Middle East Briefing: Easiest Way to Untie the Assad Knot: Say Loudly You Just did

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Easiest Way to Untie the Assad Knot: Say Loudly You Just did
Middle East Briefing/May 22/16

 Washington and Moscow are moving quietly to implement their “shared” view on Syria. Taking a look at the contacts between the UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura and Secretary John Kerry on the one hand, and Syria’s opposition and its regional allies on the other hand, gives us a quick look at the content of this “shared” solution, and hence enables all to have a critical reading of its chances in solving the Syrian crisis.

In his April 27 “Mediator’s Summary”, de Mistura laid out the framework of his current agenda. The key phrase in this framework is “governance and transition”. The problems which are facing “governance and transition” are known to all: President Bashar Al Assad wants to remain in power; his mafia of business owners who grew nurtured by his political power do not want him to leave power; Iran, which does not trust any future alternative, does not want him to leave power; and Hezbollah, which considers him an insurance policy for its own future, does not want him to leave power.

On the other side, those who look at the implications of Assad remaining in power understand that such a proposition prevents any reasonable solution. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a stable Syria under a president who caused the death of almost half a million of its people.

While Assad may appear to many to be just one person, and while many wonder how one person can prevent a solution for a crisis that caused all the horrors we have seen, the structure of the state in Syria gives the President the role of the “brains” in any living body. He is the center of the nervous system (loyalty and patronage networks) and his political power keeps the components of the regime together.

However, the assumption that the state equals Assad is wrong. Like any other country, the Syrian state is constituted of a functional bureaucratic structure, or civil servants, and the political leadership. Therefore, those who talk about Assad as the embodiment of the Syrian state in general are wrong.

Yet, the question of whether the state can survive under a different leadership in the case of Syria is valid. The political leadership, in this case, is one essential component of the functions of the state. Furthermore, the two Assads, father and son, built the deep state in Syria on their image. The leadership of the security forces in the case of Syria is the equivalent of a militia serving a specific political class rather than a nation. This explains the confusion, very common nowadays, between the state and the President.

Therefore, when de Mistura speaks of “governance and transition”, his agenda is naturally focused on solving the problem of Assad. And the solution, according to his “Mediator’s Summary” of last April, is as follows: “the establishment of a credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance, the setting of a schedule and process for drafting a constitution, and the holding of free and fair elections”. This was based on the wording of UNSC Resolution 2254.

We will notice immediately that in this phrasing, the question of what to do with Assad is left out. This was the only way to reach a Security Council resolution or to frame the UN envoy’s mission. The concept of basing a solution on both an international consensus as well as the shifting and changing balance of power on the ground in Syria dictated the creative ambiguity which left the fate of Assad out of any foundational effort to open talks.

It was natural then that the fate of Assad becomes the area in which all parties push and pull to reach whatever suits their interests. The reason why this area was left undecided was, in fact, due to the Russian military and diplomatic role. Since the Geneva communiqué of 2012, the changes in phrasing in the plans coming from the Syria Support Group or any other multi-national communiqués were nuanced in a way that reflects the increasing role of Russia and the persistence of disagreements on the fate of Assad.

Now — that is, after the Kremlin enabled Assad to regain some momentum on the ground and after the steady retreat of the US due to the “Do Nothing” doctrine of President Obama, we are detecting signs of how the fate of Assad is shaping up in the ambiguous space left open by this question.

The White House and the State Department have just finished revising a proposed draft of a new Syrian constitution. We detect from messages sent by de Mistura and by the US to opposition forces and their regional backers that the diplomatic effort is heading towards a superficial solution for the “Assad Knot”.

According to de Mistura’s “Mediator’s Summary” we find out that as of the end of last April, the special envoy named correctly the differences in positions between Assad and his opponents in regard to the transitional government. The Summary said: “the present round of talks confirmed that substantial differences exist between the two negotiating parties on their visions of the transition as well as on the interpretation of resolution 2254 (2015)”. It is believed that the differences between 2254 and the Geneva communiqué, an issue we covered previously in MEB, stem from the Russian military intervention and Moscow’s efforts to create a different dynamic on the ground in Syria.

No wonder there were differences, not only on how the transitional government would be formed but also on its domain of authority. The ambiguous area of the role of Assad has always been there and differences grow well when feeding on ambiguity. The current formula promoted by de Mistura gives the transitional government the role of a national unity government, preserves Assad on top for a limited period of time, and allows him to remain politically active in Syria, under legal and political immunity, for years to come.

The difference between a national unity government and a transitional government is not in the names, it is in how each is formed and how they operate. Assad believes that a national unity government is made through an addition of some opposition figures to members of his own government, and that is it. The opposition takes the term transitional government to its literal meaning: that it is a government responsible of building another political system radically different from the Assad police state. For the opposition, the transitional period is a bridge between two different systems. For Assad it is a cosmetic and limited change on the political surface of the same old regime. While the opposition aims at dismantling the Assad mafia inside and outside of the state, the regime aims at preserving this mafia and hopefully “digesting” the opposition within its financial and political empire.

Furthermore, the fact that Assad would remain politically active would certainly allow him to keep his “Godfather” status among his followers, who will remain everywhere within the machine of the state and around it.

Let us forget about what President Obama said repeatedly about Assad, that “he has to go”. After all, it is President Obama. We know that his pockets are filled with “very decisive” words which remain words forever. But the whole dynamic is heading to an alarming conclusion.

Assad will remain, but he will not remain. His knot would be untied, yet it will be preserved. The transitional period is not transitional except in name. The same political elite will disappear, but it will remain in power. All these riddles are offered as a “solution” to the Syrian crisis, as if it were indeed not a crisis. If anyone does not understand this magic and masterfully ambiguous solution, he should seek answers from de Mistura. This “salad” is the core of his proposition. And this is how the Assad knot is being currently untied in closed rooms thousands of miles from refugee camps and bombed cities.

The Syrian crisis is a real crisis. It demands real solutions. Preserving the same governing structure responsible for this tragedy and adding to it some “opposition” decoration is no solution. Giving any authority to Assad is no solution. A transitional government is transitional between two different things. It is a national unity government, but in the real sense of the term. The Assad regime is not an expression of any real national unity, or else we would not have seen all this blood and pain. Giving this regime a face lift by adding some opposition elements to its surface would not change its essence. It is not a solution. It is a reproduction of the same conditions that produced the crisis.

Is it possible to imagine that after all those years and all this blood, a transitional government could constitute a U-shaped bridge moving Assad back to Assad?

Whatever happens, the fight of the opposition will continue until the band of murderers in the Assad mafia, starting with the Godfather, are justly punished. War criminals should not be allowed to rule over their victims. The victims have woken up and no one will force them into submission again.

Neither de Mistura nor President Obama will be able to force what is being prepared now for Syria and the Syrian people. They gave everything to be free. And they will carry on. So, those who intone that the Assad Knot is untied are singing in an echo chamber and only for themselves. The Syrian people have a different song.