sign off on Doha's tangible support for the Taliban and for Hamas in Gaza for the sake of an illusory greater good, ensuring a safe American disengagement from Afghanistan and promoting Arab-Israeli peace. Both those premises seem dubious at best – while Qatar is, incredibly, lauded by the U.S. as a counterterrorism partner while at the same time enthusiastically promoting the ideologies which undergird that very same terrorism in the Middle East.[10]
This intensive focus by Qatar is in sharp contrast with the U.S. itself and its actions, increasingly seen in the region – by both allies and adversaries – as in decline, confused, and more and more disengaged.[11] This has intensified intra-regional competition (including arms races) and deal making; witness the spate of diplomatic efforts between Gulf adversaries of Iran and the regime in Tehran. American allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly feel little confidence in U.S. policies and promises, and will have to make their own arrangements with Iran (or with China). The recent, truly bizarre, open demonizing of Saudi Arabia over inflation and the price of oil by President Biden himself only served to deepen concerns about American intentions and abilities. Israel seems to be drawing the same conclusions about the U.S., at least as far as Iran is concerned.[12]
The debate within policy circles in the region is whether the U.S. is overwhelmed by multiple challenges and cutting its losses, or whether it is cynically jettisoning relationships and commitments as it focuses on climate change and economic issues that are increasingly dominating the discourse in Washington. The polarizing choice of Qatar, a key architect of the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan, as America's advocate in Afghanistan, coupled with mild American rhetoric on Iran and harsh discourse on Saudi Arabia, will only further the impression that America is on her way out. On her way out where exactly is not clear.
*Yigal Carmon is President of MEMRI; Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
[1] Diplopundit.net/2021/11/15/statedept-formally-announces-qatar-as-u-s-protecting-power-in-afghanistan, November 15, 2021.
[2] See MEMRI Daily Brief No. 314, How A Lilliputian Emirate Took Two American Presidents Hostage, September 15, 2021.
[3] News.yahoo.com, November 12, 2021.
[4] News.yahoo.com, November 12, 2021.
[5] Washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/first-us-qatar-strategic-dialogue, January 29, 2018.
[6] State.gov/u-s-qatar-strategic-dialogue, November 10, 2021.
[7] Reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-bayraktar-tb2-combat-drones-sales-2021-11-10, November 10, 2021.
[8] Aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/5/the-dramatic-expansion-of-qatars-military, January 5, 2021.
[9] MEMRI Daily Brief No. 330, Qatar's 'Democracy' Charade, October 25, 2021.
[10] MEMRI Daily Brief No. 296, Qatar: The 'Stealth' Pro-Islamist Subverter, July 15, 2021.
[11] See also MEMRI Daily Brief No. 304, The Taliban Victory – Made In USA, August 16, 2021; MEMRI Daily Brief No. 310, Handing Over Afghanistan To The Taliban Does Not Advance America's New Strategic Priorities - It Sabotages Them, September 2, 2021.
[12] I24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1637560360-us-warns-israel-attacks-on-iran-nuclear-facilities-counterproductive, November 22, 2021.
https://www.memri.org/reports/hiring-arsonist-fireman-qatar-serve-americas-protecting-power-taliban-ruled-kabul

Tunisia’s President Kais Saied now faces a reality check
Oussama Romdhani/The Arab Weekly/November 23/2021
Four months after invoking Article 80 of the constitution to establish a “state of exception” in which he wields most executive and legislative powers, Tunisian President Kais Saied is still searching for a compromise between his vision of politics and the hard facts of economic reality.
Critics at home and abroad have cringed at the extent of the president’s prerogatives. His exercise of power is mostly unchallenged. With his indefinite suspension of the parliament, Said rules by decree. He is unlikely to face any challenge from new Prime Minister Najla Bouden. Under the new executive orders he issued on September 22, the head of state is the one who appoints members of the cabinet, sets the “general policies and fundamental choices” of the government, while the prime minister just “leads and coordinates the actions of the government.”
Saied knows that the public follows closely all his moves and wants to know if he can deliver. In one month, his support has slipped by more than ten percent and the initial streak of unbridled optimism is giving way to caution, according to a recent opinion poll.
But Saied still continues to enjoy the confidence of no less than 66 percent of the public. If he does not yet seem to face much opposition at home, it is because the majority of Tunisians remain averse to any thought of returning to the pre-July 25 days when the Islamist-dominated parliament held sway and conflicting interpretations of authority between the prime minister and the president kept the executive branch in utter paralysis.
However, socio-economic challenges are not waiting for Saied to figure out which way to go. Recent figures show that unemployment has risen to more than 18 percent, with those for young people much higher, at an unprecedented 42 percent. It is too early to tell if and how Bouden, the 63-year geologist and first woman prime minister in Tunisia and the Arab world, will handle the conflicting pressures of financial constraints and social demands.
After being sworn in last month, she mentioned a set of broad and non-controversial objectives she wants to achieve but has not offered any detailed programme. Shoring up the faltering economy will undoubtedly loom large.
Saied and Bouden inherited from previous administrations such thorny issues as unemployment, a stagnant economy, a huge debt burden and a polluted environment. By ineptitude or lack of political will, previous governments let the problems fester.
In his first reality check, Saied told unemployed graduates he would oppose the implementation of a 2020 law that would have provided public service jobs to university graduates who have been out of work for more than ten years. His stance provoked street protests even though he had also promised to launch a system of locally-based domestic corporations to help the unemployed.
The crucial test, however, will be how to secure enough financial resources to fund the 2021-2022 budgets. On the eve of the formation of the Bouden cabinet, the Central Bank urged a high dose of financial diplomacy to convince regional and international donors to come to the country’s help. But finding that kind of support will not come easy, with or without strings attached.
Domestically, fixing the economy would also mean implementing painful reforms that none of the previous nine governments dared undertake. To balance the budget the government needs to curtail big spending, review its financial support to state-owned companies and trim the size of its bloated civil service. It will need to cut price subsidies to energy and food staples. All unpopular decisions. And it remains to be seen if the president’s favourable ratings will be enough to overcome resistance to the reforms.
Bearing such concerns in mind, Bouden has sought to reassure the powerful trade unions of the government’s willingness to keep all its pledges in terms of workers’ salaries and benefits. But it is not clear where the money for that will come from. Saied’s relationship with the unions has been uneven since he excluded them, as well as political parties, from substantial political consultations. Still, his recent phone conversation with the unions’ leader, Noureddine Taboubi, could mean he is adjusting course.
Despite the appointment of the cabinet, the rest of the political outlook remains hazy. Saied has refused to set any time limits for the emergency powers and his rule by decree even though he told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the weekend that the country is preparing to exit the “state of exception.”
Seizing the opportunity of his relatively resilient grace period, he announced his intent to submit his vision of political reform to an “online referendum” probably betting it will be approved by a landslide. The particulars of the referendum have not been made public but Saied is known to favour a presidential system and an emphasis on local politics. He is yet to unveil any clear plans for early elections but some of his supporters are already clamouring for a political party loyal to him.
The president sees the next stage as a “battle for national liberation” from corrupt practices, political meddling in the work of the judiciary and unfair economics.
His distrust of political parties and intent to set up a bottom-up “democratic regime where the people are the true holder of sovereignty” could mean a long period of political uncertainty, especially if he continues his pursuit of his political construct while keeping “traditional” political forces at arm’s length.
Saied has also to accommodate key partners in the West, especially the US and the European Union, which have put the future of Tunisian democracy under the spotlight. Tunisia will need their goodwill even if the majority of the public supports him in rejecting blatant foreign interference.
On both fronts, at home and abroad, much will depend on the willingness of Saied to strike compromises and involve others in search for solutions. Recent moves have shown a propensity on his part to adjust position under the pressure of reality.
Much will eventually depend on to what extent the hard facts of Tunisia’s challenges will guide him toward charting a more pragmatic course of change aimed at addressing the country’s many crises.
Copyright: Syndication Bureau
www.syndicationbureau.com

The length of time Sudan’s military will leave Hamdok in power is anyone’s guess
Rami Rayess/Al Arabiya/November 23/2021
It won’t take long before the military in Sudan takes control again. The decision to reinstate the prime minister Abdalla Hamdok who was ousted a few weeks ago is a short-term way of relieving international condemnation of the coup.
The military-civilian partnership that had been in place prior to the coup was a fragile government structure and the political decision-making process was fractured. The military power grab exacerbated the situation.
Each side has always eyed the other with distrust. Both parties indulged in a bitter marriage that did not last long, and the aim of cementing much needed policy changes to install a functioning democratic government floundered.
The idea that Sudan could move forward after decades of political turmoil, repression and a failing economy was in hindsight a pipe dream.
Whatever little confidence that existed for the potential of creating a successful partnership ruptured. It’s become hard to envisage any kind of solution to the crisis. Yes, the Prime Minister has been reinstalled, but for how long?
When any country’s military pursues a coup, the idea of joining hands with other partners in running the affairs of that state is anathema to it.
Putting the coup to one side the power-sharing formula has been self-defeating. Over two years the civilian forces have failed to build a political agenda that defines the future vision of the country.
Both the military and the civilian coalition working under the umbrella of the “Sovereign Council” agreed to postpone representative elections until 2023.
Three years in transition for a people thirsty for democracy is too long. The election date should have been arranged to happen sooner.
An early election that can happen immediately will redefine the degree of representation of the different political parties in the country.
The formation of a cabinet of independent technocrats as soon as possible is necessary to introduce change to the whole political process.
This is unlikely to happen. When the military wants to take over again it will.
In addition to the internal factors that have contributed to how the events unfolded in Sudan, in an international context the US, Europe, the Arab League, the African Union and the UN all condemned the coup.
Notably Russia refrained, and attributed the situation to a natural political course built on a system “imposed” on Sudan by the West, according to Moscow’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov.
Sudan’s strategic geographic importance will keep tensions running high between global powerhouses trying to position themselves as friends of the country. After the Revolution of 2019 that ousted al-Bashir’s three-decade long reign, Moscow signed two agreements with Khartoum. One of them included the construction of a Russian naval base in Sudan, a much-needed headquarters for Moscow’s Africa sphere of influence.
With the military takeover, Russia hoped the base would come online quicker with no delays.
In contrast to the growing political and economic race between Washington and Beijing on African soil, this was Moscow’s trump card. A newly built naval base in the heart of the continent and in one of its largest countries will extend Russia’s global prominence.
Russia’s aspirations for Sudan started to take shape immediately after the 2019 revolution. Russian private military companies (PMCs) could have had an enormous chance of widening the scope of their work in the country - had Khartoum’s military kept their grip and refrained from reinstating Hamdok.
The US takes the opposite view. The Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman said that: “Any changes to the transitional government by force puts at risk US assistance.”
He also said that neither side (military and civilian) can sideline the other, with both playing important roles in the country’s transition.
Washington has put on hold $700 million of funding dedicated for Sudan but has maintained humanitarian support for the sake of the Sudanese people.
Reinstating the Prime Minister has deescalated the tensions between all the different players, but this is temporary.
In the grand scheme of things, the international struggle for Sudan is in its infancy. The outcome will become a reflection of how the world powers will clash or collaborate. This is the trauma faced by another third world country acting as a pawn for the world’s most powerful nations.